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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
“I am not happy with the fact that EU tax policy is increasingly being made as a result of 
Court decisions rather than as a result of coordinated policy actions of Member States. I am 
convinced that the recent developments in this area could lead to a situation where it will become 
almost impossible for Member States to protect their tax bases at national level”  
(Commissioner Kovács’ speech on “The Future of Taxation”, London, 20071) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
The present work has, as its principal aim, the analysis of the possible 
implications, within the set of rules, provisions and principles that is commonly known 
as “European tax law”, of the principle of fiscal territoriality, especially in the design of a 
hypothetical theory of allocation of (direct) taxation powers amongst EU Member States 
with a scope extended to the entire Internal Market. It goes without saying that the field 
which is most affected by such a topic is the taxation of items of income which are 
characterised by a “foreign” element, that is to say income of a transnational nature or 
income accrued by non-resident subjects. The research will mainly focus on that second 
aspect. 																																																								
1 Commissioner Kovács, “The Future of Taxation”, speech given on 8 December 2007 in London, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/common/about/speeches/51201tdi.pdf. 
2 Bethlehem, D., The end of geography: the changing nature of the international system and the challenge to international 
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In other words, what the present work ultimately aims at achieving is considering 
a possible interpretation of “territoriality” which can fit “the Internal Market territory” 
through the lens of European Union law. The result could be useful in order to transpose 
the concept of “territoriality” from its more “traditional” interpretation given from the 
perspective of international law and/or domestic law to a more authentically European 
interpretation and application. In fact, as it will be shown in the course of the research 
(especially in its second chapter), there is still a great deal of uncertainty on the proper 
definition of “territoriality” in the context of European Union law and on its relevance in 
the dialectical relationship between domestic tax rules and EU primary and secondary 
law, especially through the words of the Court of Justice of the European Union. 
Therefore, one of the questions to which the present work will try to provide an 
answer is whether or not (and, if so, how) it is possible to transpose the concept of 
territoriality as developed by domestic and international law in the field of European 
Union (tax) law, in an attempt to reach a description of a “transnational territoriality” 
(the expression seems like an oxymoron) which would be suitable to cover the entire 
territory of the Internal Market. 
There is a clearly evident conflict, and some say incompatibility, between the 
sovereignty and the fiscal jurisdiction of the Member States as traditionally developed at 
international level and according to general international law (and as described in the 
first chapter of the research) and the European Union perspective, aiming at the 
establishment of an authentic Internal Market. The (still considerably strong) territorial 
element of each Member State’s taxing power can, in other words, constitute a significant 
obstacle to the fullest possible integration of the European Union and its Market. 
Bethlehem has provocatively defined present times as the era of the “end of 
geography”2, i.e. as times that supposedly force states to move beyond their traditional 
notions of international law, sovereignty, jurisdiction and territory. In a context 
characterised by the globalisation of the economic system, trade and financial flows, 
some states have, therefore, been criticised for their supposed extraterritorial exercise of 
jurisdiction, especially in the field of tax law. In other words, the allocation of taxing 
powers amongst states, and, in particular, between the state of residence of the taxpayer 
and the state of source of the income on which tax is levied, is challenged, if not entirely 
eroded, by globalisation and, especially, by the effects played by phenomena such as 
electronic commerce. 																																																								
2 Bethlehem, D., The end of geography: the changing nature of the international system and the challenge to international 
law, in Journal of International Law, 2014, 1, 9. 
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 It is somehow predictable to state that globalisation, in its widest meaning, has led 
legal and economic scholars to re-discuss all existing theories on the basic principles of 
the tax systems of all industrialised countries. This is particularly true with regards to 
worldwide income tax systems. In other words, with the economic and technological 
advances that followed World War II, the need for states to rationally regulate cross-
border activities and transactions, which, in the meantime, grew in number and in value, 
was place at the centre of the debate. However, all current regimes are still based on 
traditional principles of tax systems, such as worldwide taxation, thus leading, inter alia, 
to international double taxation which naturally hinders cross-border trades and 
compels states to enter into bilateral convention in order to prevent such negative effects. 
 The traditional view of the state as a political and social organisation condensed 
within the borders of a territory is certainly out-dated, at least from an economic and 
practical point of view. The conventional concept of “borders” clashes with the new 
needs and mechanisms of the market, as an a-territorial place where supply and demand 
meet on a global level. With inevitable consequences for the sovereignty of the states, 
which need to redesign their powers and the ways in which they enforce them. In this 
context, it has even been stated that the logic of negotiation, which is typical of the 
economic world, would seem to have replaced all merely juridical logics3. 
 This is one of the reasons why a juridical analysis of the principle of territoriality 
(in both its theoretical elaboration and practical implementation), traditionally used by 
countries to define the extension of the scope of their taxing powers and to allocate tax 
revenue amongst them (in the international context as far as cross-border items of 
income are concerned) can be useful to identify possible solutions to the problems posed 
to the integration of the EU Internal Market by unilateral decisions adopted by Member 
States possibly through “extraterritorial” exercises of their taxing powers. 
 The first chapter of the research will, therefore, focus on the “traditional” view of 
the concept of territoriality in both international law and domestic tax law, aiming at 
identifying the main traits of the evolution of the concept in these fields, especially as an 
expression of the countries’ (fiscal) sovereignty and of the ways in which countries 
traditionally choose to allocate their taxing powers amongst them. Specific attention will 
be paid to the dialectical relationship between the two “traditional” fiscal models used 																																																								
3 The origin of the process of erosion of state sovereignty may be identified with the creation of the League of 
Nations, whose member states renounced their “right to war” and adhered to the principles of international 
conventions on human rights. More recently, a further limitation to state sovereignty has been the result of the 
establishment of the European Union, with the transfer of some functions and competences (e.g. market rules, 
competition, state aids, etc.) from the Member States to the EU institutions. Ferrarese, M.R., Mercati e 
globalizzazione. Gli incerti cammini del diritto, in Problemi della produzione e dell’attuale normativa, University of 
Bologna, Murst Research, 1997, 8. 
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by countries and their implications, i.e. worldwide taxation and “purely territorial” 
taxation (source taxation). In that context, the main question will be whether or not is 
possible to consider territoriality as an actual binding principle for states (and on which 
grounds). 
 The following steps will be constituted by the analysis, in the second and third 
chapters of the research, of the most significant case law of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union on the point and of the statutory provisions of European Union law in 
the field of (corporate) direct taxation, in order to understand the relevance and meaning 
of a hypothetical “territoriality principle” for the purposes of European Union law, 
verifying whether and how the domestic and international elaboration of the concept can 
be transposed in the European Union context. 
 This will serve as a way to define a possible overall theory for the allocation of 
taxing powers across the entire Internal Market, with a territorial dimension actually and 
authentically reflecting the main true purpose of the European Union: the attainment of 
a fully integrated Internal Market from the point of view of taxation as well. 
 The financial and economic crisis of 2008 has, in fact, imposed some further and 
new consideration (and maybe re-thinking) on the age-old question of what is and what 
should be the role of the Union with regards to direct taxation, especially in light of the 
monetary and budgetary issues Member States have faced in the last eight years. 
Specifically, the question has arisen whether a deepening of the monetary Union with 
the Euro-zone should require a limitation of the national sovereignty in fiscal matters 
and, if it is the case, how this limitation should be implemented. Some scholars have 
even reached the conclusion that the defence of the common currency can only be 
effective with the implementation of a supranational authority to which the necessary 
fiscal and budgetary decisions should be handed over. Prof. Vanistendael, for instance, 
has supported the necessary transfer by national governments of a substantial part of 
their national sovereignty to a central authority being competent to make vital national 
fiscal and budgetary decisions, thus enacting a kind of “temporary federalism in times of 
crisis”4. 
 Nonetheless, and notwithstanding some recent interventions on the part of the EU 																																																								
4 Vanistendael F., The crisis: a window of necessity for EU taxation, in European Taxation, 2010, 9. Specifically, Prof. 
Vanistendael suggests the creation of a new arrangement either by using the existing procedure of enhanced 
cooperation enshrined in Article 20 TEU or by setting up a new treaty between the Member State of the Euro-
zone providing for a transfer of fiscal decisions in times of crisis to a supranational institution. Contra, see, for 
instance, Peeters, B., Tax sovereignty of EU Member States in view of the global financial and economic crisis, in EC Tax 
Review, 2010, 6, 236, which highlights the problem that such a solution could pose to the political and democratic 
accountability of such a hypothetical authority, advocating the less radical alternative of Euro-zone Member State 
preventatively endorsing a crisis package of fiscal measures through the existing procedure of enhanced 
cooperation. 
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lawmaker (particularly, the so-called “Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive”, also covering 
topics such as exit taxation and Controlled Foreign Company regimes), the field of direct 
taxation is still largely left to the decisions of the Member States’ governments, as the 
compared analysis of the main traits of the tax system of three “exemplary” EU countries 
that will be conducted in the fourth chapter of the research will show, with problems 
such as cross-border loss relief (especially for corporations) still not having found an 
authentic and clear EU-wide solution. 
 The substantial lack of coordinated action on the part of all Member States and of a 
high-level decision on the part of the EU legislature with regard to direct taxation still 
has a considerable impact on the effectiveness of the integration of the Internal Market 
and the achievement of the European Union’s purposes. The analysis of “territoriality” 
in the context of EU tax law will, thus, serve as a lens through which to examine the 
possible ways forward for EU integration in direct taxation. 
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CHAPTER I 
ALLOCATION AND LIMITS OF STATES’ TAXING POWERS  
IN INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW: THE ROLE OF TERRITORIALITY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. From (fiscal) sovereignty to (fiscal) territoriality. 
It is commonly accepted that talking about fiscal territoriality means, first of all, 
talking about sovereignty: if the source of the taxing power of the state is the law, its 
ultimate foundation and bedrock is the taxing state’s sovereignty. With certain limits, 
some of which are self-imposed, e.g. by way of constitutional norms, and some other 
derive - or are supposed to derive - from the concept itself of “sovereign legal order” and 
by the coexistence of analogous sovereign orders in the international arena. 
This has been the traditional approach to the topic. In the following pages we will 
proceed to an analysis of this assumption, in order to verify whether or not it should still 
be considered as well founded. The answer to the question will be the premise for the 
definition of “territoriality” and of its current role in the allocation of taxing powers 
amongst states and, in particular, in the tax treatment reserved by states to non-residents 
and, more in general, to elements that are somehow alien to their legal order. The 
definition of this question would, then, constitute the essential ground to verify the 
possibility to reach and implement a homogeneous theory of localisation of income at 
international level - or, at least, within the borders of the European Union Internal 
Market - which constitutes one of the essential purposes of the research. 
State jurisdiction to tax is justified, both in domestic and international law, as an 
attribute of statehood or sovereignty5. Naturally, jurisdiction should be conceptually 																																																								
5 McLure jr., C., Globalisation, tax rules and national sovereignty, in Bulletin of International Taxation, 2001, 328; 
Ingrosso, M., Tributo e sovranità, in Perrone, L., Berliri, C. (eds.), Diritto tributario e Corte costituzionale, Naples, 
	 13 
distinguished from sovereignty: if jurisdiction concerns the question of whether and 
under what circumstances a state has the right to regulate or rule over events and facts 
which are relevant for the community, sovereignty is the power by virtue of which 
jurisdiction is exercised. In other terms jurisdiction is both an aspect and the source of 
sovereignty6. 
According to contemporary scholarly opinion, a state’s sovereign power - which 
manifests itself essentially through the issuance of juridical norms - is, first of all, 
preeminent over any other power within the national community. In short, it consists of 
the power to regulate all relationships within a state’s community and to rule the 
community itself, identifying the interests and purposes to pursue and choosing how to 
attain them, even resorting to coercive measures. In other words, state sovereignty is a 
state’s juridical power to govern itself in a manner that does not in any way depend on 
other international law subjects, such as other states7. 
 In light of all the above, it is evident that fiscal jurisdiction cannot exist without 
fiscal sovereignty 8 . It follows that, according to mainstream scholarly opinion, if 
jurisdiction is an attribute of sovereignty, the limits to fiscal jurisdictions cannot but be 
similar to, if not coinciding with, those posed to national sovereignty9. On the other 
hand, it must, however, be reported that several influential authors have traced a clearer 
difference between sovereignty and jurisdiction, stating that the unlimited character of 
sovereignty should not automatically be attributed to jurisdictional powers as well10. 																																																																																																																																																																													
2006, 138; Queralt, J.M., La potestà tributaria, in Amatucci, A. (ed.), Trattato di diritto tributario, Padua, 1994, vol. I, 
144; Udina, M., Il diritto internazionale tributario, in Fedozzi, P., Romano, S. (eds.), Trattato di diritto internazionale, 
Padua, 1949, vol. X, 41; Giannini, A.D., I concetti fondamentali del diritto tributario, Turin, 1956, 53; Del Federico, L., 
Tassa, in Dig. Disc. Priv. - Sez. Comm., Turin, 1998, XV, 325. Other authors, nonetheless, have voiced the opinion 
that the traditional concept of “sovereignty” and, in particular, of “tax sovereignty” would be outdated and 
should be substituted by other concepts such as the supremacy of the law as the instrument by way of which the 
will of the peoples is exercised; on the point, see Liccardo, G., Supremazia e obbedienza finanziaria, in VV.AA., Studi 
in onore di Victor Uckmar, Padua, 1997, vol. II, 749. 
6 Brownlie, I., Principles of Public International Law, Boston, 1990, 299. North-American scholars traditionally 
distinguish three “categories of jurisdiction” or, better said, three ways state power manifests itself: jurisdiction to 
prescribe (i.e. legislative power), jurisdiction to adjudicate (i.e. jurisdictional power) and jurisdiction to enforce 
(i.e. the power to coercively implement state law).  
7 Chiarelli, G., Territorio dello Stato (diritto costituzionale), in Nov.mo dig. it., Turin, 1973, vol. XIX, 196; Gioia, A., 
Territorio in diritto internazionale, in Dig. disc. pubbl., Turin, 1999, vol. XV, 262; Mortati, C., Istituzioni di diritto 
pubblico, Padua, 1975, vol. I, 100. 
8 Even though the concept of “sovereignty” has always been very difficult to define, especially in a context, such 
as the field of international law, characterised by the use of many different languages. In light of this difficultu, 
and the consequent risks of confusion, some authors - amongst which Kelsen - have suggested the elimination ot 
the concept of “sovereignty” from the field of international law. However, for a description of the problems 
connected to such concept and its evolution with regards to general international law, see Heller, H., La sovranità - 
Contributo alla storia del diritto dello Stato e del diritto internazionale, in Heller, H., La sovranità ed altri scritti sulla 
dottrina del diritto e dello Stato, Italian translation by Pasquino, P., Milan, 1987, 67; on the same point, with a deeper 
analysis of the scholarly debate about the definition and the limits of the concept of “sovereignty”, see also, 
amongst others, Cortese, E., Sovranità (storia), in Enc. Dir., Turin, 1989, vol. XLIII, 205. 
9 Uckmar, V., La tassazione degli stranieri in Italia, in Uckmar, V. (ed.), Il diritto tributario, Padua, 1955, vol. XVIII, 22; 
Albrecht, A.R., The taxation of aliens under international law, in British Yearbook of International Law, 1952, 145. 
10 On this interesting, though not universally shared, theory, see, amongst others, as far as Italian authors are 
concerned, Croxatto, G., L’imposizione delle imprese con attività internazionale, Padua, 1965, 20, and, for Anglo-Saxon 
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 In the field of international (tax) law, the concept of “sovereignty”, when talking 
about states, must inevitably be further defined and described by limiting it to a specific 
territory. Therefore, the territory simultaneously is the direct/indirect object of the 
relevant power of the states and the measure of the extension of the state’s territorial 
sovereignty, i.e. the space where such sovereignty is exercised in a stable manner11. To 
quote Chrétien, “l’état a un territoire propre et une souveraineté propre. Il jouit de la 
souveraineté territorial. Jusqu’à l’extrême limite de ses frontières qu’il ferme par des barrières 
douanières, il est maître absolu en matière fiscale […] C’est dans sa souveraineté territorial que 
l’état trouve l’unique source de son pouvoir d’imposition qui est ainsi illimité […] En matière 
d’impôts, l’état jouit d’un pouvoir absolu au-dedans de son territoire tandis qu’il ne jouit d’aucun 
pouvoir en dehors de son territoire - sous réserve, bien entendu, des accords internationaux qu’il a 
contractés”12. 
With the concept of “territorial sovereignty” (“souveraineté territorial”) scholars 
have defined the right for all states to exercise their governing powers in a general and 
exclusive way within the borders of their country. The inevitable other side of the medal 
is the obligation for all other states to restrain from acting within the territory of another 
country without being “authorised”. This is, in short, the essential meaning of the 
concept that scholars have traditionally defined as “territoriality”. 
Therefore, from a national perspective, and coming to the subject of taxation, the 
state’s taxing powers constitute part of - and the expression of - that state’s sovereignty. 
As far as taxation is concerned, state sovereignty manifests itself both through the 
legislative activity of the state concerned, in the context of which that state can determine 
the elements and/or the subjects on which/whom to levy taxes (and the intensity of said 
levy, with reference, for instance, to the extension of the tax base and the determination 
of the applicable tax rate), and through the authoritative “administrative” activity 
necessary to the enforcement of the tax provisions. 
Also with regards to taxation, the relevance of the connection with the state’s 
territory comes as a consequence of the connection linking fiscal sovereignty itself to the 
territory of the state exercising it, in the terms described above. In fact, if we move from a 
national perspective to an international one, territorial sovereignty is based on the 																																																																																																																																																																													
scholars, though they embraced the theory only at a latter stage after European authors, Martha, R.S.J., The 
jurisdiction to tax in international law - Theory and practice of legislative fiscal jurisdiction, Deventer, 1989, passim. The 
view is not shared, for example, by German authors, who still tend to commit to theories according to which 
sovereignty and jurisdictional powers are supposed to entirely coincide. 
11 Espadafor, C.M.L., Premesse internazionali dell’evoluzione della sovranità tributaria, cited above, 12. 
12 Chrétien, M,, Contribution à l’étude du droit international fiscal actuel: le rôle des organisations internationales dans le 
règlement des questions d’impôts entre les divers états”, in Recueil de Cours de l’Académie de droit international, 
1954, 2, 15. 
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mutual recognition, by all states, of the independence of the other analogous subjects as 
their “counterpart”, which is one of the reasons why the international legal order has 
been defined as being grounded on the equality of all states13. In other words, while on a 
domestic and purely national level the state is superiorem non recognoscens, which 
essentially means that the state does not have to deal with the problem of other similar 
subjects that may or may not influence its domestic actions and policies14, this exact 
problem is the real essence of international law: how the single states, each of which 
constitutes a separate and autonomous sovereign subject with “limitless powers”, may 
interact with one another. 
Once again the focus shifts to the territory of the states and, more specifically, to 
the limit and threshold of the state’s powers represented by that same state’s territory: 
the exercise of the (taxing) powers of the state is legitimate insofar as it is justified by a 
connection between that exercise and the state’s territory, as the threshold and limit to 
the state’s sovereign powers. 
Legal doctrine has generally distinguished between “personal sovereignty” and 
“territorial sovereignty”, the first being defined as the supremacy the state has over 
(natural or legal) persons, comprising the right to extend its laws to regulate conducts 
and attach legal consequences to such conducts wherever the persons may be. On the 
other hand, territorial sovereignty is the power of a state to exercise its authority over all 
persons, events, things and events within its territory15-16. This distinction should be borne 
in mind, as it will be essential for the prosecution of the present work, since it has 
influenced many of the scholarly debates concerning the topic of the research. 
However, the conceptual difference traced between “territorial” and “personal” 
sovereignty does not seem to be entirely convincing, as it seems to imply that the 
“territorial” conception of sovereignty is the only one of the two being based on the 
existence of a link between the state and the object or element on which sovereign 
powers are exercised. Nonetheless, if we look closer, it is evident that sovereignty from a 
“personal” perspective is not deprive of that connection, being it simply based on a 																																																								
13 Baggio, R., Il principio di territorialità ed i limiti alla potestà tributaria, cited above, 7; Chiarelli, G., Territorio dello 
Stato (diritto costituzionale), cited above. 
14 On this subject, Baggio talks about a “juridical solipsism” of the state and of the concept of sovereignty if seen 
from a purely domestic and national perspective; see Baggio, R., Il principio di territorialità ed i limiti alla potestà 
tributaria, cited above, 7. 
15 Martha, R. S. J., Extraterritorial taxation in international law, in Meessen K. M. (ed.), Extraterritorial jurisdiction in 
theory and practice, Dresden, 1996, 19; Conforti, B., International law and the role of domestic legal systems, Rome, 1993, 
133; Espadafor, C.M.L., Premesse internazionali dell’evoluzione della sovranità tributaria, in Riv. dir. trib. int., 2013, 3, 
11. 
16 For a definition and analysis of the concept of “territory of a state”, see Biscaretti di Ruffia, P., Territorio dello 
Stato, in Enciclopedia del Diritto, Milan, 1992, vol. XLIV, 333; Chiarelli, G., Territorio dello Stato (diritto costituzionale), 
cited above; Baggio, R., Il principio di territorialità ed i limiti alla potestà tributaria, Milan, 2009, 34. For an analysis of 
the crisis of “territoriality” in general terms, see Irti, N., Norma e luoghi, Rome, 2001. 
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different type of link between the element in question and the territory of a state: in 
order for a state to be considered as having the right to extend its laws to regulate 
conducts wherever a certain person may be, that person must be somehow connected to 
(the territory of) that state. 
It is, therefore, more appropriate to refer not to a distinction between “territorial” 
and “personal sovereignty”, but to a distinction between territorial connections of an 
objective nature and territorial connections of a subjective nature. This distinction is the 
one on which the entire dialectical relationship between source and residence in the field 
of (international) tax law is based. The concept will be made clearer in the following 
pages of the research when we will trace the distinction between “territoriality as a 
principle” and “territoriality as a criterion”. 
 It is also true that the affirmation of new players on the international (tax) arena 
has deeply modified the traditional perspective through which scholars used to look at 
the question of sovereignty. Some have even stated that the coming to light of supra-
national legal orders, such as the European Union, has caused the idea itself of 
sovereignty to lose most of its relevance. These new entities - and especially, for the 
purposes of the present research, the European Union legal order17 - have not only 
imposed limitations on the states’ sovereignty, but they also “forced” them into a process 
which, on one hand, leads them to giving up some of their sovereign power to the entity 
itself, which holds an exclusive power to regulate certain matters that were previously 
ruled only by state law, and, on the other hand, compels the states to enact all necessary 
measures towards a sort of “mutual coordination” of their sovereign powers in certain 
fields of law. 
As a consequence of all the above-mentioned factors, the analysis of the 
relationship between international law and domestic law has, therefore, shifted more 
and more towards an investigation focusing mainly on the relationship between juridical 
norms rather than between sources of law, in the context of a unitary legal order18. The 
Italian Constitutional Court has, for example, recognised and accepted, through an 																																																								
17 A different reasoning should apply, for example, to the effects played on state sovereignty by the membership 
of the United Nations, whose system (provided that it is quite difficult to define the United Nations as a proper 
“legal order”) has more limited effects on the states’ freedom to act than the European Union. 
18 We will not dwell on the age-old debate between “dualism” and “monism” in the field of international law, 
especially since the debate has now lost most of its relevance and, in any case, because the topic goes outside the 
scope of the present research. On the point of the right perspective for the study of the concept of “sovereignty” 
in the new international legal order, with specific attention to international law law, see, amongst others, Bizioli, 
G., Il processo di integrazione dei principi tributari nel rapporto fra ordinamento costituzionale, comunitario e diritto 
internazionale, Padua, 2008. On the debate between “dualism” and “monism”, see Sacchetto, C., Il diritto 
internazionale tributario tra norme del sistema costituzionale italiano, effettività ed utopia, in Perrone, L., Berliri, C. (eds.), 
Diritto tributario e Corte costituzionale, Naples, 2006, 300; Amatucci, A., Il conflitto tra norme internazionali ed interne 
tributarie, in Riv. Dir. Trib. Int., 1999, 96. 
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interpretation of Articles 11 and 117 of the Italian Constitution, the relevance of 
European Union law within the domestic legal order, irrespective of whether such law 
has effectively been implemented by the Italian legislature or not19. 
This new general perspective on the relationship between European and 
international law on one hand and national law on the other hand has led to remarkable 
consequences on the external limitations posed to state sovereignty and to the state’s 
power to legislate. 
 In light of all the above, and coming to the subject of taxation, the debate on the 
extension of the state’s fiscal sovereignty on an international level has focused on the 
question concerning the existence of limits posed by international law to the states’ 
taxing powers, i.e. the states’ powers in establishing and enforcing tax laws20. Which 
essentially amounts to a question related to the conceivable existence of limitations to the 
possibility for states to choose which facts, things or persons to subject to taxation, or, in 
other terms, to the possible need for a connection between such elements and the 
territory of the taxing state. 
It goes without saying that the question at issue has become significantly more 
relevant with the progressive evolution of modern tax systems towards personal forms 
of income taxation, with the consequent need, for most countries, to determine and 
measure the overall ability to pay of a taxpayer who is personally linked to the territory. 
More specifically, it has been observed that, especially after World War II, states’ 
economies have become more and more intertwined and dependent on one another, 
thus leading states to a tendency towards an attempt to expand their taxing powers 
beyond their borders, to circumstances, things or events that are, at least in part, 
extraneous and unrelated to their territories21. 
While, in the past, authors have essentially favoured a vision according to which 
the states’ taxing powers should encounter general internal limitations connected to their 
territorial borders22, in more recent times, as a direct consequence of the above-mentioned 
tendency of the states towards an expansion of their taxing powers, as it will be 
developed in the further pages of this work, scholars have come up with doctrines based 																																																								
19 The same kind of argument has been applied to the provisions and principles established by the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Which, according to the Italian Constitutional Court, are relevant within the 
domestic legal order (with obvious consequences in the field of taxation as well) by virtue of Article 2 of the 
Constitution, that recognises and guarantees fundamental human rights and, consequently, implies the efficacy of 
such rights, as established by the ECHR, as constitutional rights within the Italian legal order. 
20 Micheli, G.A., Profili critici in tema di potestà di imposizione, in Riv. dir. fin., 1964, 1, 19; Albrecht, A.R., The taxation 
of aliens under international law, cited above, 148. 
21 Sacchetto, C., Territorialità (diritto tributario), in Enciclopedia del Diritto, Milan, 1992, vol. XLIV, 306. 
22 This theory, which has now been considerably tempered by contemporary authors, had its grounds on a 
conception of taxing powers as manifestation of territorial jurisdictional powers of the state over persons and 
things located within its territory. 
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on the theoretical absence of any bound to the states’ powers to tax also elements which 
are located outside their borders 23. At the same time, the current structure of the 
international community, balanced by the general mutual recognition of the states’ 
independence and sovereignty, was (and is) at stake, with the consequent (practical and 
diplomatic) need to trace some inevitable limitations to the states’ taxing powers when 
expanding beyond their territories24. 
It followed that, in the words of the authors that have traditionally dealt with the 
subject at issue, the concept of “territory” has been the almost exclusive focus when 
discussing possible international bounds to the exercise of the states’ taxing powers. All 
of these works, as it will be further developed, have referred to a concept of “territory” 
not only as the place where a state’s tax law may be fully valid and effective, but also, 
and foremost, as a space within which the elements giving rise to taxation (i.e., as far as 
the present research is concerned, income) should be, in a general sense, located. 
2. The territory of the state as limit and measure of the states’ taxing powers: 
“material” and “formal” territoriality. 
It has been stated that no other concept, in the field of tax law, has attracted as 
much attention as the concept of “territoriality of taxation” has and that no other 
principle has influenced the development of all studies of international tax law as the 
principle of territoriality has25. The abundance of works on the point has led the concept 
of “territoriality” to being, nowadays, considerably ambiguous, especially if we consider 
the different ways in which the concept itself is used and described in different fields of 
(tax) law. For example, as it will be further discussed in the continuation of the present 
research, “territoriality” as interpreted and defined in the field of international tax law 
has been given a partially different meaning than the one that the Court of Justice of the 
European Union seems to have developed26. 
Territoriality is a concept (or, according to some, a principle27) that, by the nature 
of its object, relates primarily to the field of international law, having the effect to limit 																																																								
23 It has been correctly highlighted that one of the reasons behind this general (and quite controversial) statement 
was - and still is - the attempt to combat international tax evasion. 
24 One of the ways this attempt to limit the uncontrolled expansion of states’ taxing powers beyond and outside 
their borders has been put in place was by the affirmation of the so-called “revenue rule”, which, as it will be 
further developed, prevents states from enforcing their tax provisions (e.g. collecting taxes) in another state’s 
territory without authorisation. 
25 Sacchetto, C., Territorialità (diritto tributario), cited above, 303. 
26 The point will be further developed in Chapter II. 
27 We will see in the following pages of the research whether or not such definition is appropriate and correct and 
in which terms. 
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the efficacy or the validity of tax rules and essentially operating in a intra-states scenario. 
Nonetheless, the questions relating to territoriality have their consequences primarily on 
domestic law, since, as it will be argued, it is each state’s domestic law that regulates the 
conditions for the validity and efficacy of its laws. 
Thus, an analysis of territoriality should inevitably start from an overview of the 
national implications of the concept at issue. 
The origin and the evolution of the theories concerning the principle of 
territoriality in the context of national tax law have drawn inspiration from the concepts 
that, on the same point, have been developed in other fields of juridical studies, such as 
public international law, criminal law, conflicts of laws or administrative law 28 . If 
transposed in the field of international tax law, the concept of “territoriality” is, by 
definition, linked with the concept of limitation to the states’ taxing powers. 
According to this view, the territory is conceived not only as an essential element 
for the existence of each state, but also as the physical area within which the power and 
authority of the states can be exercised29. With more specific regards to tax law, the 
principle of territoriality has been defined by some as the maximum expression of the 
states’ need to rationally regulate the concurring taxing powers of the states, with a 
direct and strict connection to the general concept of “state sovereignty”. In other words, 
the argument is that, given that the state can fully exercise its sovereign powers within 
its territory, and given that state sovereignty constitutes the foundation and justification 
of the states’ taxing powers, it follows that the states’ taxing powers must be territorially 
limited30. 																																																								
28 This influence is also partially due to the undisputable fact that the analysis of the principle of territoriality in 
the field of tax law is relatively recent, as opposed to what happened in other fields of law, where the elaboration 
on the point of territoriality and on the relationships between the powers of all states in the international arena 
has been a traditional focus of interest. While the first enunciation of the principle of territoriality dates back to 
Francisco Suarez’s words in his Tractatus de legibus ac Deo legislatore (1612) and, later on, to Hobbes’ Leviathan 
(1651), authors from all areas of law are unanimous in stating that concept of “territoriality” has gotten its first 
real theoretical (and practical) elaboration after the affirmation of modern states, traditionally identified with the 
signing of the 1648 Westphalia Peace Treaty, when the territory of the state becomes relevant as an independent 
space and, consequently, as a measure and limit to the efficacy of the state’s legal order. On the evolution of the 
principle of territoriality as inherently intertwined with state sovereignty from an historical perspective see 
Fardella, F., Il dogma della sovranità dello Stato - Un consuntivo, in Riv. Dir. Pubbl., 1985, 1066. 
29 On the point, see Udina, M., Trattato di diritto internazionale, Padua, 1949, 57. According to his opinion, the state’s 
taxing powers are not unlimited, neither in practice nor by law, since the legal order from which the taxing 
powers derive is not unlimited. According to the author, the essential trait of the state’s sovereign power is that 
its provisions may be coercively enforced, if necessary, but within certain limits, one of which is represented by 
the state’s territory. Under this view, the territory is not only an essential element for the existence of all states, 
but also the area within which the sovereign governing power of the state can be exercised. Exceptionally, the 
state’s governing powers may go beyond their territorial limits, but only when such enforcement is designed to 
have its effects only within the territory of the state or when the foreign country provides its authorisation (freely 
or by virtue of international obligations or international law principles). In all other cases, according to the author, 
all state provisions that cannot be enforced abroad should not be considered as legally binding or even law, but 
rather political or moral precepts that cannot be considered as an expression of sovereign power. 
30 Manganelli, A., Territorialità dell’imposta, in Dig. disc. priv. - sez. comm., Turin, 1994, vol. XV, 366. 
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Therefore, the principle of territoriality as it stands in general international law 
(provided that we will verify in the following pages of the research whether or not 
territoriality can actually be considered as an international law principle when 
transposed in the field of taxation) implies that a state may exercise its jurisdiction with 
regards to all persons and objects which are characterised by a connection with its 
territory, irrespective or their nationality or origin31. 
The above-mentioned definition of the concept of “territoriality”, when 
transposed in the field of tax law, generally conceived as both an expression of and a 
limit to the sovereign power of the states32, has led scholars to tracing a clear distinction 
between an “internal” and an “external” feature of tax laws33. 
From a domestic perspective, the effects of the principle of territoriality coincide 
with the statement of the exclusivity of tax law. More in detail, a state’s tax provision is 
generally considered as strictly territorial, which means that said provision can have full 
effect only within the state’s territory, with the consequent exclusion of the possibility for 
other states’ laws to be validly effective in the same territory34. In other terms, in 
accordance with the principle of territoriality, all events and facts having place within a 
certain territory are ruled and governed by the (tax) provisions established by the state 
governing that territory35. Such a statement is the product of a traditional tendency on the 
part of the states to strenuously defend the exclusivity of their taxing powers within 
their own territory, with specific consequences particularly on the possibility to enforce 
national tax provisions in foreign countries36. 
That being established, it must, however, be highlighted - even though this 
problem will be described more in detail in the following pages - that, in the 
contemporary era, the principle of exclusivity of tax law with regards to a specific 
territory, though still perfectly valid and applicable, at least theoretically, has undergone 
deep changes and modifications, essentially as an effect of the role of international or 
supranational institutions and entities, such as the European Union. 																																																								
31 Territoriality has not always been the dominating principle for the attribution and allocation of jurisdiction in 
international tax law. For a historic overview, see Ryngaert, C., Jurisdiction in international law, Oxford, 2008, 
passim. 
32 For a brief overview of the history and evolution of the principle of territoriality in general terms and, more 
specifically, with regards to international tax law, see, amongst others, Baggio, R., Il principio di territorialità ed i 
limiti alla potestà tributaria, cited above, 1; Sacchetto, C., Territorialità (diritto tributario), cited above, 307-310. 
33 Rohatgi, R., Basic international taxation. Principles, Richmond, 2005, 14. 
34 The question relates to the efficacy of tax law in a spatial sense. On this point, the contribution given by Italian 
scholars has been paramount in tracing the difference between “internal” and “external” features (and effects) of 
territoriality. See, amongst others, Amatucci, A., Legge tributaria, in Enciclopedia Giuridica, Rome, 1994, vol. XX, 1; 
Micheli, D., Legge (diritto tributario), in Enciclopedia del Diritto, Milan, 1992, vol. XXIII, 10; Barile, G., Appunti sul 
valore del diritto pubblico straniero nell’ordinamento nazionale dello Stato, Milan, 1948. 
35 As will be further developed, the state’s (tax) law is binding not only on citizens, but also on foreigners having a 
certain link or connecting element with the state’s territory. 
36 This aspect concerns what it will be further defined as “formal territoriality”. 
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Going back to the main topic, the principle of territoriality, if seen from an 
“external” point of view, essentially deals with the validity and the efficacy of a state’s 
tax law outside the borders of that state’s territory. On this point, it must be highlighted 
that the debate on “external” territoriality and, more in general, on the existence of 
limitations to a state’s taxing powers has so far traditionally focused, especially through 
the words of Italian authors37, on the distinction between two different profiles: a 
“material” aspect of external territoriality on one hand - concerning the content of tax 
provisions or, in other terms, the state’s power in identifying facts, things and/or 
persons to subject to tax within or outside the territory of the state itself38 - and, on the 
other hand, a “formal” profile of external territoriality, dealing with the problem of the 
actual enforcement of the state’s tax law in a foreign country39-40. 
From the first point of view (“material” territoriality), the question is whether the 
state is bound to tax only facts and circumstances taking place within its territory or, on 
the contrary, territoriality must be interpreted in a broader sense, which essentially 
amounts to asserting that the state can tax foreign subjects. 
On this point, authors have traditionally taken the position that there are no limits 
to the taxing powers of a state and that, consequently, each state is free to tax every 
income and other tax object even if foreign, alien or in some other way extraneous to the 
taxing state, and, according to some, even though entirely devoid of any link with the 
territory of the state itself. In different and simpler words, according to the main part of 
the traditional doctrine, each state is theoretically free to issue any law imposing tax on 
every kind of piece of income, irrespective of whether or not such income has anything 
to do with the taxing state concerned41. 																																																								
37 On this point, see especially Fransoni, G., La territorialità nel diritto tributario, Milan, 2004; Baggio, R., Il principio di 
territorialità ed i limiti alla potestà tributaria, cited above; Bizioli, G., Il processo di integrazione dei principi tributari nel 
rapporto tra ordinamento costituzionale, comunitario e diritto internazionale, cited above; Croxatto, G., L’imposizione 
delle imprese con attività internazionale, cited above, 38; Garbarino, C., Manuale di tassazione internazionale, Milan, 
2008, 10; Gaffuri, G., La tassazione dei redditi d’impresa prodotti all’estero. Principi generali, Milan, 2008. 
38 I.e. with regards to all elements implying relationships with territories or legal orders of more than one state and 
with concern to which more than one state can levy taxes; see Vogel, K., Il diritto tributario internazionale, in 
Amatucci, A. (ed.), Trattato di diritto tributario, Padua, 1994, 691. 
39 The latter problem, which, in the field of tax law, has given rise to the (now partially out-dated) debate on the 
so-called “revenue rule” and which, though in necessarily different terms, is common to criminal law as well, 
escapes the scope and purpose of the present research, since it deals with more “administrative” aspects of the 
problem, and, therefore, will only be traced in its essential lines. 
40 It has been stated that, while, on one hand, the distinction between territoriality from a “formal” perspective 
and territoriality from a “material” perspective has constituted the highest point of the scholarly debate on the 
question of the allocation of taxing powers amongst states, on the other hand this theory has “ratified” the 
international “anarchy” in States’ legislation in the field of tax law, giving rise to problems connected to 
international double taxation and to the consequent “failure” of the principle of territoriality with respect to the 
practical purpose it had been created for. On the point see, amongst others, Sacchetto, C., Territorialità (diritto 
tributario), cited above, 306; Martha, R.S.J., The jurisdiction to tax in international law - Theory and practice of legislative 
fiscal jurisdiction, cited above.  
41 This position finds its grounds in the acceptance of the so-called theory of universality of the legal order and the 
following assertion according to which the state does not encounter any initial limitation to its powers other than 
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From this perspective, the state’s taxing powers have been defined as theoretically 
“unlimited” and “absolute”. “Unlimited” means that the exercise of such taxing powers 
cannot be in any way restricted from a geographical point of view, while “absolute” 
means that the state’s taxing powers can produce their effects towards anybody, being it 
an individual or a juridical person42. 
The position described above, traditionally held by continental authors (mostly 
following the theories first formulated by German doctrine), has been greatly influenced 
by the well-known Lotus judgement rendered by the International Court of Justice43, 
which, in short, stated that, in absence of any specific prohibition posed by international 
treaties, the general duty for all states to refrain from exercising their governing power in 
foreign territory does not imply that states cannot exercise, in their own territory, their 
jurisdiction with regards to facts, circumstances, events and subjects which take place or 
are somehow located abroad. 
On the other hand, a different reasoning is supposed to apply to the second 
profile, i.e. the one concerning the “formal” aspect of territoriality, that is to say the one 
involving the actual extraterritorial exercise of tax collection, tax recovery or any other 
act or deed aimed at enforcing tax provisions. With regards to this aspect, authors have 
traditionally shared the opinion that any actual exercise of such kind on foreign territory 
would amount to a violation of international law44-45. 																																																																																																																																																																													
those stemming directly from its own legal order with regards to the categories of elements, facts, subjects, 
circumstances and events that the state itself intends to discipline. 
42 Couzin, R., Corporate residence and international taxation, Amsterdam, 2002, passim. 
43 Permanent International Court of Justice, judgement 9 September 1927, Lotus. The Court essentially stated that 
the duty not to exercise sovereign powers in foreign territory does not automatically entail a prohibition for the 
state to exercise, in its territory, its jurisdiction with regards to facts and subjects located abroad, being it a 
prerogative which is based on the very core of the concept of “sovereignty” (“it does not, however, follow that any 
international law prohibits a state from exercising jurisdiction in its own territory in respect of any case which relates to acts 
which have taken place abroad). More in detail, the International Court of Justice has found that states should not be 
denied the possibility to extend their laws and jurisdiction to persons, things or events outside their own territory 
according to the principles that said states deem most useful. On the other hand, however, the Lotus judgement 
acknowledged that territorial sovereignty should not be exercised in the absolute absence of any boundaries, 
since the state “may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another state”. 
44  The debate on the point has been clearly described in a number of “classic” Italian works concerning 
territoriality and international limitations to the taxing power of the states. See especially Sacchetto, C., 
Territorialità (diritto tributario), cited above, 303; Croxatto, G., La imposizione delle imprese con attività internazionale, 
cited above, 47; Berliri, A., Principi di diritto tributario, Milan, 1952, 100; Garbarino, C., La tassazione del reddito 
transnazionale, Milan, 1990, passim; Lupi, R., Territorialità del tributo, in Enciclopedia Giuridica, Rome, 1994, vol. 
XXXI, 1; Udina, M., Il diritto internazionale tributario, cited above, 17; Manganelli, A., Territorialità dell’imposta, cited 
above, 366; Cordeiro Guerra, R., La potestà impositiva ultraterritoriale, in Cordeiro Guerra, R., (ed.), Diritto tributario 
internazionale - Istituzioni, Padua, 2012, 55; Giannini, A.D., I concetti fondamentali del diritto tributario, cited above. 
45 The question of territoriality from a “formal” perspective escapes the scope of the present research, which will 
mainly focus on the implications of territoriality in a “material” sense. On the point of “formal territoriality”, 
suffice it to say that for many decades the question was ruled by a general principle of non-cooperation amongst 
states in the realisation on their own territory of other states’ tax credits, which could be waived only by virtue of 
treaties and conventions that, according to such traditional opinion, had to be conceived as exceptions to the 
general non-cooperation rule. Modern tax scholars are now mostly unanimous in defining this position as out-
dated and inadequate to the levels of development which have been reached by the international economic 
integration and tend to interpret bilateral conventions providing for mechanisms of cooperation amongst states in 
the field of tax recovery not as exceptions to the general rule, but as proof and confirmation of a tendency 
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Starting from the “Lotus doctrine” (though not specifically related to taxation, but 
rather concerning more general aspects of international law), authors have elaborated a 
distinction between formal and material exercise of taxing powers, differentiating 
between the enforcement of tax law, which is an expression of formal territoriality and, 
thus, precluded beyond national borders, and legislative power with regards to tax 
provisions (material territoriality), which may very well take into consideration 
taxpayers or elements located or realised, wholly or partly, outside the territory of the 
state. In the latter case, the juridical effects of the national provision expand to elements 
located outside national borders46. 
Starting from these premises, it has been highlighted that the result of the 
approaches described above would essentially lead to the statement that the tax norm 
providing for the taxation of an income located abroad would be nothing more than a 
sort of “program” of possible future actions by the state (the actual enforcement of the 
law abroad), which, if enacted, could infringe international law in case the state actually 
wished to give execution to the norm in foreign territory through its own coercive 
powers and means47. 
Furthermore, several authors have suggested that such “traditional” positions 
would lead to a sort of paradox, since they would result, on one hand, in the exclusion of 
the possibility to recover, in foreign territory, taxes due by taxpayers in relation with 
events or facts that have occurred within the state trying to recover such taxes, and, on 
the other hand, in allowing states to recover taxes due in relation to events or facts which 
could be, in theory, totally devoid of any effective link or connection with the taxing 
state48. The absence of territorial limits to the definition of the events, facts, subjects or 
things that can be considered as giving rise to taxation seemed too arbitrary and capable 
to give way to a considerable level of uncertainty in international tax relationships 
(amongst states and between states and taxpayers). 
																																																																																																																																																																													
towards a more integrated approach to the subject. However, even if legal scholars have voiced this opinion for 
some time now, there has been no significant change in the case law on the point so far, if we exclude the peculiar 
case of the European Union. Some scholars, such as Croxatto and Udina, have even advocated the creation of a 
sort of “international tax court” whose purpose would be to settle disagreements amongst states in the field of 
cross-border tax recovery. 
46 Maisto, G., Brevi riflessioni sulla evoluzione del concetto di ‘genuine link’ ai fini della territorialità dell’imposizione 
tributaria tra diritto internazionale generale e diritto dell’Unione Europea, in Riv. Dir. Trib., 2013, 10, 889; Vogel, K., 
Klaus Vogel on double taxation conventions, London, 1997, 11. 
47 Cordeiro Guerra, R., Principio di capacità contributiva e imposizione territoriale, in Salvini, L., Melis, G. (eds.), 
L’evoluzione del sistema fiscale e il principio di capacità contributiva, Padua, 2014, 165. The question of the effectiveness 
of tax law, which, as it will be further developed in the following pages, has been part of the debate on the 
principle of territoriality from an international law perspective as well, has been also highlighted by Bizioli, G., La 
capacità contributiva nella dimensione internazionale, in Salvini, L., Melis, G., L’evoluzione del sistema fiscale e il principio 
di capacità contributiva, Padua, 2014, 253. 
48 This hypothetical paradox is highlighted, amongst others, by Lupi, R., Territorialità del tributo, cited above, 3. 
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In light of these assumptions, part of the legal doctrine, mainly (but not 
exclusively) from the Anglo-Saxon area, has now voiced the opinion that the distinction 
traced above between the legitimacy of a “boundless” taxing power on the part of the 
state (as far as “material” territoriality is concerned) as opposed to the illegitimacy of the 
corresponding enforcing power (with regards to “formal” territoriality) is too strict and 
not able to actually reflect the reality of the ways modern states choose to regulate and 
exercise their fiscal powers. 
This more recent position has found part of its grounds in theories and assertions 
that have resulted in a general statement according to which a state could exercise some 
of its sovereign powers only in presence of a sufficient “attachment”, “connection” or 
“link” between the situation at issue and its own legal order (or, as is often the case with 
regards to tax law, between the situation at issue and the state’s territory)49. Part of the 
international legal doctrine has, therefore, highlighted the need to limit the exercise of 
the state’s sovereign powers only to situations in which an effective, actual and stable 
link between the subject and the state can be identified50-51. 																																																								
49 This theory has been developed, for example, with regards to the topic of diplomatic protection, which 
essentially revolves around the protection, outside of national borders, of subjects which are linked to a state by 
citizenship or nationality and the consequent invocation by a state of the responsibility of another state for an 
injury, breach or violation caused by an internationally wrongful act of the latter state to the detriment of a 
national or citizen of the former state. On the point, a paramount contribution, which is often mentioned also in 
every tax-focused analysis of the problem at hand, was given by the International Court of Justice’s Nottebohm 
judgement (April 6, 1955, Liechtenstein v. Guatemala, ICJ Rep. 1955, 4). Without going into further details which 
elude the scope and purposes of the research, suffice it to say that, in that judgement, the International Court of 
Justice essentially denied a state the possibility of exercising its diplomatic protection powers on one of its 
national in case there is no proof of a “genuine connection” between the citizen and the state itself (“a State cannot 
claim that the rules it has thus laid down are entitled to recognition by another State unless it has acted in conformity with 
this general aim of making the legal bond of nationality accord with the individual’s genuine connection with the State which 
assumes the defence of its citizens by means of protection as against other States”). Similar tendencies can be found also 
in the international practice concerning the fields of the law of the sea and criminal law (and criminal jurisdiction 
on an international level). However, some authors have highlighted the need to be cautious in extending such 
principles to a wider scope of application than the one given by the judgement itself, since the case dealt with a 
very specific and peculiar (and not related to tax law) fact pattern. On the point, see Maisto, G., Brevi riflessioni 
sulla evoluzione del concetto di ‘genuine link’ ai fini della territorialità dell’imposizione tributaria tra diritto internazionale 
generale e diritto dell’Unione Europea, cited above. Scholars have also cited the Barcelona Traction judgement by the 
International Court of Justice (February 5, 1970, Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, ICJ Rep. 1970, 
3), also concerning the topic of diplomatic protection, as another demonstration of the existence of territorial 
limits to the exercise of taxing powers and that such limits are based on the need to find an effective connection 
with the territory of the state. On the other hand, it has been highlighted by some authors, however, that the 
judgement mentioned above would not be able to demonstrate the principle at issue, but would rather constitute 
the proof of its exact opposite, since the Court has not clearly asserted the need, pursuant to general international 
law, of territorial linking criteria in order for a state to exercise its sovereignty (“in the field of diplomatic protection 
of corporate entities no absolute test of the genuine connection has found application in practice”). See Maisto, G., Brevi 
riflessioni sulla evoluzione del concetto di ‘genuine link’ ai fini della territorialità dell’imposizione tributaria tra diritto 
internazionale generale e diritto dell’Unione Europea, cited above. That being said, it has also been argued that the 
principles expressed in both of the above-mentioned judgements could not be automatically applied to the field 
of tax law, especially since what might constitute an appropriate “connecting factor” to legitimise the exercise of 
states’ sovereign powers in certain fields of law (e.g. private international law, diplomatic protection, 
jurisdiction…) may not be as appropriate with regards to tax law, given the increasing mobility of persons, 
production factors, riches and other fiscally relevant elements. This circumstance appears particularly evident if 
we think about electronic commerce. 
50 It must be highlighted that, according to the Italian main doctrine, the concept of “linking factor” as far as 
(international) tax law is concerned is radically different from the meaning that the word “link” has in the field of 
	 25 
Starting from these theories, which are nowadays shared amongst the majority of 
continental European scholars as well, some authors have then elaborated a theory 
revolving around the so-called “economic allegiance” concept52, that, according to the 
mainstream opinion, would essentially coincide with the concept on which the “benefit 
theory” is based, on which we will say more in the continuation of this work53. 
It should then be concluded that the state’s power to legislate and to levy taxes is 
not a consequence of that state’s power over its territory and over the persons located 
therein and, therefore, cannot be considered as inherently limited by the borders of the 
territory itself. It is, rather, the state’s legal order, and, in particular, the state’s tax law, 
that establishes the elements that should constitute the object of the state’s taxing powers 
and the persons upon which the tax burden should be imposed. It follows that it is not 
possible, at least from a purely national perspective, to identify a priori general limits to 
the state’s taxing powers and that, consequently, a general principle of territoriality 
should be considered as non-existing54. That is also because the mere legislative activity 
of the states in the field of taxation does not imply per se any extra-territorial exercise of 
state sovereignty or state jurisdiction. 
Possible limits should, then, be found exclusively in the provisions, principles and 
rules that constitute part of the state’s legal order55. Several states’ national legislations 
recognise, in principle, the existence of limitations to the exercise of taxing powers on 
foreign elements. However, the characteristics of this “rule” are so vague and different 
that a hypothetical “genuine link principle”, according to which states may levy taxes 
only on elements that are effectively and reasonably connected to the states’ territory, 
would not be easy to define in a uniform manner. On the other hand, there are also (rare) 
																																																																																																																																																																													
private international law, where the effect of the “link” is to lead into a state’s legal order provisions coming from 
other states. While, in tax law, linking factors do not refer to any foreign law, but serve the purpose to define and 
limit the scope of application of national taxes. On the point, other scholars, mainly belonging to the German 
area, have stated the exact opposite, recognising some similarities between the concepts of “linking factor” in the 
field of private international law and tax law. 
51 Some of the Authors advocating this view have taken their thesis to extremes, by stating that a tax established 
by a state without any reasonable link with its territory or its legal order would end up being in violation of a 
“general principle of law recognised by civil nations” and, therefore, sanctionable pursuant to Article 38 of the 
International Court of Justice Statute (according to which generally recognised principles are included amongst 
the sources of international law). On the point, see Gaffuri, A.M., La tassazione dei redditi d’impresa prodotti 
all’estero. Principi generali, cited above, 347. 
52 See Hellerstein, W., Jurisdiction to tax income and consumption in the new economy: a theoretical and comparative 
perspective, in Georgia Law Review, 2003, 1, 6, which justifies “substantive jurisdiction to tax” by virtu of the 
“relationship of the State to the person with the right to the income” or the “relationship of the State to the property or 
activities that produce income”. 
53 Kaufman, N.H., Fairness and the taxation of international income, in Law and Policy in International Business, 1998, 
158, 184. 
54 Manganelli, A., Territorialità dell’imposta, cited above, 368. 
55 Croxatto, G., L’imposizione delle imprese con attività internazionale, cited above, 27; Sacchetto, C., Territorialità 
(diritto tributario), cited above, 314. 
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forms of taxation that do not entail any territorial link between the state and the taxpayer 
and/or the income subject to tax56-57. 
3. Territoriality as a parameter for the allocation of taxing powers amongst 
states: the international (tax) law perspective and the admissibility of 
extraterritorial taxation. 
Essentially there is no country that forgoes taxing domestic-source income, 
irrespective of whether such income is derived by nationals, aliens, residents or non-
residents. On the other side, however, national legislations can be quite different with 
respect to what they consider being “domestic-source income” or to the dissimilar ways 
states tax foreign-source income, which leads to problems connected to extraterritoriality 
of taxation. Even though, according to some authors, taxation of foreign income is 
always and inherently extraterritorial 58  and even though territoriality of taxation is 
generally seen as a paramount standard at least in the majority of Western countries59. 
Criticism of extraterritorial taxation is generally based on considerations of equity 
or economic factors rather than on arguments derived from positive public international 
law, especially since general international law does not provide for any conflict rule to 
regulate the “order of preference” in case of concurrent tax jurisdiction, nor does it entail 
ways to deal with the disparity between the states’ fiscal concepts. Therefore, problems 																																																								
56 An example is provided by the so-called “unitary taxation” system in place in California and in some other U.S. 
states. Pursuant to this model, a part of the income produced abroad by non-resident companies is anyway 
attributed to (and taxed upon) secondary establishments located in the territory of the state and controlled 
companies established therein. The implementation of this peculiar linking criterion may lead to taxing foreign-
source income received by a non-resident even if the activity performed in the territory of the taxing state has not 
in any way contributed to the production of such income. According to some authors (Martha, R. S. J., 
Extraterritorial taxation in international law, cited above, 28), this technique employed to determine the worldwide 
income of the corporation is “abusive”, even to the point of amounting to an example of extraterritorial taxation 
of non-resident corporations and of an “abuse of rights”. 
57 As far as Italy is concerned, it has been highlighted that some Italian tax provisions would be deprived of any 
effective and stable territorial link between the state and the taxpayer or the income. That is the case, for example, 
of the rule establishing fiscal residence (and thus worldwide taxation) by virtue of the simple registration in the 
list of citizen, but also of the rule taxing capital gains accrued on shares held by an Italian citizen and concerning 
companies established abroad. Of this opinion, Maisto, G., Brevi riflessioni sulla evoluzione del concetto di ‘genuine 
link’ ai fini della territorialità dell’imposizione tributaria tra diritto internazionale generale e diritto dell’Unione Europea, 
cited above; Melis, G., La nozione di residenza delle persone fisiche nell’ordinamento tributario italiano, in Rass. Trib., 
1995, 1034. 
58 Martha, R. S. J., Extraterritorial taxation in international law, cited above, 19. 
59 Emphasising territoriality of income tax legislation generally leads to source-based taxation. However, in recent 
Latin American legislation and treaties, the principle of territoriality has somewhat receded. Moreover, even 
amongst countries confining themselves to taxing purely domestic-source income and excluding all foreign-
source income from their tax bases there may be considerable differences in practice. For example, Hong Kong, 
Uruguay and Kenya tax both natural persons and corporations only with respect to their domestic source income, 
while France taxes natural persons on their worldwide income and corporations on their domestic income only. 
The Netherlands only some foreign income (e.g. dividends and income from foreign permanent establishments) 
is exempted from taxation, provided that such income is taxable in the country where it arose. Both the United 
Kingdom and Japan have moved towards territorial tax systems within the past few years, and several recent 
proposals for United States corporate tax reform propose or consider this option as well. 
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concerning extraterritorial taxation are generally solved, even though not entirely, 
through double taxation conventions. 
 If it were to be accepted that the exercise of jurisdiction can effectively be 
considered “illegal” from an international law point of view, then one should be able to 
find, in all the many cases where states have attempted to tax without the necessary legal 
basis, effective ways to counteract these attempts in international (tax) law. Rebus sic 
stantibus, if we exclude the current double taxation conventions network, which some 
consider deeply unsatisfactory, “pure” international law seems to be devoid of such 
instruments. The same does not apply to other legal orders (provided that the 
international arena could ever be defined as a “legal order”), such as the European 
Union. 
It has even been suggested that a - probably utopic - way to suppress 
extraterritorial taxation caused by distortion in fiscal categories such as “residence”, 
“nationality”, “income”, etc., would be to reform tax treaties towards a unification of the 
concepts by providing exhaustive definitions that do not depend on national law, 
regulations or judge-made interpretation60. 
In light of all of the above, some of the legal scholars who have dealt with the 
question at issue, more receptive towards the idea of the need to “contain” states’ taxing 
powers in the interest of the international community, have tried to argue that the 
absence of any territorial limit to the taxing powers of the state - or, better, to the power 
of the state to define its tax base - would be incompatible with international law as the 
complex of principles and rules regulating relationships amongst states 61 , being it 
theoretically necessary, according to generally recognised principles, to find a 
(reasonable and genuine) link between the elements on which tax is levied and the 
state’s legal order62. 
The levying of taxes in a state might, in fact, to a certain extent, undermine the 
conditions for the exercise of taxing powers by another state, which could have to 																																																								
60 See, for example, Martha, R. S. J., Extraterritorial taxation in international law, cited above, 26. 
61 International law is generally seen as the complex of principles and rules aimed at solving possible conflicts 
derived by the coexistence of states as sovereign entities. Consequently, international law is not concerned with 
all events and situations whose juridical effects are limited within the borders of a single legal order, involving 
(public or private) subjects who are all part of the same state. According to a more “archaic” theory (which is 
nowadays generally considered out-dated), international law could be concerned with tax law only in the 
hypothesis a state or an international organisation were able to levy tax on another state and, therefore, fiscal 
relationships in the “classical sense” (state-taxpayer) could not constitute the object of international law 
provisions because such relationships are merely between a state and its citizens, nationals or subjects. On the 
other hand, more modern theories (e.g. Conforti, B., Diritto internazionale, Milan, 2014) have highlighted that 
international law may not regulate not only relationships between states, but also has effects on certain aspects of 
the relationship between the subjects of the same national community and between the state and its subjects. 
62 For a summary of the essential lines of the debate on the point and the main positions voiced by authors, see 
Fantozzi, A., Diritto tributario, Turin, 2003, 212; Croxatto, G.C., Diritto internazionale tributario, in Dig. disc. priv., sez. 
comm., Turin, 1989, vol. IV, 643. 
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renounce the possibility to levy taxes on the same taxpayer or the same item of income. 
Provided that, as it will be further discussed, international law does not seem to entail a 
general prohibition of this kind of “proliferation of tax burdens”, a tax imposed by a 
state through its sovereign powers might very well go to the detriment of another state 
or of another state’s citizen; it follows that such a phenomenon might be the object of a 
certain level of attention in the field of international law, with a consequent hypothetical 
need to regulate the cases where such a “proliferation” over the same tax elements might 
occur. 
The starting point of theory which is being discussed has been found in the 
above-mentioned “Lotus doctrine”, according to which a state can legitimately take into 
account elements, facts and events that are located or occur outside its national borders 
(so-called material territoriality). However, such doctrine does not provide any 
indication as to the hypothetical need, for international law purposes, for the existence of 
a link between such facts and the territory of the state in order for that state to be able to 
exercise its legislative tax competence with regards to foreign elements. Nor the above-
mentioned doctrine clarifies whether or not such possible hypothetical need constitutes a 
customary rule or international law or a general principle of international law. 
Given that every state operates in the international context where other analogous 
subjects operate, and since, on a juridical level, their action implies mutual limitations to 
state powers, the question now is whether or not general international law actually poses 
limitations to the exercise of the states’ taxing powers, obviously aside from all those 
limitations stemming from international treaties and conventions63. In other words, the 
task is to determine whether or not there are international general (non-conventional) 
norms positively determining the cases in which a state can avail itself of its taxing 
powers and, on the other hand, the cases in which a state should refrain from levying 
taxes64. 
It goes without saying that the problem is inextricably intertwined with the 
question of identifying the sources of law in the international (tax) context. In fact, as it is 
generally known, and briefly said, the complex of international law is composed, on one 
hand, of general rules of law of a customary nature that are the result of a process of 																																																								
63 On the limitations to the states’ taxing powers deriving from treaty law, see, amongst others, Vitale, M., Doppia 
imposizione (diritto internazionale), in Enc. Dir., Turin, 1998, vol. XIII, 1007; Croxatto, G.C., Diritto internazionale 
tributario, cited above, 644; Davies, D.R., Principles of international double taxation relief, London, 1985, Adonnino, P., 
Doppia imposizione, in Enc. Giur., Turin, 1989, vol. XII, 1989; Fantozzi, A., Vogel, K., Doppia imposizione 
internazionale, in Dig. disc. priv., sez. comm., Turin, 1990, vol. V, 182. 
64 Biscottini, G., Diritto amministrativo internazionale, in Balladore Pallieri, G., Morelli, G., Quadri, R. (eds.), Trattato 
di diritto internazionale, Padua, 1964, sec. II, vol. VI; Martha, R.S.J., The jurisdiction to tax in international law - Theory 
and practice of legislative fiscal jurisdiction, cited above. 
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consolidation of behaviours and conducts of the subjects constituting the players of the 
international community and, on the other hand, of law derived from (bilateral or 
multilateral) treaties and conventions entered into by the states. Needless to say that, 
while customary international law is binding to all states, conventional international law 
(treaty law) is only binding with regards to the states that have entered into such 
agreements65. Alongside these “positive” sources of law, a certain degree of attention has 
been paid to a more “general” - and some say too general - source: the general principles 
of law recognised by states. 
3.1. Is there a “general principle” of tax territoriality in international law? 
International law principles are listed by Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice amongst the sources of international law, together with 
treaties and customary rules, and are defined as “the general principles of law recognised by 
civilised nations”. In other terms, international principles of law are (or are supposed to 
be) the international equivalent of general “constitutional” principles embedded in the 
legal orders of the single states and applicable therein, which rise to international 
relevance if are shared by a considerable number of states. Therefore, in order for a 
general principle of domestic law to be recognised and applicable in the international 
legal order, it must be present in the majority of the single states’ legal orders and must 
also be considered by the states themselves as applicable not only domestically, but also 
transnationally. 
This view is essentially based on the assumption that the international legal order, 
like all other legal orders, is, or at least should be, characterised by principles that are 
hierarchically superior to customary and conventional law. 
Starting from this definition, some authors66 have argued, with regards to the field 
of international tax law, in favour of the existence of an international principle67 of 
territoriality generally accepted by states. In the words of those authors, such a principle 
would constitute a sort of “constitutional international law principle” acting as a 																																																								
65 With regards to tax law, it must be specified that Italian scholars have traditionally distinguished between 
“diritto internazionale tributario” and “diritto tributario internazionale”, the first being constituted of all rules with an 
international source (both of a customary or conventional nature) and concerning the exercise of taxing powers 
by the states, and the second being made of all domestic rules related to aspects of taxation which go beyond 
national borders. On the point, see Croxatto, G.C., Diritto internazionale tributario, cited above, 641; Udina, M., Il 
diritto internazionale tributario, cited above. 
66 Amongst which, for example, as far as traditional Italian doctrine is concerned, see Udina, M., Il diritto 
internazionale tributario, Padua, 1949, 83. 
67 For a definition of what constitutes an international general principle, see, Gaja, G., Principi generali del diritto 
(diritto internazionale), in Enc. Dir., Turin, 1989, vol. XXXV, 533. 
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limitation to the sovereign powers of the states, starting from the presupposition that the 
international legal order essentially revolves around the different legal orders of the 
different states, which have to coexist and, therefore, must mutually recognise their 
prerogatives and limits. 
That being stated, scholars dissent, however, on the interpretation and the 
extension to be given to this hypothetical general “constitutional” principle of 
territoriality, which has traditionally been interpreted according to two different 
meanings68. 
In a stricter and more “practical” sense, an hypothetical international law 
principle of territoriality would entail the limitation of the scope of application of the 
state’s taxing powers only to those particular cases of facts, circumstances, events or, 
more in general, sources of income located within its territory. This interpretation of the 
principle at issue, which is the traditional position advocated by German authors, could 
be defined as “territoriality in an objective sense” 69 . According to this theory, the 
principle pursuant to which a state can levy tax only on the facts or persons that are 
subject to its preeminent power or, in other words, to its (territorial or functional) 
sovereignty constitutes the fundamental rule in the field of international taxation and a 
sort of a priori principle of international law70. 
On the other hand, different authors, both European and American, have opted 
for a broader interpretation of the meaning of the principle of territoriality in the context 
of international law, stating that such principle would allow states to tax their citizens 
even though deprived of any other personal or objective connections to the territory of 
the state for the mere and simple fact of being their citizens (or nationals or residents)71. 
Adopting this theory would amount to embracing an interpretation of territoriality in a 
“subjective sense”. 
Both interpretations of the principle of territoriality seem to support the theory 
according to which, in order to exercise their taxing powers, states would need a 
connecting factor, a link between their legal order and the taxpayer. This connecting 
factor would exist when the taxpayer can be considered as being subject either to the 																																																								
68 Sacchetto, C., Territorialità (diritto tributario), cited above, 319. 
69 This definition has been used, amongst others, by Sacchetto (see Sacchetto, C., Territorialità (diritto tributario), 
cited above, 319), and, before him, by Bühler (see Bühler, O., Internationales Steuerrecht und Internationales 
Privatrecht, Amsterdam, 1960, as quoted by Sacchetto, C., Territorialità (diritto tributario), cited above, 319). 
70 The theory is clearly expressed in Martha, R.S.J., The jurisdiction to tax in international law - Theory and practice of 
legislative fiscal jurisdiction, cited above. 
71 This interpretation of the principle of territoriality has been traditionally advocated, for example, by Udina, M., 
Il diritto internazionale tributario, cited above, 83; Martha, R.S.J., The jurisdiction to tax in international law - Theory 
and practice of legislative fiscal jurisdiction, cited above, passim; Vanoni, E., Natura ed interpretazione delle leggi 
tributarie, in Forte, F., Longobardi, C. (eds.), Opere Giuridiche, Milan, 1961, vol. I, 84; Mann, F.A., Studies in 
international law, Oxford, 1973, 97. 
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state’s “personal sovereignty” (territoriality in a “subjective sense”; e.g., when the 
taxpayer is a citizen of the state) or to the state’s “territorial sovereignty” (territoriality in 
an “objective sense”). There is no need to say that, in case of exercise of “personal 
sovereignty” on the part of the state, the latter can levy taxes on its citizens even in case 
they are located, reside, have their seat or operate outside its territory, i.e. outside the 
scope of spatial validity of the national legal order. On the other hand, aliens, who are 
not the objects of the state’s “personal sovereignty”, would be subject to its taxing 
powers only if, when and insofar as they are somehow related to the scope of validity 
(end enforceability) of its tax laws.  
However, irrespective of which of the two meanings of “territoriality” described 
above (either subjective or objective) one chooses to adhere to, both arguments are 
essentially based on the assumption of the existence of a general consolidated principle 
of international tax law according to which, in case the fundamental elements of a fact, 
circumstance or event that is fiscally relevant are linked to different legal orders, it is 
legitimate for the state (or the states) to whose territory (or territories) such elements are 
connected to levy tax on that fact, circumstance or event72. In other words, according to 
the mentioned authors, a general principle of international tax law would exist by virtue 
of which states can tax income or other fiscally relevant elements as far as those income 
or elements are somehow (subjectively or objectively) linked with their territory. 
The same theory has also received a partially different formulation, based on the 
central role of the general mutual recognition, amongst states, of other state’s 
sovereignty. From this perspective, levying taxes on a situation or an event which lacks 
any sort of link (subjective or objective) to the territory of the taxing state would amount 
to a violation of another state’s sovereignty and, therefore, to a breach of international 
law73-74. According to the proponents of this theory, the existence of such a principle would 
also find comfort in the recognised international law principle according to which a state 
cannot impose or ask a foreigner to do something that is not sufficiently justified by an 
existing link between such foreigner and the state75. 
In different words, it has been theorised that state powers in taxing foreigners 
should be limited when taxing subjects which have no point of contact with the state 
itself or its legal order, which essentially means subjects that elude the scope within 																																																								
72 Udina, M., Il diritto internazionale tributario, cited above, 66. 
73 Micheli, G.A., Corso di diritto tributario, Turin, 1989. 
74 Some authors have highlighted that the use of the concept of “sovereignty” in order to justify the thesis of a 
limited taxing power of the state in the international context is quite improper and that such position should be 
grounded not on a point of sovereignty, but rather on a point of international law and order. 
75 Conforti, B., Diritto internazionale, cited above, 201. 
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which the sovereign power of the state can be enforced. This thesis has been justified by 
the general statement according to which it would not be possible to ensure the respect 
and effectiveness of each state’s sovereignty if all states did not recognise the 
fundamental freedom and equality of all states on the international arena76. 
These have been the statements on a purely theoretical level, asserting the 
existence of a general principle of territoriality of taxation, i.e. a general principle by 
virtue of which states should not levy taxes on foreign elements (objects or persons) in 
absence of a link or connecting factors between them and such elements. 
However, these assumptions have been the target of much criticism. 
There is, in fact, a fundamental point to consider, which is connected to the 
definition of what can constitute a “general principle of law recognised by civilised 
nations” for the purposes of international law. 
We have observed above that a general principle in the context of international 
law is, ultimately, nothing more a “constitutional” principle that is common to the 
national systems of the majority of civilised nations and recognised as such for merely 
domestic purposes by single countries. In other words, it is the fact that a principle is 
embedded in many domestic (constitutional) systems that may lead such a principle to 
become relevant as a source of international law. 
That being stated, it certainly does not seem possible to assert that the 
constitutional systems of the majority of “civilised states” envisages the recognition of 
(the binding value of) a principle of tax territoriality. Especially since we have to face the 
fact that, in practice, many states tend not to limit their fiscal claims only to elements, 
facts, income or events linked or somehow connected to their territory77. This is partly 
due to the effects of the process that led to an undoubted de-materialisation of income 
and assets in general, combined with the states’ purpose of fighting international tax 
evasion or tax avoidance as much as possible. 
Furthermore, justifying the right for a state to levy taxes on foreign elements, 
persons, things or events if they have an effective link to that state’s territory with 
reference to the concept of “sovereignty” does not seem to be entirely correct. Aside 
from the fact that the concept of “sovereignty” appears not to have received an 
exhaustive and unanimous definition yet, one should also reflect on the fact that, if 
sovereignty might very well justify the right of every state not to suffer any direct 																																																								
76 Sacchetto, C., Territorialità (diritto tributario), cited above, 321, and the authors cited therein, amongst which see, 
especially, Luzzato, R., Stati stranieri e giurisdizione nazionale, Milan, 1967. 
77 This point will be further developed in the following pages of the present research and, especially, in Chapter 
III. 
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interference in its territory (or, better, in the exercise of its sovereign power over its 
territory) from any other state, that concept does not seem to be able to in any way imply 
the right of every state to include within the scope of its taxing powers (and, in general, 
of its activity) elements that are “foreign” and that, therefore, would have to be 
considered as being part of another state’s territory. 
Furthermore, it may not be easy to automatically apply the above-mentioned 
international law principle according to which a state should not ask a foreigner to do 
something that is not sufficiently justified by an existing link between such foreigner and 
the state itself to the field of tax law78. 
Some of the scholars who have dealt with the question at issue have also tried to 
justify the definition and the existence of the principle of territoriality as a general 
principle of international law by referring to the so-called “principle of effectiveness”. 
Starting from this idea, some have advocated the existence of a general international law 
principle according to which a state can legitimately expand its taxing powers towards 
“foreign” elements, circumstances, facts or subjects only insofar as it enjoys the 
corresponding power to actually and effectively ensure the enforcement of such tax 
provisions79. 
However, aside from the fact that there does not seem to be any consensus, 
amongst scholars, on the actual existence and value of a general “principle of 
effectiveness” as part of international law, this theory, though endorsed by many 
influential authors especially in past years, seems to create a sort of overlap between the 
two sides of the same coin that is the principle of territoriality, i.e. between the 
“material” aspect and the “formal” aspect of territoriality. Adopting this theory would 
essentially mean linking the legitimacy of a state’s choices in the determination of its tax 
base to the actual possibility for that state to enforce its tax provisions in the future. Such 
an assertion would imply that, from an international law perspective, a state is allowed 
to do whatever it has the power to actually attain, which would not be incorrect from a 
																																																								
78 Especially if we think to certain specific tax rules embedded in many states’ tax systems and which seem to be 
consistently deprived of such effective link. As far as Italy is concerned, an example may be the rule by way of 
which a subject is considered as “resident” in Italy based on the simple registration in the list of the population 
(“Anagrafe”), with all consequences on the tax liability of that subject, who will be taxed in Italy on his 
worldwide income. 
79 This theory has been supported, for example, in Italy, by Micheli, G.A., Corso di diritto tributario, cited above, 96; 
Micheli, G.A., Problemi attuali di diritto tirbutario nei rapporti internazionali, in Dir. Prat. Trib., 1965, 1, 222; Lupi, R., 
Territorialità, cited above, 2; Manganelli, A., Territorialità dell’imposta, cited above, 369; Tinelli, G., Istituzioni di 
diritto tributario, Padua, 2013, 117. On the international level, similar opinions have been voiced by Arnold, B.J., 
Tax discrimination against aliens, non-residents and foreign activities: Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the United 
Kingdom and the United States, Toronto, 1991, 7; Qureshi, A.H., The freedom of a state to legislate in fiscal matters and 
international law, in Bulletin of International Fiscal Documentation, 1987, 1, 14; Vann, R., International aspects of 
income tax, in Thuronyi, V. (ed.), Tax law design and drafting, Washington, 1998, vol. II, 718. 
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purely domestic point of view, but would be highly unsatisfactory in the field of 
international law. 
Furthermore, it must also be noted that the problem connected to the actual 
enforcement of tax laws abroad and of the collection of taxes in foreign territories has, 
nowadays, been, at least on a theoretical level, partially solved by means of mutual 
agreements between states80, making it even more complicated to trace the line between 
what a state can and cannot do in terms of taxing foreign income (or other foreign 
elements) based on the above-mentioned “principle of effectiveness”81. 
In light of all of the above, the theory advocating the existence of an international 
law principle establishing the need for a reasonable and genuine link between the 
element on which tax is levied and the territory of the state levying the tax has been 
subjected to considerable criticism and does not seem entirely acceptable. 
3.2. Tax territoriality as an international customary rule? 
Acknowledging the difficulty not only in defining “territoriality” as an 
international law principle, but even in defining what an “international law principle” is 
or should be82, some scholars have endorsed a theory according to which the principle of 
territoriality should be considered as the object of an international customary rule. 
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice defines customary 
law, amongst the sources of international law, as “international custom, as evidence of a 
general practice accepted as law”. In short, international customary rules are generally 
defined by the coexistence of two different elements: an “objective” element, i.e. the 
constant repetition by states of the same behaviour in the same (or in comparable) 
circumstances (diuturnitas), and a “subjective” element, i.e. the belief that a certain 
behaviour corresponds to a juridical obligation on the part of the states and that said 
																																																								
80 The OECD Model Convention for the prevention of double taxation dedicates two articles to the topic, namely 
Article 26 (exchange of information) and Article 27 (mutual assistance in the recovery of taxes). At the European 
Union level, Council Directive 2011/16/EU of 15th February 2011 concerning administrative cooperation in the 
fiscal field aims at expanding, especially as far as exchange of information is concerned, the scope of application 
of the previous EU provision on the point (Directive 77/799/EEC). One should also mention the Council of 
Europe and OECD Multilateral Convention regarding mutual assistance in tax matters and Directive 2010/24/EU 
on the mutual assistance between Member States in the recovery of tax credits. 
81 Maisto, G., Brevi riflessioni sulla evoluzione del concetto di ‘genuine link’ ai fini della territorialità dell’imposizione 
tributaria tra diritto internazionale generale e diritto dell’Unione Europea, cited above. 
82 According to influential authors, in fact, accepting the existence of international “constitutional” principles 
(besides the traditional “pacta sunt servanda” and “consuetudo est servanda”) would imply that international law 
would be left to the will of the international forces contingently dominating in the international arena, with a 
consequent proliferation of principles that might possibly also justify forms of abuse dictated by dominant states 
in the context of the relationships in the international community. This is the opinion, for example, voiced in 
Conforti, B., Diritto internazionale, cited above, 54. 
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obligation is shared and complied with by all other members of the international 
community (opinio iuris ac necessitatis)83. 
The authors arguing that tax territoriality should be considered as part of 
customary international (tax) law84 have generally reached such conclusion starting from 
the assumption that most countries in the international context would arguably shape or 
tend to shape their tax systems according to criteria and parameters of a territorial 
nature. In other words, according to this vision, states would essentially conform to a 
general common behaviour imposed by customary obligations with regards to 
international “tax competence”, thus restraining from including foreign elements, facts, 
circumstances or subjects within their tax bases and from expanding the scope of 
application of their tax provisions beyond their borders. 
However, in order to argue for the existence of an international customary law, it 
is necessary to demonstrate that states adhere to such customary law because they 
believe it to be compulsory and binding upon them. In other words, in order for a 
practice generally followed by states to rise to the level of (international) customary law, 
states need to be convinced that any behaviour that moves away from that general 
practice would amount to a breach of an obligation established by international law85. 
This simple assumption seems to be enough to deprive the opinion considering 
the principle of territoriality as embedded in international customary law of all of its 
strength. 
It has been convincingly argued, in fact, that states tend to establish limits to the 
extension of their taxing powers beyond their territory not by virtue of a general belief 
that doing the opposite would result in a breach of international law, but rather in light 
of contingent and incidental reasons of an eminently political nature86. Furthermore, the 																																																								
83 It has been correctly highlighted that this second element should not be found through a sort of “psychological 
analysis” of state behaviour and on the reasons that led a certain state to act in a certain way, but rather in the 
actual events and behaviours repeating themselves. Starting from this assumption, some influential scholars in 
the field of international law have advocated a view according to which, given the difficulty to demonstrate the 
element of the opinio iuris, in order to demonstrate the existence of an international customary rule the simple 
element of the diuturnitas might be enough, as a starting point from which to presume the existence of an opinio 
iuris. On this theory, see, for instance, Conforti, B., Diritto internazionale, Naples, 2013, 33. For a definition of 
“customary law” in the context of international law, see Ziccardi, P., Consuetudine (diritto internazionale), in 
Enciclopedia del Diritto, vol. IX, Milan, 1992, 476. 
84 Amongst which, see, for example, as far as Italian doctrine is concerned, Vanoni, E., Natura ed interpretazione delle 
leggi tributarie, cited above; Gaffuri, A.M., La tassazione dei redditi d’impresa prodotti all’estero. Principi generali, cited 
above, 333, and the authors cited therein; Guggenheim, P., L’imposition des successions en droit international et le 
probléme de la double imposition, Geneva, 1928, 8. 
85  Chrétién, M., Á la rechèrche du droit international fiscal commun, Sirey, 1959, 234; Croxatto, G.C., Diritto 
internazionale tributario, cited above, 451; Sacchetto, C., Territorialità (diritto tributario), cited above, 327. 
86 Sacchetto, C., Territorialità (diritto tributario), cited above, 327; Steve, S., Sulla tutela internazionale della pretesa 
tributaria, in Riv. Dir. Fin., 1940, 1, 241; Marino, G., L’unificazione del diritto tributario: tassazione mondiale verso 
tassazione territoriale, in VV.AA., Studi in onore di Victor Uckmar, Padua, 1997, vol. II, 872. The Italian Constitutional 
Court has, for example, stated that the state is generally free, in absence of any international or supranational rule 
to the contrary, to connect a tax debt to any event having an economic consistency, with the only limit of the 
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behaviour of the states in shaping their cross-border tax base often directly contradicts 
the assumptions based on territoriality, or rather on a strict interpretation of territoriality 
“in an objective sense”, with states expanding their tax bases even beyond their borders 
in order to attain purposes which, once again, are essentially political. 
Even if one could actually demonstrate, in practical terms, the existence of an 
uniform behaviour on the part of the states in defining their cross-border tax bases with 
reference to criteria that could be defined as “territorial”, this hypothetical uniform 
behaviour would not prove anything more than the fact that states, in shaping their tax 
systems, are constantly searching for a connection between the tax subject and the state’s 
territory or between the tax object and the state’s territory. This would not per se be 
enough, in fact, to demonstrate that such restraint on the part of the states is considered 
by the states themselves as “compulsory” by virtue of an obligation posed by 
international law and not just as the result of a mere consolidated practice87. 
Acknowledging all of the above has led numerous international tax scholars to 
denying not only the possibility to consider the concept of “territoriality” as part of 
international customary law88, but also to seriously doubt the very existence of customary 
international rules in the field of tax law89. 
However, some influential authors have still, and also recently, advocated the 
existence of an international common tax regime ruled by customary international law90. 
Nonetheless, it is clear from a closer look to the reasons behind these theories that the 																																																																																																																																																																													
prohibition of merely arbitrary tax provisions. On the point, see De Mita, E., Interesse fiscale e tutela del contribuente, 
Milan, 2000, 182, and the Constitutional Court’s judgement cited therein, amongst which especially Constitutional 
Court, May 4 1995, n. 143, in Boll. Trib. 1995, 873; Constitutional Court, June 14 2002, n. 250, in Giur. Cost. 2002, 3; 
Constitutional Court, July 25 2002, n. 399, in Giur. Cost. 2002, 4. 
87 Biscottini, G., Diritto amministrativo internazionale, cited above, 365. 
88 Most Italian and international scholars are essentially unanimous in denying the existence of an international 
customary rule embedding the principle of territoriality. On the point, see, for example, Manganelli, A., 
Territorialità dell’imposta, cited above, 369; Udina, M., Trattato di diritto internazionale, cited above; Uckmar, V., La 
tassazione degli stranieri in Italia, cited above, 50; Van Raad, K., Non discrimination in international tax law, The 
Hague, 1986, 25; Forry, J.I., Differences in tax treatment of foreign investors: domestic subsidiaries and domestic branches, 
The Hague, 1984, 20; Tarigo, P., Capacità contributiva e doppio d’imposta internazionale, in Riv. Dir. Trib., 2011, 1, 554; 
Qureshi, A.H., The freedom of a state to legislate in fiscal matters and international law, cited above, 14; Qureshi, A.H., 
The public international law of taxation. Text, cases and materials, London, 1994, 22. Contra, see, amonst others, Lupi, 
R., Territorialità del tributo, cited above, who quotes several influential scholars advocating the theory of the 
existence of an international customary rule in connection to the principle of non-discrimination; Maisto, G., Brevi 
riflessioni sulla evoluzione del concetto di ‘genuine link’ ai fini dell aterritorialità dell’imposizione tributaria tra diritto 
internazionale generale e diritto dell’Unione Europea, cited above. 
89 Some doubts have recently been voiced even with regards to the international tax treatment of diplomatic 
agents. More specifically, the traditional view (for example, Conforti, B., Diritto internazionale, cited above, 216) 
was that, according to a well-founded international customary rule, states refrain from taxing the income received 
by another state’s diplomatic agents within their territory, if said income is related to the exercise of public 
functions on the part of such agents. However, some authors have argued that the exemption of such income is 
not granted pursuant to an international customary rule, but rather by virtue of a mere “international courtesy”. 
Of this opinion, Udina, M., Diritto internazionale tributario, cited above, 157; Croxatto, G., Diritto internazionale 
tributario, cited above, 645. 
90 Avi-Yonah, R.S., International tax as international law. An analysis of the international tax regime, Cambridge, 2007, 
passim. 
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claim that an international tax regime exists rests mainly on the analysis of the current 
bilateral treaty network, which is made of conventions that are remarkably similar to one 
another, being based on the same Models (either the OECD Model or the UN Model)91. 
Starting from this (empirical) assumption, authors advocating the existence of such a 
regime essentially state that, since in most countries treaties enjoy a higher status than 
domestic law and since treaties typically override contrary domestic provisions, it would 
follow that countries are bound by treaty to behave in certain ways as far as the exercise 
of their taxing powers on foreign elements is concerned and cannot enact any legislation 
to the contrary. Consequently, according to these theories, international agreements 
would be able to create law for all states parties thereto and may lead to the creation of 
customary international law when such agreements are intended for adherence by states 
generally and are in fact widely accepted. 
Briefly said, the above-mentioned scholars argue that the network of bilateral tax 
treaties that are largely similar in policy constitutes an international tax regime, with 
underlying common principles such as the so-called “single tax principle” and the so-
called “benefit principle”92. 
Pursuant to the “single tax principle”, income from cross-border transactions 
should be subject to tax once, i.e. not more but also not less than one: basically, according 
to the theory that is being discussed, the “single tax principle” amounts to a general rule 
prohibiting double taxation but also double non-taxation. This view would be in line 
with the latest developments at OECD level, being that the Commentary to the Model 
Convention has been recently modified in order to clarify that the purpose of a bilateral 
tax treaty is not only to prevent international double taxation, but also to avoid that 
certain cross-border items of income elude taxation at a global level93. 
Furthermore, as far as the “benefits principle” is concerned, such principle 
basically allocates the right to tax active business income primarily to the source 																																																								
91 It has also been argued that the existence of an uniform practice on the part of the states in drafting their 
bilateral tax conventions, referring either to the OECD or the UN Model Conventions, would be the 
demonstration of a “particular” or “specific” customary rule embedding the principle of territoriality in the sense 
of the need for a state to levy taxes only in presence of an effective link between the territory and the income, 
where a “particular” or “specific” customary rule would be a customary rule formed and applicable only 
amongst a certain number of states. Of this opinion, Gaffuri, A.M., La tassazione dei redditi d’impresa prodotti 
all’estero. Principi generali, cited above, 342; on similar positions, Melis, G., Vincoli internazionali e norma tributaria 
interna, Rome, 2005, 1104. This thesis, however, would essentially lead to granting binding effects to Model 
Conventions such as those drafted by the OECD and the UN, which does not seem an acceptable result, given, 
amongst other elements, the number of reservations expressed by states to the provisions of such Model 
Conventions and that the OECD and the UN themselves explicitly recognise the non-binding nature of those 
Models. 
92 Avi-Yonah, R.S., International tax as international law. An analysis of the international tax regime, cited above, 3. 
93 As it is known, a considerably higher degree of attention is being paid nowadays by the OECD to the problems 
of evasion and elusion (e.g., the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting project’s aim was for states to work together to 
find possible solutions to traditional problems of international avoidance in the modern context). 
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jurisdiction and the right to tax passive investment income primarily to the residence 
jurisdiction94. 
However, this theory shows many points of weakness. 
First of all, the simple fact that, rebus sic stantibus, in the current situation where 
the “elusion alert” is particularly high, states recognise that double taxation conventions 
should play this sort of “double role” does not necessarily make the underlying 
statement a general principle of international law or an international customary rule. In 
fact, even if it could be theoretically possible to find a certain level of diuturnitas in the 
behaviour of the states, the second element of opinio juris ac necessitatis is evidently 
lacking, being this behaviour of the state essentially depending on mere political and 
economic reasons: in other words, one can hardly assume that states fight tax avoidance 
and/or tax evasion and to try to prevent a certain income from eluding taxation at the 
global level because they believe that not doing so would constitute an infringement of 
international obligations. 
Double taxation conventions are bilateral international instruments based on 
reciprocity, which makes them genetically unable to be any demonstration of the 
existence of a customary rule. In other words, the need for states to explicitly establish 
provisions to regulate the exercise of their taxing powers on a bilateral basis according to 
territorial criteria could be seen per se as proof of the absence of any customary binding 
rule establishing a duty to conform to territorial criteria in the taxation of cross-border 
income95. 
It has been correctly noted that the mere “sum” of the existing bilateral tax 
treaties is not sufficient in order to give rise to an international customary rule, being it 
necessary to distinguish between the simple practice generally followed by states and 
what states do because they are convinced that not doing it would lead to a breach of 
international law96. Especially if we consider, as it has been correctly highlighted, that tax 
treaties are by their own nature bilateral, nothing more than instruments of economic 
policies and tools for international players to realise a compromise between the 																																																								
94 For a brief overview of the benefit principle and its interplay with the allocation of taxing powers and principles 
such as taxation according to ability to pay, see Lang, J., La tassazione delle imprese nella competizione internazionale, 
in Riv. dir. fin., 2012, 2, 237. 
95 According to the mainstream opinion of international law scholars, treaty law can be considered as proof of the 
existence of a customary rule only with regards to multilateral conventions, which are quite rare in the field of tax 
law. On the contrary, many proposals have been promoted by international organisation in order to stipulate a 
treaty amongst more than two states to prevent international double taxation, which, once again, demonstrates 
the inexistence of any customary rule embedding the principle of tax territoriality in international law. 
96 Melis, G., Vincoli internazionali e norma tributaria interna, cited above. However, the author seems to contradict 
himself in the prosecution of his work when he states that, nonetheless, the uniform tax treaty practice at the 
international level with regards to some more specific concepts (such as the concept of permanent establishment 
or the arm’s length principle in the context of transfer pricing) could actually give rise to a binding customary 
rule in the field of tax law with regards to such more specific concepts. 
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commercial and economic needs of two states and to protect their tax bases and their 
entrepreneurs and capital exporters/importers97. 
Furthermore, the scope of application of double taxation conventions is almost 
exclusively limited to income taxation, which, if we were to embrace the above-
mentioned thesis, would result in the quite peculiar statement that a customary rule 
prescribing territorial taxation would be applicable to only some taxes and not to other 
taxes98. 
Moreover, bilateral tax treaties signed by states in the international practice are 
inspired essentially to two very different models (the OECD Model Conventions and the 
UN Model Convention99), which is another proof of the impossibility to derive the 
existence of a customary rule from the international law practice of the states, since the 
differences amongst bilateral treaties signed by countries might be sufficient to exclude 
not only the element of the existence of an “opinio juris ac necessitatis”, but also the 
requirement of “diuturnitas”. Otherwise, we would have to accept the existence of an 
“international” customary rule binding only to some states and not to other states, since, 
for example, some Latin American countries do not recognise the OECD Convention as a 
model, having resorted to another Model altogether100, and also Northern-European states 
have come up with their own multilateral convention101. Furthermore, such a theory 
seems even less convincing if we consider that many states have expressed reservations 
to both the OECD and the UN Model Conventions (and to their respective 
Commentaries), thus giving rise to many differences that radically exclude the presence 
of an “opinio juris”, and that, furthermore, some states expressly reserve themselves the 
right, in specific cases, to override bilateral tax treaties, or certain provisions of the tax 
treaties, and to apply their domestic provisions instead102. 
It must be clear, however, that what has been said above does not amount to 
denying the undoubted relevance played, in the international tax law practice, by the 																																																								
97 Sacchetto, C., Il diritto internazionale tributario tra norme del sistema costituzionale italiano, effettività ed utopia, cited 
above, 314. 
98 Maisto, G., Brevi riflessioni sulla evoluzione del concetto di ‘genuine link’ ai fini dell aterritorialità dell’imposizione 
tributaria tra diritto internazionale generale e diritto dell’Unione Europea, cited above. 
99 We will dwell more deeply on the two models and their influence in the international allocation of states’ taxing 
powers in the following pages of the research. 
100 I.e. the so-called “Andean Pact”, which, though of very limited application, is characterised by the employment 
of principles symmetrically opposed to those inspiring the OECD Model Convention, with a large 
implementation of territorial taxation, to the point that such Model does not entail any rule for the determination 
of the taxpayer’s residence in one of the contracting states. On the point, see Jaramillo, T., La fiscalidad internacional 
en la comunidad andina, in Uckmar, V. (ed.), Corso di diritto tributario, Milan, 1999, 805. 
101 The Nordic Convention on Income and Capital, entered into by Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and 
Sweden, which was concluded in 1983 and replaced in 1987, 1989 and 1996, even though this multilateral treaty 
follows the OECD Model very closely. 
102 For example, Article 1 of the United States Model Convention expressly provides a reservation to override tax 
treaties in favour of domestic rules towards U.S. citizens. 
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OECD and UN Model Conventions and by their respective Commentaries, whose 
influential contribution has most certainly rendered the implementation of international 
tax law more uniform and homogeneous and serves, in practice, as a guidance for the 
interpretation, by national judges, of international tax law provisions and concepts. 
Starting from the acknowledgment of the influential role of such Models some authors 
have even defined them as a “quasi-source” of international law or, better, as sources of 
soft law103. However, this does not automatically imply the possibility to define the 
practical criteria enshrined in such Models as the content of a “customary rule”, for all 
the reasons explained above. 
The debate on the problems at issue has also been influenced, in part, by the 
questions concerning the interactions between international tax treatment of foreign 
income and equality. In fact, once we acknowledge the possibility for states to tax 
foreigners in a different way depending on their state of residence, this assertion 
amounts to denying the existence of an obligation to treat foreigners and citizens in an 
equal way as far as taxation is concerned, which means denying the existence of a 
general principle of equality in international law or, at least, the existence of a principle 
of equality in international law with regards to taxation104. 
One should also bear in mind that this conclusion is somehow inevitable if we 
consider that it seems practically impossible to implement a general principle of equality 
in international taxation if, as it has been highlighted above, the situation of the two 
“categories” of taxpayers concerned, foreigners and citizens (i.e. non-residents and 
residents) cannot be compared. And that is because, first of all, while the state 
encounters practical limits and difficulties in enforcing its tax provisions on foreigners 
residing in a foreign territory, such limits and difficulties do not apply as far as taxation 
of the state’s citizens is concerned105. 
The answer is not changed by the fact that several double taxation conventions 
signed by states (and model conventions as well) entail provisions aimed at preventing 
discrimination based on nationality, by way of which citizens of a contracting state 
cannot be subject in the other contracting state to any tax (or administrative 																																																								
103 Sacchetto, C., Il diritto internazionale tributario tra norme del sistema costituzionale italiano, effettività ed utopia, cited 
above, 316. 
104 Of this opinion, Baggio, R., Il principio di territorialità ed i limiti alla potestà tributaria, cited above, 58; Croxatto, 
G.C., Diritto internazionale tributario, cited above, 644; Conforti, B., Diritto internazionale, cited above, 391; Uckmar, 
V., La tassazione degli stranieri in Italia, cited above, 58; Albrecht, A.R., The taxation of aliens under international law, 
cited above, 171. 
105 As highlighted by Baggio, this hypothetical “international principle of equality” would suffer many breaches by 
states which regularly grant a more favourable tax regime to foreign enterprises than the one reserved to their 
national business in order to improve their level of attractiveness towards foreign investments; see Baggio, R., Il 
principio di territorialità ed i limiti alla potestà tributaria, cited above, 58. 
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encumbrance) that is different or more burdensome then those imposed on that other 
state’s citizens106. On the contrary, it has been correctly stated that such conventional 
provisions are not in any way proof of the existence of a customary international rule 
enshrining a hypothetical principle of equality, but rather demonstrate the exact 
opposite, i.e. the fact that such a customary rule does not exist, being it the result of 
specific agreements between states107. 
Therefore, coming to a partial conclusion, if, on one hand, it may prove difficult, 
in light of all of the above, to identify the principle of territoriality as a general principle 
of international law or even as a customary rule of international law108, it is also true, on 
the other hand, that the international law perspective does not necessarily lead to 
questioning one of the implications of the principle of territoriality from a purely 
domestic perspective, that is to say the assumption that the mere legislative activity of 
the state does not per se imply an extraterritorial exercise of the state’s taxing powers109. In 
other words, there does not seem to be any international law rule or international law 
principle which has the effect of limiting the states’ freedom and independence, at least 
potentially, in establishing their domestic tax provisions and, more specifically, which 
elements should be considered as proper fiscal objects110. 
The only limit with this regard would seem to lie in the merely political analysis 
of the practical or “diplomatic” opportunity and measure of the expansion of the tax 
base beyond national borders, which usually leads states to refraining from including 
within their tax bases “foreign” elements that do not have any reasonable or effective 																																																								
106 Tax treaties usually provide for a non-discrimination clause preventing a contracting state from imposing 
citizens from the other contracting state a tax treatment that could be more burdensome than the one reserved to 
its own citizens. The same applies to the treatment of corporations or enterprises directly or indirectly controlled 
by residents of the other contracting state and also to the tax treatment of permanent establishments. These sorts 
of provisions are enshrined, as far as the OECD Model Convention is concerned, in Article 24. 
107 Croxatto, G.C., Diritto internazionale tributario, cited above, 644. Several authors, however, do not exclude that a 
customary international law preventing discrimination in international taxation could ever see the light, given the 
considerable amount of examples in state practice. On the point, see Udina, M., Il diritto internazionale tributario, 
cited above, 89. 
108 It has been stated that the international tax system does not know, by its own nature, any sort of jus publicum, 
being it the mere result of a network of bilateral double taxation conventions which do not go beyond the 
purpose to provide a contigent solution to practical problems. According to this view, conventions are the only 
way states can consciuosly create international law (see, for example, Dixon, M., Textbook on international law, 
London, 1993, 32). On the point, Sacchetto, C., Il diritto internazionale tributario tra norme del sistema costituzionale 
italiano, effettività ed utopia, cited above, 314. 
109 Sacchetto, C., Tutela all’estero dei crediti tributari dello Stato, Padua, 1978, 96. 
110 The idea that the state is potentially free to regulate any fact, circumstance or event with regards to any subject 
irrespective of where that fact takes place or where the subject resides has been defined as a corollary of one of 
the traditional principles of international law, i.e. the principle of universality of the legal order. On the point, see 
Sacchetto, C., Territorialità (diritto tributario), cited above, 325. Furthermore, according to Gaffuri, A.M., La 
tassazione dei redditi d’impresa prodotti all’estero. Principi generali, cited above, 313, income produced outside of a 
state’s national borders is as much indicative of an increase in economic resources as income produced within 
domestic territory and, as far as “natural” characteristics are concerned, foreign income is not inherently different 
from domestic-source income; therefore, there would be no reason for a state not to levy tax on foreign income 
based exclusively on its location. 
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link to their authority111. But, again, this kind of pondering does not seem to find its 
source in any international law binding rule (either of a normative or a customary 
nature) or general principle, but only in evaluations of a strictly political nature112. The 
same, on the other hand, as it will be shown in the following pages of the present work, 
cannot be said with regards to the effects of the European Union’s legal order on the 
Member States’ taxing powers. 
In other words, if, from an international law perspective, it might be accepted, in 
light of all of the above, that there are some limits to the states’ taxing powers and to the 
extension of such powers beyond national borders, such limits, given the current 
situation of the international practice of the states and given the undoubted difficulty, 
rebus sic stantibus, of tracing any underlying rule or principle on the point in the field of 
international law, should be qualified as no more than the result of the exercise of a self-
limiting restraint on the part of the states113. 
It also follows that no internationally binding rule or principle can be considered 
as effectively able to prevent the inevitable consequence of this free and independent 
parallel exercise of taxing powers on the part of the states, i.e. international double 
taxation, with the consequent (practical) need for states to resort to bilateral tax 
conventions114. 
It should also be highlighted that, according to some authors, even if it could 
actually be argued that international law entails a rule pursuant to which states may 
exercise their taxing powers on taxpayers and/or items of income only if there is a 																																																								
111 Mann, F.A., The doctrine of jurisdiction in international law, cited above, 96. 
112 Several authors have highlighted that bilateral tax treaties and the allocation of taxing powers they realise do 
not follow any criterion based on equity or rationality, but rather depend on the political and commercial 
strength of each state, which also exercise a sort of “peer-pressure” leading to a substantial uniformation of states’ 
tax systems. Lang, for example, has stated that national legislation does not (and cannot) nowadays act in an 
autonomous and independent way in the context of fiscal competition, being it, on the contrary, subject to a 
“pressure to conform”, as a justification of a systematic change in the field of taxation of enterprises and of capital 
investment. According to the Author, even the United States had to give in to this pressure: see Lang, J., La 
tassazione delle imprese nella competizione internazionale, cited above, 237. Of this opinion, see also Knoll, M.S., The 
corporate income tax and the competitiveness of U.S. industries, in Tax Law Review, 2010, 771; Owens, J., Taxation 
within a context of economic globalisation, in Bulletin of International Taxation, 1998, 290; Lodin, S., Lodin, O., 
International tax issues in a rapidly changing world, in Bulletin of International Taxation, 2001, 1; Sacchetto, C., Il 
diritto internazionale tributario tra norme del sistema costituzionale italiano, effettività ed utopia, cited above, 315. 
113 Steve, S., Sulla tutela internazionale della pretesa tributaria, cited above, 243; Sacchetto, C., Territorialità (diritto 
tributario), cited above, 327. Contra, see Manganelli, A., Territorialità dell’imposta, cited above, 369, where the 
Author asserts that, given the circumstance that states, in practice, levy taxes on elements that are somehow 
characterised by some kind of link (either subjective or objective) to their territory, the question whether they do 
so by virtue of an international customary rule or because of a mere “self-restraint” on their part due to political 
reasons is irrelevant and merely “theoretical”, since the practical result would be the same in both cases. 
114 The fact that the exclusive purpose of bilateral tax treaties is to provide a practical solution to contingent 
problems connected to international double taxation is recognised, for example, also by the Commentary to the 
OECD Model Convention, which expressly states that the concept of “residence” is relevant for three purposes 
only: “a) in determining a convention’s personal scope of application; b) in solving cases where double taxation arises in 
consequence of double residence; c) in solving cases where double taxation arises as a consequence of taxation in the state of 
residence and in the state of source or situs” (OECD, Model Tax Convention on income and on capital - Condensed version, 
Paris, 2014, 85). 
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connection between such elements and the territory of the states, such a rule would not 
have any practical result. This is because this hypothetical rule would not be able to 
prevent the exercise of concurring taxing powers by states on the same elements and, 
therefore, the effects of international double taxation, since an element, a fact or a person 
which might be fiscally relevant may very well be connected to more than one territory, 
depending on the kind of connection that is deemed necessary115. 
The conclusion is, therefore, that when a state exercises its tax jurisdiction on the 
basis of the “principle of territoriality” as it stands in international law, said state has the 
choice as to the geographical extent of its tax jurisdiction: either said jurisdiction is 
exercised solely on domestic income or it is exercised also on foreign income, meaning 
that according to the principle of territoriality, a state is normally at liberty to tax foreign 
income subject to all limitations provided for by bilateral tax treaties116. 
In other words, pursuant to international law, a state could actually tax a non-
resident company or individual without any limitations derived by generally recognised 
international rules, so that not even a tax imposed on a taxpayer without any significant 
link (or even any link whatsoever) with the taxing state could not be considered as an 
infringement of any provision of international law117. Therefore, since, according to 
literature, there is no juridical foundation to any doctrine stating that the taxing power of 
a state cannot be exercised beyond the taxpayer’s assets on that state’s territory, 
theoretically speaking a state could very well tax non-residents’ income on a worldwide 
basis. 
According to part of legal doctrine, however, taxing powers need some sort of 
link to be exercised. It follows that a state could exercise its taxing powers only insofar as 
the company or the individual taxed is somehow “linked” to the state itself. This link, or 
nexus, is generally conceived as a “physical” one, so that the company or the individual 
at issue can be taxed by a state only if it/he/she resides within the territory of that state 
or has its/his/her abode there and so on. The same authors also state that the link 
between the taxpayer and the taxing authority is (rectius, should be) not only the 
condition allowing the latter to impose taxes on the taxpayer, but also the measure of the 
amount of tax that can be levied. 																																																								
115 Croxatto, G., La imposizione delle imprese con attività internazionale, cited above, 45; Tarigo, P., La doppia imposizione 
giuridica internazionale come fattispecie disciplinata nei trattati bilaterali, in Riv. dir. trib., 2009, 670. Contra, Gaffuri, 
A.M., La tassazione dei redditi d’impresa prodotti all’estero. Principi generali, cited above, 331. 
116 Monsenego, J., Taxation of foreign business income within the European internal market, The Hague, 2012, 11. 
117 According to the mainstream literature, “there is no territorial principle in international law which limits taxation to 
income arising within the territory to fiscal subjects within the jurisdiction”; see Qureshi, A.H., The freedom of a state to 
legislate in fiscal matters under general international law, cited above, 16; Greggi, M., Revisiting Schumacker: the role of 
limited tax liability in EU law, in Richelle, I., Schon, W., Traversa, E. (eds.), Allocating taxing powers within the 
European Union, Heidelberg, 2013, 50. 
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Despite the fact that the same authors advocating the last-mentioned position 
admit that there are no positive rules or customary principles endorsing their opinions118, 
most states recognise, in practical terms, that their taxing powers can be exercised only in 
presence of a nexus between the individual or the company and their legal system or 
their territory119. In the vast majority of cases, the state where the income has its source 
also limits its taxes to the ability to pay manifested by an individual or a company in its 
territory, thus implementing a sort of proportionality rule. Thus, states - source states, to 
be exact - show, in merely practical terms, an intrinsic self-restraint when dealing with a 
taxpayer that has got no any kind of link to their territory. 
There is also another point to be considered, which is of paramount relevance for 
the continuation of the present research. Excluding the possibility to define territoriality 
as embedded in an international customary rule has its consequences on European 
Union law as well. The Court of Justice of the European Union has, in fact, consistently 
stated that the Union is bound by international law, including customary international 
law120. Customary international law, therefore, binds the European Union legislature and 
must be complied with in all European Union actions. It follows that ruling out that 
territoriality could constitute an internationally binding customary rule excludes the 
duty for the European Union legislature to comply with it and for the Court of Justice to 
find the illegitimacy of provisions which are not in line with territoriality. 
In light of the above, once we have excluded the possibility to describe 
territoriality as a principle enshrined in international tax law and as an example of a 
customary international law, the only possible solution to define territoriality is to go 
back to its national dimension, defining it as a corollary of national sovereignty, as a 
inherent character of the state’s sovereign powers, also in fiscal matters. 
																																																								
118 Chrétien, M., A la recherche du droit international fiscal commun, cited above. 
119 According to Qureshi (cited above), “there is indeed a discernible practice of states to base fiscal jurisdiction on certain 
common reasonable links”, even though the vast differences amongst states’ practice on the point prevents from 
ascertaining the existence of a common principle of international customary law. 
120 The Court held, for example, that “when it adopts an act, [the European Union] is bound to observe international law 
in its entirety, including customary international law, which is binding upon the institutions of the European Union” 
(Court of Justice of the European Union, 21 December 2011, C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America and 
Others v. Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change). In the same judgement, the Court has specified that the 
standard of review for compliance with customary international law on the part of European Union measures is 
less intense than the standard applicable to verify the compatibility of EU law with international agreements: 
“since a principle of customary international law does not have the same degree of precision as a provision of an international 
agreemtn, judicial review must necessarily be limited to the question whether, in adopting the act in question, the 
institutions of the European Union made manifest errors of assessment concerning the conditions for applying those 
principles”. 
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4. The new face of territoriality as a criterion for the allocation of taxing powers 
in search of a reasonable and genuine fiscal attachment: worldwide taxation 
vs. source taxation. 
 Having established what “fiscal sovereignty” and “fiscal jurisdiction” entail, and 
having established that, in practice, even in absence of any binding international law rule 
or principle on the point, states recognise that fiscal jurisdiction should have its own 
bounds, being it a concept strictly linked to state sovereignty - which is essentially 
somewhat “limited” in the terms explained above - the question now should be how 
states establish the limits of their fiscal jurisdiction. 
As it has correctly been argued, all studies concerning the territorial scope of 
application of tax law, even though they have resulted in a rigorous theoretical analysis 
and description of the problem at national and international level, have left open a 
considerable number of questions of a practical nature, e.g. the problem of juridical 
double taxation121. Therefore, the attention of the authors has recently shifted to the 
elaboration of more “technical” principles - or rather criteria - with the purpose to 
mediate or minimise the prejudicial effects of international double taxation on the 
efficiency and equity of international taxation. 
In other words, assuming that it seems impossible, or at least extremely difficult, 
in light of what has been said above, to consider territoriality as a “principle” embedded 
in international law (which would imply recognising its role as a source of law in the 
international context) or as part of customary international law, and also assuming that, 
in the national context, talking of territoriality essentially means dealing with problems 
of definition of the state’s tax base, contemporary studies of the topic at issue tend to 
focus on an entirely different, more practical and technical, point of view. This change of 
perspective has been partly justified by the considerable level of attention currently 
being paid to the problems posed by international (juridical) double taxation and to the 
consequent need to find ways to prevent them and to ensure the efficiency of 
transnational trade and the highest possible level of equity of taxation on taxpayers, 
attempting to minimize as much as possible the prejudicial effects of international 
double taxation. 
As a result, the concept known as “territoriality”, even though still considered as 
one of the paramount landmarks of international tax law, has undergone a progressive 
“demotion” of its role, going from being considered a fundamental “principle” of 																																																								
121 Sacchetto, C., Territorialità (diritto tributario), cited above, 328. 
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international tax law122 to being reduced to a mere “criterion” used by states to guide their 
economic policies and to allocate their taxing powers over cross-border tax bases, in an 
attempt to reach a higher level of fiscal neutrality in the context of international trade123-124. 
In other terms, the “decline” of the dogmatic value of the principle of territoriality has 
led to its rationalisation and technicalisation125.  
 Consequently, “territorial taxation” is now synonym to a tax model according to 
which states only levy taxes on income produced or having its source within their 
territories or, in other words, on income that is linked to the states’ territory in light of an 
objective connection126. This model of taxation, based on an interpretation of territoriality 
as a criterion, is generally referred to as “source taxation”, as opposed to the “worldwide 
taxation” model, according to which states may tax all income accrued upon their 
residents, nationals or citizens irrespective of where those income are located or have 
their source127. 
As far as international tax law is concerned, there are no generally recognised 
rules according to which a state must tax resident individuals or companies on their 
worldwide income, while taxing non-resident individuals or companies only on the 
income they produce within its territory (limited tax liability). However, it has been 
highlighted that there is a remarkable degree of convergence between tax regimes of 
developed countries, not only as far as international rules are concerned, but with 																																																								
122 If one can actually speak of a real “principle”, in light of all that has been said supra on the debate concerning 
territoriality in the national and international context. 
123 Sacchetto, in acknowledging the progressive “evolution” of territoriality from principle to criterion, recognises 
that this process has been essentially fostered by Anglo-Saxon authors, who are traditionally more focused on 
empirical and operative aspects of the problem. See, on the point, Sacchetto, C., Territorialità (diritto tributario), 
cited above, 305. 
124 Looking beyond the borders of tax law, this evolution has been theorised by Kelsen, who essentially stated that 
all norms are valid “always and everywhere” if limitations to their territorial or temporal validity are not 
provided by the norms themselves. In other words, possible limitations to the validity of the norms, according to 
Kelsen, are not to be found in the nature and essence of the norms, but exclusively in the single positive legal 
order. 
125 As it has been stated by Krüger, territoriality has not lost its central role as an institutional concept in 
international law, but what has progressivley lost its importance is the institutional element of the principle of 
territoriality; see Krüger, Allgemeine Staatslehre, Stuttgart, 1964, 98, as quoted in Sacchetto, C., Territorialità (diritto 
tributario), cited above, 328. 
126 According to the IBFD International Tax Glossary, the definition of “territoriality” is as follows: “Term used in the 
context of international taxation to connote the principle of levying tax only within the territorial jurisdiction of a sovereign 
tax authority or country. The underlying theory is that no taxes can be levied outside this area without violating the 
sovereign tax authority of another state. Consequently, both residents and non-residents of a state adopting this principle are 
only taxed on the income from sources in that country and on property situated in that country. Residents are not normally 
taxed on any foreign-source income (sometimes, however, subject to anti-avoidance measures). The term may also refer to the 
principle that a state has the right to tax all persons, property and activity within its borders. The term is also used in a 
similar way in the context of EU direct taxation, although the precise meaning appears still to be evolving”. 
127 Traditional doctrine has observed that this dichotomy revolves around the two most relevant moments, for tax 
purposes, in the production of the income, with a higher degree of attention being paid to the initial and final 
moment of such process: the genesis of the income, its production, which, of course, takes place in the source 
state, and the final step of the process, i.e. its consumption, whihc is generally performed in the state of residence 
of whoever receives the income. This view has been voiced, for example, in the 1923 League of Nations report Sur 
la double imposition présenté au Comitié financier par MM Bruins, Einaudi, Seligman et Stamp. 
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regards to purely domestic tax provisions as well. The need to face similar problems in 
taxing income has led different jurisdictions with different starting points to reach quite 
similar results128. 
Despite such a significant convergence in international tax law, important 
differences remain when comparing domestic tax laws as well as other areas outside the 
income tax treaty network, the main one being the difference between states adopting 
worldwide (or “universal”) income taxation systems and states following strictly 
territorial models129. 
Admittedly, the above-mentioned distinction between worldwide and territorial 
jurisdictions has become more and more blurred with the constant evolution of modern 
tax systems, aiming, on one hand, at preventing taxpayers from putting in place undue 
profit shifting measures - thus somewhat expanding their tax jurisdictions beyond the 
state’s physical borders - and, on the other hand, at attracting new investments. It 
follows that worldwide jurisdictions do not generally tax their residents on all foreign 
source income130 and, in practice, source jurisdictions do not limit their taxing powers to 
domestic income only. For these reasons as well, scholars have highlighted a sort of 
convergence between the two models131. 
 Taking a step back, it should be highlighted that if, on one hand, the source-
residence dichotomy lies on a question of legitimacy of taxing powers, the worldwide-
territoriality dichotomy relates to the extension of taxing powers, i.e. to the extension of 
the powers to levy taxes on income derived from cross-border activities132. 
 In this new perspective, the central concept is that of “fiscal attachment”. 
 Said concept has the purpose to explain and describe the relationship between the 
entity holding fiscal jurisdiction (i.e. the state) and the fiscal subject or the object of 
taxation, thus determining the possibility (again, on a merely practical level, since, on the 
theoretical level, this possibility for the state seems boundless) for the first to extend its 
fiscal jurisdiction to the latter. Differently said, the concept of “fiscal attachment” serves 
to explain the relationship between the holder of fiscal jurisdiction and the fiscal subject 																																																								
128 It has been noted, for example, that countries that were initially characterised by a “global” tax system, taxing 
all income from whatever source derived in the same way, have now incorporated schedular elements, whereas 
countries (such as the United Kingdom) with a schedular background have largely adopted schedules for “other 
income” that lead to a global tax base. 
129 This distinction is mirrored in the OECD Model Convention, since, as we will see, it makes provisions, with two 
alternative articles, in order to allow States to choose which method to prevent juridical double taxation they see 
as more fit to the structure of their own tax system: a foreign tax credit article for worldwide jurisdictions (Article 
23 B of the OECD Model Convention) and an exemption article of territorial jurisdictions (Article 23 A of the 
OECD Model Convention). 
130 For example, income earned through foreign subsidiaries controlled by residents is not generally taxed by the 
State of residence of the controlling entity, even though there are several anti-deferral regimes in place. 
131 Avi-Yonah, R. S., Sartori, N., Marian, O., Global perspectives on income taxation law, London, 2011, 151. 
132 Sacchetto, C., L’evoluzione del principio di territorialità e la crisi della tassazione, cited above, 35. 
	 48 
or object of taxation, determining, according to some, the legality of the exercise of fiscal 
jurisdiction133. 
Going back to what was said before about the distinction between personal 
sovereignty and territorial sovereignty, authors generally distinguish between 
“personal” fiscal attachments and “economic” fiscal attachments. In case the relationship 
between the state and the fiscal subject is indirect - that is to say when the object of the 
tax is located in the state exercising fiscal jurisdiction (e.g. property and other sources of 
income within the taxing state) - the fiscal attachment is deemed to be “economic”134. 
Scholars have traditionally traced a distinction between the different linking 
criteria based on the elements on which such criteria are founded. 
On one hand, some links are defined as “objective”, connecting taxing powers to 
elements located or taking place within the territory of the taxing state, with such 
presence being seen as a symptom of “economic allegiance”: in an extreme simplification 
of a much more complicated reality, it can be stated that these are the links which are 
used by a state whose tax system is inspired by the “source principle”, which is the 
paramount benchmark of systems adhering to territorial taxation. 
On the other hand, there are some other links, which are defined as “personal” or 
“subjective links”, that are generally based on the taxpayer’s residence (as a sort of 
“social allegiance”) - or, anyway, on other similar characteristics, such as the taxpayer’s 
citizenship (“political allegiance”)135 - irrespective of where the income being part of that 
taxpayer’s tax base originates. This is the criterion used by all those states implementing 
a tax system based on the so-called “worldwide taxation principle”. 
The concept of fiscal attachment must be complemented by the concept of fiscal 
liability, which defines the extent of the tax liability or the scope of the taxing power of 
the entity holding tax jurisdiction in relation to a specific fiscal subject or object. 
Fiscal liability can be either unlimited or limited. In case of unlimited fiscal 
liability, the holder of fiscal jurisdiction can assess and consequently tax all income 
wherever accrued on the taxpayer’s part. This system is generally known as “worldwide 
taxation” and corresponds with the employment of personal fiscal attachments based on 																																																								
133 Martha, R. S. J., Extraterritorial taxation in international law, cited above, 23. 
134 It must be noted that there are also fields where international law (or, better said, international conventions) 
allows state to exercise certain functional powers in connection with particular rights and privileges conferred on 
states by specific conventions, such as the 1982 Montego Bay Convention on the Law of the Seas, which has 
introduced a phenomenon which has been defined as an original fiscal jurisdiction of a territorial nature 
attributed to an international organisation.  On the point of “functional jurisdiction” to tax, see, amongst others, 
Martha, R. S. J., Extraterritorial taxation in international law, cited above, 25 and the authors cited therein. 
135 The United States’ tax system, for example, is based on the taxpayer’s citizenship. However, the U.S. example 
constitutes an exception in the international tax arena, being that the most commonly used tax system is based on 
the combination of objective and subjective criteria, i.e. on the taxpayer’s residence and the localisation of the 
source of the income. 
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either nationality or residence. In case of limited fiscal liability, the taxing state has the 
right to tax only the income derived from sources located within its territory; hence the 
definition of this type of system, which is generally named “territorial taxation”, even 
though, as we are going to further develop in the following paragraphs, there is a certain 
degree of doubt on the correct use of such term. However it may be, limited fiscal 
liability corresponds with the employment of either personal fiscal attachments (short of 
residence) or economic fiscal attachments136. 
Needless to say that the actual descriptive value of these definitions is 
considerably limited, if compared with the reality of state practices in defining their tax 
bases. In the majority of cases, in fact, income taxes are levied by resorting to both kinds 
of criteria. Roughly speaking, the same state usually taxes residents on their income 
wherever it originates, while non-residents are taxed only if and when - and inasmuch as 
- their income (or part of their income) originates from sources located within the 
territory of the state levying taxes137. 
Furthermore, one should not underestimate the relevance, with regards to the 
definition of “territoriality” and its implications for the definition of the scope of the 
states’ taxing powers, of the progressive evolution of modern systems of taxation, which 
have gradually gone from adhering to a “real” (or “objective”) model of taxation to 
adopting a “personal” (or “subjective”) model138. In many countries, in fact, worldwide 
taxation has been adopted as the main criterion for taxing residents when “personal” 
income taxation was introduced139. 
This change of perspective has also caused a shift in the point of view from which 
the problem of territoriality had been traditionally analysed. The “classical” theories 
based on the idea of taxing powers as a manifestation of the territorial sovereignty of the 
state over persons and things that are located therein have given way to a new 
perspective where the state’s taxing power became not only linked to the things existing 
																																																								
136 Thus, as a rule, the type of fiscal attachment employed throws light not only on the subjective side of the fiscal 
relationship, but also on the extent of the fiscal liability; see Martha, R. S. J., Extraterritorial taxation in international 
law, cited above, 24. 
137 This is true, though quite simplistic, as far as direct taxation is concerned, while with regards to indirect taxes, 
the attention is generally focused on the source of the income. 
138 Bizioli, G., La capacità contributiva nella dimensione internazionale, cited above, 252. 
139 Gaffuri, A.M., La tassazione dei redditi d’impresa prodotti all’estero. Principi generali, cited above, 296. In Italy, for 
example, personal direct taxation was introduced for the first time with the complementary progressiva income 
tax instituted in 1925. The provisions governing such tax established that the tax base should include income 
produced abroad and enjoed in Italian territory by persons residing therein and income produced abroad by 
subjects that were domiciled or resident in Italy whenever such income was not taxed in the source state by virtue 
of international conventions. In 1954 the tax on corporations was introduced: Italian corporations were taxed on 
their income wherever produced, while foreign corporations were liable to tax only on the income produced in 
Italy through a permanent establishment. The full adoption of “worldwide taxation” was completed through the 
1970s reform, with the introduction of income tax for physical persons and collective entities. 
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on that state’s territory, but also to the subjects who are somehow connected not much to 
the territory of the state, but to the state itself. 
The consequence has been a deep modification of the political and economic 
meaning of the link connecting the state with the object of its taxes. Said link is, thus, no 
longer considered as being reduced only to the territory of the state, but has evolved into 
a “personal” or “subjective” connection between the state and the taxpayer. From this 
perspective, the citizen or national of the state becomes the obvious “prototype” of the 
taxpayer contributing to the public coffins of that state, while the problem remains as to 
if, when, how and how much a state should levy its taxes on aliens. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the majority of the states levy their taxes on the 
worldwide income accrued on their nationals or residents or citizens wherever it 
originates140, there are still many states141 whose tax systems follow a strictly territorial 
model. On the other hand, on the international scenario, tax models based on the 
worldwide taxation principle vary considerably from one country to another. France, for 
example, taxes its residents on their worldwide income if they are physical persons and 
only on the income originating within French territory in case they are corporations142. 
Furthermore, some other countries exempt from taxation only certain categories of 
income originated abroad143. 																																																								
140 Notwithstanding the legitimate questions concerning nationality as a proper basis on which to ground a fiscal 
attachment with a tax subject, from the perspective of international law, a state could be fully entitled to tax its 
nationals wherever they may be, irrespective of the source of the income and irrespective of where their nationals 
are located. The question in this case is how to determine who can be considered as being a “national” of a certain 
state. Any further analysis of the problem goes beyond the scope and purpose of this research. Suffice it to say, on 
the point, that as far as nationality of natural persons is concerned international law essentially leaves it to 
national law to determine the relevant criteria to be employed, while this is not the case with regards to 
nationality of juridical persons. Concerning the latter, states generally hold that their nationality is that of the 
state of incorporation (on the point, see, for example, International Court of Justice, Barcelona Traction, 1970, ICJ 
Rep). However, practice shows that very few states resort to an entitlement to tax based on nationality. The most 
common fiscal attachment employed by states is the one based on residence, which essentially leads to the same 
results as a system taxing on the basis of nationality, i.e. taxation on a worldwide basis. Non-resident aliens may, 
thus, be taxed only on the income derived from sources located within the taxing state and on property located 
within the taxing state. It must be noted that some civil law countries, such as Italy and France, do not have a 
specific and autonomous definition of “residence” for tax purposes, essentially referring to the definition which 
applies for the purposes of private law, with some necessary adaptations. On the other hand, some other states 
(e.g. Germany and Spain) have introduced an autonomous definition of “fiscal residence”, while other countries 
resort to entirely different and more complicated concepts (for example, the United Kingdom makes a distinction, 
a far as tax law is concerned, between domiciled and non-domiciled residents). For a more detailed analysis on 
the point, see Pistone, P., The impact of EU law on tax treaties. Issues and solutions, Amsterdam, 2002, 179. The 
question becomes even more complicated with regards to legal persons, which are essentially “juridical 
creations” that are not characterised by any effective and “physical” relation with the territory. Some states define 
the residence of a legal person referring to its place of incorporation, while, according to other states, attention 
should be paid either to the place where the legal person’s administrative bodies are located or to the place where 
the board meetings for the day-to-day administration of the entity are held (so-called “place of central 
administration”) or, again, to the place where the highest level of the decision-making process is held (the so-
called “place of effective management”). 
141 Such as Hong Kong, Kenya, Uruguay and, more generally, many Latin-American countries. 
142 A more detailed analysis of the French tax system will be provided in Chapter III. 
143 Switzerland, for example, does not levy any tax on business income produced abroad through a permanent 
establishment and also on any income stemming from real property located in foreign territory. Australia 
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In light of the above, it is possible to observe that the connecting factors used by 
states to define the scope of their taxing powers show an increasing tendency towards a 
progressive detachment from the territory of the state per se: the connection is not (or not 
only) with the territory anymore, but with the state itself. From this perspective, some 
authors have talked about a progressive “dematerialisation” of the principle (or 
criterion) of territoriality144, in favour of linking criteria based on more personal elements, 
such as nationality, citizenship or residence, the latter to be interpreted not as a 
“physical” or “material” link between the taxpayer and the territory of the state, but 
rather as a “subjective” connection linking the taxpayer to a certain community. 
Starting from an empirical analysis of the reality of international taxation, it can 
be observed that capital-exporting countries generally shape their fiscal systems in 
conformity with the “worldwide taxation” model, since the production of income by 
their residents on the international level largely contributes to those states’ public coffins, 
while capital-importing countries are more incline to follow a strictly territorial tax 
model, given the reduced level of activity abroad on the part of their residents and the 
higher level of complexity required by a worldwide tax model in terms of administrative 
burdens145.  
In more general terms, it seems safe to say that no country that levies an income 
tax forgoes taxing domestic-sourced income, irrespective of who has derived it 146 . 
Therefore, it can be stated that, according to consolidated and uniform state practice, 
domestic-sourced income, as far as it is taxable, should be taxed whether derived by 
foreigners or by nationals. In contrast, taxation of income having its source in a foreign 
territory differs significantly from state to state. Most countries tax resident individuals 
and corporations with respect to their worldwide income and some even tax the 
worldwide income of citizens as well147. 
However, this general empirical rule is subject to a considerable number of 
exceptions. 
First of all, as it has been mentioned above, some countries tax their residents on 
their worldwide income and non-residents only on the income having its source within 
their territory; other states levy income tax on a strictly territorial basis, taxing domestic-																																																																																																																																																																													
exempts foreign income whenever such income is already subject to tax in the state where it originates. The same 
applies to the Netherlands’ tax system, even though only with regards to business income produced abroad 
through permanent establishments, dividends distributed to holding companies and some other categorie of 
foreign income. 
144 Sacchetto, C., Territorialità (diritto tributario), cited above, 313. 
145 Ogley, A., The principles of international tax, London, 1992, 23. 
146 Ault, H.J., Arnold, B.J. (eds.), Comparative income taxation - A structural analysis, 2010, London, 429. 
147 Vogel, K., Worldwide vs source taxation of income. A review and re-evaluation of arguments, in Intertax, 1988, 217. 
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source income and not taxing foreign income at all, while other states tax only domestic-
source income of corporations and tax individuals on their worldwide income if 
residents or citizens or nationals. Secondly, some countries exempt only certain classes of 
foreign income from domestic taxation148 and many countries exempt foreign income 
under double taxation conventions. The result of the interplay between the above-
mentioned models in the international context is a kind of “dual situation”, where 
connecting factors of a territorial nature are considered as only some of the multiple 
possible connections between a certain situation and the state or, coming to direct 
taxation, between a certain income and the state’s taxing powers. 
4.1. Allocation of taxing powers amongst states: equity and neutrality. 
 The debate on which of the two models (either worldwide taxation or territorial 
taxation) should be preferred has focused on two essential profiles: tax neutrality and 
equity. 
 Equity is a subjective criterion based on social and political - and not strictly 
scientific - assumptions. Equity considerations should, first of all, distinguished between 
those referring to the position of the single taxpayer (“individual equity”) and those 
which refer to the positions of the state of citizenship or residence and the state of source 
(so-called “inter-nations equity”)149. 
As far as equity with regards to the position of single taxpayers is concerned, 
authors have traditionally distinguished the concept of “equity” into two aspects: 
“horizontal equity” - requiring taxpayers in the same economic situation to be treated 
equally in the sense that the same taxes should be levied on the same amounts of income 
- and “vertical equity”, meaning that taxpayers with higher income should be subject to 
higher levels of taxation150. In other words, questions concerning “individual equity” 
essentially amount to questions of equality. In general terms, individual equity is 
considered attained whenever taxation reflects the taxpayer’s ability to pay, which, 
according to some authors’ opinion, coincides with the taxpayer’s income151. 
																																																								
148 For example, Switzerland traditionally does not tax foreign business income derived through a permanent 
establishment located abroad. 
149 Musgrave, P.B., Taxation of foreign investment income: an economic analysis, Baltimore, 1963, as cited in Vogel, K., 
Worldwide vs source taxation of income. A review and re-evaluation of arguments, cited above, Part III, 394. 
150 Part of the legal doctrine has strongly adversed the distinction between “horizontal” and “vertical” equity. See, 
for example, Kaufman, N.H., Fairness and the taxation of international income, in Georgetown Journal of 
International Law, 1997, 145. 
151 Marino, G., L’unificazione del diritto tributario: tassazione mondiale verso tassazione territoriale, in VV.AA., Studi in 
onore di Victor Uckmar, Padua, 1997, 861. 
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As far as inter-nations equity is concerned, on the other hand, the concept relates 
to the circumstance that each state in the international tax arena should receive its fair 
share of tax revenue in relation to transactions connected to its territory. The purpose is, 
therefore, the equitable division of the international tax revenue between the countries 
that are involved to some extent in the generation of international income. Ideally, such a 
goal should be achieved by way of bilateral double taxation conventions or bilateral 
agreements between states as equal parties reciprocally recognising their mutual taxing 
rights152. From a theoretical perspective, inter-nations equity considerations generally 
tend to favour taxation by the source state. 
According to part of the doctrine, “personal tax systems”, i.e. tax systems based 
on the worldwide taxation principle, are more equitable than “objective tax systems”, 
since they are supposed to take into account the actual amount of the taxpayer’s wealth 
(its ability to pay), taking into consideration all income accrued on the same taxpayer, 
irrespective of the location of its sources. Economic studies, in fact, have, in general 
terms, shown a tendency to justify taxation at source on the so-called “benefit principle”, 
while, from this perspective, the worldwide taxation model based on residence would be 
inspired to the “ability-to-pay principle”153. 
It has also been argued that a tax system based on a worldwide taxation model 
leads to more “equitable” results than a system based on a purely territorial model, since 
it would prevent any discrimination in favour of those taxpayers who produce their 
income, at least in part, in foreign territories, with a specific view to ensuring the 
application of a progressive tax rate154. 
On the other hand, the question of tax neutrality is connected to the problem of 
the efficient allocation of assets on the international arena and has amongst its main 
purposes the attainment of a higher level of efficiency in the tax system on a global 
level155. In general terms, the concept of “neutrality” is based on the assumption that 
productivity rises to its highest levels when productive factors are allocated by market 
forces without any public intervention. Tax provisions are, therefore, neutral when they 																																																								
152 Rohatgi, R., Basic international taxation. Principles, cited above, 23. The author highlights that reciprocity is 
considered as one of the key-principles in the context of international law and of international taxation. 
153 Fleming jr., J., Clifton, J., Peroni, R.J., Shay, S.E., Fairness in international taxation: the ability-to-pay case for taxing 
worldwide income, in Florida Tax Review, 2001, 301. Contra, Rohatgi, R., Basic international taxation. Principles, cited 
above, 22, according to whom both source taxation and worldwide taxation are based on the benefit theory. 
154 Croxatto, G., L’imposizione delle imprese con attività internazionale, cited above, passim. 
155 Garbarino, C., La tassazione del reddito transnazionale, cited above, 76. Some authors have proposed a distinction 
between the concept of “neutrality” and the concept of “efficiency” as far as allocation of taxing powers of the 
state in the international context is concerned, advocating that efficiency, in the sense of an efficient allocation of 
production factors, should be sought by states rather than neutrality. Of this opinion, Peters, C., International tax 
neutrality and non-discrimination: plea for a more explicit dialogue between the state and the market, in Lang, M. (ed.), Tax 
treaties: building bridges between law and economics, Amsterdam, 2010, 614. 
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do not influence - or influence to a very limited extent - the distribution of productive 
factors realised by market forces156. Briefly put, the basic idea behind the concept and 
theory of fiscal neutrality is that taxes should be imposed in such a way that economic 
processes continue to operate as if no taxes were levied at all, or, more realistically, that 
they are distorted as little as possible157-158. 
The underlying assumption to all of the debate at issue is that it is understood 
that tax laws will never be completely neutral, but as far as efficiency is desirable, a high 
degree of neutrality should be sought159. 
All studies on tax neutrality have essentially distinguished between two different 
aspects: capital export neutrality and capital import neutrality160 - 161 . In short, export 
neutrality means that the investor should pay the same overall amount of taxes, on a 
global level, irrespective of the fact that he were to receive a certain income from a 
foreign investment or from an investment made in his country. On the opposite side, 
import neutrality means that capitals coming from different countries should compete in 
equal terms in the state where they are employed162-163. 
In general terms, countries fully endorsing the perspective of capital import 
neutrality - according to which the same tax burden should be levied in the state of 
residence on the income produced abroad by its residents and in the state of source on 																																																								
156 Sacchetto, C., Territorialità (diritto tributario), cited above, 328. 
157 Vogel, K., Worldwide vs source taxation of income. A review and re-evaluation of arguments, cited above, Part II, 313. 
158 Another definition of “neutrality” has been provided by Ture, according to which inter-nation neutrality means 
that neither country will attempt to use its fiscal powers to change relative prices in the other country, any more 
than it would do in absence of taxes. Consequently, Ture rejects worldwide taxation and argues for the 
implementation of fiscal systems based on taxation at source. See Ture, N.B., Taxing foreign source income, in 
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, U.S. taxation of American business abroad, Washington, 
1975, as cited in Vogel, K., Worldwide vs source taxation of income. A review and re-evaluation of arguments, cited 
above, Part II, 313. 
159 Especially in the European Union context, with regards to which some authors have referred to a “market 
neutrality principle”. See Vanistendael, F., In defence of the European Court of Justice, in Bulletin for International 
Taxation, 2008, 62, 98. 
160 Professor Richard Musgrave seems to have been the first to distinguish, with regard to the problem at hand, the 
aspects of capital export and capital import neutrality. According to his definition, “export neutrality means that the 
investor should pay the same total (domestic plus foreign) tax, whether he receives a given investment income from foreign or 
from domestic sources […] Import neutrality means that capital funds originating in various countries should compete at 
equal terms in the capital market of any country”. Consequently, export neutrality implies a system of worldwide 
taxation combined with the granting of foreign tax credits, while import neutrality implies a system of territorial 
source-based taxation combined with the exemption of foreign-source income. See Musgrave, R., Criteria for 
foreign tax credit, in Baker, R. (ed.), Taxation and operation abroad - Symposium, Baltimore, 1960, 84, ad cited in Vogel, 
K., Worldwide vs source taxation of income. A review and re-evaluation of arguments, cited above, Part II, 311. 
161 In recent times the debate on capital import vs. capital export neutrality was enriched by the reference to the 
concept of “capital ownerhsip neutrality”. Starting from the assumption that part of foreign investment is 
represented by the acquisition of existing assets by new owners, capital ownership neutrality would require 
domestic tax provisions on cross-border transactions not to distort the ownership patterns of assets. See Schön, 
W., International tax coordination for a second-best world, in World Tax Journal, 2009, 10, 71. 
162 Musgrave, R., Criteria for foreign tax credit, cited above, 87. 
163 Even though the distinction between capital import and capital export neutrality is traditionally embedded in 
the scholarly dispute concerning efficiency of international taxation, some authors have, nonetheless, highlighted 
that this distinction should not be relevant, since “neutrality” is a unitary concept which defines as neutral all 
taxes which do not interfere with economic processes. On the point see Sacchetto, C., Territorialità (diritto 
tributario), cited above, 331, and the authors cited therein. 
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the income produced by its residents exclusively within its borders - levy their taxes on a 
source basis only, often exempting foreign active income but taxing residents on their 
foreign-source passive income. Whereas, on the other hand, countries adhering to the 
capital export perspective tend to shape their tax systems according to the worldwide 
taxation model. 
Even though there is unanimous consensus on the fact that the principle of capital 
import neutrality (also known as “external neutrality”) ensures a higher level of growth 
and competitiveness of the enterprises operating in foreign territories, there is almost 
equal consensus on the circumstance that such neutrality cannot be attained unless tax 
rates are the same in all countries, given the considerable number and heterogeneity of 
the subjects with which enterprises operating abroad come into contact. The traditional 
mainstream opinion, therefore, has been - at least until recently - that a system based on 
export neutrality (or “internal neutrality”) should be preferred, with the consequent 
implementation of systems based on the worldwide taxation principle. 
Some authors have argued that international efficiency might be attained only by 
adhering to a model based on export neutrality, which might be reached exclusively by 
action performed by the legislature of traditional “residence countries” (that is to say 
capital exporting countries). 
More specifically, it has been theorised that capital export neutrality, being able to 
ensure that each national supply of capital available at that tax level is allocated 
internationally in its most efficient manner, should be preferred to a model aimed at 
attaining capital import neutrality. The latter, in fact, would arguably result in a system 
under which all investors who invest in one particular country are subject to the same 
treatment (i.e. that of the country of the source of investment income), thus allowing all 
foreign investors in that country equal opportunities for expansion, but, on the other 
hand, amounting to a system that would be highly non-neutral to international capital 
flows, unless all tax rates were equal164. 
In light of these reasons, during the 1960s and 1970s, scholars advocated the need 
of a system aiming at export neutrality, i.e. at a tax model based on the “worldwide 
principle” (or better “worldwide criterion”), whereas, during the 1980s, worldwide 
taxation and the capital export neutrality perspective was harshly criticised by those 
who argued that such a model was able to impair international trade and, therefore, to 
damage both the state of residence and the source state. 
																																																								
164 Musgrave, P.B., Taxation of foreign investment income: an economic analysis, cited above. 
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Many international bodies, such as the International Chamber of Commerce and 
the International Fiscal Association, have embraced the idea of capital import neutrality, 
thus favouring a tax model based on a strictly territorial criterion, opting for a model 
based on income taxation at source and a corresponding exemption of foreign-source 
income on the part of the state of residence of the taxpayer165. This has traditionally been 
the approach held also by the United Nations, which have come up with a Model 
Double Taxation Convention that provides for a higher level of taxation at source and 
which is alternative to the OECD Model (that is traditionally more oriented towards a 
capital export neutrality model and the implementation of a tax system based on 
worldwide taxation of residents). 
Part of the Italian doctrine has voiced similar opinions, highlighting that a model 
pursuing capital import neutrality (and taxation at source of foreign income) would have 
to be preferred to a worldwide tax model, because it would grant a higher level of 
international competitiveness to enterprises and businesses operating abroad, which 
would, therefore, be subject to the same level of local taxes levied on other business 
operating in the same country (and in the same market), thus preventing distortions 
caused by taxation166. It was also stressed that a model based on taxation at source would 
be simpler than the one based on worldwide taxation, also because states would not 
need to implement complex procedures and standards for granting tax credits for taxes 
paid abroad. Contemporary German scholars have advocated similar views, stating that 
the “ideal solution” in order to prevent double taxation would be the implementation by 
all countries of a purely territorial tax system, based on objective criteria167. 
On the other hand, different authors have, however, highlighted that such a 
system would imply a “transfer of (tax) sovereignty” on the part of the state of residence 
of the taxpayer in favour of the source state168, with states of residence “renouncing” the 
possibility to “supervise” investments made abroad and, thus, being impaired in 
effectively implementing a tax system based on the ability to pay of the taxpayer and on 
progressive tax rates. 
																																																								
165 On the point see International Chamber of Commerce, Avoidance of double taxation, exemption and tax credit 
method - Resolution of the International Chamber of Commerce Council and Report of Commission on Taxation, Paris, 
February, 1955 (quoted by Sacchetto, C., Territorialità (diritto tributario), cited above, 329), and International Fiscal 
Association, Fiscal obstacles to the international flow of capital between a parent and its subsidiary, in LXIX Cahiers de 
droit fiscal international, Deventer, 1984 (also quoted by Sacchetto, C., Territorialità (diritto tributario), cited above, 
329). 
166 Maisto, G., Imposizione dei redditi prodotti all’estero e competitività internazionale, in Dir. prat. trib., 1981, 1, 1135. 
167 Vogel, K., Worldwide vs source taxation of income. A review and re-evaluation of arguments, cited above, passim. 
168 Garbarino, C., Di alcuni principi che informano le norme tributarie interne in materia di tassazione del reddito prodotto 
su base internazionale, in Riv. dir. fin., 1989, 1, 44. 
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Discussions on the potential effects of worldwide and territorial taxation 
generally focus on the impact on government revenue in the home country and on the 
competitiveness of the home country on the international market, i.e. the consequences 
on the attractiveness of that country in the eyes of foreign investors. These discussions 
also take into account the possible “spill-over effects”, which essentially refer to the ways 
the impact of one country’s policies or changes in policy can have on other countries. 
 More recently, part of the doctrine has highlighted that an analysis of allocation of 
taxing powers amongst states which focuses only on the traditional concepts of capital 
export neutrality and capital import neutrality is by nature incomplete, since it 
underestimates or even disregards the essential role of one of the two fundamental 
economic factors, i.e. capital and labour, focusing only on the first one. According to 
these authors, therefore, it would be necessary to reshape the essential traits of the 
debate in order to take into account labour as well, thus leading to the adoption of two 
different models, i.e. “capital and labour export neutrality” (CLEN) and “capital and 
labour import neutrality” (CLIN)169. 
 A model based on capital and labour export neutrality would be characterised by 
the fact that the overall tax burden imposed on the income (taking into account both 
domestic taxation and taxation at source) should be the same irrespective of which 
productive factor (capital or labour) has produced the income and irrespective of the 
state (residence state or source state) it comes from. This model would, according to its 
creator170, call for the implementation of a tax model based on taxation in the state of 
residence with a full credit being granted to the taxpayer for taxes paid abroad. 
 On the other hand, a model based on capital and labour import neutrality would 
entail that capital and labour employed in various states should be granted the same 
conditions in the market of the labour and in the market of the capital, without being it 
possible for the place of residence of the worker or of the investor to be a reason for a 
difference in treatment. This model would require the implementation of a “purely 
territorial” taxation, with each state having the right to tax only the income produced 
within their territories and with the exemption of foreign income from taxation171. 																																																								
169 Kemmeren, E.C.C.M., Source of income in globalising economies: overview of the issues and plea for an origin-based 
approach, in Bulletin of International Taxation, 2006, 3, 430. 
170 Kemmeren, E.C.C.M., Source of income in globalising economies: overview of the issues and plea for an origin-based 
approach, cited above, 440. 
171 Kemmeren, E.C.C.M., Source of income in globalising economies: overview of the issues and plea for an origin-based 
approach, cited above, 440. The author opts for a model based on capital and labour import neutrality, stating that 
taxation based on the worldwide principle creates a non-neutral and inefficient system, while a system based on 
territoriality would allow enterprises to conduct business on the same level and at the same conditions as their 
foreign competitors. More specifically, the author states that “a tax system based on the territoriality principle would 
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However, irrespective of which “model of dualism” one adheres to (either CIN 
vs. CEN or CLIN vs. CLEN) and even though, according to economic doctrines, the best 
scenario would be “tax equalisation”, i.e. a context where states reach an equilibrium 
between individual equity, inter-nation equity and neutrality, through the adoption by 
all states by a coordinated and integrated structure of their respective tax systems, such a 
purpose seems still quite unattainable, especially because of the lack of a coordination 
between fiscal systems, which, according to some, could be reached only in presence of 
just one global tax legal order to which single states should respond. 
Therefore, even though, according to economic doctrines, the best scenario would 
be “tax equalisation”, i.e. a context where states reach an equilibrium between individual 
equity, inter-nation equity and neutrality, through the adoption by all states by a 
coordinated and integrated structure of their respective tax systems, such a purpose 
seems still quite unattainable, especially because of the lack of a coordination between 
fiscal systems, which, according to some, could be reached only in presence of just one 
global tax legal order to which single states should respond. 
4.2. The enactment of case-by-case solutions for the allocation of taxing powers 
by way of bilateral agreements: the “tax design” of the OECD Model 
Convention. 
A study on tax territoriality and allocation of taxing powers amongst states 
cannot be considered exhaustive and complete if it does not take into account the effects 
of bilateral tax conventions as the main instrument, rebus sic stantibus, for the allocation 
of taxing powers amongst states, which can significantly alter the implementation of the 
relevant connecting criteria between the income and the state levying the taxes. 
We have already highlighted in the previous pages of this work that 
simultaneously applying a system of “worldwide taxation” to residents and a system of 
strictly territorial taxation (taxation at source) to non-residents leads to the inevitable 
consequence of giving rise to international juridical double taxation172 . And that is 
because, naturally, a taxpayer who produces a certain item of income in foreign territory 																																																																																																																																																																													
the shift of investment capital from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions. Consequently, enterprises in low-tax states might 
increase their market shae through lower prices to the detriment of enterprises resident in high tax states, even though the 
latter are more efficient”. 
172 The causes of double taxation have been identified in the following circumstances: 1) the overlapping of taxes 
imposed by two states considering the income deriving from the same element or event located within their 
respective territories; 2) the overlapping of taxes by two states with regards to the same element and based on the 
definition of “resident” by both countries when at least one of the two states follows a model based on worldwide 
taxation; 3) the overlapping of taxes by two states if one of them taxes on a territorial basis and the other one on a 
worldwide basis; 4) the result of different interpretations given by two states to the same concept 
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is going to be taxed on that income by two different states, i.e. the state where he resides 
(or the state of which is a citizen) and the state where the source of the income at issue is 
located. The solution to these problems caused by the concurring effects on the two 
above-mentioned linking criteria and the consequent identification of the tax regime 
applicable to cross-border income implies resorting to complex rules establishing the 
qualification of the category of income to which the relevant income belongs, the 
localisation of said relevant income and, thirdly, the specific tax treatment applicable. 
And this is precisely the purpose of bilateral tax conventions. 
We have also already specified that there is almost unanimous consensus, 
nowadays, on the fact that the international order does not entail any principle or 
general rule prohibiting double taxation173 . Nonetheless, with a view to preventing 
problems connected to international juridical double taxation, some have argued in 
favour of the adoption by states of purely territorial systems or, in other terms, of tax 
systems modelled on the source principle, thus a priori exempting foreign income from 
the states’ tax bases. This - probably utopic - theory starts from the assumption that, if all 
states adopted such a model, there could be no problem with regards to double taxation, 
if we exclude the cases of double residence of the taxpayer or cases of conflicting rules on 
the localisation of the income. These more general solutions seem quite unattainable in 
the current international context, at least on a global scale, whereas the possibility to 
conduct such an attempt could be verified in more restricted geographical areas, such as 
the European Union, as this work will attempt to highlight. 
Aside from general solutions of this sort, states still try to solve problems 
connected to international double taxation by resorting to a case-by-case approach 
through bilateral tax treaties. 
As known, the main purpose of bilateral tax treaties is to eliminate, or at least to 
lessen, the negative effects of the exercise of two states’ concurrent taxing powers over 
the same cross-border income. Their ratio is, therefore, opposite to the one inspiring state 
legislation on a merely domestic level: if, as seen above, national tax law aims at 
extending state’s taxing powers over all facts on which it is actually possible to enforce 
tax provisions, on the other hand tax treaties deal with the need to somehow limit the 
state’s taxing powers in order to prevent double taxation174. 
																																																								
173 Baggio, R., Il principio di territorialità ed i limiti alla potestà tributaria, cited above, 69; Chrétien, M., A la recherche du 
droit international fiscal commun, Sirey, 1955, passim; Adonnino, P., Doppia imposizione, cited above, passim. 
174 Baker, P., Double taxation agreements and international law, London, 1994; Rohatgi, R., Basic international taxation. 
Principles, cited above, 6. 
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That is why it has been traditionally stated that double taxation conventions have 
limiting effects only, meaning that conventional tax provisions cannot give rise to or 
either expand the state’s taxing powers, but can exclusively restrict such power (or, more 
correctly, the exercise of such power) or leave it unchanged. Treaties enshrine essentially 
distributive rules: once the tax treaty has established that a certain item of cross-border 
income can only be taxed by one state, that state will levy tax on that income according 
to its domestic fiscal provisions. Some authors have even stated - in a quite unconvincing 
way - that this “rule”, according to which tax treaties cannot make the fiscal situation of 
a taxpayer more burdensome and taxpayers should always be able to obtain that only 
national tax provisions are applied in case a tax treaty were to make his/her/its tax 
burden heavier, would amount to a customary international rule would exist175. 
On the point, it should, however, be noted that the fact that double taxation 
conventions do not generate new fiscal obligations and do not render the situation of a 
single taxpayer more burdensome than how it would be according to national law only 
seems to be the result of how tax treaties are shaped and of the content and purpose of 
the single provisions enshrined therein, rather than the result of a theoretical - but 
considerably hard to demonstrate in practice - customary rule. One should not forget, in 
fact, that states resort to bilateral tax treaties in order to provide mutual limitations to 
their taxing powers in order to prevent the occurrence of double taxation once they have 
established that double taxation is prejudicial to international trade, and certainly not to 
expand their taxing powers, thus making the problem worse. 
Going back to the main topic at hand, i.e. the allocation of taxing powers amongst 
state and the effects of such allocation, double taxation conventions entered into by the 
majority of Western countries (aside from the United States, which have their own tax 
treaty model) generally follow the Model Convention drafted by the OECD, which 
acknowledges both of the above-mentioned tax systems, i.e. the “territorial taxation” 
model and the “worldwide taxation” model, and calls for the implementation of both 
territorial and worldwide criteria. 
Notwithstanding this fact, the OECD Model Convention’s outline is essentially 
based on the taxation of “residents” of one of the contracting states, even though the 
																																																								
175 This is, for example, the opinion voiced by Melis, G., Vincoli internazionali e norma tributaria interna, cited above, 
passim, and by Miraulo, A., Doppia imposizione internazionale, Padua, 1990, 58. The debate on the point, however, 
has been given a limited degree of attention by North-American doctrine and, in general terms, also by European 
tax scholars, exception made with regards to French authors, who have dealt with the topic with much more 
attention. 
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definition of “residence” is left to domestic provisions176, thus essentially embracing the 
worldwide taxation principle. 
It is therefore correct to state that, in general terms, the OECD Model Convention 
endorses an allocation of powers according to which the source state is endowed with 
limited taxing powers, while the state of residence has unlimited taxing powers. 
Correspondingly, according to the Model, the duty to eliminate or reduce conventional 
cases of double taxation lies entirely on the state of residence. 
As far the source state’s taxing powers are concerned, the Model provides for 
different ways and “intensities” of such powers depending on the category of income at 
issue. In general terms, the source state might either have a limited or unlimited taxing 
power on a certain kind of income or even have no taxing power at all on another kind 
of income. Then, for the purposes of preventing the occurrence of any international 
double taxation, in cases such income might be taxed (with or without limitations) by the 
source state, the state of residence will generally be called to either granting the taxpayer 
a tax credit or, in alternative, exempting from taxation all items of income that have 
already been subject to tax by the source state. 
Alongside provisions granting the source state exclusive taxing powers with 
regards to cross-border income (as for income from government employment pursuant 
to Article 19, with regards to which the residence state is deprived of any taxing right), 
the OECD Model Conventions, at certain conditions, provides for an unlimited taxing 
power for the source state, for example, with regards to the taxation of business income 
received by a subject who is resident of a contracting state through a permanent 
establishment located in the other contracting state. 
However, contrarily to domestic legislation, Article 7 of the OECD Model 
Convention opts for a “limited” attractive force of the permanent establishment, which 
means that, once it has been established that the income to be taxed is business income 
and that there is a permanent establishment in the state where such business income has 
its source, the source state can levy tax on that income only insofar as such income can 
be attributed to the permanent establishment. The OECD Commentary to the Model 
Convention further specifies that the source state’s right to tax does not extend to income 																																																								
176 Article 4 of the OECD Model Conventions provides that “for the purposes of this Convention, the term ‘resident of a 
Contracting State’ means any person who, under the laws of that State, is liable to tax therein by reason of his domicile, 
residence, place of management or any other criterion of a similar nature, and also includes that State and any political 
subdivision or local authority thereof”. In case the difference between the parameters adopted by the contracting 
states were to lead to a situation of “double residence”, the second and the third paragraphs of Article 4 of the 
OECD Model Convention provide tie-breaker criteria in order to solve these sorts of conflicts. For a more detailed 
analysis of the problems connected to the concept of residence in the context of international tax law, see Maisto, 
G. (ed.), Residence of companies under tax treaties and EC law, Amsterdam, 2009, passim; Avery Jones, J.F., Place of 
effective management as a residence tie-breaker, in Bulletin of International Fiscal Documentation, 2005, 20.  
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that the foreign business receives on its territory without any effective intervention by its 
permanent establishment located therein, but is limited only to any income effectively 
connected to the permanent establishment’s activity. 
The OECD Model suggests a similar criterion based on an effective connection 
between the state and the income on which tax is levied to the taxation of other 
categories of income as well, such as dividends, interests, royalties, capital gains and 
“other income”. As far as such kinds of income are concerned, in fact, conventional 
benefits are not granted when the beneficial owner who is resident of one of the 
contracting states exercises a business activity in the other contracting state through a 
permanent establishment located therein if such income is effectively connected to such 
permanent establishment177. 
An analogous restriction of the states’ taxing power is provided, in the OECD 
Model Convention, with regards to income from employment. According to Article 15 of 
the Model Convention, in fact, salaries and other similar income received by a non-
resident subject can be taxed in the state where the employment is exercised if certain 
conditions are met178. In that case, the “source state” can levy tax on the salaries without 
limitations, whereas, if such conditions are not met, that state does not have any taxing 
power in relation to such income. 
According to the OECD Model Convention, with regards to certain other 
categories of transnational income, tax territoriality is conventionally limited and, 
consequently, such kinds of income are subject to limited powers of taxation on the part 
of the source state. 
This is the case, for example, as far as dividends are concerned. With regards to 
outbound dividends, in fact, Article 10 of the OECD Model Convention does not entrust 
any right of full taxation either to the state of residence of the taxpayer or to the state of 
																																																								
177  Tax treaties signed by Italy generally adopt such criterion based on the “effective connection” concept, 
notwithstanding the fact that Italy has reserved the right to tax single items of such income as business income, 
according to its domestic tax law, whenever the beneficial owner has a permanent establishment in Italy, even if 
there is no effective connection between the income and the permanent establishment. Some problems may arise 
with regards to the allocation of the income between the state where the enterprise has its seat and the state 
where the permanent establishment is located. On the point, Article 7 of the OECD Model Convention provides 
for the application, as main criterion, of the rule according to which the permanent establishment can be 
attributed all income that it is possible to deem would have been received if the permanent establishment had 
been a distinct and separate enterprise performing identical or similar activities in identical or similar conditions 
and in a fully independent way from the enterprise of which it constitutes an establishment. 
178 Pursuant to Article 15.2, “notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1, remuneration derived by a resident of a 
Contracting State in respect of an employment exercised in the other Contracting State shall be taxable only in the first-
mentioned State if: a) the recipient is present in the other State for a period or periods not exceeding in the aggregate 183 
days in any twelve month period commencing or ending in the fiscal year concerned, and b) the remuneration is paid by, or 
on behalf of, an employer who is not a resident of the other State, and c) the remuneration is not borne by a permanent 
establishment which the employer has in the other State”. 
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source of the dividends179. More specifically, Article 10 provides, on one hand, that 
dividends can be taxed by the state of residence of who receives them and, on the other 
hand, that, in any case, a right to tax is reserved to the source state (i.e. the state where 
the company distributing the dividends has its seat or, in any case, its fiscal residence). 
Such a right, however, is considerably limited by the fact that the source state is deemed 
to have already taxed the underlying income of the company distributing the dividends 
at company level180. 
Such limitation to the source state’s taxing power is conditioned upon the fact 
that the taxpayer who receives the dividends is the actual beneficial owner of such 
income, i.e. the subject who economically and legally owns the shares conferring the 
right to receive the income. In case that subject is not the beneficial owner of the income 
and a third subject (intermediary) is interposed between the company distributing the 
dividends and the beneficial owner of such dividends the limitation of the taxation at 
source cannot be granted, unless the actual beneficial owner of the dividends is also a 
resident of the other contracting state. The OECD Model Convention proposes a similar 
“compromise” with regards to interests as well181. 
In other cases, on the contrary, the OECD Model Convention establishes that, as 
far as certain categories of income are concerned, a derogation to tax territoriality should 
be implemented and that, therefore, such income should be taxed exclusively by the 
state of residence of its beneficial owner. This is the tax treatment of cross-border 
royalties pursuant to Article 12 of the OECD Model Convention, which prevents the 
source state from levying taxes on outbound royalties182. 
Furthermore, tax territoriality does not apply, according to Article 21 of the 
Model Convention, to all “other income”, that is to say to all categories of income not 																																																								
179 This is presumably partly due to the fact that some states (e.g., the Netherlands) do not provide for any taxation 
at source of outbound dividends. 
180 Pursuant to Article 10 of the OECD Model Convention, “dividends paid by a company which is a resident of a 
Contracting State to a resident of the other Contracting State may be taxed in that other State. However, dividends paid by a 
company which is a resident of a Contracting State may also be taxed in that State according to the laws of that States, but if 
the beneficial owner of the dividends is a resident of the other Contracting State, the tax so charged shall not exceed: a) 5 per 
cent of the gross amount of the dividends if the beneficial owner is a company (other than a partnership) which holds directly 
at least 25 per cent of the capital of the company paying the dividends; b) 15 per cent of the gross amount of the dividends in 
all other cases”. 
181 With the only difference that, according to Article 11 of such Model Convention, in order for such a limitation of 
the source state’s taxing power to be granted another condition must be met, besides from the one mentioned 
above with regards to beneficial ownership: the amount of the interests must not exceed the amount determined 
with reference to the “normal value” criterion, in light of particular relationships between the subject paying the 
interests and their beneficial owner. The possible difference between the amount of interests paid and the 
“normal value” of the income may be taxed by the source state according to its domestic law. 
182 Pursuant to Article 12 of the OECD Model Convention, “royalties arising in a Contracting State and beneficially 
owned by a resident of the other Contracting State shall be taxable only in that other State […] The provisions of paragraph 1 
shall not apply if the beneficial owner of the royalties, being a resident of a Contracting State, carries on business in the other 
Contracting State in which the royalties arise through a permanent establishment situated therein and the right or property 
in respect of which the royalties are paid is effectively connected with such permanent establishment. In such case the 
provisions of Article 7 shall apply”. 
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provided for by different provisions of the tax treaty. Such an income may be taxed only 
by the state of residence of whoever receives them, irrespective of where they come 
from. 
After having defined the allocation of taxing powers between contracting states in 
the terms described above, the Model, then, provides, pursuant to Articles 23A and 23B, 
two methods for the elimination of double taxation: the state of residence of the taxpayer 
is allowed to tax the foreign income, but it must either recognise a credit for the tax paid 
by that taxpayer in the source state or, alternatively, grant an exemption from tax. 
A more detailed analysis of the differences between the exemption method and 
the credit method and of their economic and legal consequences on taxpayers and states 
is beyond the scope of the present research. Suffice it to say, here, that, as it has been 
correctly observed, the exemption method is generally preferred by states adhering to a 
strictly territorial tax model. The state of residence of the taxpayer refrains from 
exercising its taxing power over a certain item of income whose source is located abroad 
in favour of the state where such income has been produced. Practically speaking, the 
state of residence of the taxpayer receiving the income excludes such income from that 
taxpayer’s tax base, leaving the exclusive power to levy tax on the income up to the 
source state183. 
 The implementation of such a mechanism on the part of the state of residence 
does not entail any relationship with the tax burden imposed by the source state: the 
relevant item of income is not taxed irrespective of the fact that the source state levies tax 
on it or actually collects the tax possibly levied184. In practice, however, states often 
provide for some “corrective measures” by virtue of which, for example, the foreign item 
of income is exempted from taxation only if considered taxable according to the source 
state’s domestic law or only if actually taxed by that state. 
 Needless to say that the implementation of the exemption method requires states 
to renounce or, at least, significantly reduce the exercise of their tax jurisdiction, which 
has led states, until recent years, to opt for the different (though more burdensome) 
credit method. 
																																																								
183 The exemption method is generally distinguished into two categories, i.e. “full” exemption and exemption 
combined with the implementation of elements that ensure the application of a progressive tax rates. More 
specifically, according to the first method, the state of residence does not take into any consideration for any 
purposes the foreign income at hand, while, when applying the second exemption method, the state of residence 
reserves the right to include such foreign income in the computation of the taxpayer’s tax base only for purposes 
of calculating the exact tax rate to apply to the taxpayer’s income generated in the state of residence, in order to 
comply with the general principle of progressivity of taxation. 
184 For this reason, according to scholarly opinion, the exemption method is the method which is closer to reaching 
the objective of eliminating international double taxation. 
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 On the other hand, the credit method is generally preferred by those states that 
have chosen to follow the worldwide taxation model. Foreign income is taxed both in the 
source state and in the state of residence of the taxpayer, but the latter relieves, at least 
partly, the taxpayer from the burden of taxes paid abroad through the granting of a tax 
credit that is then used to reduce the amount of taxes due to the state of residence. 
 States generally provide for certain quantitative conditions limiting the full 
implementation of the credit method: some states grant a tax credit only if the relevant 
tax has actually and definitely paid by the taxpayer to the source state; other states limit 
the credit to the percentage of the tax which would have been levied by the state of 
residence if the income at issue had been of merely “national” nature; some other states, 
furthermore, grant a “presumed” tax credit, thus preventing the possible effect of 
neutralising the deductions possibly granted by the source state. Again, tax credits may 
be granted on a “global” level, in relation to the amount of all taxes paid by a resident 
subject to foreign countries, or separately for taxes paid in single foreign countries. 
If it is true, on one hand, that such a mechanism ensures a higher level of tax 
neutrality in international trade, it is also true, on the other hand, that, according to some 
observers, the tax credit system entails a sort of transfer of the possible tax advantages 
granted by the source state to the state of residence of the taxpayer. In fact, all fiscal 
advantages (e.g. deductions) the taxpayer might be granted in the state of source of his 
income would be automatically “absorbed” by a corresponding higher tax burden 
imposed by his state of residence, since the credit granted by the state of residence is 
usually equal to the tax effectively paid by the taxpayer in the source state185. In other 
words, the less the taxpayer pays to the source state, the more he will have to pay to his 
state of residence. This is one of the reasons justifying the criticism against the current 
tax credit system, especially coming from developing countries. 
A third method, which is very rarely used by countries, entails the state of 
residence allowing the deductibility from the tax base of taxes paid abroad, thus, to a 
certain extent, considered as “expenses” inherently linked to the production of the 
income. 
Going back to the main topic, there is no need to say that bilateral treaty practice 
by states does not always totally adhere to the rules provided for by the OECD Model. 
Sometimes, for example, bilateral double taxation conventions reserve the source state 
the right to levy tax on passive income having its source in the state’s territory, normally 
																																																								
185 Manganelli, A., Territorialità dell’imposta, cited above, 371. 
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establishing a maximum “cap” for the relevant tax rates. This is what often happens with 
regards to cross-border royalties186. 
It also goes without saying that the OECD Model Convention is nothing more 
than a model, with no actual binding force on any of the states that are part of the OECD, 
even though the OECD Commentary to the Model Convention is being used more and 
more as a parameter, even by the Court of Justice of the European Union, to establish the 
legitimacy of certain domestic tax provisions with effects on international trade. 
Needless to say that the OECD Model voices the positions of the great majority of 
industrialised capital-exporting countries, which makes it easy to understand why most 
of its “suggestions” tend to privilege the state of residence of the taxpayer and to limit 
the taxing powers of the state where the income has its source187. 
On the other hand, the Model Convention drafted by the United Nations has 
assumed a different perspective, being it a model for the negotiation of bilateral tax 
treaties between an industrialised country and a developing capital-importing country. 
The UN Model grants higher taxing powers to the state where the income has its source, 
reducing to a minimum the cases where the state of residence of the taxpayer has 
exclusive power to tax, thus also mirroring developing countries’ common practice to 
levy taxes only on income whose source is located within their national territory and not 
to tax income produced abroad188. 
Having established all of the above, one should also note that, at the international 
level, there is general consensus on the fact that the current situation concerning tax-
treaty law should be considered unsatisfactory189, up to the point that a considerable 
number of authors have advocated the need either to rethink double taxation 
conventions or to abandon them entirely190. 
Besides these “extreme” positions, it is true that the “system” created by the 
current double taxation conventions and by the (unilateral and/or bilateral) mechanisms 
for the elimination of double taxation (exemption or deduction) seems precarious and 
somehow erratic. On one hand, states, with their national provisions, constitute the 
primary cause of the phenomenon of double taxation, even though justified by the need 
to pursue the domestic purpose of efficiency (e.g. worldwide taxation and progressivity) 																																																								
186 The majority of tax treaties signed by Italy, for example, provide for the possibility for the source state to levy a 
withholding tax at source on outbound royalties, establishing, however, that the tax rate of such withholding tax 
cannot be higher than a certain level. Generally, such a limitation of tax rate by the state of source is conditioned 
upon the fact that whoever receives the outbound royalties is the actual beneficial owner of that item of income. 
187 The same perspective has been adopted by the United States Model Convention. 
188 Baggio, R., Il principio di territorialità ed i limiti alla potestà tributaria, cited above. 172. 
189 Tarigo, P., La doppia imposizione giuridica internazionale come fattispecie disciplinata nei trattati bilaterali, cited above, 
902; Tremonti, G., Vitaletti, G., La fiera delle tasse, Bologna, 1991, 114. 
190 Easson, A., Do we still need tax treaties, in Bulletin for International Taxation, 2010, 12, 619. 
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and fight against international tax evasion and avoidance. On the other hand, by 
entering into bilateral tax treaties, states try to eliminate or reduce the effects created by 
their own domestic rules, pursuing, on a case-by-case basis, aims of both substantial 
equity (preventing double taxation) and economic policies, i.e. placing their residents 
(taxpayers) in a more favourable position in the international market at attracting foreign 
investors. 
The unsatisfactory and inherently partial solutions posed by double taxation 
conventions, combined with the needs posed by the new economies and the new ways 
international trade is conducted, led states, international organisations and scholars to 
look for new (or improved) coordinating criteria for the exercise of the states’ concurring 
taxing powers. 
5. Recent developments of the debate on worldwide and territorial taxation. 
In light of all of the above, and notwithstanding all that has been said in the age-
old debate on equity and neutrality in international taxation, two considerations may 
certainly be considered as scientifically true: on one hand, the source state grants the 
conditions allowing the income to be produced and paid to the foreign taxpayer, 
following that the source state can legitimately exercise its right to levy taxes on that 
income; on the other hand, however, many have stated that it would be unthinkable for 
traditional “residence states”, i.e. industrialised countries, to entirely give up all their 
taxing powers with regards to foreign income, since doing so would amount to 
renouncing to effectively implement principles such as taxation according to ability to 
pay and progressivity. 
Lately a large number of international tax scholars - many of which have resorted 
to arguments which had been already developed by traditional authors in the first half of 
the XX century - have advocated the need for a “return to territoriality”, that is to say the 
need for states to shape their tax systems according exclusively to a model based on 
taxation at source, which is seen as a tool to ensure both economic efficiency and 
international equality (or, at least, a higher level of efficiency and equality on the 
international arena)191. 																																																								
191 Vogel, K., Worldwide or source taxation of income?, in Rass. Trib., 1988, 1, 259; Vogel, K., Worldwide vs source 
taxation of income. A review and re-evaluation of arguments, cited above, passim; Harris, P.A., Corporate/shareholder 
income taxation and allocating taxing rights between countries, Amsterdam, 1996; Kemmeren, E.C.C.M., Principle of 
origin in tax conventions. A rethinking of models, in Themes, 2003, 279; Vanistendael, F., Reinventing source taxation, in 
EC Tax Review, 1997, 152; Cipollina, S., I confini giuridici nel tempo presente. Il caso del diritto fiscale, Milan, 2003, 29. 
Furthermore, theories advocating the return to a purely territorial tax system have developed especially in Latin 
American countries, which have traditionally emphasised territoriality in income tax legislation. Latin American 
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In other words, it has been stated that the implementation of only one kind of 
model, if consistently applied, could avoid the negative results of the interplay between 
the different tax systems and would entail a fair and equitable distribution of tax burden 
and allocation of taxing powers. According to the opinion that is being discussed, in 
slightly simplified terms, taxation by the country of residence is considered as 
potentially unjust to the taxpayer who has earned his income in other countries and also 
to the source country because, in stripping away part of its tax base, it also disrupts the 
source state’s tax policy decisions. It is essentially stated that a consistent and uniform 
application of territorial taxation would allow granting equal tax treatment both to 
residents and non-residents, thus preventing possible discriminations to the detriment of 
both. 
According to a large part of the authors representing this view, given the 
assumption that a taxation of investment in foreign countries may be seen as 
economically efficient only if the investor pays no more tax than is imposed on domestic 
enterprises in the same country in which the enterprise was established, this assumption 
may be considered consistent with a model founded on source-based taxation, if the 
concept of “source” is defined as the place where the enterprise established by direct 
investment is located192. 
A central role in this more recent view is played by the so-called “benefit 
theory”193, or, better said, to one of the interpretations of the benefit theory, according to 																																																																																																																																																																													
authors have been particularly committed to promoting the principle which they considered to be a matter of 
equity not only with regards to the taxpayer, but also, and even more, with regards to the states involved. For 
example, in a “Declaration of Principles”, the First Latin American Tax Law Convention of 1956 proposed that the 
principle of territoriality should be the exclusive principle of taxation within and amongst Latin American states 
for the taxation of cross-border transactions. This position has, however, been partially revised in the following 
years, when all Latin American Tax Law Conventions advocated that the principle of territoriality should be the 
main (not exclusive) principle of taxation, thus not excluding that the source principle, based on material links 
between the income and the territory (such as the production of the income, its perception, the existence of certain 
goods in the territory, etc.), could co-exist with personal linking criteria which are typical of worldwide taxation 
(such as residence, nationality, domicile, etc.). Notwithstanding these assumptions, positive tax law of Latin 
American states (e.g., Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Mexico, Peru) is not always compliant, in practice, with the 
territoriality criterion. 
192 Vogel, K., Worldwide vs source taxation of income. A review and re-evaluation of arguments, cited above, Part II, 315; 
Vogel, K., Taxation of cross-border income, harmonisation and tax neutrality under European Community law. An 
institutional approach, Deventer, 1993, 22. 
193 This theory, though recently re-discovered, dates back to Grotius and was first developed in a juridical, 
financial and economic meaning by Adam Smith (Smith, A., An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of 
nation, London, 1776). In Italy, this doctrine has been developed by several influential and “traditional” authors, 
who, in the past, pointed out the “benefit criterion” as the fundamental rule for the allocation of taxing powers 
amongst states in order to avoid double taxation, as highlighted in Marino, G., L’unificazione del diritto tributario: 
tassazione mondiale verso tassazione territoriale, cited above, 847. Some “classical” Italian tax scholars of the XIX and 
XX centuries, for example, stated that social services should be financed by those taking advantage of them, thus 
asserting the need that, in all states, taxes levied on each taxpayer reflect the advantages drawn by said taxpayer 
from the services rendered by the public sector. In the first half of the XX century, however, with the renown 1923 
League of Nations report Sur la double imposition présenté au Comitié financier par MM Bruins, Einaudi, Seligman et 
Stamp, a change of perspective was proposed, shifting the focus from the concept of “benefit” to the concept of 
“ability to pay” as the main criterion for allocating taxing powers amongst states. From this evolution followed 
the attention paid to concepts such as the source of the income and the residence of who receives the income. 
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which, as it has already been mentioned above, taxing powers would better be left to the 
state of source, that state being the one granting (the main part of) the services 
contributing to the production of the income, at least as far as active income is 
concerned. This theory, which some authors elevate to the level of “principle”, is 
founded on the assumption that the state of residence has the primary right to tax 
passive income, whereas the state of source has the primary right to tax active business 
income194. 
However, staying on the point of the “benefit theory”, it has also been argued that 
both the state of residence and the source state can be considered as legitimately entitled 
to a tax claim on the grounds of services provided, but that the share of services 
provided by the source state is typically higher than that provided by the state of 
residence. 
Some authors advocating the need for a return to pure territoriality and taxation 
at source have also stated that, in case of multinational corporations, source-based 
taxation seems generally preferable. One of the reasons underlying this assumption is 
that residence of corporations is difficult to establish and relatively meaningless, since 
residence based on place of incorporation is formalistic and easy to manipulate by the 
taxpayer, which can be said with regards to residence based on the place of effective 
management and control as well. Moreover, multinationals are considered as not being 
part of a single society or country, but of many societies and countries, which assumes 
relevance for distributive purposes195. 
Another reason to the same point is partly based on an application of the above-
mentioned “benefit theory”. It has been argued, in fact, that one should also consider 
that business income received in the source state may not be immediately received and 
enjoyed in the state of residence of the taxpayer, since often, on the contrary, such 
foreign income is reinvested in the enterprise in the source state. In light of this 
consideration, foreign income staying in the foreign should not be equated to income 
that is under the disposition of its owner in the state of residence and, therefore, it has 
been argued that states should at least distinguish, for tax purposes, income over which 
the owner has direct disposition from income on which his disposition is more remote, 
implementing a sort of “limited worldwide taxation” system196. 																																																								
194 Avi-Yonah, R.S., The structure of international taxation: a proposal for simplification, in Texas Law Review, 1996, 74, 
3106. 
195 Avi-Yonah, R.S., International tax as international law. An analysis of the international tax regime, cited above, 11. 
196 Especially if we consider that, exception made for certain peculiar cases, corporate income is taxed in all 
countries only at the corporate level, as long as it has not been remitted to the owner. A similar assumption is the 
one underlying the manner the United Kingdom taxes foreign income of non-domiciled residents, by way of 
which certain items of income of such residents are taxed only as far as they are remitted to the United Kingdom. 
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As mentioned above, from a theoretical perspective, inter-nations equity 
considerations tend to favour taxation by the source state, insofar as the non-resident 
taxpayer is effectively integrated in the economic life of the host state, being it possible to 
assume that such taxpayer owe a certain degree of “economic allegiance” to the state for 
having enjoyed the benefits it provides197. 
Another more practical argument which the authors advocating the necessity of a 
purely territorial tax system resort to is that the source jurisdiction has by definition the 
“first bite at the apple” or, in other terms, it has the first opportunity to collect the tax on 
payments derived from within its borders, which would make it extremely difficult to 
prevent source states from levying the tax. 
On the other hand, it has been highlighted that the theory advocating the return 
to a model of “pure territoriality” is based only on justifications of a purely economic 
nature. The same authors have, furthermore, asserted that the theory itself does not take 
into account or underestimates the national reasons justifying the implementation of the 
worldwide principle, amongst which, for example, the need to respect the domestic 
principle of equality and the principle of progressivity of taxation (which are generally 
embedded in the majority of Western legal systems), the need to prevent international 
evasion and avoidance and the fact that such a system would encourage enterprises to 
take their business (or part of their business) abroad and to relocate their plants in 
foreign territories. 
One of the reasons expressed by those supporting “worldwide taxation” as the 
preferable tax model is the need not to discriminate between taxpayers on the base of the 
different source of their income. In fact, in case states were to levy taxes only on income 
produced on their territory, the consequence might be to favour those taxpayers who 
produce part of their income abroad, especially with concerns to the application of a 
progressive tax rate. Worldwide taxation would be, in other terms, neutral with regards 
to both domestic and foreign investments, thus avoiding discriminations on the base of 
the place of source of the income198. 
Furthermore, as far as the argument based on the “benefits theory” is concerned, 
it has been highlighted that the state of residence of the taxpayer contributes to the 
production of the income as well, even if such income is produced abroad, protecting the 																																																																																																																																																																													
On the point, see Vogel, K., Worldwide vs source taxation of income. A review and re-evaluation of arguments, cited 
above, Part III, 396. 
197 López, E.E., An opportunistic, and yet appropriate, revision of the source threshold for the twenty-first century tax 
treaties, in Intertax, 2015, 1, 7; Pinto, D., E-commerce and source-based income taxation, in Bulletin for International 
Fiscal Documentation, 2003, 19; Avi-Yonah, R., International taxation of electronic commerce, in Tax Law Review, 
1997, 3, 507. 
198 Croxatto, G., La imposizione delle imprese con attività internazionale, cited above, 159. 
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interests of the taxpayer and granting services that allow the development of its 
economic activity, thus being “entitled” to levy tax as well as the source state (if not 
more than the source state, according to some scholars)199. 
Another problem with the theories supporting the establishment of tax systems 
based exclusively on taxation at source is linked with the absence of, and the difficulty in 
reaching, a unanimous definition of what constitutes “source”, which is unanimously 
recognised as not being a self-defining concept. It has been stated, in fact, that the 
concept of “source” is “unambiguous only in what it excludes: taxation based on source is 
different from taxation based on residence or on citizenship” and that if the concept of 
“source” is viewed in international comparison, legislation and case law are 
considerably divergent200-201. 
The concept of “source” has been defined as the place where the income-
generating activity is located, referring to a state that is in some way or other connected 
to the production of the income in question or to a state where value is added to a good. 
However, the type of connection that establishes which state should be considered as the 
source of a certain income has not been generally described, if we exclude the definitions 
provided by the Commentary to the OECD Model Convention202. 
The problem of defining what “source” means could even lead to a sort of 
paradoxical result. A tax system resorting exclusively to source taxation, i.e. a purely 
territorial model, should be able, at least theoretically, to entirely disregard the concept 																																																								
199 Pires, M., International juridical double taxation of income, Deventer-Boston, 1989, 134. 
200 Vogel, K., Worldwide vs source taxation of income. A review and re-evaluation of arguments, cited above, Part I, 223-
226. 
201 Economists have attempted to shed some light when determining the source of the income from a theoretical 
point of view. They have essentially developed two different approaches: the so-called “supply approach”, which 
identifies the source as the place where the factors generating the income operate, and the so-called “supply-
demand approach”, which states that profits are created through the interaction of supply (factors of production) 
and demand (where the market is located). The “supply approach” has historically been preferred, arguing that it 
would not be possible to assume a sufficient degree of involvement of the non-resident taxpayer in the economic 
life of a state that merely provides the market for goods and services. On the point, see, amongst others, López, 
E.E., An opportunistic, and yet appropriate, revision of the source threshold for the Twenty-First Century tax treaties, cited 
above, 8. 
202 As highlighted by Vogel, as far as business profits are concerned, a fundamental distinction must be made 
between countries allocating business profits according to a single comprehensive source rule, not distinguishing 
between different types of profits, and countries splitting business profits and allocating them according to their 
nature (e.g. profits derived from manufacturing, sales, loans, etc.). Common law countries traditionally tend to 
apply different source rules to different types of business profits. The United Kingdom, for example, still uses the 
quite broad concept of a “trade carried on within the UK”, distinguishing between “trading with” and “trading 
within” the UK: only income from trading within the UK is considered domestic-source income and, in order to 
establish whether a trade is carried on within the UK, much attention is generally given to the place where the 
contract is made. On the contrary, in the United States the place where the contract is made is not generally 
conclusive. The range of criteria used for sourcing income further expands, if seen through an international 
comparison, with regards to passive income. For example, the criteria used to identify the source of cross-border 
interest, whether derived in business or not, include the residence of the debtor, the place at which the principal 
is made available, the place at which the principal is used, the place the payment of the interest is made and so 
on. On the point, see Vogel, K., Worldwide vs source taxation of income. A review and re-evaluation of arguments, cited 
above, Part I, 226. 
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of “residence”, being taxation at source applicable both to residents and non-residents. 
However, some scholars have tried to identify the source of certain kinds of income by 
referring to the residence of the subjects who receives them. This has been the case, for 
example, with regards to dividends, interest and royalties, which, for example under 
treaties following the OECD Model Convention, are considered as produced in the 
territory of the state if paid by subjects who are residents therein. This consideration has 
led some authors to highlighting that switching to a purely territorial tax system without 
a comprehensive definition of what constitutes the “source” of an income would not 
allow to bypass the problem of establishing the residence of taxpayers, leaving residence 
at the centre of the debate in the exact way it has been in the analysis of worldwide 
taxation203. 
Notwithstanding all of the above, it is undeniable that, as it has been mentioned 
above, some states’ income tax systems, especially with regards to corporations and 
juridical persons in general, are already inspired to “semi-territorial” models of taxation, 
while other countries are considering or have considered this possibility204. 
This is the case, for example, of France, where Article 209-I of the Code Général des 
Impôts provides that only income produced in France and income attributed to France’s 
taxing jurisdiction by way of international conventions should be taken into account in 
the determination of the taxable base of juridical persons. Moreover, in general terms, 
corporations residing in the Netherlands are subject to tax on income wherever 
produced in the world. However, an exception is made for income produced abroad 
through permanent establishments distinctly and autonomously performing activities by 
way of their own organisation and structure. The same rule applies also for Switzerland 
and Australia. Article 217 of the Belgian Code des Impôts sur le Revenus provides that 
income produced abroad through a permanent establishment is partly exempted from 
taxation. 
To a certain extent, it could be argued that even states adopting the exemption 
method in order to prevent international double taxation on dividends can be listed 
amongst the number of states looking at a territorial tax system205. 
Some other authors have even “stepped out” of the debate between which model 
between the worldwide and the territorial tax systems would be preferable, advocating 																																																								
203 Marino, G., L’unificazione del diritto tributario: tassazione mondiale verso tassazione territoriale, cited above, 873. 
204 In the United States, for example, a proposal made in 1993 in the context of the Report of the National Commission 
on Economic Growth and Tax Reform (better known as “Kemp Commission”), starting from the consideration of the 
high costs suffered by the U.S. Treasury in the operative administration of controls and enforcement, suggested 
the introduction of an entirely new regime mirroring a territorial tax model pursuant to which income produced 
outside U.S. territory by individuals or corporations should not be subject to tax. 
205 Marino, G., L’unificazione del diritto tributario: tassazione mondiale verso tassazione territoriale, cited above, 872. 
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that a comprehensive reform of international taxation would have to aim at a true 
alignment between economic activity and tax jurisdiction206, which, however, as if of 
today, remains the object of a merely academic debate. Bearing this in mind, these 
authors have highlighted the need to look for new indicators of economic allegiance 
which would be able to adapt to the new economic context: on one hand, the inter-nation 
equity principles call for an equitable division of the worldwide tax base amongst the 
states involved to some extent in the generation of the cross-border income; on the other 
hand, the economic allegiance principle advocates for attributing taxing rights to the 
states that have contributed with their infrastructures and services to the generation of 
the income by the taxpayer. According to this view, the result would be a model based 
on formulas (so called “global formulary apportionment”), thus leaving behind the age-
old residence-source paradigm207. 
Some have even suggested a solution that constitutes a compromise between 
worldwide taxation and taxation only at source, that is to say the so-called “schedular 
taxation”208. This theory is based on the assumption that worldwide taxation is not going 
to “survive” the process of deep integration amongst state and economies on a global 
scale, starting from which it has been argued that it might be necessary to switch to a 
system where all types of income are subject to separate taxation with lower tax rates 
being applicable to those income whose sources are of a more mobile nature. 
Once we acknowledge the fact that countries are unlikely to agree to limit their 
tax jurisdiction to residence or source only, the next step should be to decide on the 
optimal method in order to prevent double taxation created by the interaction between 
the tax system of the source state and that of the state of residence. 
While source countries have a practical advantage in assessing and collecting 
taxes, preventing double taxation is generally left to residence countries. There is, 
however, an international consensus that residence jurisdiction has primacy over passive 
income, while source jurisdiction has primacy over active income. This consensus is 
clearly reflected in the extensive tax treaty network of those states following the OECD 
Model Convention example. Nonetheless, even in treaties based on the UN Model 
																																																								
206 Which, we should remember, was supposed to be the alleged main ambition of the OECD BEPS Project. 
207 López, E.E., An opportunistic, and yet appropriate, revision of the source threshold for the Twenty-First Century tax 
treaties, cited above, 13; Clausing, K., Avi-Yonah, R., Reforming corporate taxation in a global economy. A proposal to 
adopt formulary apportionment, Brookings Institution, June 1, 2007; Hellerstein, W., The case for formulary 
apportionment income allocation in the 21st Century: the end of transfer pricing, in International Transfer Pricing, 2005, 
103. 
208 This opinion has been voiced, for example, by Tanzi. On the point, see Tanzi, V., Taxation in an integrating world, 
Washington, 1995, 133, as cited in Marino, G., L’unificazione del diritto tributario: tassazione mondiale verso tassazione 
territoriale, cited above, 869. 
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Convention, which generally favours developing countries, source states recognise the 
primacy of the states of residence of the taxpayer over passive income. 
The topic of the possible implementation of a purely territorial tax system has 
been indirectly raised also in the OECD context, in occasion of the enactment of its 
reknown Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project209. 
If it is certainly true, in fact, that the BEPS Project does not officially and directly 
aim at changing the existing international standards with regards to the the allocation of 
taxing rights210, on the other hand it somehow indirectly responds to the change of 
balance of taxing powers between residence and source states generated by new 
business models and new transactions (e.g., electronic commerce), for example by means 
of Action 1, with the purpose to conduct a preliminary study of the fiscal challenges of 
the digital economy through questioning one of the ancient standards of the 
international tax system, i.e. the “permanent establishment threshold”, which is 
conceived by some as the main responsible for the crisis of the current system of 
allocation of taxing rights211. 
The OECD BEPS Projects has the purpose to realign income taxation with the 
place where the economic substance of the transaction or the income-producing activity 
is212, especially as a reaction to the progressive dematerialisation of wealth and to the new 
structures of multinationals, which contribute to the placement of certain categories of 
income in a sort of “fiscal limbo” which is far from the states’ tax jurisdictions. It seems 
almost obvious to state, in fact, that economies, and especially financial sectors, are less 
and less tied to the territory, which makes the definition of territorial connecting factors 
between income and the taxing state considerably harder213. 
																																																								
209 In brief, the OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project has been launched in 2013 by the OECD, with the 
sponsorship of G20 countries, and reached its conclusion at the end of 2015. The BEPS package provided fifteen 
“Actions” that were supposed to equip governments with the domestic and international instruments needed to 
tackle phenomena of base erosion and profit shifting and with the tools to ensure that profits are taxed where 
economic activities generating the profits are performed and where value is created. 
210 As it has expressly stated by the OECD itself in its 2013 Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (p. 11). 
211 Nonetheless, it has been correctly observed that the conclusions drawn by the OECD final report on Action 1 
seems considerably “watered-down” if compared to the ambitious purposes declared at the beginning of the 
BEPS Project (the expression comes from López, E.E., An opportunistic, and yet appropriate, revision of the source 
threshold for the Twenty-First Century tax treaties, cited above, 12). It is essentially concluded that the 
implementation of potential solutions to the problem would be premature at the present stage and that, therefore, 
it would be more convenient to wait. It has also been highlighted that the temporary abandonment of this line of 
work could be explained mainly by referring to the likely resistance exercised by the United States in any 
dialogue intended to broaden source-based taxation, especially when the majority of the raised proposals would 
seem to target digital companies, mostly residents for tax purposes in the United States. On the point, see 
Spencer, D., The OECD BEPS Project: tax challenges of the digital economy, in Journal of International Taxation, 2014, 
1, 30. 
212 OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profits Shifting, Paris, 2013, 13: “a realignment of taxation and relevant 
substance is needed to restore the intended effects and benefits of international standards, which may not have kept pace with 
changing business models and technological developments”. 
213 Cassese, S., La crisi dello Stato, Rome, 2002, 37. 
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Starting from this general acknowledgment, the BEPS Project’s Actions have 
focused, through their respective areas of concerns, on two different profiles which are 
both relevant for the purposes of the present research: the crisis of the concept of 
“residence” for tax purposes and the growing difficulty to define the location of the 
source of the income. Under this perspective, the purpose to draft rules to allow the state 
where the economic substance of the activity lies did not seem entirely defined, being it 
unclear whether the concept of “economic substance” should, in the OECD’s opinion, 
evaluated with regards to the place where the source of the income is located (objective 
criterion) or with regards to the place where the taxpayer receiving that income is 
(subjective criterion)214. 
Nonetheless, the subsequent work of the BEPS Committees has shown a 
tendency, on the part of the OECD, to favouring a subjective approach, thus confirming 
the OECD’s traditional preference towards taxation based on residence (worldwide 
taxation)215. However, it should be highlighted that the solutions advocated by the final 
reports of the BEPS Project are largely influenced by the declared purpose of the Project 
itself, i.e. to provide states with more effective tools to counter international tax 
avoidance practices, which makes them by nature not suitable to establish general rules 
able to have effect also beside such purpose216. 
6. Concluding remarks: tax territoriality as a limit to the economic integration 
of the European Union Internal Market. 
What has been argued in the previous pages has essentially shown that, rebus sic 
stantibus, it would be quite difficult (if not impossible) to assert the existence of a binding 
principle or rule of tax territoriality enshrined in a source of international law, being it as 
a “general principle of law recognised by civilised nations” or as embedded in an 
international customary rule. With the consequence that sovereign states are generally 
free, in absence of any more specific rule (e.g. provisions of an international treaty) to 
exercise their taxing powers on foreign income as they see fit, being it theoretically 
possible and legitimate for states to enact legislation levying taxes even on income 																																																								
214 Dorigo, S., Mastellone, P., L’evoluzione della nozione di residenza fiscale delle persone giuridiche nell’ambito del Progetto 
BEPS, in Riv. dir. trib., 2015, 3, 39. For a general overview of the (potential) consequences of the BEPS Project on 
the concept of “source” and on the debate on territoriality and allocation of taxing powers, see also López, E.E., 
An opportunistic, and yet appropriate, revision of the source threshold for the Twenty-First Century tax treaties, cited 
above, 6. 
215 Some authors have strongly criticised this approach, stating that the BEPS Project would be doomed to fail right 
from the start, being it based on an attempt to solve new problems through essentially traditional concepts.  
216 Dorigo, S., Mastellone, P., L’evoluzione della nozione di residenza fiscale delle persone giuridiche nell’ambito del Progetto 
BEPS, cited above, 74. 
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having its source in foreign territory and even in a dearth of connections with the taxing 
state. In simpler terms, state sovereignty implies jurisdiction to tax both residents and 
non-residents on income generated outside state territory. 
For the same reasons, general international law does not seem to entail any 
explicit prohibition of juridical or economic international double taxation: sovereign 
states are generally free to consider a certain item of income as taxable without 
depending on the choices made by other states concerning that same item of income, 
exception being made for the case-by-case solutions adopted by states to counter the 
negative effects of double taxation on their businesses and enterprises, either unilaterally 
or through bilateral tax treaties. There is no hierarchical order which rules the claims 
extended by different countries on the same items of income; thus, any overlap 
stemming from the exercise of concurrent taxing powers on the part of different 
countries is, from an international tax law perspective, nothing but a “natural 
consequences” of the nature of international law itself and of the interaction of states 
which are all “equally sovereign”217. 
It follows that it does not seem possible, rebus sic stantibus, to come up with any 
uniform and homogeneous theory for the allocation of cross-border income and of states’ 
taxing powers at international level, given that this hypothetical “model”, in absence of a 
concerted action by states (which is quite difficult to imagine), would be deprived of any 
actual grounds to be based on. 
This conclusion may be considered as acceptable in the international context, 
accepting that states are theoretically “boundless” when designing their domestic tax 
provisions with cross-border relevance; especially if we consider that, on a practical 
level, irrespective of the actual nonexistence of a binding principle of tax territoriality in 
a stricter sense, states show a certain degree of restraint in allocating their taxing powers, 
generally (but not always and not always with irreproachable results) searching for a 
reasonable link between them and the tax object. 
It could be stated, therefore, that states generally tend to conform to criteria 
whose application resembles the mechanisms underlying the “principle of territoriality” 
as it stands in general international law, as a jurisdiction principle recognising a rights to 
legislate on the basis of a territorial connection between a state and a certain subject or 
object. In the international tax law practice, said link is, in fact, always of a “territorial” 
nature, where the term “territorial” is used lato sensu, referring both to “subjective 																																																								
217 The adoption of this assumption on the part of the Court of Justice of the European Union, as it will be shown in 
the following chapter of the research (see Chapter II, paragraph 6), has led to interesting results, in the context of 
the EU Internal Market, which will are going to be described as “parallel exercise of taxing powers doctrine”. 
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territoriality”, based either on residence, nationality or other subjective kinds of 
connection with the state’s territory, and to “objective territoriality”, based on the actual 
collocation of the income or the factors underlying the production of said income within 
the state’s territory. International law, therefore, does not favour any of the two 
“criteria” mentioned above, i.e. worldwide taxation and strictly territorial taxation, 
leaving countries with the outmost freedom in shaping their tax systems and in the 
extension of their taxing powers, with the only limits to that freedom being those self-
imposed by the states themselves, by entering into conventions for the elimination of 
double taxation. 
The same, however, cannot be as easily accepted with regards to the European 
Union context, which is characterised - as known and as it will be further discussed in 
the following pages of the present research - by both general principles (e.g., the 
principle of non-discrimination, the fundamental freedom of movement of persons, 
goods, capital and services, the freedom of establishment, etc.) and specific provisions 
(directives and regulations, or even Treaty provisions concerning, for example, 
competition) that are aimed at ensuring, amongst other purposes, the proper functioning 
of the Internal Common Market. 
This is even more true if we consider the fact that, in giving birth to the European 
Union, Member States have renounced to a part of their sovereignty by way of a transfer 
of competences, at least with regards to some specific areas, in favour of the Union itself. 
Therefore, if, in the international context, state sovereignty does not encounter any 
particular limitation besides those deriving from the (quite rare) international general 
principles of law and from bilateral conventions, the same reasoning cannot 
automatically apply in the context of the European Union. 
Therefore, tax territoriality as described beforehand - or, rather, the absence of a 
binding principle of tax territoriality applicable to countries - amounting to the assertion 
of the outmost freedom for states (and Member States) to shape their tax systems and to 
levy taxes on foreign income without necessarily being limited to facts and events 
located within their national borders, constitute a potential hindrance for the 
effectiveness of the attainment of the purpose of integration of the European Internal 
Market. Even more so if we consider the negative effects that the boundless exercise of 
taxing powers on the part of the Member States can generate, in terms, for example, of 
juridical double taxation. 
The question should, therefore, be which role could, and should, be played by tax 
territoriality in such a context. Once we abandon the idea that a hypothetical principle of 
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territoriality could be of any help to the process of integration of the European Market, 
we should ask ourselves whether or nor a more significant role could actually be played 
by tax territoriality (either “objective” or “subjective”) interpreted as a criterion for 
allocating taxing powers amongst Member States in a way that does not conflict with 
fundamental principles of the Union or with the functioning of the Common Market. 
In case of a positive answer, territoriality would, thus, go from constituting a 
potentially very significant hindrance to the realisation of a fully operative and 
functioning European Common Market from becoming a fundamental instrument at the 
service of European integration.  
This is what will constitute the object of the following pages of the present work, 
where we will, first of all, attempt to verify, through an analysis both of the statutory 
provisions of the European Union in the field of direct taxation and of the most 
significant case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union on the point, the 
relevance and meaning of the “territoriality principle” for the purposes of European 
Union law, verifying if and how the domestic and international elaboration of the 
concept can be transposed in the European context. This analysis will serve as a 
necessary presupposition in order to understand, from a de jure condendo perspective, 
which of the two models described above (either worldwide taxation or “territorial” 
taxation or, possibly, none of them) better fits the European Union system and its 
fundamental principles and whether or not it could be possible to formulate a more 
general theory for the allocation of cross-border income (and taxing powers) in the 
Internal Market and for the taxation of non-residents on the part of the Member States. 
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CHAPTER II 
TERRITORIALITY AND THE INTEGRATION OF THE INTERNAL MARKET: 
THE COURT OF JUSTICE’S ROLE IN A HYPOTHETICAL DESIGN OF A MODEL FOR THE  
CROSS-BORDER ALLOCATION OF TAXING POWERS WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. European Union law and the consequent limitations to the Member States’ 
sovereignty in the field of tax law: domestic fiscal provisions must bow to 
the functioning of the Internal Market. 
As it has been shown in the first chapter of the present research, modern states 
are based on an absolute conception of state sovereignty, with each country being able to 
regulate, within the borders of their respective territories, all kinds of juridical 
relationship. At the international level, this peculiar trait is generally translated into the 
affirmation of the general independence of each national legal order with regard to the 
other ones; this character brings with it the necessary mutual recognition amongst 
countries of their independence towards one another. This kind of interaction between 
different legal orders on different levels leads, on one hand, to the “absolutization” and 
the exclusivity of national sovereignty considered per se, from a merely domestic and 
internal point of view, but also, on the other hand, to the “relativity” of that legal order 
which is inextricably bound to the recognition of the states’ mutual independence, from 
an external point of view. The unavoidable consequence, for the purposes of the 
research, is that “external” juridical provisions may be recognised within each single 
state’s legal order only if and insofar as said legal order allows. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, this paradigm has undergone a profound 
crisis with the introduction of a new and unprecedented legal order, i.e. the European 
Union, whose peculiar characters have deeply modified the contours of state 
	 80 
sovereignty, especially through legislative provisions, e.g. regulations, coming from a 
legislative body which is different from national parliament and which are directly 
applicable in the state’s legal order irrespective of that state’s will, but also as an effect of 
the existence of a judicial body interpreting European Union law and rendering 
judgements directly binding upon Member States. 
The consequences on tax law cannot but be considerably disruptive. 
As known, the current system for the distribution of competences between the 
European Union and Member States, created with the Maastricht Treaty, is based on the 
provisions of Article 5 TEU, according to which “the limits of Union competences are 
governed by the principle of conferral”218 and “the use of Union competences is governed by the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality”. As far as the principle of subsidiarity is 
concerned, the same Article 5 TEU clarifies that “in areas which do not fall within its 
exclusive competence, the Union shall act only in so far as the objectives of the proposed action 
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and 
local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved 
at Union level”. 
There is no need to dwell on the well-known and undisputed fact that taxation, 
both direct and indirect, falls within the scope of the competences which are 
instrumental to the attainment of the correct functioning of the Internal Market pursuant 
to Article 4 TFEU219: it is in light of this well-grounded assumption that part of the legal 
doctrine has argued that a genuine Internal Market can only be realised if the Member 
States’ tax systems are integrated, at least sufficiently enough to remove the tax obstacles 
hampering the development of such Market and created by tax rules and practices that 
constitute discrimination, restrictions and, more generally, distortions220. However, if 
Articles 110-113 TFEU provide a basis for the positive integration and harmonisation of 
indirect taxes on the part of the European Union, the same has not been provided with 																																																								
218 The same Article 5, par. 2, TEU specifies that “under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within the 
limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein. 
Competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States”. 
219 Union competence is based on the principle of conferral, pursuant to which the European Union has only the 
competences conferred on it by the Treaties (Article 5 TEU). The competences conferred upon the Union may be 
divided into three categories: exclusive competences (Article 3 TFEU), shared competences with “pre-emption” 
(which means that both the European Union and the Member States are competent, but whenever the Union 
chooses to exercise its competence, the Member States have to comply) and shared competences without “pre-
emption” (meaning that the Union is only competent to support and coordinate the exercise of such competences 
by the Member States, without superseding such competences). Internal market as described in Article 4 TFEU 
falls within the group of the shared competences with “pre-emption”. 
220 On the point, see, amongst others, Kemmeren, E.C.C.M., Double tax conventions on income and capital and the EU: 
past, present and future, in EC Tax Review, 2012, 3, 158; Sacchetto, C., Member States tax sovereignty: between the 
principle of subsidiarity and the necessity of supranational coordination, in Hinnekens, L., Hinnekens, P. (eds.), A vision 
of taxes within and outside European borders, Amsterdam, 2008, 804; Dorigo, S., Residenza fiscale delle società e libertà di 
stabilimento nell’Unione Europea, Padua, 2012, 10. 
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regards to direct taxation221. 
Unlike indirect taxes, direct taxes are not even referred to in the Treaties. Direct 
taxation, in fact, is left to the competence of the single Member States and the Treaty 
does not define, in general terms, the foundation of the states’ taxing powers, which is 
seen by many as a direct consequence of the fact that, unlike national states, the 
European Union does not have any taxing powers of its own. Therefore, harmonisation 
of direct taxation at EU level seems to have a much smaller Treaty basis than 
harmonisation of indirect taxation222. 
This is also one of the reasons why the field of (direct) taxation is unanimously 
recognised as one of the most closely-guarded competences of the Member States, 
following the traditional opinion according to which “les Etats ne pouvant se dessaisir de 
leur competences fiscales, sans disparaitre” 223 . In the current state, Member States are 
generally free to determine whether they want to levy tax in the first place, what they 
wish to levy tax upon, the rate at which they wish to levy tax and - which is the most 
interesting aspect for the purposes of the present research - the criteria upon which they 
wish to base their tax jurisdiction. The reasons underlying this strong bond between 
States and their national sovereignty in the field of direct taxation are evident, especially 
if we consider that direct tax revenue contributes vitally to the public coffers of (almost) 
all Member States224 and, consequently, to the choices that each Member State makes in 
terms of public spending. 
Nonetheless, it is also true that, as a consequence of the establishment of the 
European Union, Member States’s sovereignty in the field of direct taxation cannot but 
																																																								
221 It is for this reason that many authors have argued that the comparison between the number of “pure” 
European fiscal norms and the number of European norms which are relevant also for the purposes of tax law 
(e.g., competition, non-discrimination, state aids…) leads to the statement that the European Union legal order 
does not entail a complete system of fiscal norms, but rather a number of rules which have also effects on tax law, 
with concern only to some some sectors of the fiscal system of the single Member States. See, on the point, 
Roccatagliata, F., Diritto tributario comunitario, in Uckmar, V. (ed.), Diritto tributario internazionale, Padua, 2005, 
1206; Aujean, M., Le fonti europee e la loro efficacia in materia tributaria, tra armonizzazione, coordinamento e concorrenza 
fiscale leale, in Di Pietro, A. (ed.), Per una costituzione fiscale europea, Padua, 2008, 9. 
222  The only legal basis for harmonisation of direct taxation would seem to be the general provisions on 
harmonisation, i.e. Articles 114 and 115 TFEU, and the complementary provision of Article 352 TFEU, which calls 
of appropriate unanimous measures by the Council “if action by the Union should prove necessary to attain, within the 
framework of the policies defined in the Treaties, to attain one of the objectives set out in the Treaties, and the Treaties have 
not provided the necessary powers”. Since Article 114 TFEU, providing for qualified majority decisions on matters 
concerning the establishment and functioning of the Internal Market, does not apply to taxation, only Article 115 
TFEU, requiring unanimity and calling for directives for the purpose of the approximation of national rules 
directly affecting the establishment or the functioning of the Internal Market, remains as a legal basis for the 
harmonisation of direct taxation. 
223 Berlin, D., Droit fiscal communautaire, Paris, 1988, 53, 101. 
224 This circumstance is clearly analysed and supported by a considerable amount of graphs and figures in 
Kingston, S., The boundaries of sovereignty: the ECJ’s controversial role applying internal market law to direct tax 
measures, in Cambridge Yearbook of European legal studies, 2006, 1, 287. 
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bow to the fundamental Treaty principles and to the essential purposes of the European 
Union225. 
Even though the main reference, in the field of direct taxation, is, and should be, 
to the well-known non-discrimination principle and to the fundamental freedoms 
provided for by the Treaty on the Functioning of the Eureopan Union (free movement of 
persons, goods, workers, services, capital and freedom of establishment), on which there 
is certainly no need to dwell - provided that a more detailed analysis of the Court of 
Justice’s interpretation of such freedoms in the context of direct taxation is to follow - it 
should be reminded that other Treaty provisions must inevitably be taken into 
consideration in order to fully understand the relevance of European Union law on the 
exercise of tax sovereignty on the part of the Member States. 
First of all, it should be reminded that Articles 2 and 3 TEU establish the values 
and general objectives of the European Union, referring to concepts such as justice, 
solidarity and equality, while the three main political objectives of the Union are the 
establishment of an area of freedom and security, the attainment of a real Internal 
Market and of an economic and monetary union. Furthermore, Article 120 TFEU 
provided that the Member States, and not the European Union, shall conduct their 
economic policies with a view to contributing to the achievement of the above-
mentioned objectives of the Union, whereas Article 121 TFEU provides that the Member 
States shall regard their domestic economic policies as a matter of common concern as 
far as European Union integration is concerned, coordinating with the Council with a 
view to reaching, through such policies, a higher level of harmonisation and to attaining 
the fundamental objectives to which the European Union aspires. 
 It is abundantly clear from all of the above, therefore, that the limits posed by the 
EU to the competences of the Member States in the field of taxation do not have 
eminently and essentially fiscal aims. On the contrary, they are, or they are supposed to 
be, exclusively functional to other objectives to which taxation must yield, such as the 
functioning of the internal market and competition. If we try to translate all of the above 
to a “constitutional language”, the EU model of taxation is entirely devoted to the 
elimination of any economic interference hindering the proper functioning of the 
internal market. On the other hand, domestic taxation is generally modelled, according 
to modern constitutions, in order to achieve general social aims. 
Therefore, even though, as it has been highlighted in the previous chapter of the 																																																								
225 On the point see, amongst others, Seer, R., Le fonti del diritto comunitario ed il loro effetto sul diritto tributario, in Di 
Pietro, A. (ed.), Per una costituzione fiscale europea, Padua, 2008, 31. 
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research, the states’ fiscal sovereignty is theoretically absolute and that, therefore, each 
state is theoretically free to levy taxes on any economic event irrespective of where it 
occurs. However, in the context of the European Union, several limits are set both by 
way of secondary law and as an effect of the general principles stated in the Treaties, 
which means that the European Union context necessarily falls outside all paradigms 
described in the previous pages, with the European Union imposing principles and rules 
that largely influence the exercise of Member States’ sovereignty in fiscal matters. Suffice 
it to say that, when a Member State decides to levy tax on an individual or a juridical 
persons which is not resident in its own territory, it must do so in compliance with a 
general non-discrimination principle, which is considerably different, as we will see, 
from the similar principle frequently mentioned in bilateral tax treaties. 
A consequence of the coexistence of different national tax systems is that 
disparities inevitably exist amongst jurisdictions, which has distorting effects on 
investment, employment and establishment decisions. However, according to at least 
part of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, as we will see in the 
following paragraphs, possible distortions resulting from mere disparities amongst tax 
systems do not fall within the scope of the free movement provisions in the Treaties. In 
other terms, according to the Court, obstacles resulting from disparities are different 
than obstacles resulting from discrimination, which occurs as a result of the rules of just 
one tax jurisdiction226: from this perspective, disparities are supposed nothing more than 
an inherent consequence of the sovereignty retained by Member States in direct taxation 
matters, occurring because there are discrete sovereign tax systems existing 
simultaneously, each having its own rules227. 
It follows from all of the above that tax harmonisation, in the context of the 
European Union, does not pursue aims of “fiscal justice” in the national meaning of a 
redistributive allocation of the burdens related to the financing of public expenditure on 
citizens. Taxation is not considered as a tool that is instrumental to the promotion of 
certain social purposes, but mainly as a neutral instrument that has to leave the 																																																								
226 Douma, S., The three Ds of direct tax jurisdiction: disparity, discrimination and double taxation, in European Taxation, 
2006, 11, 524. 
227 Weber, D., In search of a (new) equilibrium between tax sovereignty and the freedom of movement within the EC, in 
Intertax, 2006, 12, 588. See also Court of Justice, 23 April 2002, C-234/99, Nygaard: “as it stands at present, 
Community law does not contain any provision designed to prohibit the effects of double taxation occurring in the case of 
charges, such as that in issue in the main proceedings, which are governed by independent national legislation, and, while the 
elimination of such effects is desirable in the interests of the free movement of goods, it may nonetheless result only from the 
harmonisation of national systems”. That, in general terms, sovereignty in direct tax matters rests with Member 
States, has been stated also in the Bachmann judgements (Court of Justice of the European Union, 28 January 1992, 
C-204/90, Bachmann v. Belgium): “it is neither the intention of avowed aim of EU law to call into question the limits of any 
inherent power of taxation or to disturb the order of priority of the allocation of tax competences as between Member States, 
and, in the absence of EU harmonisation, the Court is not competent to interfere in the conception or organisation of the tax 
systems of Member States”. 
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realisation of the purposes set out in Article 2 of the Treaty only to market forces. From 
this perspective, all European Union interventions in the field are supposed to be aiming 
only at regulating the proper functioning of the Internal Market228. More specifically, the 
Internal Market requires a common commercial policy, a system ensuring the prevention 
of all possible distortions of competition and the approximation of the national laws of 
all Member States to the extent necessary for the functioning of the Internal Market229. In 
the words of the Court of Justice, the Internal Market “involves the elimination of all 
obstacles to intra-community trade in order to merge the national markets into a single market 
bringing about conditions as close as possible to those of a genuine internal market”230. 
All of the above-mentioned reasons have led a considerable number of authors to 
defining European Union tax law as “une fiscalité de control”231. This characteristic is to a 
large extent due to the fact that, as it has been correctly observed, whereas domestic tax 
systems are generally and constitutionally inspired by aims of a social nature (e.g., 
justice, redistribution of wealth, ability to pay, etc.), the interpretation and function of 
taxation in the European Union context are considerably influenced by the fact that, from 
a “constitutional” point of view, the Union pursues a free market economic model that 
requires the elimination, as far as possible, of all economic interferences232. 
In the European Union current context, therefore, taxation has gradually gone 
from constituting the very core of the idea itself of state sovereignty, the functioning 
mechanism through which the theoretical configuration of the primary relationships 																																																								
228 Vanistendael, F., The compatibility of the basic economic freedoms with the sovereign national tax systems of the Member 
States, in EC Tax Review, 2003, 4, 136. It is worth mentioning that, as reminded by Kemmeren, even though the 
terms “Internal Market” and “Common Market” are considered to be synonym, they are slightly different in 
terms of what they respectively imply for the European Union context. The “Internal Market” is characterised by 
the abolition of obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital, while a proper “Common 
Market” requires a common commercial policy, a common system ensuring the prevention of distortions in the 
Internal Market and the approximation of the laws of each Member State to the extent that is deemed necessary 
for the functioning of the Common Market. In other terms, according to Kemmeren, “it is essential that the common 
market be analogous in nature to the domestic market of a single state”. See Kemmeren, E.C.C.M., The internal market 
approach should prevail over the single country approach, in Hinnekens, L., Hinnekens, P. (eds.), A vision of taxes within 
and outside European borders, The Hague, 2008, 557. On the same point, see also Cordewener, A., The prohibitions of 
discrimination and restriction within the framework of the fully integrated Internal Market, in Vanistendael, F., EU 
freedoms and taxation, Amsterdam, 2006, 4. 
229 In the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European 
Economic and Social Committee on “Double taxation in the Single Market”, COM(2011)712, 11 November 2011, 
the Commission has highlighted that it is part of its Europe 2020 strategy to attain the removal of all remaining 
obstacles to the integration of the Internal Market, highlighting, in particular, that double taxation, as the result of 
an inconsistent interaction of different domestic tax systems in the European Union, is a major impediment to this 
purpose. 
230 Court of Justice of the European Union, 9 February 1982, 270/82, Polydor; Court of Justice of the European 
Union, 5 May 1982, 15/81, Gaston Schul I, as quoted by Kemmeren, E.C.C.M., Double tax conventions on income and 
capital and the EU: past, present and future, cited above, 158. 
231 Berlin, D., Droit fiscal communautaire, cited above, 53. 
232 Sacchetto, C., Member States tax sovereignty: between the principle of subsidiarity and the necessity of supranational 
coordination, cited above, 804; the Author defines EU taxation as “functional taxation”. For an overview of the most 
recent challenges European Union tax law faces, see Fregni, M.C., Problemi e prospettive dell’Unione fiscale europea, 
in Rassegna Tributaria, 2013, 5, 1061. 
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between peoples and governments, the cornerstone of the fundamental balancing of 
interests between the interests of the state as a “collective entity” and the interests of the 
single citizen, to being considered as a phenomenon that should be “contained” and 
limited233 in order to protect and promote competition and the fullest possible exercise of 
the fundamental freedoms of movement and in order to prevent obstacles and barriers to 
the free economic activities of EU citizens234. 
One of the purposes of the present research is, therefore, precisely to understand 
whether or not this is an unavoidable conclusion, directly following from the inherent 
nature of the European Union and of the relationship between the Union and its Member 
States, or rather if this conclusion is the result of a merely contingent situation and 
whether the European Union has the means to come up with a model of (cross-border) 
taxation that can actually ensure a higher degree of integration of the Internal Market 
while, at the same time, pursuing such as equality and redistribution of wealth. In other 
terms, we will try to verify whether or not it is actually possible to “turn the tables” on 
the conception of “taxation” from the European Union point of view, shifting from the 
current “negative” perspective, in which the fiscal phenomenon is conceived as just 
something that must be contained in order to ensure the Internal Marker purpose, to a 
new “positive” perspective, in which taxation can become a fundamental tool for the 
implementation of the Internal Market and the realisation of the authentic purpose of the 
European Union. 
This is one of the ultimate purposes of the analysis that is conducted in the 
present research, starting from the acknowledgement of the fundamental role that 
territoriality plays in this study. In the following pages, therefore, we will conduct an 
analysis on how the Court of Justice of the European Union has interpreted and 
construed the concept of territoriality in its case law on direct taxation, from the specific 
perspective of the jurisprudence on the taxation of non-residents: more in detail, we will 
examine how the Court has transposed the international law concept of territoriality, 
notwithstanding all the uncertainties surrounding it that were described in the previous 
chapter, sometimes to justify restrictions to the freedoms of movement of non-resident 
EU citizens, sometimes to force Member States to modify their tax measures (and the 
borders of their tax jurisdictions) in order to comply with the need to ensure the 
implementation of the fundamental freedoms, of the principle of non-discrimination 																																																								
233 Boria P., L’anti-sovrano. Potere tributario e sovranità nell’ordinamento comunitario, Turin, 2014, passim. 
234 According to part of the legal scholarship, assuming the Internal Market as the central and paramount 
benchmark on which to analyse the compatibility of Member States’ tax laws with European Union law clashes 
with the choices made by single Member States’ constitutions, granting taxation a fundamental role in the 
processes of social transformation and progress. 
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and, ultimately, of cross-border neutrality. 
It has been convincingly observed that, in the European Union context, the Court 
of Justice’s case law has provided an essential impulse to a phenomenon of convergence 
of domestic laws, by way of a process of “circulation” of general principles developing in 
two opposite directions: from national legal orders towards the EU legal order and from 
the EU legal order to national legal orders, in a sort of osmosis of principles by way of 
which the two legal orders reciprocally influence one another235. 
This, however, does not appear to be entirely true with regards to the 
principle/criterion of territoriality, which has not yet reached a definite understanding 
in the elaboration of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which creates a certain 
degree of confusion with regards to the implication of such a concept also on a domestic 
scale. This is certainly due in part to the fact that, in light of the reasons described in the 
previous chapter, it is considerably difficult to consider the concept of “territoriality” as 
an actual principle, at least in the field of international tax law (to which, however, the 
Court makes explicit references whenever mentioning the “principle of territoriality”). 
On the other hand, the Court of Justice’s case law has not certainly helped in the clear 
definition of what should be meant by the concept of “territoriality” and of which 
relevance said concept should have for the purposes of an “European tax law”, with an 
approach to the topic which, as it will be shown, has treated “territoriality” in a very 
inconsistent manner through the years. This, however, is not a subject that can be treated 
lightly, since the confusion on the concept, meaning and implications of the principle of 
territoriality, as we will see, leads to a vagary approach to the topic of what a Member 
State can and cannot do in shaping the borders of its tax jurisdiction. 
Before proceeding in the analysis of the topic, it should be highlighted that the 
present research will limit itself to the aspects of “territoriality” that are connected 
exclusively to direct taxation and will not concern itself with the (quite different) 
elaboration of the concept applied to the field of indirect taxation and, especially, VAT. 
The main difference being, in fact, linked to the fact that Member States, as seen above, 
have not enacted any complete transfer of sovereignty to the European Union in the field 
of direct taxation, whereas such a transfer has been put in place with regards to indirect 
taxation. Which essentially means that European Union law encompasses a definition 
and an elaboration of its own on the point of “territoriality”, but that such an analysis 
can be considered as limited only to the field of indirect taxation. With regards to direct 
																																																								
235 Cipollina, S., I confini giuridici nel tempo presente. Il caso del diritto fiscale, cited above, passim. 
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taxation, on the other hand, it is not possible to (immediately) find an “European Union 
concept of territoriality”. 
The question, therefore, should be whether or not such a hypothetical concept can 
be drawn from the analysis criteria for the allocation of taxing powers that the Member 
States have had to put in place (both as the effect of the Court of Justice’s jurisprudence 
and of EU secondary law) in order to comply with the fundamental Treaty freedoms. In 
other words, we should verify the possibility of coming up with a “European concept of 
territoriality” drawn from the elaboration of the common principles forming part of the 
national legal systems. 
Which also leads to the (obvious) conclusion that (the analysis of) European 
Union law will come to relevance with regards only to its application to cross-border 
items of income, whereas the “domestic” definition of territoriality overlooks the specific 
relevance of transnational income, given that the choice between “source” or “residence” 
as fundamental territorial criteria for the definition of the state taxing powers’ scope 
applies irrespective of an item of income having a purely domestic or a cross-border 
nature. 
1.1. The peculiarity of European Union provisions and principles on taxation: 
tax rules without a taxing power.  
It has been highlighted above that the European Union legal order leans towards 
a “negative” or “subtractive” of the single Member States’ taxing powers. The European 
Union, in other words, calls upon itself some of the choices in the field of taxation, 
subtracting them from the competences of the single Member States, thus enacting a 
transfer of taxing powers which removes, or limits, part of national sovereignty. These 
choices, however, have not brought to a positive regulation of direct taxation (yet), but 
rather have led to limitations to national sovereign taxing powers.  
It is certainly true, however, that the European Union, as it currently is, is not 
easily reconciled with an idea of “sovereignty”, being it that it lacks any ascending 
conception of power (with a very limited role of democratic representation) and any 
specific connection to a territory in the traditional meaning of the word. Currently, 
therefore, the European Union’s role in direct taxation is essentially to limit the exercise 
of national sovereign powers so as to lead to a composition of the various interests at 
play (state interest, enterprises, individuals…) based on “market concepts”: this is, 
according to some, a vision of taxes that answers only to the need of ensuring 
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competition and, more in general, the functioning of the market. 
It has already been highlighted that, from this perspective, taxing powers lose, at 
least as far as European Union law is concerned, all of their “social” elements and all 
purposes of redistribution of wealth, being it reduced to a mere instrument of collecting 
state resources which has, furthermore, to be contained as not to hinder the development 
of the Internal Market and, ultimately, cross-border neutrality. 
According to some, this character is an unavoidable consequence of the peculiar 
role of the European Union and, more specifically, of the fact that the European Union 
establishes fiscal provisions and principles without having any corresponding fiscal 
power of its own and no “territory” on which to exercise it. Many EU provisions deal 
with taxation, even though they have never conferred any power to levy taxes upon the 
European Union and they have never had the aim to raise money to finance the expenses 
of the EU. The Union does not have its own taxes, therefore it also lacks any 
administrative power with regards to taxation: tax collection is left exclusively to single 
Member States’ financial administrations, which, then, contribute part of the resources 
collected to the European Union’s coffers. 
The fact that direct taxation is generally left to the competence of the single 
Member States and that the Treaty does not define any foundation of the Member States’ 
taxing powers, can also be interpreted as a direct consequence of the fact that, unlike 
national states, the European Union does not have any taxing powers of its own. In fact, 
one of the most peculiar traits of the European Union order lies in the way the Union 
itself is financed, through a “hybrid” system that is partly based on contributions from 
all member States (which is typical of all international organisations) and partly based on 
the collection of the Union’s own resources (which is typical of all sovereign states)236. 
However, all of the Union’s own resources are not directly linked to any exercise of 
taxing sovereignty by the Union itself, all of them being contributions which are 																																																								
236 Originally, the EC Treaties provided for financial contributions to the EC institutions to be distributed amongst 
single member States on the basis of political criteria, that is to say depending on the role that each State played in 
the institutions also in terms of voting rights. In 1970, a treaty was signed in Luxembourg modifying these rules, 
thus entailing the use of own resources instead of financial contributions from States. The system underwent 
another change in 1988, when the Council decided that the budgetary needs of the Community would have better 
been met through an enlargement of the list of own resources. Nowadays, the Union relies upon four types of 
own resources: customs duties, contributions from agricultural activities, part of the tax revenue from the 
collection of VAT by member States and a contribution which all member States must pay to the Union on an 
annual basis (which is generally set aroung 1% of the State’s GDP). On the subject, see Boria, P., L’anti-sovrano - 
Potere tributario e sovranità nell’ordinamento comunitario, cited above, 46. Article 311 TFEU allows the Council, 
unanimously, in accordance with a special legislative procedure and after consulting the European Parliament, to 
adopt a decision about the system of own resources of the Union, possibly establishing new categories of own 
resources or abolishing an existing category. That decision shall not, however, come into effect until it is 
approved by the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures. On the point, see 
also Elwes, S., The Internal Market versus the right of Member States to levy direct tax. A clash of fundamental principles, 
in Intertax, 2013, 1, 16. 
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essentially collected and then “paid” by all single member States. 
From the European Union’s lack of own taxing powers follows that the Union 
cannot, as it is, exercise any exclusive competence in fiscal matters, having to assume a 
role essentially limited to the coordination and regulation of national fiscal policies and 
tax measures. It is also true, on the other hand, that, rebus sic stantibus, European Union 
institutions do not have any particular interest in the collection of fiscal resources, since 
the matter is left to the Member States. From this perspective, the link between taxes and 
public expenditure currently leans towards national taxing powers, with the competence 
of the European Union being given a considerably limited role, at least on paper. This is 
one of the consequences following from the implementation of the principle of 
subsidiarity. 
This characteristic of the European Union legal order, according to some, brings 
to a friction with the fact that the fiscal phenomenon constitutes the object of much 
attention (but quite less regulation) on the part of the European Union, coherently with 
the purpose of building a truly functioning Internal Market, with no barriers. 
Taxation is, therefore, inherently linked to the attainment of the European 
Union’s purposes, but, since taxation is not conceived (yet) as a tool for the collection of 
financial resources which are essential for the existence and development of a European 
community, being it that the European Union itself does not have any actual taxing 
power, taxation is interpreted and treated as an element which is able to cause potential 
distortions to competition and to the exercise of fundamental freedoms. 
It is light of this reason that part of the legal scholarship237 has argued that the lack 
of any fiscal power upon the European Union cannot but influence the “constitutional” 
definition of the taxing powers in terms that are substantially different (and to a certain 
extent incompatible): given that there is no need, from the European Union perspective, 
to regulate the fundamental values of the community in relation to individual citizens 
when it comes to taxation, the European Union “ensemble” of values cannot but be only 
connected to the purposes underlying European integration, with a “negative” 
conception of taxation. The consequence is that the EU discipline of taxation is inherently 
shaped on values which are generally far from the Member States’ fiscal interest. 
1.2. The European Union’s “negative” approach to direct taxation: the (much 
criticised) Court of Justice’s role in the development of an European tax 
law. 																																																								
237 Boria, P., L’anti-sovrano - Potere tributario e sovranità nell’ordinamento comunitario, cited above, passim. 
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Article 115 TFEU allows the Council, acting unanimously in accordance with a 
special legislative procedure and on a proposal from the Commission and after 
consulting the European Parliament, to issue directives for the approximation of 
Member States’ laws directly affecting the establishment or functioning of the Internal 
Market238. However, all actions in the field of direct taxation under Article 115 TFEU find 
a fundamental obstacle in the requirement of unanimity and on the fact that, to put 
forward a proposal for a directive, the Commission must demonstrate that a certain 
distortion caused by direct taxation (or, better, by the interaction of national direct tax 
laws of Member States) implies an actual obstacle for the implementation of the Internal 
Market. 
The combination of the need for unanimity and of the reluctance of Member 
States in accepting limitations to their taxing powers in the field of direct taxes has led to 
an almost complete “paralysis” of all forms of positive integration of direct taxation in 
the European Union context239-240. 
Scholars are essentially unanimous in stating that, as a consequence of such a 
“paralysis” the Court of Justice of the European Union has been the institution that, 
more than all others, has driven forward the process of an European tax integration241. 
The efforts of the Court of Justice stand out in contrast to the lack of political will on the 
part of the Member States to reach a wide-ranging harmonisation of taxation by way of 
legislation. On the basis of the fundamental Treaty principles of non-discrimination, free 
movement of workers, free movement of goods, freedom of establishment, free 
movement of services and free movement of capital, the Court has elaborated general 
assertions and criteria to which Member States must comply. However, the Court of 
Justice case law on direct tax matters suffered a great deal of criticism by tax scholars for 
its apparent lack of clear tax policy objectives. Academics generally agree in recognising 																																																								
238 On the point, see Commission Communication to the Council and the European Parliament, The contribution of 
taxation and customs policies to the Lisbon strategy, COM(2005)532, where it is stated: “several aspects of the functioning 
of national tax systems have negative effects on market integration or prevent the advantages of a single market from being 
fully exploited. The removal of such obstacles would allow businesses to make sounder economic choices based on the 
productivity of factors and are less distorted by the influence of certain extra costs”. 
239 Pistone, P., Expected and unexpected developments of European integration in the field of direct taxes, in Intertax, 2007, 
70. For a complete summary of the European Union initiatives in the field of direct taxation and of the slow 
process leading up to the current situation, from the 1996 Ecofin held in Verona to current days characterised by a 
“soft law approach” on the part of the Commission, see Aujean, M., Le fonti europee e la loro efficacia in materia 
tributaria, tra armonizzazione, coordinamento e concorrenza fiscale leale, cited above, 17. 
240 It should be noted that one of the topics discussed during the Intergovernmental Conference of 2003-2004 was 
the possibility to replace the need for an unanimous vote with a procedure based on qualified majority in some 
fields concerning taxation and relevant to the functioning of the Internal Market, such as administrative 
cooperation, the fight against tax fraud, tax evasion, free movement of capital, measures concerning corporate tax 
bases and environmental taxation. See Commission Recommendation to the Intergovernmental Conference, 
COM(2003)548. On the point, see also Aujean, M., Le fonti europee e la loro efficacia in materia tributaria, tra 
armonizzazione, coordinamento e concorrenza fiscale leale, cited above, 12. 
241 Vanistendael, F., The ability to pay principle in the EU legal order, in Salvini, L., Melis, G. (eds.), L’evoluzione del 
sistema fiscale e il principio di capacità contributiva, Padua, 2014, 210. 
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the “judge-made harmonisation” of direct taxation in the context of the European Union 
as just the pars denstruens of the harmonisation process, arguing that a harmonisation 
built on the removal of national provisions does not (and cannot) provide the systemic 
coherent view and the global approach that statutory law could provide. And that is 
mainly due to the fact that the Court uses tools such as the non-discrimination principle, 
which, according to many, was established in order only to protect the citizens of a 
Member State from the discriminatory provisions of another Member State. 
It is commonly accepted in the Court of Justice’s jurisprudence that, because there 
are no general European Union rules on direct taxation and on the allocation of taxing 
powers amongst Member States, the power to determine the criteria for the levying of 
taxes with a view to defining fiscal jurisdiction and avoiding double taxation lies with 
the Member States, which are free to define, unilaterally or by way of their double 
taxation conventions, the connecting factors for the allocation of taxing powers and the 
structure of their tax systems. The fact that each of the Member States has sovereignty 
over whether and how to levy direct taxes means, of course, that there are twenty-seven 
discrete and different direct taxation systems interacting in the context of the European 
Internal Market, with all the consequent advantages and disadvantages for taxpayers 
arising from the disparities created by the implementation of such rules242. 
It follows that, according to the Court of Justice’s case law, Member States may 
choose to shape their tax systems following a model of source taxation not only for non-
residents, but for residents as well, designing their tax jurisdictions so as to cover only 
domestic-source positive and negative items of income. The Court of Justice of the 
European Union has confirmed that the use of these criteria by Member States in order 
for them to establish their tax jurisdiction is compatible with EU law (Gerritse, De Groot, 
Saint Gobain, Futura). Nonetheless, it also goes without saying that, according to 
consistent case law of the Court of Justice, when exercising the taxing powers so 
allocated, Member States must not ignore or breach European Union law243. Therefore, 
even limitations to the Member States’ tax jurisdictions, either self-imposed or deriving 
from bilateral agreements, may be found as not compliant with European Union law 
when tested against the EU citizens’ right to unrestricted exercise of the Treaty freedoms. 
The Court of Justice’s case law has to a large extent interpreted fundamental 
freedoms as expressions of the more general principle of non-discrimination244. Especially 																																																								
242 Weber, D., In search of a (new) equilibrium between tax sovereignty and the freedom of movement within the EC, cited 
above, 586. 
243 Greggi, M., Revisiting Schumacker: the role of limited tax liability in EU law, cited above, 52. 
244 Garcia Prats, F.A., EC law and direct taxation: towards a coherent system of taxation?, Report to the EATLP Annual 
Conference, Helsinki, 2007, 3, where the Author critically analysed the Court of Justice’s case law in the field of 
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in earlier times, the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice interpreted the Treaty 
provisions on freedom of movement as imposing on Member States a prohibition of 
discrimination towards citizens of different Member States. Subsequently, the Court of 
Justice partially modified this approach, thus stating that Treaty provisions on freedom 
of movement of persons, capital, goods, services and establishment not only prohibit 
discriminations against non-resident EU citizens (interpreted as indirect discrimination 
based on nationality), but also prevent Member States from establishing all other sorts of 
restrictions, towards both residents and non-residents, hindering or otherwise having 
dissuasive effects on the exercise of the freedoms of movement granted by the Treaty245. 
This approach finds its ground on the paramount relevance of market equality in 
the European Union context. Fundamental freedoms are the expression of the need for 
Member States to grant equal opportunities and equal initial conditions to all economic 
actors within the Internal Market, irrespective of their residence or of the place where the 
income is produced. It has been correctly observed that this general principle does not 
automatically translate into an “absolute” principle of equality in the European Union 
context, which, as far as taxation is concerned, could, at least theoretically, be attained 
only by way of the unification of all Member States’ tax laws, but into a more “limited” 
meaning, i.e. the possible extension of domestic provisions to non-resident subjects or to 
the taxation of income produced in foreign territory246. 
On the other hand, authors have argued that competition within the Internal 
Market should not be interpreted not only as between enterprises and economic 
operators, but also as amongst Member States, with the consequent need to eliminate all 
distortions of the proper functioning of the Market from whatever source they should 
come247. Applying such concepts to the field of tax law, according to this model, Member 
States should replace their tax models based on capital export neutrality (or “internal 
neutrality”) with new models based on capital import neutrality (or “external 
																																																																																																																																																																													
direct taxation, stating, inter alia, that “Member States are put in a difficult situation: no matter what they do, they end up 
discriminating”.  
245 Bizioli, G., Il principio di non discriminazione, in Di Pietro, A., Tassani T. (eds.), I principi europei del diritto 
tributario, Padua, 2013, 231; Cordewener, A., The prohibitions of discrimination and restriction within the framework of 
the fully integrated Internal Market, cited above, 12. 
246 Bizioli, G., Il principio di non discriminazione, cited above, 207. The Author also highlights that the principle of 
non-discrimination in the field of tax law is applied to the tax provisions of one Member State only, obliging that 
Member State to grant equal treatment to purely domestic situations and to cross-border situations, with the 
consequent elimination, within one single legal order, of different treatment, leaving unadulterated the disparity 
of treatment deriving from the implementation of tax laws belonging to a plurality of different legal order, with 
an unavoidable “fragmentation” of the Internal Market. This point will be further developed in the following 
pages of the research, with the analysis of the Court of Justice’s so-called “parallel exercise doctrine”. 
247 Graetz, M., Taxing international income: inadequate principles, outdated concepts and unsatisfactory policies, in Tax 
Law Review, 2001, 261. 
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neutrality”)248, i.e., amongst other measures, replacing worldwide taxation with territorial 
taxation (taxation at source). It has also been recognised, however, that the problem with 
the adoption and implementation of such a model would be that a strictly territorial tax 
system would preclude the effective compensation of the losses suffered in a Member 
State with the income produced in another Member State by a taxpayer who is resident 
of the latter Member State, with the consequent risk of hindering the exercise of the 
fundamental freedom of establishment. 
Even more so if we consider that the European Commission has repeatedly 
confirmed, with regards to direct taxation, that there is “no need for an across the board 
harmonisation of Member States’ tax systems. Provided they respect EU rules, Member States are 
free to choose the tax systems they consider most appropriate and in accordance with their 
preferences. In addition, any proposal for EU action in the tax field needs to take into account the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Many tax problems require only the better 
coordination of national policies”249. A similar statement has been voiced many times by the 
Court of Justice of the European Union, which, for example, in the Bachmann 
judgement250, has recognised that “it is neither the intention or avowed aim of EU law to call 
into question the limits of any inherent power of taxation or to disturb the order of priority of the 
allocation of tax competences as between Member States, and that, in the absence of EU 
harmonisation, the Court is not competent to interfere in the conception or organisation of the tax 
systems of Member States”.  
Part of the scholarly opinion, therefore, has strongly criticised the Court, stating 
that is has no expertise in the field of international allocation of taxing powers and that 
sometimes it makes errors in tax law, the main one being that it incorrectly assumes the 
non-existent power to interpret bilateral tax treaties and national tax law. Some argue 
that the Court does not have any legal basis in EU law for any competence to interpret 
bilateral treaties between the member States. Nevertheless, in cases such as Wielocks, 																																																								
248 Kemmeren, E.C.C.M., Principle of origin in tax conventions. A rethinking of models, citd above, 69; Weber, D., Is the 
limitation of tax jurisdiction a restriction of the freedom of movement?, Paper for the annual conference of the European 
Association of Tax Law Professors, Helsinki, 7-9 June 2007, 5. 
249 Commission Communication to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, 
COM/2001/260, Tax policy in the European Union: priorities for the years ahead. This was one of the few really 
comprehensive tax policy documents issued by the Commission, where the Commission identified three aims for 
taxation in the context of the Internal Market. More specifically, according to the Commission, national tax 
systems should be more transparent and simple, contribute to an effective functioning of the Internal Market and 
shift to lower rates and broader bases. Generally speaking, however, since positive integration requires 
unanimity, which is difficult to attain, the Commission aims at maximising the effects played by the “negative 
harmonisation” resulting from the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, closely monitoring the 
Court’s judgements on Treaty freedoms and issuing soft law communications on how these judgements should 
be understood, inviting Member States to consequently adapt their tax laws and administrative practices to 
comply with such interpretation (e.g. with regards to exit taxation, tax incentives for R&D, cross-border loss 
relief, levying and crediting of withholding taxes on cross-border dividends, abuse of law in the area of direct 
taxation, etc.) and, if necessary, initiating infringement proceedings against non-compliant Member States. 
250 Court of Justice of the European Union, 28 January 1992, C-204/90, Bachmann v. Belgium. 
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X&Y and Van der Grinten, the Court undertook such interpretation of bilateral tax 
treaties or even of national tax law251. This ultra vires interpretation of tax treaties and tax 
law shows a limited understanding of the issues, of their political importance and of the 
mechanism of tax base allocation and elimination of double taxation252. 
From the viewpoint of the analysis of EU case law, scholars have pointed out that, 
as an effect of the Court of Justice’s intervention, the border between the competence of 
the EU and of the Member States has been shifted, with a de facto modification of the 
division of competences between the EU and the single Member States. Some scholars, in 
particular, have criticized the role played by the Court arguing that it has led to a 
violation of the principle of subsidiarity. More in detail, according to them, there is no 
concluding clear link between fundamental freedoms and national tax provisions 
because the Treaty principle do not make any reference to tax matters, thus concluding 
that the extension of the scope of application of the fundamental freedoms to tax matters 
was a mere creation of the Court of Justice. 
1.3. Beyond the “discrimination-restriction” binomial: “overall approach” vs. 
“per country approach”. 
Notwithstanding the position that may be held as regards the “fairness”, legality 
and political implications of the Court of Justice’s intervention in matters concerning 
direct taxation, it has been traditionally observed that the Court of Justice’s case law on 
direct taxation, discrimination and the compatibility of national fiscal measures with the 
Treaty freedoms may be distinguished into two different groups: a group of judgements 
where the Court has analysed the fact pattern taking into account elements limited only 
to the legal order of one single Member State (so-called “per country approach”) and a 
different group of judgements where the Court has examined factual and juridical 
elements from a global perspective (so-called “overall approach”)253-254. 																																																								
251 Wattel, P.J., Red herrings in direct tax cases before the ECJ, in Legal Issues of Economic Integration, 2004, 2, 81. 
252 A clear picture of the problem has been given by Commissioner Kovács in his speech “The Future of Taxation”, 
2007, London, available online. 
253 Bizioli, G., Balancing the fundamental freedoms and tax sovereignty: some thoughts on recent ECJ case law on direct 
taxation, in European Taxation, 2008, 135. For a brief description of the evolution and meaning on the “overall 
approach” of the Court of Justice, see Vanistendael, F., The ECJ at the crossroads: balancing tax sovereignty against the 
imperatives of the Single Market, in European Taxation, 2006, 9, 413; Cougnon, J.M., Plea for a multilateral approach in 
the judgements of the European Court of Justice, in EC Tax Review, 2011, 4, 179. 
254 AG Geelhoed, for example, is amongst the supporters of the “overall approach”. In his Opinion on the Test 
Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation case (Court of the European Union, case C-374/04), he has 
observed that “the combination of home State and source State obligations under the free movement provisions should 
properly be seen as a whole, or as achieving a type of equilibrium. Examination of the situation of an individual economic 
operator in the framework of just one of these States - without taking into account the Article 43 EC obligations of the other 
State - may give an unbalanced and misleading impression, and may fail to capture the economic reality in which that 
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The question of the dialectical relationship of these two very different approaches 
of the Court of Justice to the matters concerning direct taxation, and the consequent 
problems deriving from the fact that, as of today, there is not a definitive prevalence of 
one approach over the other - with the following difficulties, for Member States, to adapt 
to this level of uncertainty in drafting their national fiscal measures - is far from being 
exclusively doctrinal or merely theoretical. It is clear, in fact, that the decision on 
whether to analyse the field of direct taxation from one or the other point of view has 
very practical and potentially disruptive consequences on the Member States’ freedom to 
legislate and to exercise (or not exercise) their tax jurisdiction, as the analysis of the 
Court’s case law that will follow is going to demonstrate more in detail. 
Suffice it to say, here, that applying the “overall approach” to the implementation 
of the principle of non-discrimination implies the extension of the comparison to a 
plurality of legal orders and, therefore, to a plurality of tax systems, deciding on the 
position of a taxpayer from the point of view of operations in a fully integrated Internal 
Market: restrictions and discriminations are decided not only on the basis of the effect of 
the rules that are in place in a single separate tax system, but also on the basis of the 
integration of both tax systems of the Member State of residence and the Member State 
of source255. The result of this approach is that the boundaries imposed on Member States 
are constituted not only of the prohibition of discrimination against non-residents (or 
against residents with foreign activities) if compared with residents, but also of the need 
to ensure that non-residents (or residents with foreign activities) are not subjected to 
heavier burdens than those suffered by residents as a consequence of the combined effect 
of two (or more) tax systems256. Which considerably clashes with the “parallel exercise of 
taxing powers doctrine” formulated, for example, in cases such as Schempp and 
Kerckhaert Morres. 
The supporters of the “overall approach” argue that a “per country approach” 
would be inconsistent with the aim of the realisation of a proper Internal Market, being, 
on the contrary, essential that the European Internal Market be analogous to the 
domestic market of a single state. Therefore, according to this view, the Court of Justice 																																																																																																																																																																													
operator is acting”. This position has been confirmed in AG Geelhoed’s Opinions on the Kerckhaert Morres and 
Denkavit cases as well. 
255 Vanistendael, F., Le nuove fonti del diritto ed il ruolo dei principi comuni nel diritto tributario, in Di Pietro, A. (ed.), 
Per una Costituzione fiscale europea, Padua, 2008, 120; Vanistendael, F., The ECJ at the crossroads: balancing tax 
sovereignty against the imperatives of the Single Market, cited above, 414. 
256 Cordewener, A., The prohibitions of discrimination and restriction within the framework of the fully integrated internal 
market, in Vanistendael, F. (ed.), EU freedoms and taxation, Amsterdam, 2006, 35; Lehner, M., Tax consequences 
resulting from the application of the non-restriction principle in the areas other than taxation: distinction between 
discriminatory and non-discriminatory restrictions, in Vanistendael, F. (ed.), EU freedoms and taxation, Amsterdam, 
2006, 47. 
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should, in its judgements, take into account not only the domestic tax law of a Member 
State, but also the relevant double taxation conventions concluded by that Member State 
with the other Member State involved and also the tax law of the latter257. 
On the other hand, many have criticised the “overall approach” as hindering the 
effective exercise of the Member States’ sovereign powers, observing that inherent to tax 
sovereignty to levy taxes is that the exercise of this sovereignty does not depend on how 
another country acts with regards to taxation: a Member States, in other terms, may 
decide itself how to structure its own tax system in a manner that is not dependent on 
the behaviour of any other country258. 
In the evaluation of the question on which of the two approaches should be 
considered as more suitable to the attainment of a proper functioning of the Internal 
Market, it should also be considered that, on one hand, the “overall method” is certainly 
more careful to the actual reality of the case, allowing to take into account the practical 
consequences arising from the tax provisions at issue on the taxpayer concerned, not 
only from a domestic perspective, but from a supranational and “truly European” point 
of view as well: it is certainly the method which, more than any other, aims at 
considering the European Union as a true Single Internal Market. However, on the other 
hand, this, which could be considered as one of the points of strength of the “overall 
approach”, is also one of the most relevant limits of the method: in fact, taking into 
account the actual situation of the taxpayer concerned and all the practical consequences 
played by the interaction of all national systems at play cannot but imply the adoption of 
a “case-by-case approach”, thus impairing the development of general principles and 
rules that could be followed by Member States in the designing of their fiscal 
jurisdictions and their tax provisions concerning cross-border circumstances and, 
therefore, hindering legal certainty and exposing national treasuries to considerable 
risks. 
It follows from the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union that the 
attainment of a “common market” which is authentically “common” is not just a means, 
but it must be considered as being, in itself, amongst the fundamental aims of the 
European Union. From the above, several commentators have drawn the conclusion that 
the most appropriate reasoning to be used by the Court when analysing potential 																																																								
257 Kemmeren, E.C.C.M., The internal market approach should prevail over the single country approach, cited above, 562. 
For a contrary opinion, see Lang, M., The Marks & Spencer case. The open issues following the ECJ’s final word, in 
European Taxation, 2005, 2, 57; Weber, D., In search of a (new) equilibrium between tax sovereignty and the freedom of 
movement within the EC, cited above, 585. 
258 Weber, D., In search of a (new) equilibrium between tax sovereignty and the freedom of movement within the EC, cited 
above, 602. 
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restrictions or discriminations put in place by member States’ national tax provisions is 
the so-called “overall approach”259. By way of this reasoning, the Court should not only 
take into account the domestic tax law of a member State, but also all relevant double 
taxation conventions which that State has entered into with other countries, as well as 
the domestic provisions of all other involved member States. 
Statistically, the Luxembourg judges have more frequently applied the “overall 
approach” rather than its opposite. In Schumacker, for example, as we will see, the Court 
took into account the overall result following from the application of the tax rules in both 
the state of residence and the source state in order to assess whether or not the taxpayer 
involved had been subject to any discriminatory treatment. It derived that, while 
generally it is the state of residence of the taxpayer which must take into account his 
personal and family circumstances for tax purposes, in that case this task was left to the 
source state, which had to take into account the personal and family circumstances of a 
non-resident taxpayer because it was not possible for the state of residence to take them 
into account, since the foreign source income was exempt in that state and the taxpayer 
did not have any other relevant income in its state of residence. A system of taxation in 
the state of the residence of the taxpayer (worldwide taxation) is deemed coherent not 
with the ability-to-pay principle as described by the Court of Justice, but rather with the 
principle of “capacità contributiva” as enshrined in many national constitutions: by 
resorting to a worldwide taxation system, the state of the residence takes into 
consideration the overall economic capacity of the taxpayer. Ability-to-pay has more to 
do with taxation at source: see where the income really is. The same reasoning applies to 
loss compensation and to the determination of which state must take into account the 
losses incurred by a taxpayer. 
2. The difficult reconciliation between the (necessarily) different perspectives 
of European and international tax law. 
In the previous chapter of the research, it has been highlighted that, in the field of 
international law, even though, in practice, states show a certain degree of restraint in 
allocating their taxing powers, it is impossible to assert the existence of a binding 
principle or rule of territoriality, being it as a “general principle of law recognised by 
civilised nations” or as embedded in an international customary rule. With the 
consequence that sovereign states are generally free, in absence of any more specific rule 																																																								
259 Kemmeren, E.C.C.M., The internal market approach should prevail over the single country approach, cited above. 
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(e.g. provisions of an international treaty) to exercise their taxing powers on foreign 
income as they see fit, being it theoretically possible and legitimate for states to enact 
legislation levying taxes even on income having its source in foreign territory and even 
in a dearth of connections with the taxing state. For the same reasons, general 
international law does not encompass any prohibition of international double taxation, 
exception being made for the case-by-case solutions adopted by states to counter the 
negative effects of double taxation on their businesses and enterprises, either unilaterally 
or through bilateral tax treaties260. 
From this perspective, the international tax law “scenario” - the quite non-
technical term is used in lack of another appropriate “more juridical” word, since it 
would be quite improper to resort to terms such as “system” or “legal order” - shows 
unavoidable differences from the European Union legal order. The existence of no 
boundaries or limits to the countries’ taxing powern, in fact, cannot be as easily accepted 
with regards to the European Union context, which is characterised by both general 
principles (e.g., the principle of non-discrimination, the fundamental freedom of 
movement of persons, goods, capital and services, the freedom of establishment, etc.) 
and specific provisions (directives and regulations, or even Treaty provisions 
concerning, for example, competition) that are aimed at ensuring, amongst other 
purposes, the proper functioning of the Internal Market. 
Different systems, different logics, different paradigms correspond, therefore, to 
different aims and different values that are pursued and protected by the two different 
“orders” (even though, as highlighted in the previous chapter, speaking of international 
tax law as a “system” or an “order” is quite incorrect), providing answers to basically 
different questions. Which explains why it is so difficult to reconcile such diverging 
perspectives, based on different values and aims. The European Union legal order is 
based on the paramount importance of the Internal Market, which characterises such 
order with a “functional nature”, whereas the system made up of the bilateral tax treaties 
signed by countries is characterised by a global absence of any systematic nature and by 
an inherently selective approach, with the only purpose to prevent or remedy 
international juridical double taxation. 
 The different nature of the interests at play and the above-mentioned “functional” 
nature of European Union law serve to explain, inter alia, the hierarchical supremacy of 
European Union law (either primary and secondary) over international (bilateral or 																																																								
260 Van de Vijver, A., International double (non-) taxation: comparative guidance from European legal principles, in EC Tax 
Review, 2015, 5, 240. 
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multilateral) conventions signed by Member States. Article 351 TFEU establishes a 
general primacy of European Union law, obliging Member States to eliminate all of their 
conventional provisions that are not compatible with the Treaty or secondary EU law261. 
At the international level, where each State is an independent subject in terms of 
international law, sovereignty is one of the main elements constituting the nature of the 
state itself262. With specific regard to tax law, the concept of sovereignty has undergone 
considerably deep changes, especially after the creation of the European Union. 
Sovereignty is no longer conceived as unlimited and indivisible, but, on the contrary, as 
a unity composed of a variety of competences, some of which (or, even better, their 
exercise) can be delegated to a supranational entity. This explains why the States were 
able to attribute to the European Union the exercise of some competences derived from 
their constitutions, amongst which the exercise of (some) competences in the field of tax 
law. 
It has been observed that direct tax issues before the Court of Justice do not so 
much concern interpretation of tax law, since the Court is not competent to interpret 
national law or bilateral tax treaties263, as they concern general European Union law and 
principles, such as free movement, market access, market equality, distortions of 
competition, subsidiarity, proportionality, non-discrimination and so on. The fact that 
the Court is competent to interpret EU law, but not competent to interpret national or 
bilateral tax law, makes the integration of direct taxation by way of judicial intervention 
considerably complex, especially if we consider the role played in cross-border taxation 
by the treaty network between Member States, which is largely based on the OECD 
Model Convention (and its Commentary)264. 
The Court has also acknowledged that Member States, in shaping the limits of 
their fiscal jurisdictions and allocating their taxing powers, may find inspiration in the 
																																																								
261 For an overview of the relationship between international tax law and European Union law, see Pires, M., Le 
fonti del diritto comunitario e il diritto internazionale, in Di Pietro, A. (ed.), Per una costituzione fiscale europea, Padua, 
2008, 125. 
262 According to R. Monaco, the concept of State sovereignty corresponds to a character of superiority of the State 
itself with respect to the human society it governs and not to any superior position with respect to other States 
which are part of the international community (R. Monaco, Limiti della sovranità dello Stato e organizzazione 
internazionale, in Studi di Diritto Costituzionale in memoria di Luigi Rossi, Milan, 1952, 370). 
263 Even though, according to Wattel, in cases such as Wielocks (case C-80/94), X & Y (case C-436/00) and Van der 
Grinten (case C-58/01), the Court of Justice has undertaken such interpretation of bilateral tax treaties or even of 
national tax law, which, in the absence of harmonisation of direct tax law in the European Union, should be left to 
the exclusive competence of the national judges. See Wattel, P.J., Red herrings in direct tax cases before the ECJ, cites 
above, 83. 
264 Terra, B.J.M., Wattel, P.J., European tax law, Alphen aan del Rijn, 2012, 25. 
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consolidated international practice, e.g. in the practice resulting from the implementation 
of the OECD Model Double Taxation Convention (and of its Commentary)265. 
In particular, the Gilly case is remembered as one of the first cases in which the 
Court ventured into the interpretation of double taxation conventions, in order to verify 
whether the connecting factors employed by tax treaties for the allocation of taxing 
powers amongst Member States and the double taxation relief mechanisms are 
compatible with European Union law and, more specifically, with the freedom of 
movement of persons. First of all, the Judges confirmed that the definition of the criteria 
for the allocation of taxing powers falls within the competences of the Member States 
and that they are free to design their tax jurisdiction making reference to the 
consolidated practice stemming from the OECD Model Convention, since European 
Union law is generally indifferent as to the criteria used for such division of taxing 
powers, which, in absence of any European Union measure on the point, are covered by 
national sovereignty. In its analysis, the Court also specified that the purposes of a 
double taxation convention is merely to prevent the same income from being taxes twice 
and not to ensure that the tax to which a taxpayer residing in one of the contracting 
countries is subject is not higher than that which would be levied in a purely domestic 
circumstance. Which confirms the essentially different perspective from which 
international tax law and European Union law operate. 
As it has been shown in the previous chapter, international tax law is largely 
based on the distinction between residents and non-residents, with the first ones being 
generally taxed on their worldwide income and the second ones being taxed only on 
their domestically-sourced income. Therefore, international tax law is mostly concerned 
with the attribution of tax base between countries and with the consequent allocation of 
taxing powers. 
It follows that the international tax law perspective is substantially different than 
the “Internal Market perspective”, interpreted as a single jurisdiction where no “foreign” 
tax base is supposed to exist and no difference between residents and non-residents 
should apply in the name of principles such as non-discrimination and freedom of 
movement. However, as long as no primary or secondary European Union law on tax 
jurisdiction exists, Member States have to define and allocate their fiscal jurisdiction 																																																								
265 Similar statements can be found, amongst others, in judgements such as Gilly (Court of Justice of the European 
Union, 12 May 1998, C-336/96, Mr and Mrs Robert Gilly v. Directeur des services fiscaux du Bas-Rhin), Saint Gobain 
(Court of Justice of the European Union, 21 September 1999, C-307/97, Saint Gobain ZN), Van Hilten (Court of 
Justice of the European Union, 23 February 2006, C-513/03, Heirs of M.E.A. van Hilten - van der Heijden v. Inspecetur 
van de Belastingdienst te Heerlen) and N. v. Inspecteur (Court of Justice of the European Union, 7 September 2006, C-
470/04, N. v. Inspecteur). 
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themselves, especially protecting it against base erosion, profit shifting and, more in 
general, fiscal incoherence266. 
Therefore, one of the basic clashes between the international and the EU 
perspectives is that international tax law considers as fundamentally different a taxpayer 
or a source of income which stays within the same tax jurisdiction and a taxpayer or a 
source of income which leaves a taxing jurisdiction or which divides itself up over two 
jurisdictions, whereas, on the other hand, European Union law considers these positions 
as fundamentally comparable, since all fiscally relevant events occur within the same 
single Internal Market267. 
Another consequence of the different approach characterising international (tax) 
law and European Union (tax) law of this different approach can be found in the 
considerably different importance and relevance of the role played by the concept of 
“non-discrimination” in the fields of international tax law and European Union (tax) law. 
It should be noted, in fact, that in the context of European Union law the principle of 
non-discrimination, as a general principle enshrined in the Treaties establishing the 
conditions for the development of a functioning Internal Market amongst sovereign 
Member States, has received a very high degree of attention, constituting one of the 
fundamental grounds on which the Court of Justice has ruled in its “negative 
harmonisation” of tax law across EU territory268, whereas, in the international tax practice, 
the principle is generally neglected, though often (vaguely) mentioned in the bilateral 
treaties concluded between states269. 
On the point, it has been argued that each of the fundamental freedoms enshrined 																																																								
266 Terra, B.J.M., Wattel, P.J., European tax law, cited above, 452. 
267 This statement is generally correct, as is demonstrated, for example, by the consistent application, on the part of 
the Court of Justice, of the so-called “always somewhere approach”, according to which income is taxed 
somewhere in the Internal Market and expenses and losses are deductible somewhere in the Internal Market. 
However, some discrepancies in the Court’s case law have shown: for example, the Court in the Schumacker 
judgement, as we will see, has stated that residents and non-residents are not in a comparable position as far as 
tax law is concerned and that, therefore, a different fiscal treatment between the two categories of taxpayers could 
be allowed. See, for a general approach to the topic of the interaction between European Union law and 
international tax law, Pistone, P., Towards European international tax law, in EC Tax Review, 2005, 1, 4; Kemmeren, 
E.C.C.M., Double tax conventions on income and capital and the EU: past, present and future, cited above, 157. 
268 Santiago, B., Non-discrimination provisions at the intersection of EC and international tax law, in European Taxation, 
2009, 5, 249; Farmer, P., EC law and direct taxation. Some thoughts on recent issues, in EC Tax Journal, 1995, 1, 101; 
Wassermeyer, F., Does the EC Treaty force the EU Member States to conclude a multilateral tax treaty?, in Lang, M. 
(ed.), Multilateral tax treaties. New developments in international tax law, The Hague-London-Boston, 1997, 21; 
Wouters, J., The principle of non-discrimination in European Community law, in EC Tax Review, 1999, 2, 102; 
Hinnenkens, L., The search for the framework conditions of the fundamental EC Treaty principles as applied by the 
European Court to Member States’ direct taxation, in EC Tax Review, 2002, 3, 115. 
269 This is so true that part of the legal doctrine has stated that the non-discrimination provision should not have 
any place in a double taxation convention, since these instruments have as their only purpose the allocation of 
taxing powers on a bilateral basis for the purposes of the prevention of double taxation and should not pursue 
“ethical” aims. Of this opinion is Santiago, B., Non-discrimination provisions at the intersection of EC and international 
tax law, cited above, 252. For an overview on the debate, see Gammie, M., Prospects for company and shareholder 
taxation, in Intertax, 2003, 8, 258; Avery Jones, J., The non-discrimination article in tax treaties, in European Taxation, 
1991, 10, 345. 
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in the Treaties is implicitly based on the non-discrimination principle, since each of the 
Treaty freedoms entails the abolition of obstacles to the free movement of products and 
persons and the prohibition of any discrimination on grounds of origin or nationality, 
which makes the non-discrimination principle instrumental for the attainment of the 
purpose of a proper Internal Market270. 
This appears to be true particularly with regard to cross-border taxation, even 
though the current wording of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
prohibits discrimination based on nationality, thus not explicitly covering all possible 
measures discriminating on the grounds of different elements, such as, for example and 
for the purposes of the present research, residence. However, the Court of Justice has 
clarified that the Treaty non-discrimination principle must be interpreted as prohibiting 
all forms of discrimination based on nationality, even if covert or indirect, as a 
discrimination based on residence could amount to a disguised discrimination on the 
ground of nationality271. The point will be further developed in the following pages of this 
work, where cases such as Schumacker or Gerritse will be examined. 
The differences described above between the European and the international 
perspectives also explain the significantly different meanings that the concept of 
“territoriality” has acquired in both context. It has been shown in the previous chapter of 
this study that, in the international field, the concept of “territoriality”, in the 
impossibility of identifying a binding principle of territoriality for the reasons described 
earlier, is used as a criterion for the allocation of taxing powers amongst countries, i.e. 
for the distribution of tax bases and tax revenue amongst states in the hypothesis of 
cross-border transactions. In the European Union context and, in particular, in the Court 
of Justice’s jurisprudence, as it will be shown, “territoriality” assumes an entirely 
different meaning, inherent to the different purpose and nature of the European Union, 
being interpreted and construed mainly as “the need to ensure a balanced allocation of 
taxing powers” amongst Member States. This point will be further developed in the 
following pages of the present research, where we will analyse more in detail the 
evolution of the Court of Justice’s case law and its current approach to the topic. 
2.1. Can European Union law succeed where international law (inevitably) 
failed, with a general prohibition of international double taxation? 																																																								
270 Gammie, M., The compatibility of national tax principles with the single market, in Vanistendael, F. (ed.), EU freedoms 
and taxation, Amsterdam, 2006, 106. 
271 It should be noted that the Commission has suggested the possibility to formally equate nationality and 
residence as far as non-discrimination in the field of taxation is concerned; see Commission Communication on 
Company taxation in the Internal Market, COM(2001)582. 
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As it has been shown, general international law does not encompass any 
(binding) principle imposing countries to enact measures to aim of preventing 
international juridical double taxation: states enter into bilateral (or sometimes 
multilateral) conventions in order to prevent double taxation in light of reasons of a 
merely political and practical nature, and not because they are bound to do so by virtue 
of any general principle or customary rule embedded in the international law legal 
order. 
The conclusions must, or at least should, necessarily be (partially) different as far 
as the European Union context is concerned, also in light of what has been stated above 
concerning the prevalence of the Treaty purpose of the attainment of a properly 
functioning and fully integrated Internal Market, which is not easily reconciled with a 
territory where cross-border transactions are not relieved from the negative effects of 
double taxation. 
Acknowledging the correctness of this assumption, the previous version of Article 
293 of the EC Treaty provided that “Member States shall, so far as it is necessary, enter into 
negotiations with each other with a view to securing, for the benefit of their nationals, […] the 
abolition of double taxation within the Community […]”. With the Treaty of Lisbon, the 
provision was repealed, with no explanation of its repeal being provided by any 
accompanying document. The absence of any justification has led to various 
explanations being suggested by several authors who have wondered about the reasons 
behind the adoption of such a measure272. 
Some have suggested that the repeal of Article 293 of the EC Treaty should be 
interpreted in the sense that prevention of double taxation is not considered as a goal of 
the European Union any more, which, however, would seem to be contrasting with the 
Court of Justice’s case law and with the need to preserve the proper functioning of the 
Internal Market (and the free movement of persons, capital and services and the freedom 
of establishment). Other authors have interpreted the abolition of Article 293 of the EC 
Treaty in the exact opposite way, arguing that this measure should be interpreted as 
meaning that the prevention of double taxation is not a purpose which should be 
pursued by way of bilateral negotiations any more and that, therefore, the European 																																																								
272 See, for example, Kemmeren, E.C.C.M., After repeal of Article 293 EC Treaty under the Lisbon Treaty, in EC Tax 
Review, 2008, 2, 145; Hinnekens, L., The uneasy case and fate of Article 293 Second indent EC, in Intertax, 2009, 37, 
602; Reimer, E., The abolition of Article 293 EC: comments on Hofmann’s analysis, in Rust, A. (ed.), Double taxation 
within the European Union, The Hague, 2011, 87; Sullivan, J., The non-exercise of taxing powers by Member States and 
its compatibility with EC law, in European Taxation, 2009, 4, 193; Nieminen, M., Abolition of double taxation in the 
Treaty of Lisbon, in Bulletin for International Taxation, 2010, 330; Cerioni, L., Double taxation and the Internal Market: 
reflections on the ECJ’s decisions in Block and Damseaux and the potential implications, in Bulletin for International 
Taxation, 2009, 11, 543. 
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Union has acquired direct competence in the matter, even though without an obligation 
to actually use such a competence273. 
What can be considered as certain is that the mere fact that there is still a problem 
concerning double taxation from the EU law perspective is proof enough of the fact that, 
with regards to direct taxation, the European Union legal order operates in a context 
where Member States still enjoy a substantially “full” degree of sovereignty (exception 
being made for the provisions of secondary law on specific aspects of cross-border 
income). Whereas, in the international (tax) law context, the width of state sovereignty in 
direct taxation is limited by the interplay of bilateral double taxation conventions, when 
it comes to the European Union scenario such effect comes as the result of the need to 
comply with the fundamental Treaty freedoms, which justifies a (partial) transfer of 
sovereignty from the national to the supranational sphere even in the field of direct 
taxation. 
That being said, there is still uncertainty in legal scholarship as to whether or not 
a general prohibition of double taxation should be included amongst the fundamental 
EU principles (together with e.g. non-discrimination, equality, loyal cooperation and so 
on)274. In fact, even though the prevention of double taxation is unanimously considered 
as a highly desirable purpose to be attained to the aim of creating a more perfect internal 
market, the existence of a general principle enshrining the prohibition of double taxation 
is the object of much doubt, also because of the lack of a coherent approach on the topic 
by the Court of Justice of the European Union275. 
The reference on this point should be to the “Kerckhaert Morres doctrine”, which 
will be examined further in the development of the research. Suffice it to say now that, 
according to this approach of the Court of Justice, given that there are currently no EU-
level provisions and rules concerning the harmonisation of direct taxes within the 
Internal Market, the prejudicial effects deriving on taxpayers and on their cross-border 
income simply from the implementation by Member States of their fiscal measures, 
provided that there are not per se discriminatory, cannot be remedied by invoking the 
protection deriving from the Treaty freedoms, since these negative results are nothing 
more than the result of the “parallel exercise” of taxing powers and tax jurisdictions on 
the part of the Member States. 																																																								
273 Terra, B.J.M., Wattel, P.J., European tax law, cited above, 15; contra, Marres, O., The principle of territoriality and 
cross-border loss compensation, in Intertax, 2011, 3, 116. 
274 For an analysis of the various meanings and implications of the concept of “double taxation” in the context of 
the European Union, see Traversa, E., Il divieto di doppia imposizione, in Di Pietro, A., Tassani, T. (eds.), I principi 
europei del diritto tributario, Padua, 2013, 328. 
275 Especially after the repeal of Article 293 of the EC Treaty by way of the Treaty of Lisbon. 
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This concerns especially international double taxation, in the European Union 
context. Double taxation, in fact, is generally the result of a non-coordinated, but 
inherently legitimate (and often not per se discriminatory) exercise of taxing powers by 
different authorities, each of which relies on different criteria (territorial, personal or 
material) in order to establish a link between the income and the state imposing the tax 
and to justify the tax itself, as it has been shown in the first chapter of the research. In 
other terms, double taxation derives from the overlapping of the tax bases from the 
points of view of two or more distinct, separate and independent legal orders: it is not, 
therefore, the result of a conflict of rules, but rather the result of the combined effect of 
different rules276. This is what the case law of the Court of Justice and the juridical 
literature formed on the point has defined as “disparity”, which does not constitute, per 
se, a breach of European Union law. However, the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice 
on this point is far from being consistent and coherent, having sometimes disallowed 
such an approach, forcing Member States to modify the extension of their fiscal systems 
in order to avoid international double taxation. 
Notwithstanding this latest observation, which we will develop further in the 
following pages, what should be recognised beyond any doubt is that, as has been noted 
by large part of the legal doctrine, the prevention of double taxation is, or should be, an 
at least implicit purpose of the European Union, since it can hardly be doubted that the 
overlap of taxing jurisdictions leads to distortions of the proper functioning of the 
Internal Market277, and that “double tax conventions and the EC Treaty are natural friends, 
because they pursue mutual objectives”278. The Court of Justice has essentially reached, in 
principle, the same conclusions, recognising, for example, that “conventions preventing 
double taxation such as those envisaged in Article 293 EC are designed to eliminate or mitigate 
the negative effects on the functioning of the Internal Market resulting from the coexistence of 
national tax systems”279. 
Nonetheless, as it will be shown in the following pages of the research, the 
attitude of the Judges has not always proven to be in line with such a general principle. 
Also the Commission, on the other hand, has been considerably proactive in pointing 
																																																								
276 Tarigo, P., Gli elementi costitutivi della doppia imposizione internazionale quale fattispecie dei trattati, in Rass. Trib., 
2009, 3, 670. 
277 Lehner, M., A significant omission in the Constitution of Europe, in British Tax Review, 2005, 337. 
278 The expression is drawn from Kemmeren, E.C.C.M., Principle of origin in tax conventions, cited above, 246. 
279 Court of Justice of the European Union, 14 November 2006, C-513/04, Kerckhaert Morres. On the same point, see 
also, amongst others, Court of Justice of the European Union, 12 February 2009, C-67/08, Block; Court of Justice of 
the European Union, 6 December 2007, C-298/05, Columbus Container Services. 
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out the importance of eliminating double taxation within the Internal Market280. 
3. The “debut” of territoriality in the Court’s case law: a tax system that is in 
line with the fiscal principle of territoriality cannot breach EU law. 
The first explicit mention of the concept of “territoriality” in the words of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union may be found in the Futura judgement281. Briefly 
said, the case dealt with a French company with a permanent establishment (branch) in 
Luxembourg, which had asked for compensation of the losses suffered in France by the 
head office for the purpose of calculating the basis of assessment for the Luxembourg 
branch. One of the conditions provided for by Luxembourg tax law for the granting of 
such loss relief to non-resident subjects was that the losses had to be “economically 
linked” to an item of income generated in Luxembourg through the economic activity 
that was the source of the taxed income. The issue was, therefore, whether or not the 
requirement of an “economic link” could be permitted under European Union law.  
The Court found such provisions - according to which, essentially, limited tax 
liability is applied to non-residents and unlimited tax liability is applied to residents282 - to 
be in line with the fiscal principle of territoriality and, therefore, not able to give rise to 
any discrimination prohibited by EU law. More specifically, the Court held that the 
freedom of establishment does prevent a Member State from conditioning the carry-
forward of losses incurred by a non-resident taxpayer on the fact “that the losses must be 
economically related to the income earned by the taxpayer in that State, provided that resident 
taxpayers do not receive more favourable treatment”. It then ruled that the system at issue, 
“which is in conformity with the fiscal principle of territoriality, cannot be regarded as entailing 
any discrimination, overt or covert, prohibited by the Treaty”283: applying this approach, 
measures in line with the principle of territoriality might, therefore, be used by Member 
States to deny the deduction of foreign losses of persons subject to limited tax liability if 
foreign profits are not taxable in the source Member State, whereas persons subject to 																																																								
280 The Economic and Social Committee had even proposed to modify former Article 293 of the EC Treaty to the 
effect that “double taxation or the absence of taxation is incompatible with the Internal Market”; see Opinion of the 
Economic and Social Committee on Taxation in the European Union, 1997. 
281 Court of Justice of the European Union, 15 May 1997, C-250/95, Futura Participations and Singer.  
282 On the point, the Court’s judgement started from the assumption that “Luxembourg law provides that, as regards 
resident taxpayers, all of their income is taxable, the basis of assessment to tax not being limited to their Luxembourg 
activities. Consequently, although there are exemptions under which a part or event, in certain cases, all of their income 
earned outside Luxembourg is not subject to tax in that country, the basis for assessment for resident taxpayers at any rate 
includes profits and losses arising from their Luxembourg activities. On the other hand, for the purpose of calculating the 
basis for assessment for non-resident taxpayers, only profits and losses arising from their Luxembourg activities are taken 
into account in calculating the tax payable by them in the State”. 
283 Court of Justice of the European Union, 15 May 1997, C-250/95, Futura Participations and Singer, par. 22. 
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unlimited tax liability have the option to deduct foreign losses since they are generally 
taxed on their worldwide income. 
At the outset, it should be noted that the Court assumes that the “principle of 
territoriality” is also applied to residents when they are taxed on their worldwide 
profits284, which means that the Judges resort to a notion of “territoriality” as coinciding 
with the concept that, in the previous chapter of the research, has been defined as 
“territoriality as a principle”, as opposed to the concept of “territoriality as a criterion”, 
as a possible synonym of “limited taxation” or “taxation at source”. In other words, the 
Court considers that a Member State acts in accordance with the principle of territoriality 
when it taxes resident taxpayers on their worldwide income and non-resident taxpayers 
on their income sourced in its territory285. A different interpretation of the concept of 
“territoriality” would seem to have been provided by the Luxembourg Judges in other 
subsequent judgements, e.g. Kerckhaert Morres, as it will be shown in the following pages, 
whereas a similar statement to that rendered in Futura may be found, for example, in the 
Marks & Spencer decision. 
Moving on, the Court’s reasoning amounted, essentially, to radically excluding 
that a tax system conforming with the principle of territoriality could be in contrast with 
the Treaty freedoms and, more in general, with European Union law: according to the 
Court of Justice, a tax system complying with territoriality (i.e. excluding foreign-source 
positive and negative elements from the domestic tax base) cannot be considered to 
amount to any discrimination prohibited by the Treaties286. In Futura, the Court has 
effectively relied on territoriality to justify its acceptance of a difference in treatment 
between residents and non-residents in the exercise of tax jurisdiction on the part of the 
Member State, together with the consequent distinction between worldwide taxation and 
taxation at source. 
Some authors have also interpreted this statement in Futura as a reiteration of the 
concept of “fiscal cohesion” first introduced in the Bachmann judgement287, confirming the 
compatibility with European Union law of tax systems providing for a consistent 
territorial matching, for tax purposes, of profits and corresponding losses288. 
After Futura, however, if we exclude some rare cases (such as the Marks & Spencer, 																																																								
284 Weber, D., Is the limitation of tax jurisdiction a restriction of the freedom of movement?, cited above. 
285 Marres, O., The principle of territoriality and cross-border loss compensation, cited above, 113. 
286 Wattel, P.J., Fiscal cohesion, fiscal territoriality and preservation of the (balanced) allocation of taxing powers. What is the 
difference?, in Weber, D. (ed.), The influence of European law on direct taxation. Recent and future developments, The 
Hague, 2007, 139. 
287 Court of Justice of the European Union, 28 January 1992, C-204/90, Bachmann v. Belgium. 
288 In later judgements, such as Verkooijen (Court of Justice of the European Union, 6 June 2000, C-35/98), the Court 
of Justice described the argument based on the cohesion of the tax system as referred to the symmetry between 
“the grant of a tax advantage and the offsetting of that advantage by a fiscal levy”. 
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Bosal Holding and Manninen judgements, and few others), the Court has not made 
explicit reference to the concept of “territoriality” anymore, resorting to different words 
that could probably (but it should not be taken for granted, as we will see) have the same 
meaning as “territoriality”, such as “cohesion”, “coherence” or “balanced allocation”, 
thus creating a certain degree of confusion as to the actual relevance of territoriality in 
the allocation of taxing powers amongst Member States and in the evaluation of the 
compatibility of national tax provisions with EU law. 
It is, in fact, difficult to see the difference between “fiscal territoriality” and “fiscal 
cohesion” in the words of the Court289. Both concepts refer to the need to treat tax base 
increases and connected tax base reductions in a symmetrical way within the same tax 
system, i.e. to protect the balanced allocation of taxing rights. The necessity to balance 
the allocation of taxing powers amongst Member States, as interpreted, for example, in 
Marks & Spencer, is supposed to be developed, according to the Court’s reasoning, on the 
basis of the principle of territoriality as supposedly enshrined in international tax law. It 
follows that Member States may protect their fiscal jurisdictions against attempts to 
erode their tax bases by resorting to losses or expenses suffered in different countries. 
Using the words of AG Poiares Maduro, the concept of the need to preserve the balanced 
allocation of taxing powers, in the Court’s case law, has a “corrective function”, which is 
to ensure “the protection of the integrity of the national tax systems within the context of the 
Internal Market”290, or, in other words, to restore the balance between the necessity to 
respect the Treaty freedoms and the Member States’ tax sovereignty291. If this is what the 
need to preserve the allocation of taxing rights amongst Member States means, the 
justification would seem to be nothing more than a different definition or description of 
fiscal cohesion (and of the “fiscal principle of territoriality”). 
As we will see, an exception to the general rule stated in Futura may arise in case 
the “Schumacker doctrine” applies and almost all of the taxpayer’s income is received in 
the source Member State and losses are considered to concern the “personal or family 
sphere” of the taxpayer (if the taxpayer is a physical person, an individual): in this case, 
non-residents, according to the Court’s case law, should be granted the right to deduct 
foreign losses even though foreign profits are not taxable in the source Member State, 
otherwise such losses might end up not being taken into consideration neither in the 
residence state nor in the source state, thus leading to discrimination to the detriment of 																																																								
289 Wattel, P.J., Red herrings in direct tax cases before the ECJ, cited above, 92. 
290 Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro on case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer. 
291 De la Motte, A.M., Tax sovereignty, national transfer of tax losses within international groups of companies and freedom 
of establishment, in Common Market Law Review, 2015, 1079. 
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non-resident taxpayers. 
At a later time, however, the Court dealt with territoriality in an entirely different 
manner. If, from the perspective adopted in Futura, compliance with the principle of 
territoriality excluded ex se the fact that a fiscal measure could breach EU law - thus not 
being necessary to evaluate the existence of possible justifications of such a breach, 
because no breach could be detected - in subsequent judgements, the analysis of the 
compatibility between a fiscal measure and the principle of territoriality shifts to the 
level of the possible justifications of such restrictive measure and the concept of 
territoriality begins to be associated with other terms, such as “coherence”, or, more 
frequently, “balanced allocation of taxing powers”. In other words, in the subsequent 
judgements of the Court of Justice, the compliance with the principle of territoriality is 
no longer considered as sufficient per se to exclude the existence of a breach of European 
Union law, but only as one of the possible reasons that could justify the legitimacy and 
tolerability of a breach of EU law on the part of a Member State. 
4. Territoriality vs. ability-to-pay: the first clue of the Court’s “interventionism” 
in the allocation of taxing powers amongst Member States. 
In subsequent judgements, especially concerning individual taxpayers, the Court 
of Justice introduced a new element to its analysis on the compatibility of the national 
tax treatment of non-residents or, more in general, of cross-border transactions with 
European Union law. It is an element that had not been taken into consideration before, 
even though it is not mentioned in the Treaties, and that directly conflicts with the 
relevance of the principle of territoriality for the purposes of excluding that a certain tax 
measure could be breaching European Union law, limiting the possibility for Member 
States to invoke territoriality in order to avoid being found in breach of EU law with 
regards to measures imposing a different fiscal treatment of residents and non-residents: 
it is the concept of “ability to pay”.  
A “traditional” approach to the topic of the interaction between the principle of 
territoriality and the criteria for the allocation of the states’ taxing powers would 
theoretically impose to disregard any relevance of “ability to pay”, given the inherent 
difference between the two concepts. However, from a European Union perspective, the 
two perspectives are closely intertwined, since, as we will see, the Court of Justice has 
actually resorted more than once to the concept of “ability to pay” in its decisions 
concerning direct taxation. 
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The concept of “ability to pay” has always played a limited role in the field of 
international tax law and, in general, in the allocation of taxing rights amongst states in 
the international tax scenario 292 . By contrast, in the European Union context, the 
constitutional basis for the “ability to pay” principle varies considerably between 
Member States. While in some countries (such as Italy, Spain and France) the principle is 
expressly incorporated into the constitution, in other states (such as Germany) the same 
principle is considered as an indirect corollary of constitutional rules and in some other 
countries (e.g. the United Kingdom) the ability to pay principle is not formally 
incorporated in the constitution, but is anyway used as a guiding principle for the 
implementation of tax policies. 
 As far as the European Union legal order is concerned, since, as mentioned above, 
there is no legal basis, with the exception of custom duties and a few agricultural levies, 
providing the EU with any power to tax and since the EU as such has no direct 
competence with respect to the Member States’ economic and fiscal policy, the Treaties 
do not contain any direct reference to ability to pay as a general guiding principle to 
which Member States must comply in exercising their taxing powers. 
However, although the European Treaties do not make any explicit reference to 
the “ability to pay” concept, the Court of Justice of the European Union and the 
European Commission have consistently applied the fundamental freedoms in fiscal 
matters in a way that clearly reflects a particular attention to the concept of the ability to 
pay in the field of taxation of cross-border transaction in the context of the EU Internal 
Market. Notwithstanding the absence, in the European Treaties and in all pieces of EU 
primary law, of any explicit reference to the ability to pay, the case law of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union clearly shows that said concept has played a fundamental 
role in shaping the Court’s jurisprudence on the evolution of the relevance of the 
principle of territoriality and on the difference in treatment between residents and non-
residents for fiscal purposes. 
 It has also been argued that the Court of Justice itself has used the general non-
discrimination clause enshrined in the Treaties in combination with the ability-to-pay 
principle in order to foster as far as possible the harmonisation of the direct tax systems 
across the European Union or at least in order to remove the barriers preventing such 
																																																								
292 For an interesting short history of the evolution of the concept of “ability to pay” see Vanistendael, F., The ability 
to pay principle in the EU legal order, cited above 198. See also De Mooij, R.A., Stevens, L.G.M., Exploring the future of 
ability to pay in Europe, in EC Tax Review, 2005, 1, 9. 
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harmonisation 293 . In doing so, the Court had developed new principles of non-
discrimination which differ from the usual non-discrimination rules enshrined in 
bilateral double taxation conventions. However, the application of such concepts has not 
been systematic and the ability-to-pay principle per se has not been used, so far, as a test 
to establish possible infringements of EU law on the part of the Member States294. 
 It is important, however, to clarify, before proceeding in the analysis of the 
relevant case law on the point, that “ability to pay” as construed by the Court of Justice 
of the European Union does not exactly coincide with the equivalent concept that may be 
found in the Member States’ own constitutional legal orders. Such a concept, from a 
purely national and domestic point of view, has essentially the purpose, briefly said, to 
ensure a fair and balanced distribution of the fiscal burden amongst the citizens, making 
sure that each citizen contributes to the public expenditure accordingly with its own 
economic capacity and possibilities. 
Naturally, this cannot be the meaning of such a concept in the European Union 
context, given all that we have said before on the lack of any direct taxing power in the 
hand of the European Union itself and on the absence of any socio-economic purpose of 
an equitable redistribution of wealth in the “EU DNA”. Therefore, the concept of “ability 
to pay” cannot but assume a partially different meaning in the words of the Court of 
Justice, even though this has never been expressly clarified by the Court. Essentially the 
“ability to pay” concept as applied by the Luxembourg Judges - and not by the EU 
legislature, to whom the concept itself remains, as of today, completely foreign - refers to 
the need to link direct taxation with the place where the income on which tax is levied 
lies, possibly even contradicting, to a certain extent, the distribution of taxing powers 
agreed upon by Member States, either by way of tax treaties or through unilateral 
measures. 
The first EU judgement in which a point of ability to pay was raised by the Court 
with concern to the tax treatment of a non-resident was Schumacker 295 , where the 
Luxembourg Judges for the first time accepted that a different tax treatment between 
residents and non-residents does not, in principle, constitute per se an infringement of EU 
law. In fact, besides being a paradigmatic case on the point of the application of principle 																																																								
293 Greggi, M., Revisiting Schumacker: the role of limited tax liability in EU law, in Richelle, I., Schon, W., Traversa, E. 
(eds.), Allocating taxing powers within the European Union, cited above, 46; Vanistendael, F., The ability to pay 
principle in the EU legal order, cited above, 211. 
294 This is probably partly due to the fact that, as highlighted by Vanistendael, the Treaties do not contain any 
direct reference to the ability-to-pay as a guiding principle for taxation, even though Articles 2 and 3 TEU refer to 
concepts such as justice, solidarity and equality which may be interpreted as implying the relevance of a principle 
such as ability-to-pay. See Vanistendael, F., Ability to pay in European Community law, in EC Tax Review, 2014, 3, 
122. 
295 Court of Justice of the European Union, 14 February 1995, C-279/93, Schumacker. 
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of non-discrimination, and one of the most important and most quoted tax decisions of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union, the Schumacker judgement opened a new 
perspective on the “traditional” comparative analysis generally carried out by the Court, 
urging for an complex rethinking of the tax status of the non-resident taxpayer and 
limited tax liability and taking into account the overall result which followed from the 
application of the tax rules at issue in both the residence Member State and the Member 
State of source in order to assess whether or not discrimination ultimately arose. It is 
certainly safe to say that Schumacker is an example of the application, on the part of the 
Court, of the “overall approach”: it could not be otherwise, considered the relevance 
played in this judgement by the concept of ability to pay. 
As it is well known, the case dealt with the question whether or not a non-
resident wage-earning taxpayer working abroad was entitled to the application of a 
particular income-splitting system with his spouse, which the source state, i.e. Germany, 
reserved only to its resident taxpayers296. 
The first part of the judgement is clear and simple. The Court begun its reasoning 
observing that it is supposedly easier to determine a taxpayer’s personal and family 
circumstances for fiscal purposes in the state where the main part of his interests 
(personal and financial) lies and that “accordingly, international tax law, and in particular 
the Model Double Taxation Convention of the OECD, recognises that in principle the overall 
taxation of taxpayers, taking account of their personal and family circumstances, is a matter for 
the state of residence”297. 
The Judges then moved on to stating that the possible difference in treatment 
between residents and non-residents for tax purposes is not enough to find the tax 
provision at issue to be discriminatory and, therefore, to be in breach of the rights 
conferred on EU citizens by the Treaties and, in particular, of the fundamental freedoms. 
Especially because, according to the Court, “in relation to direct taxes, the situations of 
residents and non-residents are not, as a rule, comparable”298. This statement is in line with the 
																																																								
296 And Article 24 of the OECD Model Convention, according to which the bilateral tax treaty relevant in the case 
at issue had been shaped, expressly excludes this kind of personal deductions from the scope of application of the 
non-discrimination principle. 
297 Court of Justice of the European Union, 14 February 1995, C-279/93, Schumacker, par. 32. 
298 Court of Justice of the European Union, 14 February 1995, C-279/93, Schumacker, par. 31. The Court has 
confirmed this statement in subsequent judgements as well. See, for example, more recently, Court of Justice of 
the European Union, 24 February 2015, C-512/13, Sopora; Court of Justice of the European Union, 24 February 
2015, C-559/13, Grunewald; Court of Justice of the European Union, 18 June 2015, C-9/14, Kieback, where the 
Court has re-affirmed that “in relation to direct taxation, residents and non-residents are generally not in comparable 
situations because the income received in the territory of a Member State by a non-resident is in most cases only a part of his 
total income, which is concentrated at his place of residence, and because a non-resident’s personal ability to pay tax, 
determined by residence to his aggregate income and his personal and family circumstances, is easier to assess at the place 
where his personal and financial interests are centred, which in general is the place where he has his usual abode”. For a 
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fiscal principle/criterion of territoriality: recognising that residents and non-residents 
are not in comparable situations acknowledges and justifies that residents and non-
residents may be subject to different treatments by countries as far as taxation is 
concerned, recognising that, for residents, tax is generally levied on a worldwide basis, 
whereas, for non-residents, tax is levied only on income produced within the territory of 
the country imposing such tax299. 
Going back to the reasoning of the Schumacker judgement, the Court specifies 
therein that in case the non-resident taxpayer were to derive most of his personal and 
family income from employment in the state of source, then the non-resident taxpayer 
could be considered as being in the same situation as a resident taxpayer, since the latter 
generally earns the major part of his income in the country where he resides300. This in the 
name of the general principle of equality and non-discrimination, since, according to the 
Court, “the Community principle of equal treatment requires that, in the State of employment, 
the personal and family circumstances of a foreign non-resident be taken into account in the same 
way as those of resident nationals and that the same tax benefits should be granted to him” and 
that “discrimination arises from the fact that [a taxpayer’s] personal and family circumstances 
are taken into account neither in the State of residence nor in the State of employment” 301. 
Even without ever expressly mentioning the concept, the Judges have clearly 
reached such a conclusion considering the overall ability to pay of the taxpayer involved, 
rather than a specific provision or tax regime, and used it as a parameter to elaborate a 
model of allocation of taxing powers (and consequent duties) amongst Member States. 
While in other cases the existence of a possible discrimination was assessed by taking 
into consideration the different treatments given to two categories of subjects (resident 
taxpayers on one hand and non-resident taxpayers on the other hand), in Schumacker the 																																																																																																																																																																													
comment on the latter case, see Peeters, B., Kieback: when Schumacker emigrates…, in EC Tax Review, 2016, 2, 58. On 
a similar point, see also Court of Justice of the European Union, 12 December 2013, C-303/12, Imfeld. 
299 Wattel does not agree with the statement that residents and non-residents should be considered as generally not 
comparable; see Wattel, P.J., Red herrings in direct tax cases before the ECJ, cited above, 85. 
300 A similar principle had been formulated also by the Commission in its 1993 Recommendation “on the taxation of 
certain items of income received by non-residents in a Member State other than that in which they are resident” 
(Commission Recommendation 94/79/EC of 21 December 1993), concerning income from dependent personal 
services, pensions, income from professional occupations or other self-employed activities, income from 
agricultural and forestry activities and income from industrial and commercial activities. The 1993 
Recommendation called upon Member States not to subject such items of income, “in the Member State of taxation, 
to any heavier than if the taxpayer, his spouse and his children were resident in that Member State”, subject “to the 
condition that the items of income […] which are taxable in the Member State in which the natural person is not resident 
constitute at least 75% of that person’s total taxable income during the tax year”. 
301 Court of Justice of the European Union, 14 February 1995, C-279/93, Schumacker, par. 41. It has been argued that 
the concept of “discrimination” thereby affirmed would be “incomprehensible”, since it would not be possible to 
define discrimination by reference to something another Member State is not doing and would also fail in 
designating which of the Member States is doing the discriminating. Authors have highlighted that this statement 
by the Court would ignore that, as the Court itself has consistently argued, the Treaties do not guarantee a change 
of jurisdiction to be fiscally neutral, nor require a Member State to adapt its tax rules to the other Member State’s 
system such as to ensure fiscal neutrality of secondary establishments abroad. See Terra, B.J.M., Wattel, P.J., 
European tax law, cited above, 75. 
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Court considered the German rules to be in violation of the Treaty even if the taxpayer at 
issue was not resident in Germany, since he generated most of his income there302. 
Most commentators, right after the publication of the judgement at issue, have 
highlighted that, in formulating its decision, the Court was probably moved by the fact 
that excluding the non-resident taxpayer from the possibility of application of the 
income-splitting system would result in a situation where the personal circumstances of 
the taxpayer would not be taken into account anywhere in the Internal Market, neither in 
the state of residence nor in the source state303. 
It has also been correctly argued that, in Schumacker, a violation of the non-
discrimination principle was found in the application to the non-resident taxpayer of the 
tax provisions of the source state and of the residence state taken together. In other 
terms, Germany was simultaneously treating the taxpayer concerned both as a resident 
taxpayer and as a non-resident one. What counted the most in the application of the tax 
regime at issue was not the residence of the individual per se, but rather the “residence of 
his ability to pay”: in a certain sense, substance was prevailing over form304, with the 
difference between “source rules” (limited tax liability) and “residence rules” (unlimited 
tax liability) blurring in case the major part of the taxpayer’s income is located in the 
source state and not in its state of residence. 
 Scholars have highlighted that the Schumacker judgement was an extreme case of 
“all or nothing”305. One of the peculiarities of the Schumacker case can be found in the fact 
that Mr. Schumacker’s liability, which was supposed to be a limited tax liability, being 
him a non-resident subject, was a de facto full liability to tax, since he produced 
practically all of his income in the source state. 
																																																								
302 This statement has been criticised by part of the legal scholarship. Wattel, for example, has argued that, in his 
opinion, the percentage of income earned in the Member State of source would not be a reliable criterion for 
altering the allocation of the taxing powers amongst Member States, also because, in order to reach a correct 
implementation of such an allocation, the “job country” would need to know the total income and the personal 
circumstances of the non-resident worker, which might prove difficult. See Wattel, P.J., Red herrings in direct tax 
cases before the ECJ, cited above, 85 (“it remains unclear what justification the percentage division of the total income 
between the two States would offer for the discrimination against non-residents”). 
303 More in detail, the Court has rejected the source state’s (Germany’s) argument for not taking into account the 
personal situation of the non-resident taxpayer, which was that, in that case, the personal situation of the 
taxpayer would be taken into account twice, that is to say once in the source state and once in the state of 
residence, leading to undue tax savings on the part of the taxpayer. On the contrary, the Court of Justice stated 
that such an argument could not be upheld because “in a situation such as that in the main proceedings, the State of 
residence cannot take account of the taxpayer’s personal and family circumstances because the tax payable there is 
insufficient to enable it to do so” (Court of Justice of the European Union, 14 February 1995, C-279/93, Schumacker, 
par. 41). 
304 Greggi, M., Revisiting Schumacker: the role of limited tax liability in EU law, cited above, 46. 
305 The words are of Frans Vanistendael’s (Vanistendael, F., The ability to pay principle in the EU legal order, cited 
above, 212). 
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 Personal taxation entails the need to take into consideration the overall situation 
of the taxpayer306. This is done through personal allowances, credits or deductions, which 
are generally attributed in the state where the individual is resident. On the other hand, 
traditionally the source state does not allow any deduction related to family burdens or 
to other personal circumstances and expenditures. This system follows a sort of 
territoriality principle. In Schumacker the Court seems to push the “genuine link” theory 
to extremes, forcing a State to recognise tax advantages wherever it imposes a tax 
liability over a non-resident subject. 
Following the above-mentioned reasoning, the Court seems to go beyond the 
traditional approach to source and residence and the general “presumption” that the 
state of residence is the one where the majority of a taxpayer’s income lies. Given the 
apparent ground-breaking importance and novelty of such a statement, many thought at 
the time that the Schumacker judgement called for a rethinking of the approach to the 
traditional distinction between full and limited tax liability, thus expecting a sort of 
“revolution” of the Court’s reasoning in tax cases and also an intervention from the EU 
legislature towards a higher level of harmonisation in direct tax matters. 
Many scholars see the Schumacker decision as providing a legacy that is still to be 
appropriately dealt with by academics, judges and lawmakers and consisting in the need 
to rethink the concept of limited liability to tax and the rules on taxation at source, at 
least at the EU level307. However, the Court seems to have confirmed the principles 
enucleated in Schumacker in its subsequent decisions on the Wielocks 308 , Gshwind 309 , 
Zurstrassen310 and Wallentin311 cases, where the Luxembourg Judges essentially confirmed 
that the non-resident taxpayer is entitled to have all the aspects of his/her subjective 
ability to pay taken into account in the source Member State in case there is no tax 
liability in his/her Member State of residence. 
In particular, in its Lakebrink judgement312, the Court stated that the scope of the 
“Schumacker doctrine” extends to all the tax advantages connected with the non-
resident’s ability to pay tax which are granted neither in the Member State of residence 																																																								
306 Especially since personal taxes traditionally are the ones with whom social goals are pursued, such as 
redistribution of wealth. However, it has been observed that the Schumacker decision has left some technical 
questions unanswered, especially if we consider the position of a taxpayer earning his entire income abroad, but 
not in one, but two Member States different than the one where he resides. In this case, according to the 
“Schumacker doctrine”, in neither of the source Member States involved he would receive “his entire income”, 
meaning that his personal circumstances would be legitimately taken into account nowhere. On the point, see 
Terra, B.J.M., Wattel, P.J., European tax law, cited above, 525. 
307 Greggi, M., Revisiting Schumacker: the role of limited tax liability in EU law, cited above, 60. 
308 Court of Justice of the European Union, 11 August 1995, C-80/94, Wielocks. 
309 Court of Justice of the European Union, 14 September 1999, C-391/97, Gschwind. 
310 Court of Justice of the European Union, 15 May 2000, C-87/99, Zurstrassen. 
311 Court of Justice of the European Union, 1 July 2004, C-169/03, Wallentin. 
312 Court of Justice of the European Union, 18 July 2007, C-182/06, Lakebrink. 
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nor in the Member State of employment. In the Lakebrink decision, the Court held that, 
“since the ability to pay tax may indeed be regarded as forming part of the personal situation of 
the non-resident within the meaning of the judgement of Schumacker”, the tax advantages 
“connected with the non-resident’s ability to pay tax which are not taken into account either in 
the State of residence or in the State of employment” should be taken into account 
“somewhere” in the Internal Market. The same reasoning has been confirmed in the 
Renneberg judgement313 as well, where the Court stated that, if the largest part of the 
income produced by the non-resident taxpayer is generated within the Member State of 
source, said Member State must grant the non-resident taxpayer the possibility to enjoy 
the same tax treatment reserved to residents, assessing the non-resident taxpayer’s 
income on a worldwide basis. 
The “Schumacker doctrine” was further developed and better specified in 
subsequent judgements, which have also recently clarified that “in relation to tax 
advantages connected with a particular taxpayer’s ability to pay tax, the mere fact that a non-
resident has received, in the State of employment, income in the same circumstances as a resident 
of that State does not suffice to make his situation objectively comparable to that of a resident. It is 
additionally necessary, in order to establish that such situations are objectively comparable, that, 
due to that non-resident’s receiving the major part of his income in the Member State of 
employment, the Member State of residence is not in a position to grant him the advantages 
which follow from taking into account his aggregate income and his personal and family 
circumstances” 314 . This statement cannot but sound quite similar to the traditional 
implications of the Court of Justice’s so-called “always somewhere approach”, which we 
will analyse in the following pages with specific reference to the Marks & Spencer 
decision315. 
Notwithstanding the specification described above, the “Schumacker doctrine” 
evidently amounted to an actual disruption, on the part of the Court of Justice, of the 
need to protect the territorial allocation of taxing powers agreed upon by Member States, 
with a considerably “heavy” intervention in the allocation of taxing powers designed by 
Member States. 
It has also been observed that the Schumacker decision did not provide an useful 
tool for solving cases in which the situation is not “so black or white”, i.e. cases in which 
the personal deductions could only be partially taken into account in the state of 																																																								
313 Court of Justice of the European Union, 16 October 2008, C-527/06, Renneberg. 
314 Court of Justice of the European Union, 18 June 2015, C-9/14, Kieback. 
315 Reference is made, specifically, to the “final losses criterion” as developed for the first time in the Marks & 
Spencer judgement and by virtue of which a Member State must allow the deduction of losses originated in 
another Member State if they cannot be used in that Member State. 
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residence, resulting in a higher tax burden for the employee exercising his freedom of 
cross-border movement. In such cases, in fact, since personal deductions can actually be - 
wholly or partially - taken into account by the state of residence, the source state is 
allowed, according to the Court of Justice, to tax the non-resident employee without 
necessarily taking into account any personal deduction316. The result is often that the total 
amount of tax due in the source state by the non-resident subject exceeds the amount of 
tax due in the state of residence by the same taxpayer, with the consequence that the 
higher tax burden suffered in the source state cannot be entirely taken into account by 
way of a tax credit in the state of residence. 
This exact fact pattern was examined by the Court in the Gilly case317, where the 
Court stated that, since no harmonisation measures for the elimination of double 
taxation has been adopted at EU level, Member States are competent to determine the 
criteria for income taxation with a view to eliminating double taxation by way of 
international agreements and that, therefore, a simple difference in treatment between 
residents and non-residents cannot be regarded, per se, as discrimination prohibited by 
the Treaties (even if a Member State chooses to shape its tax jurisdiction on the ground of 
nationality): whether or not the tax treatment of a certain taxpayer is favourable is not 
determined by the choice of the connecting factor, but rather by the level of taxation in 
the competent Member State. 
In that case, the Court observed that any unfavourable consequence entailed by 
the tax credit mechanism at issue was nothing more than the result of the differences 
between the tax rates applied by the Member States concerned and that, in absence of 
any European Union legislation on the point, the Member States are free to determine 
these rates. According to the Court, any different answer would “such as to encroach on 
the sovereignty” of the Member State at issue in matters of direct taxation, with a 
consequent erosion of the principle of territoriality, since said Member State would not 
be able to tax the income having its source within its territory. 
Subsequently, in the Saint-Gobain judgement318, the Court confirmed that Member 
States are free to choose the connecting factors they deem most appropriate for the 
allocation of their fiscal jurisdiction, also by way of bilateral tax treaties, but that such 
allocation is subject to the examination of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
through the lens of the fundamental freedoms, even if the allocation so designed is based 																																																								
316 Vanistendael, F., The ability to pay principle in the EU legal order, cited above, 212. 
317 Court of Justice of the European Union, 12 May 1998, C-336/96, Mr and Mrs Robert Gilly v. Directeur des services 
fiscaux du Bas-Rhin. For an overview of the most critical points of the judgement, see Avery Jones, J., What is the 
difference between Schumacker and Gilly?, in European Taxation, 1999, 1, 2. 
318 Court of Justice of the European Union, 21 September 1999, C-307/97, Saint Gobain ZN. 
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on a double taxation convention concluded with a third country319. In the Saint-Gobain 
decision, although the core problem of the case was the entitlement of a permanent 
establishment to treaty benefits, the Court of Justice basically stated that Member States 
are free, within the framework of bilateral agreements concluded to prevent double 
taxation, to determine the connecting factors for the purposes of allocating taxing 
powers amongst themselves, even though “as far as the exercise of the power of taxation so 
allocates is concerned, the Member States […] may not disregard Community rules”. 
 It seem obvious that the “ability-to-pay perspective” and the “territoriality 
perspective” are not easily reconciled: for the taxpayer, his ability to pay is determined 
by the combination of the elements which are relevant for all the tax systems of the 
Member States where his income originates. The question is whether the Court of Justice 
should decide to make a proportional application of the “national concepts” of ability to 
pay depending on the proportion of the income that falls within the tax jurisdiction of 
each Member State320 or whether this decision should be taken by the European Union 
legislature. 
4.1. On the comparability of residents and non-residents. 
One of the reasons why the Schumacker judgement is so often recalled and quoted 
is related to the statement according to which, in the Court of Justice’s view, resident and 
non-resident taxpayers are not generally in comparable situations as far as direct 
taxation is concerned. 
Acknowledging this general uncomparableness of the two categories of subjects 
essentially amounts to a recognition, on the part of Court, of the Member States’ freedom 
in tracing the borders of their fiscal jurisdiction and taxing power and, in other words, 
the legitimacy of a tax system based on what the Luxembourh Judges called “principle of 
territoriality” in the Futura judgement, i.e. a tax system which treats residents and non-
residents in different ways, starting from the recognition of the substantial difference of 
their positions. In fact, if residents and non-residents are not comparable, this means that 
a national tax measure cannot be considered as discriminatory, and in breach of EU law, 
in case it treats them in a different manner, given that, in the traditional “rule of reason” 
test of the Court of Justice, excluding comparability between two situations or two 																																																								
319 Non-tax case law of the Court of Justice shows that, under European Union law, benefits negotiated by Member 
States for nationals in treaties concluded between such Member States and third countries should also be 
extended to nationals of other Member States in identical or comparable circumstances. See, for example, Court of 
Justice of the European, 15 January 2002, C-55/00, Gottardo. 
320 Which is the solution advocated by Vanistendael, F., Ability to pay in European Community law, cited above, 134. 
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subject amounts to also excluding the possibility of a national measure breaching one of 
the fundamental freedoms or the general principle of non-discrimination. 
Actually, the above-mentioned statement of the Court, according to which 
residents and non-residents are not generally in comparable situation, even though it has 
never been expressly denied or refuted by the Court of Justice in any of its subsequent 
judgements, constitutes nothing more than a general principle, or a general criterion, 
that has been made the object of so many exceptions and derogations in the subsequent 
jurisprudence that it has risked losing any effective interpretive and practical value. 
The Schumacker judgement constitutes an example: residents and non-residents 
are deemed as not generally comparable, which would have led to the exclusion of the 
presence of a breach of European Union law, but, in the case at issue, the two situations 
were actually similar, and therefore comparable, in light of the simple, and contingent, 
fact that the non-resident taxpayer earned almost all of his income in the Member State 
of source, which made his situation, according to the Court, comparable to the situation 
of a person residing in that Member State. 
On the point of the comparability of residents and non-residents, it should be 
noted, therefore, that, even after Schumacker, the Court of Justice has always accepted 
several exceptions to the general incomparableness of the two categories in other 
decisions as well, e.g. in the Denkavit case321, where, as regards outbound dividends, it 
stated that “resident shareholders receiving dividends are not necessarily in a situation which is 
comparable to that of shareholders receiving dividends who are resident in another Member State 
[…]. However, as soon as a Member State, either unilaterally or by way of a convention, imposes 
a charge to tax on the income, not only of resident shareholders, but also of non-resident 
shareholders, from dividends which they receive from a resident company, the situation of those 
non-resident shareholders becomes comparable to that of resident shareholders”. 
In the Court’s judgement on the Gerritse case, the limitations to the deductibility 
of expenditure connected to services rendered by a non-resident provided for by 
German law show various similarities to the provisions examined in Futura, since they 
entailed the specific need for a “direct link” between the expenditure and the income 
accrued within the same Member State’s jurisdiction, in conformity to the principle of 
territoriality as described (or, better, intended) in Futura. Once again, however, the Court 
denied the compatibility of such a measure with EU law in light of the need to grant 
equal treatment between a cross-border scenario and a purely domestic scenario and 
between residents and non-residents in order to ensure a correct implementation of a 																																																								
321 Court of Justice of the European Union, 14 December 2006, C-170/05, Denkavit International and Denkavit France. 
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progressive tax system, thus disregarding the principle of territoriality. 
 Briefly said, the case dealt with the questions of whether non-resident artistes 
performing in Germany and on which tax was levied by Germany through withholding 
taxes could claim deduction of expenses connected to their performance and of whether 
a flat withholding tax on gross income constituted an infringement of the fundamental 
freedoms. The Court started with the standard observation that situations of residents 
and non-residents are not comparable, as a rule, and that, therefore, a different treatment 
of the two categories is not necessarily always discriminatory322. 
The Judges then raised the question of whether the objective difference in the 
situation between residents and non-residents allows a Member State to disregard the 
discriminatory character of a flat rate at source without any tax-free allowance imposed 
on non-residents. On the point, the Court ruled that “concerning the tax-free allowance, 
since […] it has a social purpose allowing the taxpayer to be granted an essential minimum 
exempt from all income tax, it is legitimate to reserve the grant of that advantage to persons, 
which have received the greater part of their taxable income in the State of taxation, that is to say, 
as a general rule, residents”. 
Then the Court, partially stepping away from its “Schumacker doctrine”, while 
testing the relevant German rules against the freedom of movement of services, stated 
that, as the business expenses in question were directly linked to the activity that 
generated the taxable income in Germany, residents and non-residents were placed in a 
comparable position in that respect, “so that application to the former of a higher rate of 
income tax than that applicable to the latter […] would constitute indirect discrimination 
prohibited by Community law”. This statement was made by the Court without analysing 
the fact that the plaintiff had only earned a small percentage of his worldwide income in 
Germany323. 
 The same could be said with concern to the Conijn judgement324, which dealt with 
the question of whether non-resident participants in a German commercial partnership 
were allowed to deduct from their German tax base costs incurred to receive tax advice 
by professional advisors. In this case, even though the non-resident taxpayer at issue had 
earned a small percentage of his overall income in Germany, the Luxembourg Judges 
that, since the relevant costs were incurred by the plaintiff in preparing its tax return in 
respect of income derived in Germany and since it was the fact that he received that 																																																								
322 Vanistendael, F., Ability to pay in European Community law, cited above, 127. 
323 Cordewener, A, Personal income taxation of non-residents and the increasing impact of the EC Treaty freedoms, in 
Weber, D. (ed.), The influence of European law on direct taxation. Recent and future developments, The Hague, 2007, 41. 
324 Court of Justice of the European Union, 6 July 2006, C-346/04, Conijn. 
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income which triggered his duty to file a tax return in Germany and, therefore, to receive 
fiscal advice, the costs at issue were directly linked to the income taxed in Germany. 
Furthermore, the Court even stated that both residents and non-residents are placed in a 
comparable situation as regards the complexity of national tax law. Once again, the 
Court chose not to apply the “Schumacker doctrine”. 
The topics of territoriality, of its relation with the requirement of a balanced 
allocation of taxing powers amongst Member States, of the treatment of residents and 
non-residents for tax purposes and of the general uncomparableness of the two 
categories of taxpayers were also addressed by the Court of Justice in its Rewe decision325. 
After having confirmed that a difference in treatment amongst resident parent 
companies depending on the place of establishment of their subsidiaries cannot be 
justified as a consequence of the mere fact that they have decided to carry on economic 
activities in another Member State, with an express denial of the above-mentioned 
general statement concerning the uncomparableness of residents and non-residents for 
tax purposes, the Court came to an analysis of fiscal territoriality and its relevance in the 
examination of the compatibility of domestic tax measures with European Union law. 
The Court recalls that it can be accepted from an European Union law perspective 
that, in accordance with the principle of territoriality, the Member State of establishment 
of a parent company taxes companies residing in its territory on their worldwide income 
and non-resident subsidiaries only on the profits deriving from their activities conducted 
within its territory. However, according to the Court, such a principle cannot in itself 
justify the refusal by the Member State of residence of the parent company of an 
advantage on the ground that the same Member State does not levy tax on the profits of 
its non-resident subsidiaries. In doing so, the Court defined the purpose of the principle 
of territoriality as “to establish in the application of EU law the need to take into account the 
limits of the Member States’ power of taxation”326. 
More recently, in its decision on the Miljoen case327, the Court ruled that “in relation 
to expenses such as business expenses which are directly linked to an activity that has generated 
taxable income in a Member State, that residents and non-residents of that State are in a 																																																								
325 Court of Justice of the European Union, 29 March 2007, C-347/04, Rewe Zentralfinanz. For a comment on the 
judgement, see, amongst others, Kiekebeld, B.J., Smit, D.S., EU free movement of capital and corporate income taxation: 
the relationship between the free movement of capital and the other TFEU freedoms and justification grounds in a third 
country context, in Jansen, S.J.J.M. (ed.), Fiscal sovereignty of the Member States in an Internal Market, Amsterdam, 
2011, 132. 
326 An identical definition has been given by the Court in its judgement on the Busley case (Court of Justice of the 
European Union, 15 October 2009, C-35/08, Busley). 
327 Court of Justice of the European Union, 17 September 2015, joined cases C-10/14, C-14/14, C-17/14, J.B.G.T. 
Miljoen, X and Société Générale SA. A similar statement can be found also in Court of Justice of the European 
Union, 31 March 2011, C-450/09, Schröder. 
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comparable situation, with the result that legislation of that State which denies non-residents, in 
matters of taxation, the right to deduct such expenses, while, on the other hand, allowing 
residents to do so, risks operating mainly to the detriment of nationals of other Member States 
and therefore constitutes indirect discrimination on grounds of nationality”, especially since “as 
soon as a Member State, either unilaterally or by way of a convention, imposes a charge to tax on 
the income, not only of resident taxpayers, but also of non-resident taxpayers, from dividends 
which they receive from a resident company, the situation of those non-resident taxpayers 
becomes comparable to that of the resident taxpayers”. 
In light of all of the above, it has been stated that the “Schumacker principle” 
according to which the situations of residents and of non-residents are not, as a rule, 
comparable has been, at least partially, abandoned or even tacitly reversed by later 
judgements of the Court. Its implementation, first of all, is generally limited to 
individuals and does not extend to corporations or other juridical persons. It seems 
obvious, in fact, to state that legal persons do not have a subjective sphere comparable to 
the personal or family circumstances of human beings. It is also true that the Court, since 
its Avoir fiscal judgement, has always rejected the idea of a general incomparableness 
between a non-resident corporation and a resident corporation328. Moreover, even with 
regards to physical persons, the remaining field of application of the doctrine is their 
“subjective sphere”, meaning tax rules related to the taxpayer’s personal and family 
circumstances and their consequences on rights of deduction, which is the area where, 
until now, the Court seems to have strictly adhered to the idea of a general 
incomparableness between residents and non-residents329. 
This was not the case only for individuals, but also for corporations. 
In the Royal Bank of Scotland case330, the national measure at issue distinguished 
between companies having their seat in the Member State concerned (Greece) and 
companies having their seat in another Member State, but carrying on business in the 
first Member State through a permanent establishment, consequently allowing the 
former company to benefit from a lower tax rate which was denied to the second 
company. 
In its judgement, the Court recognised the effect of the limited fiscal jurisdiction 
of the source Member State, but, however, stated very clearly that this circumstance, 
which “arises from the limited fiscal sovereignty of the source State, is not such as to prevent the 																																																								
328 Similar principles can be derived also from cases such as Commission v. France (28 January 1986, C-270/83), 
Commerzbank (13 July 1993, C-330/91) and Metallgesellschaft (8 March 2001, joined cases C-397/98 and C-410/98). 
329 Cordewener, A, Personal income taxation of non-residents and the increasing impact of the EC Treaty freedoms, cited 
above, 57, 59. 
330 Court of Justice of the European Union, 29 April 1999, C-311/97, Royal Bank of Scotland plc v. Greece. 
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two categories of companies [i.e. resident companies and non-resident companies] from 
being considered, all other things being equal, as being in a comparable situation as regards the 
method of determining the taxable base”, since, in this case, resident banks and permanent 
establishments of foreign companies were subject to the same method of determination 
of their tax bases. In other words, according to this decision, equal treatment should be 
guaranteed within the boundaries of the source Member State’s limited fiscal 
jurisdiction: the host Member State should, therefore, provide equal treatment to 
taxpayers insofar as their activities are within its jurisdiction as determined by national 
law and bilateral tax treaties, being such taxpayers in comparable situations for th 
purposes of the discrimination analysis331. 
The Court also held that the fact that companies having their seat in the Member 
State concerned are taxed on their worldwide income and foreign companies conducting 
business in that Member State through a permanent establishment only on the profits 
attributable to that permanent establishment does not amount to a difference in 
treatment possibly entailing a breach of European Union law, since the different 
treatment results from the principle of territoriality or, in the Court’s words, “from the 
limited fiscal sovereignty of the State in which the income arises”. 
In other words, according to the Court, equal treatment should be guaranteed by 
Member State within the boundaries of the source Member State’s limited fiscal 
jurisdiction, which means that the host Member State should treat taxpayers equally 
insofar as their activities are located within its jurisdiction as determined by tax treaties. 
This essentially amounts to the acknowledgement that the taxpayers concerned would 
find themselves in comparable situations for purposes of the analysis on the point of 
discrimination, which concerns not only domestic rules that distinguish between 
residents and non-residents, but also rules enshrined in a double taxation convention332. 
5. Territoriality as “balanced allocation of taxing powers amongst Member 
States” and the “always somewhere approach”: after the “ability-to-pay 
principle”, another step towards a homogeneous theory for the allocation of 
taxing powers amongst Member States? 
Territoriality receives a significantly different treatment in subsequent 																																																								
331 More specifically, the Court found “that companies having their seat in Greece are taxed there on the basis of their 
worldwide income (unlimited tax liability), whereas foreign companies carrying on business in that State through a 
permanent establishment are subject to tax there only on the basis of profits which the permanent establishment earns there 
(limited tax liability)”. 
332 Douma, S., The three Ds of direct tax jurisdiction: disparity, discrimination and double taxation, cited above, 527. 
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judgements of the Court of Justice, which considerably change the paradigm of general 
uncomparableness of residents and non-residents described above. This is particularly 
true with specific regard to the strain of the Court’s case law concerning taxes imposed 
on transnational groups of companies and cross-border loss relief. 
In cases such as Bosal Holding333 and Marks & Spencer, for example, the analysis of 
the relevant domestic fiscal provisions has led the Court of Justice to results which have 
been considered as exactly opposite as to those which should have been reached if the 
principles stated in the Futura judgement had been strictly applied. Which essentially 
amounts to stating that the Court has changed its initial interpretation of what 
“territoriality” actually means for EU law purposes, with the analysis through the 
“territoriality lens” shifting from the first step of the “rule of reason test” (i.e. the 
existence of a discrimination caused by a national tax provision, which had been 
excluded when a tax system complied with the “international principle of territoriality”, 
also by virtue of the general uncomparableness of resident and non-resident taxpayers) 
to the second level of said test, i.e. the analysis of a measure which has been considered 
as per se discriminatory/restrictive in order to understand whether or not such a 
measure can be justified by overriding reasons in the public interest. 
In its Marks & Spencer decision334, the Court of Justice, in confirming its traditional 
standing on the prohibition of discriminations and restrictions of outbound movements, 
clarified that the fact that a non-resident company is not subject to a Member State’s tax 
jurisdiction does not allow said Member State to differentiate this situation from that of a 
resident company which is subject to tax therein, thus applying what has been defined as 
its “overall approach” and a completely different view on territoriality. One of the 
elements of novelty characterising this decision, if compared with previous judgements 
of the Court, lies in the analysis of the possible grounds for justification of discriminatory 
or restrictive measures. 
In the Marks & Spencer judgement, in fact, the Court rejected the argument based 
only on territoriality according to which the distinction between residents and non-
residents could justify per se a difference in treatment between the two categories of 
taxpayers. The Luxembourg Judges basically stated that the answer to the question 
needed to be based on the evaluation of each specific situation, then accepted the United 
Kingdom’s argument that symmetry in the treatment of positive elements and negative 
elements of income (profits and losses) would be necessary to preserve the balanced 																																																								
333 On which we will further develop the analysis in the following chapter of the research. 
334 Court of Justice of the European Union, 13 December 2005, C-446/03, Marks & Spencer. 
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allocation of the taxing powers amongst Member States. 
The Court is aware that “by taxing resident companies on their worldwide profits and 
non-resident companies solely on the profits from their activities in that State”, the Member 
State of residence of the parent company acted “in accordance with the principle of 
territoriality enshrined in international tax law and recognised by Community law”, but 
nonetheless added that, “however, the fact that id does not tax the profits of the non-resident 
subsidiaries of a parent company established on its territory does not in itself justify restricting 
group relief to losses incurred by resident companies”335. 
In its decision, the Court implicitly stated that, in certain cases, territoriality is not 
enough not only to exclude the existence of a breach of EU law, but also as a valid 
justification for said breach, being it necessary, on the contrary, to combine territoriality 
with other two justifications, i.e. the need to counter tax avoidance and the need to 
prevent any possible double use of the losses (double dip)336. According to the Court, in 
other words, the fact that the United Kingdom does not tax the profits of the non-
resident subsidiaries of a parent company located in its territory, thus applying the fiscal 
principle of territoriality in a consistent manner, cannot per se justify a measure 
restricting group relief only to losses incurred by resident companies, because otherwise 
this would essentially amount to stating that the fact that subsidiaries are located in a 
different Member State from the Member State of residence of their parent company 
justifies a restrictive treatment337. 
Therefore, Member States are generally allowed to limit their tax jurisdiction to 
income having its source within their territory, following that, if a Member State does 
not levy tax on the positive income of foreign subsidiaries, then that State should also be 
allowed not to take into account the negative components linked to that foreign income. 
However, with regards to “final losses”, the Court deviates from this general rule and 
follows what has been called an “always somewhere approach”, which is the 																																																								
335 A similar statement can be found, for example, in the Rewe judgement, where the Court has states that the 
principle of territoriality “does not in itself justify the Member State of establishment of the parent company refusing to 
grant an advantage to that company on the ground that it does not tax the profits of its non-resident subsidiaries” (Court of 
Justice of the European Union, 23 February 2006, C-471/04, Rewe). In his Opinion on the case, AG Poiares Maduro 
argued that, should the definition of “balanced allocation” be based only on a “rule of symmetry” between the 
right to tax a company’s profits and the duty of a Member State to take that company’s losses into consideration, 
that definition would not significantly differ from a purely economic reasoning related to a reduction in tax 
revenue suffered by the Member States, which does not, in principle, qualify as a justification ground. 
336 AG Poiares Maduro has given his interpretation of such a statement in his Opinion on the Rewe case (AG 
Poiares Maduro’s Opinion, 31 May 2006, C-347/04), suggesting that the criterion of a balanced allocation of 
taxing powers amongst Member State cannot stand alone as a justification, not being it possible to separate it 
from the other two criteria, i.e. the risck of “double dip” and the risk of tax avoidance. On the point, see Lang, M., 
Direct taxation: is the ECJ heading in a new direction?, in European Taxation, 2006, 9, 426. 
337 Isenbaert, M., EC law and the sovereignty of the Member States in direct taxation, Amsterdam, 2010, 715; Wathelet, 
M., Tax sovereignty of the Member States and the European Court of Justice: new trends or confirmation?, in Hinnekens, 
L., Hinnekens, P. (eds.), A vision of taxes within and outside European borders, Amsterdam, 2008, 912. 
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consequence of a sort of “tempered territoriality”338: if the losses of the foreign subsidiary 
cannot be deducted in the Member State where that subsidiary is established, then the 
Member State where the parent company is located must take them into account. 
In doing so, the Court has, in other terms, established a sort of “order of priority”, 
deciding that, in the event it were possible to deduct the losses at issue in both the 
Member State of residence of establishment of the subsidiary and in the Member State of 
residence of the parent company, it would have been necessary, for the purposes of 
protecting a balanced allocation of taxing powers amongst Member States, to give 
priority to the deduction of those losses in the Member State of establishment of the 
subsidiary concerned339. 
As it has been correctly observed, this reasoning leads to an asymmetrical 
treatment of non-resident subsidiaries, compelling Member States to take into account 
negative elements of income related to positive elements of income over which Member 
States do not have any fiscal jurisdictions, but only “in extreme circumstances”, i.e. in so 
far as these negative elements cannot be taken into account anywhere in the Internal 
Market. Therefore, if, on one hand, it can actually argued that this solution somehow 
favours companies located in the European Union with cross-border activities (thus 
favouring, to a certain extent, the functioning of a proper Single Market), it certainly 
does not help to achieve a design a general system of profit allocation amongst Member 
States, since it conditions the extension of a Member State’s tax jurisdiction upon 
circumstances which have to be analysed on a case-by-case basis: the United Kingdom 
was basically forced to extend its taxing jurisdiction to a part of foreign income of a non-
resident company (not subject to tax in the UK) over which it had symmetrically not 
asserted any taxing jurisdiction. 
This conclusion directly contradicts the basic and shared assumption on which all 
of the Court of Justice’s case law in the field of direct taxation is based, i.e. the principle 
according to which Member States retain the power to determine the criteria for the levy 
of their taxes, with a view to defining tax jurisdiction and avoiding double taxation, 
which directly implies that Member States are also free to limit their taxing rights and, 
thus, to decide not to levy tax on certain taxpayers or types of income (as long as they do 
not do so in a discriminatory way). Which demonstrates once again the need for positive 																																																								
338 Melis, G., Perdite intracomunitarie, potestà impositiva e principio di territorialità: unicuique suum?, in Rassegna 
Tributaria, 2008, 1486. 
339 Wathelet, M., Tax sovereignty of the Member States and the European Court of Justice: new trends or confirmation?, 
cited above, 915. See also Vanistendael, F., Ability to pay in European Community law, cited above, 130, where the 
Author states that the statement of the Court on “final losses” “looks like a Pyrrhic victory for the principle, 
guaranteeing legal guerrilla litigation by national tax administration demanding absolute certainty from their national 
courts that the losses cannot be used anywhere else in the world”. 
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harmonisation at the EU legislative level, at least with regards to cross-border corporate 
loss relief340, which would certainly be preferable to the “creation of taxing rights” on the 
part of the Court of Justice. 
It has been correctly argued that in the Marks & Spencer judgement overcoming 
discrimination meant overcoming the consistent application of territoriality or “fiscal 
symmetry” in the allocation of taxing rights amongst Member States as it had been 
settled in the Futura case, according to which, if a Member State does not tax the profits 
produced abroad, it does not have to allow deductions of costs or losses incurred abroad. 
This statement had been supported by legal doctrine also by resorting to the concept of 
economic allegiance and to the general prohibition of extraterritorial taxation341. 
It should also be observed, in light of all that has been discussed in the previous 
Chapter of this research, that the Court’s definition of territoriality as a principle 
“enshrined in international tax law” is highly questionable. Several authors have, in fact, 
highlighted that, by concluding tax treaties, contracting states agree to restrict their 
powers in exercising their tax rights, by way of rules that considerably vary between 
different types of income (and different taxes) and between different bilateral 
conventions. Therefore, since the sole expression of “international tax law” is constituted 
by the network of tax treaties concluded by countries, and given the fact that the 
contents of such treaties depend on the negotiating powers of the contracting states, 
“international tax law” does not seem to be based on principles at all and that 
territoriality cannot be seen as a “principle of international tax law”342. 
 It is also interesting to highlight that Advocate General Maduro, in his Opinion 
on the Marks & Spencer case, had specifically considered the point of territoriality and 
defined the meaning of the “principle of territoriality” from the perspective of the Court 
of Justice, stating that it was the principle according to which the Court “recognises merely 
the need to take account of constraints resulting from the fact that Member States are equally 
sovereign in tax matters [and should, therefore] reach an accommodation with States enjoying 
equal sovereignty in tax matters”, but that it cannot “be invoked to enable the Member States to 
evade their obligations under Community law”. 
 This view of the principle of territoriality and of its relevance in the context of 
European Union law was then picked up by the Court in subsequent judgements. For 																																																								
340 After the Marks & Spencer judgement, the Commission published a Communication on Tax treatment of losses in 
cross-border situations (Commission from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the 
Economic and Social Committee, 19 December 2006, COM(2006)824, where it encouraged Member States to adopt 
unilateral measures as regards cross-border loss relief within group of companies. 
341 Brauner, Y., Dourado, A.P., Traversa, E., Ten years of Marks & Spencer, in Intertax, 2015, 4, 308. 
342 Lang, M., The Marks & Spencer case. The open issues following the ECJ’s final word, cited above, 60. 
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example, the Court, in the Busley decision, stated that the purpose of the principle of 
territoriality is “to establish, in the application of Community law, the need to take into account 
the limits on the Member States’ powers of taxation”343. It should, however, be noted that, 
notwithstanding this definition, the Court, has subsequently proposed, e.g. in its 
Commission v. Belgium decision, a partially different definition of “territoriality”, defined 
as the notion according to which fiscal systems “coexist without a hierarchy between them”344, 
which basically amounts to the idea underlying the “parallel exercise of taxing powers” 
doctrine, which we will analyse in the following pages of this study, even though, in that 
case, the Court ruled on a point of cohesion as justification for discriminating domestic 
measures. 
 Notwithstanding the issue of the above-mentioned vagary attitude of the Court 
towards the topic of the definition of the concept of “territoriality”, part of legal 
scholarship welcomed the Marks & Spencer judgement as a step forward towards an 
“European fiscal Union”, hoping to be witnessing the birth of a new principle according 
to which, in the event of a difference in treatment between purely domestic situations 
and cross-border ones, a taxpayer should be allowed to take advantage of a tax benefit 
wherever he/she/it is located, as a direct consequence of the confirmation of the 
“Schumacker doctrine”345. In other terms, supporters of the Marks & Spencer’s approach 
have found that the “Futura doctrine” does not serve the purpose of reaching a more 
integrated Internal Market and agreed with AG Poiares Maduro in stating that, whereas 
the need to ensure cohesion may justify restrictive rules, cohesion cannot, however, go to 
the detriment of integration of tax systems within the context of the Internal Market. 
Therefore, a vision of territoriality as that which is typical of international law, greatly 
relying on national sovereignty, may not be adequate for the European Union context 
and for the purposes of the Internal Market. 
 What is certain is that deducting in the source Member State costs incurred by a 
non-resident without a permanent establishment means overcoming the traditional role 
of the source country with regards to non-residents. 
It also seems certainly correct to say that, to a certain extent, the Marks & Spencer 
decision contradicts the “Kerckhaert Morres doctrine”, which has been already mentioned 
above and which will be analysed in the next paragraph346, meaning that the idea of an 
“always somewhere approach” such as that adopted by the Court in the Marks & Spencer 																																																								
343 Court of Justice of the European Union, 15 October 2009, C-35/08, Busley, par. 30. 
344 Court of Justice of the European Union, 1 December 2011, C-250/08, Commission v. Belgium. 
345 Wathelet, M., Tax sovereignty of the Member States and the European Court of Justice: new trends or confirmation?, 
cited above, 913. 
346 See Chapter II, paragraph 6. 
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judgement goes against the logic on which the Luxembourg Judges founded their 
statement according to which double taxation of the same item of income, in absence of 
any relevant discrimination, is merely the result of the parallel exercise of taxing 
jurisdictions on the part of the Member States. Authors have argued that the Court of 
Justice, with its Marks & Spencer decision, has demonstrated having some difficulties 
accepting the “other side” of the coin that is the “Kerckhaert Morres doctrine”, namely 
that the parallel exercise of taxing powers on the part of the Member States may also 
result in irremediable double non-deductibility of certain charges or losses. 
The “final losses” criterion established in Marks & Spencer has been upheld in 
various subsequent decisions of the Court of Justice as well347, but nonetheless it has also 
been the object of considerable criticism, especially with regards to the uncertainty it is 
able to produce in practical terms (when is it possible to really consider a loss as “final”?) 
and also because, in subsequent judgements, the Court of Justice seemed to deny such a 
criterion, with an apparent denial of its “always somewhere approach”. 
The Court, in fact, took a partially different approach than the one adopted in 
Marks & Spencer in its X Holding judgement348, concerning the Dutch “single entity 
taxation” regime. The decision started its reasoning by quoting its ruling in Schumacker, 
stating that “in tax law, the taxpayers’ residence may constitute a factor that might justify 
national rules involving different treatment for resident and non-resident taxpayers. However, 
that is not always the case. To accept that the Member State of establishment may in all cases 
apply different treatment because the registered office of a company is situated in another Member 
State would deprive Article 43 EC of its substance”. However, according to the Court, “the 
situation of a resident parent company wishing to form a single tax entity with a resident 
subsidiary and the situation of a resident parent company wishing to form a single tax entity with 
a non-resident subsidiary are objectively comparable with regard to the objective of a tax scheme 
such as that at issue in the main proceedings in so far as each seeks to benefit from the advantages 
of that scheme”. 
This reasoning has been much criticised by legal doctrine. It has been observed, in 
fact, that considering parent companies of non-resident subsidiaries (not subject to tax) 
comparable to parent companies of resident subsidiaries (subject to tax) only on the 
ground of the fact that both seek to benefits from the advantages of the scheme at issue is 																																																								
347 See, for example, Court of Justice of the European Union, 3 February 2015, C-172/13, Commission v. United 
Kingdom; Court of Justice of the European Union, 17 December 2015, C-388/14, Timac Agro Deutschland GmbH. For 
a comment on the point, see Pinetz, E., Spies, K., ‘Final losses’ after the decision in Commission v. UK (Marks & 
Spencer II), in EC Tax Review, 2015, 6, 309. 
348 Court of Justice of the European Union, 25 February 2010, C-337/08, X Holding. For a comment of the 
judgement, see Van Thiel, S., Vascega, M, X Holding: why Ulysses should stop listening to the siren, in European 
Taxation, 2010, 8, 334. 
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not a strong enough argument to limit the Member States’ sovereign powers in the 
design and allocation of their fiscal jurisdiction on the ground of the “source” and 
“residence” criteria349. 
Notwithstanding this, the Court found the Dutch measure to be justified by the 
need to safeguard the allocation of taxing powers amongst Member States and 
proportionate because, unlike residents, non-residents are not subject to tax. More 
specifically, the Court stated that “Articles 43 EC and 48 EC do not preclude legislation of a 
Member State which makes it possible for a parent company to form a single tax entity with its 
resident subsidiary, but which prevents the formation of such a single tax entity with a non-
resident subsidiary, in that the profits of that non-resident subsidiary are not subject to the fiscal 
legislation of that Member State”. According to the Court, the exclusion of non-resident 
companies from such a scheme is justified by the need to safeguard the balanced 
allocation of taxing powers amongst Member States, since “the possibility of including a 
non-resident subsidiary in the single tax entity would be tantamount to granting the parent 
company the freedom to choose the tax scheme applicable to the losses of that subsidiary and the 
place where those losses are taken into account”. 
On this point, it has been noted that what was denied at the first step of the “rule 
of reason test” employed by the Court, where the Court deemed residents which were 
subject to tax and non-residents which were not subject to tax comparable, became 
decisive in the third step of said test350. It could even be argued that, in X Holding, the 
territoriality argument (which, in Futura, was taken into account in the first step of the 
“rule of reason test”, stating that a tax system compliant with the fiscal principle of 
territoriality could not constitute a breach of EU law, and which, subsequently, has been 
considered in the context of the second step of said test, as a possible justification for a 
discriminatory measure) was “moved” to the “very bottom” of the Court’s analysis, i.e. 
to the third step of the “rule of reason”: if a discriminatory or restrictive tax measure 
could be justified, and then complies with the principle of territoriality, it follows that it 
constitutes a proportionate measure.  
The Court then clarified the scope of application of the principles voiced in X 
Holding, for example, in its more recent Groupe Steria judgement351, where it stated that it 
cannot be inferred from the X Holding decision that any difference in treatment between 
companies belonging to a tax-integrated group and companies not belonging to such a 																																																								
349 Terra, B.J.M., Wattel, P.J., European tax law, cited above, 545. 
350 Terra, B.J.M., Wattel, P.J., European tax law, cited above, 546. 
351 Court of Justice of the European Union, 2 September 2015, C-386/14, Groupe Steria SCA. For a comment on the 
case, see Korving, J., Groupe Steria: a threat to group taxation regimes?, in EC Tax Review, 2016, 1, 40. 
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group is admissible under the Treaty freedoms, since the X Holding judgement only 
concerned the condition of residence as a condition for having access to a tax integration 
scheme. Therefore, according to the Court, “as regards tax advantages other than the transfer 
of losses within the tax-integrated group, a separate assessment must be made […] as to whether a 
Member State may reserve those advantages to companies belonging to a tax-integrated group 
and consequently exclude them in cross-border situations”. 
5.1. After Marks & Spencer: the evolution of the “always somewhere” approach 
from an “overall” perspective. 
The Court of Justice’s case law on cross-border loss relief and group taxation has 
probably constituted the maximum level of expansion of the “interventionism” of the 
Court in direct tax matters, with its “always somewhere” doctrine forcing Member States 
to modify the extension of their fiscal jurisdiction, also disregarding the consequences of 
the traditional territorial allocation of taxing powers according to which a certain level of 
symmetry is applied when deciding which foreign income to levy tax on. This kind of 
approach appears to be the result of the maximum degree of expansion of the 
interpretation of fundamental Treaty freedoms as an expression of the principles of 
equality and non-discrimination, elevating the analysis of the Court to a genuinely 
European level and concerning the examination and evaluation of the effects played by 
tax measures from at least two Member States352. 
In other terms, the Court of Justice, in the name of the reasoning generally known 
as “always somewhere approach”, has forced Member States to extend their fiscal 
jurisdictions to items of income they had excluded. Aside from the fact that, in doing so, 
the Court effectively traces the limits of the Member States’ tax jurisdictions and 
allocates positive and negative items of income to different jurisdictions, which is 
something that (as the Court itself has recognised more than once) is generally left to the 
political decisions of said Member States, it has been argued that such an approach 
actually disrupts the tax base coherence between connected negative and positive 
elements of income353. 
However, the “always somewhere” approach as developed in the Marks & Spencer 
decision has not always been applied in a consistent manner by the Court of Justice, 
leading, once again, to some doubts and uncertainties as to the scope of application of 																																																								
352 Bizioli, G., Aporie e contraddizioni della giurisprudenza europea in material di exit taxation, in Riv. dir. fin. sc. fin., 
2014, 3, 390. 
353 Terra, B.J.M., Wattel, P.J., European tax law, cited above, 466. 
	 132 
the justification based on the “balanced allocation of taxing powers”. 
On the point, for example, in the context of corporate group taxation, the Oy AA 
case354, concerning restrictions on the deductibility of profits transferred from a subsidiary 
to its parent company, is certainly worth mentioning. Pursuant to the regime at issue, 
taxable profits could be transferred to other companies belonging to the same group, so 
as to achieve a more “global” offsetting of profits and losses on a group scale, only if 
both the contributor and the recipient were fiscally resident in the Member State at issue 
(Finland). 
In examining the compatibility of such a measure with European Union law, the 
Court has expanded on its “Marks & Spencer approach” to the issue, emphasising that, in 
absence of harmonising European Union measures in the field of direct taxation, 
“Member States retain the power to define, by treaty or unilaterally, the criteria for allocating 
their powers of taxation”355, but that the justification based on ensuring the balanced 
allocation of taxing powers amongst Member States might be allowed only if “the system 
in question is designed to prevent conduct capable of jeopardising the right of the Member States 
to exercise their taxing powers in relation to activities carried on in their territory”356. 
Starting from these assumptions, the Court ruled that, even though the regime at 
issue constituted a restriction of the freedom of establishment, such a restriction was 
justified by the need to safeguard the balanced allocation of taxing powers combined 
with the need to prevent tax avoidance. This conclusion basically enforces territorial 
taxation, even though territoriality (or the balanced allocation of taxing powers) is seen 
as not sufficient per se and as needing to be combined with anti-avoidance purposes. The 
point will be further developed in the following pages of the research357. 
A partially different approach, more similar to the Marks & Spencer ruling, has 
been taken by the Court in the Lidl Belgium case358 , which concerned a German resident 
company whose permanent establishment located in Luxembourg suffered some losses, 
which were deemed as non-deductible in German from the head company’s income. 
In this case, the Court ruled in favour of the compatibility of the regime with 
European Union law because considered the measure justified by the need to ensure a 
balanced allocation of taxing powers amongst Member States combined with the need to 
prevent the risk of “double dip”359. It also reiterated that a measure restricting the 																																																								
354 Court of Justice of the European Union, 18 July 2007, C-231/05, Oy AA. 
355 Court of Justice of the European Union, 18 July 2007, C-231/05, Oy AA, par. 58. 
356 Court of Justice of the European Union, 18 July 2007, C-231/05, Oy AA, par. 59. 
357 See Chapter II, paragraph 7. 
358 Court of Justice of the European Union, 15 May 2008, C-414/06, Lidl Belgium. 
359 Many authors have criticised the ruling given on the Lidl Belgium case from this viewpoint, highlighting that the 
risks of double deduction of losses are less relevant with regard to permanent establishment than with concern to 
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freedom of establishment only goes beyond what is necessary to attain its legitimate 
objectives where it denies deduction of foreign losses even though a non-resident subject 
has exhausted the possibilities for having those losses taken into account in the future in 
the Member State where they originated (which was not the case in the fact pattern 
examined by the Court in Lidl Belgium). The Court has, therefore, accepted the 
immediate cash flow disadvantage as an acceptable consequence of the allocation of 
taxing powers according to territoriality360. 
In its subsequent decision on the Philips Electronics case361, concerning, once again 
the United Kingdom’s group relief regime, the Court of Justice assessed again the 
question whether or not a restriction on freedom of establishment can be justified on the 
grounds of the need to preserve the balanced allocation of taxing powers amongst 
Member States, holding that the balanced allocation justification has the purpose to 
safeguard the symmetry between the right to tax profits and the right to deduct losses362, 
but that it could not be used as a justification in the case at issue because the power of 
the Member State of source to impose taxes “on whose territory the economic activity giving 
rise to the losses of the permanent establishment is carried out […] is not at all affected by the 
possibility of transferring, by group relief and to a resident company, the losses sustained by a 
permanent establishment situated in its territory”. 
The “always somewhere” approach was also confirmed by the Court in the much 
criticised Deutsche Shell judgement363. The case dealt with a currency loss on the working 
capital contribution granted by a German company to its Italian branch (permanent 
establishment) and that was qualified by the Court of Justice as a “specific operational 
factor which is capable of being taken into consideration only by the German tax authorities”, 
which led the Judges to state that “it is unacceptable for a Member State to exclude from the 
basis of assessment of the principal establishment currency losses which, by their nature, can 
never be suffered by the permanent establishment”364. 																																																																																																																																																																													
foreign subsidiaries, since permanent establishments do not enjoy juridically separate personality from that of 
their head companies. It has, therefore, been argued that the application of the Marks & Spencer reasoning to this 
case as well was not completely on point. Of this opinion is, for instance, Monsenego, J., Taxation of foreign business 
income within the European Internal Market, cited above, 445. 
360 Marres, O., The principle of territoriality and cross-border loss compensation, cited above, 118. 
361 Court of Justice of the European Union, 6 September 2012, C-18/11, Philips Electronics. For a comment on the 
judgement, see Monteiro, R., Kiers, M., The Court’s position on cross-border losses: a quest for the well-being of EU 
citizens?, in EC Tax Review, 2013, 2, 92. 
362 Once again the difference between the justification based on “fiscal coherence” and that based on “the need to 
preserve a balanced allocation of taxing powers amongst Member States” becomes more and more blurred. 
363 Court of Justice of the European Union, 28 February 2008, C-293/06, Deutsche Shell. 
364 It should be noted that, from a strict corporate law perspective, it has been pointed out that, whereas a 
subsidiary is an entity which is distinct and separate from the parent company, a permanent establishment is only 
the expression of a de facto presence of a foreign company in another country, with no separate legal personality, 
which, according to some authors, implies that, in order to deny carry-over of losses suffered by a foreign 
permanent establishments, a stronger justification ground would be needed than in the case of foreign 
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In other words, according to the Court, since the currency loss at issue did not 
exist in Italy and since it had to be deductible somewhere, then it had to be deducted in 
Germany, notwithstanding the fact that Germany did not have any tax jurisdiction on 
the related currency gains. In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected the arguments 
based on the coherence of the tax system, noting that there supposedly was no direct link 
between the currency gains and the currency losses, and on the need to preserve the 
balanced allocation of taxing powers amongst Member States, stating that a Member 
State cannot be required to take into account the negative elements connected to the 
income accrued on a permanent establishment located abroad only because those 
elements cannot be taken into account in the Member States where the permanent 
establishment is located, since Member States are not generally obliged to shape their tax 
regimes so as to avoid disparities with the tax regimes of other Member States. 
In doing so, however, the Court actually compelled a Member State (Germany) to 
selectively assume fiscal jurisdiction when it had decided not to do so, forcing it to take 
into account, for the purposes of its tax law, items of income over which that Member 
State had no tax jurisdiction at all. In light of these considerations, it has been observed 
that the Deutsche Shell judgement constitutes another example of a decision through 
which the Court of Justice selectively allocated positive and negative items of income, 
disrupting the sovereign decisions taken by Member States even in absence of an actual 
discrimination. 
 6. Back to the basics: the “parallel exercise of taxing powers” doctrine. 
 After the “expansion” of the protection granted to the taxpayer’s position with 
the application of the “always somewhere approach” with the Marks & Spencer strain of 
decisions and of the relevance of the parameter of ability to pay inaugurated with the 
“Schumacker” judgement, however, the Court of Justice seemed to retreat on more 
“conservative” positions, reiterating the statement of the primacy of the Member States’ 
freedom in determining the borders of their fiscal jurisdictions, either unilaterally or by 
way of bilateral negotiation with other countries. 
 The main reference on the point is to the Kerckhaert Morres decision365. 
The case concerned a Belgian measures which applied the same tax rate to 
dividends irrespective of whether they came from Belgium or from France and of the 																																																																																																																																																																													
subsidiaries. On the point, see Wimpissinger, C., Cross-border transfer of losses. The ECJ does not agree with Advocate 
General Sharpston, in EC Tax Review, 2009, 179, and the authors cited therein. 
365 Court of Justice of the European Union, 14 November 2006, C-513/04, Kerckhaert Morres. 
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fact that France had already subjected such dividends to a first layer of taxation. It was, 
therefore, argued by the claimants that Belgian rule restricted free movement of capital 
as it failed, in taxing the French-source dividends, to take into account the French tax 
already levied. 
The Court of Justice found the Belgian rule not to be discriminatory, to the extent 
that Belgium exercised tax jurisdiction over foreign-source and domestic-source 
dividends charging the same tax rates, thus ruling that the mere exercise in parallel by 
two Member States of their fiscal sovereignty and the consequent differences in 
treatment between purely domestic and cross-border circumstances, if each system is not 
ex se discriminatory, cannot be prohibited by the fundamental freedoms provided for by 
the Treaties, but can only be dealt with either by harmonisation measures at the 
European Union level or by bilateral or multilateral conventions between the Member 
States. Therefore, the disadvantage caused by the measure at issue in the Kerckhaert 
Morres case, resulting from the parallel exercise of fiscal sovereignty by two Member 
States, was not considered as constituting a breach of European Union law, since 
“Community law, in its current state and in a situation such as that in the main proceedings, 
does not lay down any general criteria for the attribution of areas of competence between the 
Member States in relation to the elimination of double taxation within the Community” and, 
therefore, “it is for the Member States to take the measures necessary to prevent situations such 
as that at issue in the main proceedings by applying, in particular, the apportionment criteria 
followed in international tax practice”. 
In other terms, the Court essentially stated that the adverse consequences that 
might arise from a conflict of tax jurisdiction, that is to say the parallel exercise of fiscal 
sovereignty by two Member States, do not fall within the scope of the fundamental 
freedoms. It can be derived from this judgement that the fundamental freedoms only 
serve as broad prohibitions of discrimination addressing the source Member State and 
the Member State of residence separately and individually366. The underlying reasoning is 
that the adverse effect of simultaneous source taxation and residence taxation on the 
same item of income is not caused by one of the two jurisdictions and, therefore, not by 
discrimination, but rather by the parallel (and legitimate) exercise of taxing powers by 																																																								
366 Cordewener, A., The prohibitions of discrimination and restriction within the framework of a fully integrated market, 
cited above, 11. According to the Author, this would be “the only way a non-discrimination principle can be handled 
within a legal framework that comes close to a federal system, i.e. a moltitude or regionally limited national legal orders (of 
the Member States) which are confronted with common rules contained in a higher legal order”. See also Cordewener, A., 
Personal income taxation of non-residents and the increasing impact of the EC Treaty freedoms, cited above, 67; 
Garabedian, M., Malherbe, J., Cross-border dividend taxation: testing the Belgian rules against the ECJ case law (or 
testing the ECJ case law against the Belgian rules), in Hinnekens, L., Hinnekens, P. (eds.), A vision of taxes within and 
outside European borders, The Hague, 2008, 397; Quaghebeur, M., Kerckhaert Morres revisited: ECJ to reconsider 
Belgian taxation of inbound dividends, in Tax Notes International, 2008, 9, 931. 
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two jurisdictions. 
This reasoning is in line with the Opinion AG Geelhoed had expressed with 
regards to the same Kerckhaert-Morres case, where he concluded that the mere fact that 
the Member State of residence might not relieve double taxation is not contrary to the 
Treaty provisions on free movement as long as that Member State complied with the 
obligation not to discriminate between foreign-source and domestic-source income in 
exercising its jurisdiction. In the absence of any priority rule at the European Union level, 
any distortion of economic activities deriving from such a choice would be a mere 
consequence of the fact that, in the present situation of EU law, different tax systems 
coexist and “this means disadvantages for economic actors in some cases and advantage in 
others”367. Ultimately, in the AG’s opinion, the possibility of such disadvantages may not 
be challenged under the fundamental freedoms, first of all because Member States still 
have the power to choose the criteria for the allocation of their taxing powers and also 
because no alternative criteria for such an allocation of tax jurisdiction can be derived 
from European Union law. 
According to this reasoning - which, on a purely theoretical juridical level, seems 
to be essentially correct - disparities arise because different national tax systems apply to 
the same factual circumstance independently from one another: this is what has been 
argued in the previous chapter of the research when we demonstrated the absence of 
any actual binding principle for the allocation of taxing powers amongst countries at the 
international level368. It is, in fact, a “corollary” of the affirmation of state sovereignty to 
acknowledge that a country (even a Member State) may freely limit its tax jurisdiction 
(e.g. choosing not to tax a certain item of income) and that taxation on the part of a 
country is not linked to taxation on the part of another country. If disparities were 
prohibited because they restrict the exercise of the freedoms of movement within the 
Internal Market, this would amount to rethinking state sovereignty in a field, such as 
direct taxation, in which the European Union has no exclusive competence, by linking a 
country’s taxing rights to the ways in which another country chooses to exercise (or not 
to exercise) its fiscal jurisdiction. This would also imply that the Court of Justice would 
have to take political decisions, which belong to state sovereignty, thus contradicting its 
basic assumption according to which competence with regard to direct taxation lies with 
the Member States; and it would do so by exercising its judicial powers, imposing an 																																																								
367 Court of Justice of the European Union, Advocate General Geelhoed’s Opinion, 6 April 2006, C-513/04, 
Kerckhaert Morres, par. 36. See also Kofler, G., Fundamental freedoms and juridical double taxation, cited above, 34. 
368 Van de Vijver, A., International double taxation in the European Union: comparative guidelines from Switzerland and 
the United States, cited above, 15. 
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integration of national tax systems by way (not of a legislative decision, but) of 
judgements which are necessarily rendered on specific cases. 
It should incidentally be noted that, even though the Court clarified this 
reasoning in explicit terms for the first time in Kerckhaert-Morres, it had previously hinted 
to the legitimacy of the effects caused by the parallel and autonomous exercise of taxing 
powers by Member States, for which there would be no remedy pursuant to European 
Union law other than harmonisation of the divergent national regimes, for the first time 
in its Peralta judgement369. Similar statements had also been made by the Court, for 
example, as far as taxation is concerned, in the Schempp judgement370, where the Judges 
have acknowledged that “the Treaty offers no guarantee to a citizen of the Union that 
transferring his activities to a Member State other than that in which he previously resided will be 
neutral as regards taxation. Given the disparities in the tax legislation of the Member States, such 
a transfer may be to the citizen’s advantage in terms of indirect taxation or not, according to 
circumstances”371. 
The Court has also drawn similar conclusions with regards to corporations as 
well, e.g. in its Krankenheim judgement372, where it argued that Member States are no 
under any obligation to coordinate their respective tax systems in order to make intra-
EU transfers fiscally neutral373. An analogous argument, even though not as explicit as in 
Kerckhaert Morres, could also be found in the previous Court’s judgemen on the Gilly 
case, where it had stated that “although the abolition of double taxation within the Community 
is […] included among the objectives of the Treaty, it is clear from the wording of that provision 
[i.e. previous Article 220 of the EEC Treaty] that it cannot itself confer on individuals any 																																																								
369 Court of Justice of the European Union, 14 July 1994, C-379/92, Criminal proceedings against Matteo Peralta. More 
specifically, the Court, in that occasion, had stated that “in the absence of Community harmonisation, a Member State 
may certainly impose, directly or indirectly, technical rules which are specific to it and which are not necessary to be found in 
the other Member State on maritime transport undertakings which, like the undertaking employing Mr. Peralta, are 
established on its territory and which operate vessels flying its flag. But the difficulties which might arise for those 
undertakings from that situation do not affect freedom of establishment within the meaning of the Treaty. Fundamentally, 
those difficulties are no different in nature from those which may originate in disparities between national law governing, for 
example, labour costs, social security costs or the tax system”. 
370 Court of Justice of the European Union, 12 July 2005, C-403/03, Egon Schempp v. Finanzamt München V. 
371 For a similar statement, see also Court of Justice, 29 April 2004, C-387/01, Wiegel. The Court of Justice of the 
European Union has dealt with the topic several times in non-tax cases as well, such as in the Perfili judgement (1 
February 1996, C-177/94, Criminal proceedings against Gianfranco Perfili), where it held “that, in prohibiting every 
Member State from applying its law differently on the ground of nationality, within the field of application of the Treaty, 
Articles 12, 43 and 49 EC are not concerned with any disparities in treatment which may result, between Member States, 
from differences existing between the laws of the various Member States, so long as they affect all persons subject to them in 
accordance with objective criteria and without regard to their nationality”. 
372 Court of Justice of the European Union, 23 October 2008, C-157/07, Krankenheim Ruhesitz. 
373 More specifically, the Court stated, in Krankenheim, that “a Member State cannot be required to take account, for the 
purposes of applying its tax law, of the possible negative results arising from particularities of legislation of another Member 
State applicable to a permanent establishment situated in the territoru of the said State […] Freedom of establishment cannot 
be understood as meaning that a Member State is required to draw up its tax rules on the basis of those in another Member 
State in order to ensure, in all circumstances, taxation which removes any disparities arising from national tax rules, given 
that the decisions made by a company as to the establishment of commercial structures abroad may be to the company’s 
advantage or not, according to circumstances”. 
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rights on which they might be able to rely before their national courts”374. In the D. v. Inspecteur 
judgement375, furthermore, the Court explicitly stated that Member States are free to 
determine the connecting factors for the purposes of allocating their taxing powers and 
that the Court accepts that “a difference in treatment between nationals of the two Contracting 
State that result from that allocation cannot constitute discrimination”. 
The somehow uniform application of such a reasoning on the part of the 
Luxembourg Judges has led legal scholars to trace a consistent distinction, in the analysis 
of the Court of Justice’s case law on discrimination and compatibility of Member States’ 
tax measures with Treaty freedoms, between the two concepts of “discrimination” (and 
restriction) and of “disparity”376. According to the Court’s approach, discriminations have 
their origin within a single jurisdiction, occurring where a disadvantage or hindrance to 
the exercise of the Treaty freedoms is caused as a consequence of the (tax) provisions of a 
single Member State directly or indirectly distinguishing between purely domestic 
situations and comparable cross-border situations. Such discriminations are generally 
prohibited, according to the Court’s case law, if they cannot be properly justified or are 
disproportionate. 
Disparities, on the other hand, depend on the interactions between two different 
Member States’ regimes. In other words, disparities are possible obstacles to free 
movement caused by differences between the legal systems of two (or more) Member 
States. On this point, the Court holds that disparities, such as those created by the 
parallel exercise of taxing powers by Member States, are outside the scope of application 
of the Treaty freedoms, because, otherwise, Member States’ sovereignty in levying direct 
taxes would be at risk, with the Court being force to make choices falling within the 
political sovereignty of the Member States377. 
However, the so-called “Kerckhaert Morres approach” has been criticised not only 
by the Commission itself378, but also by a large part of legal scholarship379, arguing, in brief, 																																																								
374 Court of Justice, 23 May 1998, C-336/96, Gilly. 
375 Court of Justice of the European Union, 5 July 2005, C-376/03, D. v. Inspecteur. 
376 On the point, see, amongst others, Terra, B.J.M., Wattel, P.J., European tax law, cited above, passim. 
377 See, amongst others, Weber, D., In search of a (new) equilibrium between tax sovereignty and the freedom of movement 
within the EC, cited above, 588, according to which “since two Member States are involved when a disparity arises, the 
ECJ will have to decide which Member State is being restrictive and will thus have to choose which of the taxation rights 
takes priority. Because Community law respects Member States’ sovereignty in direct tax matters, disadvantages resulting 
from disparities should not be contrary to the Treaty freedoms”. 
378 Commissioner Kovacs reportedly noted that in the Kerckhaert Morres judgement the Court failed to take into 
account the Internal Market issue. See Kofler, G., Fundamental freedoms and juridical double taxation, cited above, 36. 
379 Rainer, A., ECJ decides on withholding taxes on cross-border income, in Intertax, 2007, 63; Kofler, G., Mason, R., 
Double taxation: a European switch in time?, in Columbia Journal of European Law, 2007, 67; Van Thiel, S., Why the 
European Court of Justice should interpret directly applicable Community law as a right to most-favoured nation treatment 
and a prohibition of double taxation, in Weber, D. (ed.), The influence of European law on direct taxation. Recent and 
future developments, The Hague, 118; Vanistendael, F., In defence of the European Court of Justice, cited above, 90; 
Vanistendael, F., Does the ECJ have the power of interpretation to build a tax system compatible with the fundamental 
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that international double taxation, though tolerated by the Court of Justice - which seems 
to be satisfied simply if both Member States involved refrain from distinguishing 
between cross-border situations and comparable purely domestic situations - constitutes 
one of the most relevant obstacles to free movement within the Internal Market. 
It has also been observed that the traditional Court’s case law concerning non-tax 
matters strongly indicates that the interplay between the legal systems of two Member 
States may generate forbidden obstacles to the proper functioning of the Internal Market, 
leading to situations where indistinctly applicable rules of a Member State (i.e. non-
discriminatory measures) create an unequal impact on cross-border situations, by way of 
the imposition of a double regime of rules380. In non-tax cases381, the Court has tried to 
overcome the friction created by legislative disparities between Member States, 
constituting prohibited hindrances to the functioning of the Internal Market, by adopting 
the principle of mutual acceptance and recognition to solve the problems cause by the 
interaction of the legislations of the Member States involved. In doing so, the Judges 
have found the ratio of such a reasoning in the fact that the Treaty requires not only the 
elimination of all discrimination on the ground of nationality, but also the abolition of 
any restriction, even if applying without distinction both to nationals and non-nationals, 
liable to prohibit, impede or render less advantageous or attractive cross-border 
initiatives on the part of EU citizens. The same authors voicing this opinion, however, 
generally recognise that the mutual recognition principle may not be easily transposed 
into the field of direct taxation382. 																																																																																																																																																																													
freedoms?, in EC Tax Review, 2008, 52; Isenbaert, M., The ECJ condones Belgian personal income taxation of dividends. 
A temporary state of affairs?, in EC Tax Review, 2007, 236; Snell, J., Non-discriminatory tax obstacles in Community law, 
in International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 2007, 361. 
380 Kofler, G., Fundamental freedoms and juridical double taxation, in Bizioli, G. (ed.), Essays in international and 
European tax law, Naples, 2010, 14; see also Farmer, P., The Court’s case law on taxation: a castle built on shifting 
sands?, in EC Tax Review, 2003, 75, and the authors cited therein; Englisch, J., The European Treaties’ implications for 
direct taxes, in Intertax, 2005, 324; Lang, M., Englisch, J., A European legal tax order based on ability to pay, in 
Amatucci, A. (ed.), International tax law, The Hague, 2006, 251; Hinnekens, L., AMID: the wrong bridge or a bridge too 
far? An analysis of a recent decision of the European Court of Justice, in European Taxation, 2001, 206. 
381 Reference is especially made to cases on free exchange of goods between Member States, requirements for the 
import of foreign goods, services provided by foreign suppliers and social security legislation. See, for example, 
Court of Justice of the European Union, 20 February 1979, 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG (“Cassis de Dijon”); Court of 
Justice of the European Union, 2 December 1999, C-234/97, Fernandez; Court of Justice of the European Union, 7 
May 1991, C-340/89, Vlassopoulou; Court of Justice of the European Union, 30 November 1995, C-55/94, Gebhard; 
Court of Justice of the European Union, 15 February 1996, C-53/95, Kemmler; Court of Justice of the European 
Union, 3 February 1982, joined cases 62/81 and 63/81, Seco; Court of Justice of the European Union, 28 March 
1996, C-272/94, Guiot; Court of Justice of the European Union, 23 November 1999, joined cases C-369/96 and C-
376/96, Arblade. On the point, see also Wattel, P.J., Fiscal cohesion, fiscal territoriality and preservation of the (balanced) 
allocation of taxing power: what is the difference?, cited above, 146. 
382 Kofler, G., Fundamental freedoms and juridical double taxation, cited above, 22; Weber, D., In search of a (new) 
equilibrium between tax sovereignty and the freedom of movement within the EC, cited above, 582; Hinnekens, L., The 
search for the framework conditions of the fundamental EC Treaty principles as applied by the European Court to Member 
States’ direct taxation, cited above, 112; Lyal, R., Non-discrimination and direct tax in Community law, in EC Tax 
Review, 2003, 68; Bizioli, G., Il processo di integrazione dei principi tributari nel rapporto tra ordinamento costituzionale, 
comunitario e diritto internazionale, Padua, 2008, passim; Bizioli, G., Il principio di non discriminazione, in Di Pietro, A., 
Tassani, T. (eds.), I principi europei del diritto tirbutario, Padua, 2013, 191. 
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It should also be noted that the issue of the restrictions to the exercise of Treaty 
freedoms posed by juridical double taxation would not be solved even in a hypothetical 
world where all Member States had identical tax systems in place383. This is even more 
true if we consider that, as highlighted in the first chapter of the present research, 
general public international law hardly poses any limit to the sovereignty of countries in 
designing the borders of their fiscal jurisdictions and in allocating their taxing powers. 
This is the dilemma on which the focus has been for some time, as a consequence 
of the Court’s struggle to reconcile two opposite views, i.e., on one hand, the fact that, as 
far as tax law is concerned, there is an undeniable considerable difference than the one 
between being subject to tax or not being subject to tax or between being subject to only 
one country’s tax law and being subject to more than one country’s tax law - which, as 
long as there are no distributive rules at European Union level, can freely determine the 
limits of their tax jurisdictions - and, on the other hand, the fact that if the cross-border 
character of the income at issue were to be accepted as lawfully implying a higher level 
of taxation on the taxpayer, then said taxpayer would have little incentive to exercise 
his/her/its Treaty freedoms. And, as has been correctly observed, the Member States 
would have little incentive to undo, either by way of unilateral measures or through 
bilateral conventions, restrictive taxation of cross-border situations as compared to 
purely domestic ones384. 
Then again, denying direct applicability of the fundamental Treaty freedoms to 
juridical double taxation on the grounds that European Union law lacks criteria to 
allocate taxing powers amongst Member States also seems to ignore the fact that, in other 
cases concerning direct taxation, the Court actually divided fiscal jurisdiction amongst 
Member States, despite the absence of any European Union “guideline” on the point385. 
Notwithstanding such strong criticism, the Court has subsequently confirmed its 
“Kerckhaert Morres approach” in similar cases, such as Damseaux, Columbus Container 
Services, Block and Leby-Sabbag 386 , where the Luxembourg Judges have essentially 																																																								
383 Kemmeren, E.C.C.M., Principle of origin in tax conventions, cited above, 246. Of the same opinion is also, amongst 
others, AG Geelhoed (Opinion on Case C-374/04, ACT Group Litigation, 23 February 2006), who recognised that, 
even if all Member States had completely non-discriminatory tax systems and even if they all had identical tax 
systems, double taxation would still be present in the Internal Market, since taxation based on source and 
residence would still remain in place in the jurisdictions concerned and the tax measures would still continue to 
overlap. Even more clearly, AG Colomer has stated that “the fact that a taxable event might be taxed twice is the most 
serious obstacle there can be to people and their capital crossing internal borders” (Opinion on Case C-376/03, D., 26 
October 2004). 
384 Wattel, P.J., Fiscal cohesion, fiscal territoriality and preservation of the (balanced) allocation of taxing power: what is the 
difference?, cited above, 141. 
385 Kofler, G., Mason, R., Double taxation: a European switch in time?, cited above, 80. 
386 Court of Justice of the European Union, Order of the Court, 19 September 2012, C-540/11, Levy-Sabbag, where 
the Court found that “dans la mesure où le droit communautaire, tel qu’applicable à la date des faits en cause dans l’affaire 
au principal, ne prescrit pas de critères généraux pour la répartition des compétences entre les États membres s’agissant de 
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recognised the existence of a fiscal disadvantage resulting from juridical double taxation, 
but nonetheless ruled that this disadvantage is nothing more than the result of the 
exercise in parallel by the two Member States concerned of their fiscal sovereignty, thus 
not falling within the scope of the restrictions prohibited by the fundamental freedoms. 
More in detail, the Damseaux case387 concerned a dividend payment by a French 
company to an individual residing in Belgium; France had levied a withholding tax on 
such payment and Belgium levied tax on the income belonging individual taxpayer 
residing in its territory and, therefore, on the cross-border dividend payment received as 
well. The Court ruled that, “in the absence of any unifying or harmonising measure at 
European Union level, Member States retain the power to define, by treaty or unilaterally, the 
criteria for allocating their powers of taxation, particularly with a view to eliminating double 
taxation”, since “it is for the Member States to take the measures necessary to prevent […] 
double taxation by applying, in particular, the criteria followed in international tax practice”. 
According to the Court’s reasoning, if both the Member State of residence and the 
Member State of source are liable to tax the dividends at issue, it cannot be held that, 
under European Union law, it is necessarily for the Member State of residence to prevent 
or eliminate the prejudicial effects of double taxation because that would amount to 
granting a priority with respect to the taxation of such income to the Member State of 
source and European Union law (aside from the Directives on particular aspects of 
corporate tax) does not currently lay down any general criteria for the attribution of 
competence amongst Member States in relation to the elimination of double taxation 
within the Internal Market and to the allocation of taxing powers amongst Member 
States388. It follows that the Treaty freedoms do not contain any indication as to any 
priority of assumption of taxing jurisdictions or as which of the Member States involved 
should yield to the other Member State’s taxing power; and, furthermore, that the 
Treaties do not require Member States to adapt their direct tax systems to fit the direct 																																																																																																																																																																													
l’élimination des doubles impositions à l’intérieur de la Communauté, l’article 56 CE, lu en combinaison avec les articles 
10 CE et 293 CE, doit être interprété en ce sens qu’il ne s’oppose pas à une situation dans laquelle l’État membre, qui s’est 
engagé, par une convention bilatérale préventive de la double imposition à établir un mécanisme tendant à éliminer une telle 
imposition des dividendes, supprime ensuite ce mécanisme par une modification législative ayant pour effet de réintroduire 
une double imposition”. 
387 Court of Justice of the European Union, 16 July 2009, C-128/08, Damseaux. 
388 These principles were clearly reiterated in the Block case (Court of Justice of the European Union, 12 February 
2009, C-67/08, Block), concerning double taxation with regards to inheritance tax, where the Judges stated that 
“Community law, in the current stage of its development […] does not lay down any general criteria for the attribution of 
areas of competence between the Member States in relation to the elimination of double taxation within the European 
Community. Consequently […] no uniform or harmonisation measure designed to eliminate double taxation has as yet been 
adopted at Community law level. […] It follows […] that, in the current stage of development of Community law, the 
Member States enjoy a certain autonomy in this area provided they comply with Community law, and are not obliged 
therefore to adapt their own tax systems to the different systems of tax of the other Member States in order, inter alia, to 
eliminate the double taxation arising from the exercise in parallel by those Member States of their fiscal sovereignty and, in 
consequence thereof, to allow the inheritance tax paid in a Member State other than that in which the heir is resident to be 
deducted in a case such as that of the main proceedings”. 
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tax systems of other Member States, nor do they guarantee that the cross-border exercise 
of Treaty freedoms will always be neutral for tax purposes. 
In other words, according to the Court, disadvantages resulting from differences 
in the scope of subjection to tax of non-residents and of income having its source in 
foreign territories are, in principle, outside the scope of application of the Treaty 
fundamental freedoms, provided non-residents and foreign-source income are not 
subject to more burdensome tax measures than residents and domestic-source income389. 
Stating otherwise would entail, according to the Court, granting a Member State priority 
in levying taxes on a certain item of income, which European Union law cannot do (yet). 
On the other hand, one could argue that a hypothetical allocation of fiscal 
jurisdiction amongst Member States granting the Member State of source “priority to 
tax” could be seen as compliant with international juridical practice and, more 
specifically, with the system created by the OECD Model Convention and its 
Commentary. Nonetheless, it should be remembered that the Court of Justice has 
clarified that, even though the OECD Model Convention an expression of “international 
juridical practice”, the interpretation of European Union law does not provide any 
leeway for general criteria for the allocation of taxing powers amongst Member States, 
not even in order to prevent or alleviate international double taxation of cross-border 
income, which is generally recognised as capable of hindering the exercise of Treaty 
freedoms and, therefore, the functioning of the Internal Market390. 
A similar approach has been adopted by the Court in the Truck Center 
judgement 391 . In its analysis of the case, the Court did not find any restriction or 
discrimination to be entailed by a tax regime which provided for a different treatment of 
foreign creditors by way of withholding tax in the source Member State as compared to 
domestic creditors, which were taxed by assessment according to that State’s corporation 
tax, since, according to the Judges, that difference in treatment depended, on one hand, 
on the accepted difference between taxation at source by the Member State of source in 
respect of non-resident creditors and worldwide taxation by the Member State of 
residence in respect of domestic creditors and, on the other hand, on the difference in the 
position of the source Member State with regards to the possibility of recovery of the tax 
due. In that occasion, the Court also stated that such difference in treatment does not 
“necessarily procure an advantage for domestic recipient companies”, thus placing restrictions 																																																								
389 Terra, B.J.M., Wattel, P.J., European tax law, cited above, 61. 
390 Mason, R., Tax discrimination and capital neutrality, in World Tax Journal, 2010, 126; Traversa, E., Il divieto di 
doppia imposizione, cited above, 352. 
391 Court of Justice of the European Union, 22 December 2008, C-282/07, Truck Center. 
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resulting from indiscriminate taxation outside the possibility of scrutiny on the part of 
the Court392. 
However, the conclusions reached by the Court in Truck Center seem to largely 
clash with the approach taken by the Luxembourg Judges in other judgements, where 
the Court followed an entirely different approach, disregarding the above-mentioned 
difference between the position of “a Member State as residence country” and that of “a 
Member State as source country”. On the point, reference should be made, for instance, 
to the Commission v. Italy decision393. The case concerned the different treatment that 
Italian tax law reserved to dividends distributed by Italian companies to other 
companies residing in Italy and to dividends distributed by Italian companies to non-
resident companies 394 .  First of all, the Court of Justice examined whether or not 
companies residing in Italy and companies residing in other Member States, if 
considered as the beneficiaries of the dividends at issue, should be seen as in comparable 
situations, finding that, in order to prevent non-resident companies from being limited 
in the exercise of their right to free movement of capital, the Member State of residence 
of the company distributing the dividends should ensure that non-resident companies 
receiving such dividends are granted a fiscal treatment which is similar to the one 
granted to resident receiving companies. Therefore, the Court found that, as Italy had 
decided to exercise its fiscal jurisdiction with regards to outbound dividends, non-
resident companies receiving those dividends cannot but find themselves in a situation 
which is comparable to that of resident companies as far as the risk of economic double 
taxation was concerned. It followed that non-resident companies receiving dividends 
distributed by Italian companies should not be treated differently than Italian-resident 
companies receiving such dividends and the Italian tax provision at issue was 
considered as breaching EU law395. 
6.1. Derogations from the “parallel exercise” doctrine in certain fields of 
taxation of non-resident individuals. 
Although, as it has been shown above, the Court has accepted that the prejudicial 
effects caused by the parallel exercise by Member States of their taxing powers are 																																																								
392 Terra, B.J.M., Wattel, P.J., European tax law, cited above, 62. 
393 Court of Justice of the European Union, 19 November 2009, C-540/07, Commission v. Italian Republic. 
394 More specifically, Italian law exempted 95% of the amount of the dividends distributed to residen companies 
and subject the remaining 5% to tax pursuant to the regular corporate tax rate (at the time 33%), whereas 
outbound dividends distributed to non-resident companies were subject to a 27% withholding tax. 
395 A similar reasoning may be found also in judgements such as Denkavit, Amurta and Aberdeen Property 
Investment. On the point, see also Traversa, E., Il divieto di doppia imposizione, cited above, 345. 
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outside the scope of application of the Treaty freedoms, it seems reluctant to apply this 
sort of “laissez-faire approach”, so to speak, when it may lead to double non-deductibility 
of cross-border losses, both for individuals and for corporations. 
Speaking of personal allowances, an example of this rather contradictory attitude 
of the Court of Justice can be found in the De Groot judgement396. Ruling on that case, in 
fact, the Court required the Member State of residence of a migrant employee to grant 
him 100% of its personal tax allowances, even though that Member State exempted from 
taxation 66% of his income, on which tax was levied by the employment Member State. 
Therefore, since the Judges deemed it impossible for them to actually require the 
employment Member State to grant a proportion of the personal allowances provided by 
its tax law to the non-resident employee - even though the employment Member State 
fully taxed such employee on his domestic-source employment income - they ruled that 
the residence Member State had to recognise all of its personal allowances, irrespective 
of the proportion of income it had a right to tax, because, otherwise, the fact that the 
taxpayer had exercised its right to free movement would have led him to losing such 
allowances (which would have been granted in full had he had a job in his Member State 
of residence). 
The starting point of the Court’s reasoning was that, in absence of harmonisation, 
Member States are free to “alter by way of bilateral or multilateral agreements […] that 
correlation between total income of residents and residents’ general personal and family 
circumstances to be taken into account by the State of residence. The State of residence can 
therefore be released by way of an international agreement from its obligation to take into account 
in full the personal and family circumstances of taxpayers residing in its territory who work 
partially abroad”. However, the Court then considered that the Member State of residence 
of a migrant employee responsible for fully granting personal allowances could only be 
relieved of such obligation if that duty is fulfilled by the Member State of employment, 
either by virtue of a tax treaty or by way of unilateral measures. 
More specifically, the Court found that “the State of residence may […] be released 
from that obligation if it finds that, even in the absence of a convention, one or more of the States 
of employment, with respect to the income taxed by them, grant advantages based on the personal 
and family circumstances of taxpayers who do not reside in the territory of those States but 
receive taxable income there. However, the mechanisms used to eliminate double taxation or the 
national tax systems which have the effect of eliminating or alleviating double taxation must 
permit the taxpayers in the States concerned to be certain that as the end result, all their personal 																																																								
396 Court of Justice of the European Union, 12 December 2002, C-385/00, De Groot v. Inspecteur van belastingen. 
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and family circumstances will be duly taken into account, irrespective of how those Member 
States have allocated that obligation amongst themselves, in order not to give rise to inequality of 
treatment which is incompatible with the Treaty provisions on the freedom of movement for 
workers and in no way results from the disparities between the national tax laws”397. 
In other words, since, in the Court’s words, discriminatory taxation in one 
jurisdiction may be erased by corresponding tax reductions in another jurisdiction, it 
followed that the personal allowances at issue, according to the Court, had to be granted, 
somewhere: if not on the part of the source Member State, then at least in the Member 
State of residence398. 
Many authors have highlighted that, in its De Groot judgement, the Court has 
essentially “condemned the wrong Member State”, i.e. the Member State which was not 
responsible for the discrimination and relieved the other Member State of its Treaty 
obligation, while it was the latter Member State which overtly discriminated against 
non-resident employees. The solution the Court resorted to in De Groot does not appear 
to be in line with the Schumacker judgement either: in Schumacker, in fact, the Court 
referred to the percentage of income earned by a non-resident subject in the Member 
State of source in order to force the Member State of source, and not the Member State of 
residence, to grant the non-resident subject the advantages granted to resident taxpayers. 
It has been observed that, in reaching the above-mentioned conclusions, the Court 
has gone not only beyond the extension of its powers and its function, but also beyond 
the scope and meaning of the non-discrimination principle. This is because, in ruling as 
above, the Luxembourg Judges have disregarded the fact that the difference in treatment 
was not per se discriminatory in the sense which is prohibited by the Treaty, but resulted 
from the natural disparities existing between different tax systems at EU-level, which 
poses a problem that should be solved only by positive integration399. 
 Another derogation to the general doctrine based on the “parallel exercise of 																																																								
397 It should also be noted that the Court seems to have at least partially retracted the position expressed in De 
Groot, since, in the subsequent Amurta case (Court of Justice of the European Union, 8 November 2007, C-379/05, 
Amurta), it stated that “the Netherlands cannot rely on the existence of a tax advantage granted unilaterally by another 
Member State in order to escape its obligations under the Treaty. However, it cannot be excluded that a Member State may 
succeed in ensuring compliance with its obligations under the Treaty through the conclusion of a convention for the 
avoidance of double taxation with another Member State”. 
398 Terra, B.J.M., Wattel, P.J., European tax law, cited above, 465. 
399 Santiago, B., Non-discrimination provisions at the intersection of EC and international tax law, cited above, 259; 
according to the Author, it would be arguable that the existence of a discrimination being dependent on the 
taking into account of the tax treatment in the other Member State may not be compatible with the sovereign 
status of the Member States. The position is similar to the one held by Weber, D., In search of a (new) equilibrium 
between tax sovereignty and the freedom of movement within the EC, cited above, 585. Contra, Van Thiel, S., Free 
movement of persons and income tax law. The European Court of Justice in search of principles, Amsterdam, 2002, 373, 
according to whom the purpose of the non-discrimination principle in the field of taxation would be to prevent 
the imposition of an excessive tax burden on EU citizens and prevent them from enjoying unfair tax advantages 
in comparison with their ability to pay. 
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taxing powers” may be found, with regard to individual income taxation, in the 
subsequent Renneberg judgement400. The case dealt with a fact pattern that, prima facie, 
could seem to be similar to the fact pattern in Schumacker, but which, after a more careful 
analysis, shows significant points of difference. The taxpayer concerned resided in 
Belgium and had taken out a mortgaged loan therein in order to finance the acquisition 
of his home, which was also located in Belgium. Pursuant to Belgian law, mortgage 
interest could be deducted only from income deriving from real estate, which meant that 
the taxpayer concerned could only use a small part of the interest paid in order to reduce 
its Belgian tax base and wished to deduct the unused interest from his employment 
income, which he earned entirely in the Netherlands, where, by contrast, mortgage 
interest was deductible from the entire taxpayer’s income, and not only from the part of 
that income deriving from real estate. 
The Court, with a much criticised reasoning, applied its “Schumacker doctrine” 
and observed that the taxpayers concerned earned almost all of his income in the 
Netherlands, which made it comparable to a Dutch resident and that, therefore, he 
should be treated in the same way as Dutch residents in respect of all factors 
determining his personal ability to pay, which entitled him to deduct in the Netherlands 
the unused interest paid in relation to his mortgaged loan401. 
Legal doctrine has harshly criticised this solution, making reference to the fact 
that the Netherlands had no tax jurisdiction over foreign dwellings occupied by non-
residents, together with the fact that the applicable double taxation convention between 
Belgium and the Netherlands allocated taxing rights on positive and negative items of 
income from real estate exclusively to the state where such real estate is located. Starting 
from these assumption, scholars have, convincingly, stated that there was no reason for 
the “parallel exercise of taxing powers” doctrine, based on the traditional interpretation 
of the “need to ensure the balanced allocation of taxing powers amongst Member 
States”, not to be applied to the case at hand and that the mortgage interest was 
exclusively connected to the jurisdiction of the Member State levying tax on the positive 
income from the real estate concerned, i.e. Belgium402. Even more so if we consider the 
well-grounded, and often reiterated, principle according to which Treaty freedoms do 																																																								
400 Court of Justice of the European Union, 16 October 2008, C-527/06, Renneberg. 
401 The Court also observed that, by way of the double taxation convention signed with Belgium, the Netherlands 
had retained the right to include items of income allocated to Belgium within the income of its residents for the 
purpose of ensuring progressivity of taxation, i.e. of determining the tax rate applicable on its residents’ 
worldwide income, and that the consequence of this inclusion was that Dutch residents with a second house in 
Belgium could deduct the interest paid in relation to mortgaged loans taken out to finance said second house. 
402 See, on the point, amongst others, Terra, B.J.M., Wattel, P.J., European tax law, cited above, 71-72; Meussen, 
G.T.K., Renneberg: ECJ unjustifiably expands Schumacker doctrine to losses from financing of personal dwelling, in 
European Taxation, 2009, 4, 185. 
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not guarantee tax neutrality of any cross-border movement or relocation403. On the 
ground of this criticism, it has been stated that, in Renneberg, the Court came close to 
forcing the source Member State to apply worldwide taxation to non-residents. 
Drawing a (partial) conclusion from all of the above, it could be argued, therefore, 
that, as numerous scholars have stated, that the “Schumacker doctrine” (i.e. the 
prevalence given to the taxpayer’s personal situation and ability to pay) prevails over the 
other principles linked to the “parallel exercise of taxing powers” on the part of the 
Member States only as far as individuals and individual taxation are concerned. 
According to some authors, the difference of treatment between corporations and 
individuals could be found in the fact that, with regards to corporations, the Court looks 
at legal comparability, while, with regards to individuals, the Court had based its 
judgements on an analysis through the lens of ability-to-pay, in order to ensure that for 
individuals all elements influencing their personal ability to pay and economic capacity 
are always taken into account404. Needless to say that this hypothesis would essentially 
amount to stating that the Court has taken a “policy approach” with regards to the 
subject and comes very close to requiring Member States to grant “resident treatment” to 
non-residents. 
Going back to the main point, in fact, it cannot be doubted that, even though the 
Court has found no ground in the Treaty freedoms to prevent the above-mentioned 
issues and recognises that it cannot prevent such “parallel exercise of tax jurisdiction” on 
the part of the Member States, in practical terms, the actual impediments to cross-border 
economic activities, as compared to comparable purely domestic activities taking place 
within one single jurisdiction, constitute a problem, especially for multinational groups 
of companies. 
On the other hand, with regards to corporation tax, the Court has accepted that 
the Member State of residence and the Member State of source can limit their fiscal 
jurisdiction to profits accrued and losses suffered within their respective territories, with 
the consequent unavoidable “compartmentalisation” of positive and negative elements405. 
It did so, for example, in the Lidl Belgium judgement. The case406 concerned the tax 
regime resulting from the double taxation convention between Germany and 
Luxembourg, by virtue of which foreign-source business income and business-related 																																																								
403 Court of Justice of the European Union, 12 July 2005, C-403/03, Schempp; Court of Justice of the European 
Union, 15 July 2004, C-365/02, Lindfors; Court of Justice of the European Union, 6 December 2007, C-298/05, 
Columbus Container Services; Court of Justice of the European Union, 28 February 2008, C-293/06, Deutsche Shell; 
Court of Justice of the European Union, 23 October 2008, C-157/07, Krankenheim. 
404 Terra, B.J.M., Wattel, P.J., European tax law, 73. 
405 The term is used in Terra, B.J.M., Wattel, P.J., European tax law, cited above, 69. 
406 Court of Justice of the European Union, 14 May 2008, C-414/06, Lidl Belgium. 
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losses and costs were eliminated from the German tax base, with the consequent non-
deductibility of the losses incurred by a Luxembourg branch of a German company from 
that company’s German profits, whereas the losses of a domestic German branch could 
be deducted from the domestic profits of the head company, since the profits of such 
domestic German branch could be taxed. The Court found there to be a discrimination, 
but considered the exclusion of foreign losses justified by the need to preserve the 
allocation of the power to impose taxes amongst Member States, acknowledging that the 
Court cannot, in absence of any measure adopted by the European Union legislature, 
compel Member States to selectively extend their fiscal jurisdiction to extraterritorial 
losses. 
7. Territoriality cannot stand by itself: balanced allocation of taxing powers 
combined with the need to counter tax avoidance. 
In more recent times, the Court of Justice’s case law has started to show a 
considerably higher degree of attention for the fiscal interest of the Member States, 
acknowledging the legitimacy of national anti-avoidance provisions (in so far as they do 
not breach the proportionality requirement)407. 
It has already been highlighted that one of the purposes of the European Union is 
the establishment of legislative measures suitable to allow Member States to attain 
efficient and solid public finances, which sometimes clashes, in the field of tax law, with 
other European Union values and aims, such as the principle of non-discrimination and 
the fundamental Treaty freedoms. It should also be added that the protection of national 
public finances should not be interpreted in a “conservative” sense, as the Member 
States’ will to resist the EU integration process, but rather as the necessary protection of 
fundamental mechanism governing the functioning of the Internal Market, that is to say 
the protection of the single national economic systems, thus avoiding a “fiscal crisis” for 
the Member State concerned and indirectly enhancing the efficiency and solidity of the 
Internal Market408. 
																																																								
407 Sacchetto, C., Member States tax sovereignty: between the principle of subsidiarity and the necessity of supranational 
coordination, cited above, 807; Seer, R., The jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice: limitation of the legal 
consequences?, in European Taxation, 2006, 470. For an in-depth analysis of the problems connected to the 
prevention of tax avoidance in the European Union context, see also Ruiz Almendral, V., Tax avoidance, the 
balanced allocation of taxing powers and the arm’s length standard, in Richelle, I., Schön, W., Traversa, E. (eds.), 
Allocating taxing powers within the European Union, Brussels, 2013, 131; Faulhaber, L.V., Sovereignty, integration and 
tax avoidance in the European Union: striking the proper balance, in Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 2009, 48, 
177. 
408 P. Boria, L’anti-sovrano, cited above, passim. 
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The attainment of such a purpose, based on the protection of the Member States’s 
fiscal interest, entails, inter alia, the recognition, on the part of the Court of Justice, of the 
legitimacy of domestic measures aimed at countering tax evasion and tax avoidance in 
order to protect the effectiveness of the national tax systems, which, however, often pose 
more than a problem with concern to the compatibility of such measures with the 
fundamental freedoms and the principle of non-discrimination. 
The Treaties do not mention the risk of tax evasion and/or tax avoidance as a 
possible limit to the general prevalence of the fundamental freedoms, with the only 
exception of Article 65 TFEU, which, with reference to the freedom of movement of 
capital, provides for the possibility for Member States to implement and enact national 
fiscal measures distinguishing between residents and non-residents and also on the 
ground of the country where the non-resident taxpayers resides or where the capital has 
been invested, or, more in general, other fiscal measures aimed at preventing breaches of 
national tax law. 
At first, the Court of Justice was particularly reluctant in accepting the need to 
prevent tax avoidance as a mandatory requirement of public interest and, as such, as 
capable of justifying restrictions to Treaty freedoms409. Subsequently, the need to prevent 
tax abuse, as a species of the European Union law of a more general prohibition of abuse 
of rights, has been fully accepted as a possible justification ground for restrictive 
measure on the part of the Member States, in so far as the measures were proportionate, 
i.e. applied only to “wholly artificial arrangements”410-411. 
 Later developments of the Court’s case law have, however, shown a growing 
tendency towards acceptance of more restrictive measures. Legal scholars have argued 
that this change of approach is the result of the integration between two different 
justifications traditionally used by the Court of Justice, i.e. the need to prevent abuse (or 
tax avoidance) and the need to safeguard the coherence of the tax system (balanced 																																																								
409 In the Avoir fiscal case (Court of Justice of the European Union, 28 January 1986, 270/83, Commission v. French 
Republic), the Judges rejected the French argument according to which extending the imputation credit system to 
French dividends paid to French branches of non-resident companies would create the risk of tax avoidance, 
since prevention of fiscal abuse was not amongst the justifiable reasons for restricting Treaty freedoms. 
410 The Court has, for example, stated that “as regards the justification based on the risk of tax avoidance, suffice it to note 
that the legislation at issue in the main proceedings does not have the specific purpose of preventing wholly artificial 
arrangements, set up to circumvent national tax legislation, from attracting tax benefits, but applied generally to all 
situations in which the majority of a group’s subsidiaries are established, for whatever reason, outside the United Kingdom. 
However, the establishment of a company outside the United Kingdom does not, of itself, necessarily entail tax avoidance” 
(Court of Justice of the European Union, 16 July 1998, C-264/96, ICI v. Colmer). The same approach has then been 
reiterated, for example, in the Eurowings and Cadbury Schweppes cases, where the Court ruled that Member States 
may not penalise the use of low-tax regimes in other jurisdictions if the economic activity conducted therein is 
genuine. 
411 The Commission has summarised the Court of Justice’s case law on the point of abuse in the field of tax law in 
its Communication to the Council the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee of 10 
December 2007 on the application of anti-abuse measures in the area of direct taxation, COM(2007)785. 
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allocation of taxing rights amongst Member States)412. Starting from the ICI judgement413, 
the Court started accepting the principle of justifying a restriction with reference to the 
need to prevent the risk of tax avoidance, limiting this possibility only to cases where 
national legislation has the specific purpose of preventing wholly artificial arrangements 
set up to circumvent tax legislation. 
 The first examples of this new attitude may be found, for instance, in the Van 
Hilten judgement414, which concerned the compatibility with European Union law of the 
Dutch inheritance tax regime, and, more specifically, of the definition of Dutch 
inheritance taxes on the basis of the nationality of the testator. In that case, the testator, of 
Dutch nationality, resided first in the Netherlands, then in Belgium and then in 
Switzerland, but her heirs were assessed to Dutch inheritance tax because of a Dutch 
provision under which a Dutch national who, having resided in the Netherlands, dies 
within ten years of ceasing to reside therein is deemed to have been resident in the 
Netherlands at the time of death. Such a regime posed serious questions as to its 
compatibility with European Union law and, more in particular, with free movement of 
capital. 
The Court ruled that the Dutch provisions on the extension of inheritance taxes to 
former residents depending on whether or not they were Dutch nationals were 
compatible with EU law, arguing that the difference in treatment between nationals and 
non-nationals stemmed “from the Member States’ power to define, by treaty or unilaterally, the 
criteria for allocating their powers of taxation” and that the type of legislation at issue, 
extending inheritance tax jurisdiction on the base of a sort of fictitious residence of the 
testator, was “justified by the concern to prevent a form of tax evasion whereby a national of a 
State, in contemplation of his death, transfers his residence to another State where the tax is 
lower”. 
The above-mentioned Marks & Spencer judgement held a similar statement. In the 
latter judgement, in fact, the Court found the UK regime not providing relief for foreign 
losses of foreign subsidiaries not subject to UK tax jurisdiction as restrictive of the 
freedom of establishment, but also found that said regime could be justified in a 
combination of three different justifying grounds, one of which was the need to prevent 
																																																								
412 Terra, B.J.M., Wattel, P.J., European tax law, cited above, 476. 
413 Court of Justice of the European Union, 16 July 1998, C-264/96, ICI. 
414 Court of Justice of the European Union, 23 February 2006, C-513/03, Heirs of M.E.A. van Hilten - van der Heijden 
v. Inspecetur van de Belastingdienst te Heerlen.  
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tax avoidance415 (the other ones were the risk of double dip and the need to ensure 
balanced allocation of taxing powers amongst Member States). 
 In some of its more recent decisions, the Court has even considered the possibility 
that a restrictive measure could be justified by the “objective of combating tax havens”416, as 
possible overriding reason in the public interest to be weighted against the need to 
ensure the implementation of the fundamental freedoms and of the principle of non-
discrimination. 
 The connection between territoriality (i.e. balanced allocation of taxing powers) 
and the need to prevent tax avoidance is even more evident in the already mentioned Oy 
AA judgement417, where the Court basically stated that the preservation of a balanced 
allocation of taxing powers amongst Member States comprises in itself the purpose of 
curbing tax avoidance. The Judges found that “the objectives of safeguarding the balanced 
allocation of the power to impose taxes between Member States and the prevention of tax 
avoidance are linked. Conduct involving the creation of wholly artificial arrangements which do 
not reflect economic reality, with a view to escaping the tax normally due on the profits generated 
by activities carried out on national territory is such as to undermine the right of the Member 
States to exercise their tax jurisdiction in relation to those activities and jeopardise a balanced 
allocation between Member States of the power to impose taxes”. 
 The concept of “wholly artificial arrangement” on which the Court of Justice has 
built a large part of its doctrine on the compatibility with European Union law of 
domestic anti-avoidance measures is particularly relevant for the purposes of the present 
research, since it provides indications as to the connecting criteria which the Court 
considers relevant in order to identify the circumstances on which to evaluate the 
effective integration of a taxpayer (especially a legal entity) within a Member State’s 
legal order418. 
Furthermore, it should be incidentally recalled that the consistent application of 
said concept by the Court of Justice has largely influenced the EU legislature, which, in 																																																								
415 More specifically, the Court of Justice has stated that “as regards, last, the third justification, relating to the risk of tax 
avoidance, it must be accepted that the possibility of transferring the losses incurred by a non-resident company to a resident 
company entails the risk that within a group of companies losses will be transferred to companies established in the Member 
States which apply the highest rates of taxation and in which the tax value of the losses is therefore the highest. To exclude 
group relief for losses incurred by non-resident subsidiaries prevents such practices, which may be inspired by the realisation 
that the rates of taxation applied in the various Member States vary significantly”. (Court of Justice of the European 
Union, 13 December 2005, C-446/03, Marks & Spencer). It should be noted that, as highlighted by Terra and Wattel 
(Terra, B.J.M., Wattel, P.J., European tax law, cited above, 484), the Court did not even require the United Kingdom 
to asses whether cross-border relief would have been obtained by “wholly artificial arrangements”, as it would 
have been necessary under the “Cadbury Schweppes doctrine”.  
416 Court of Justice of the European Union, 1 April 2014, C-80/12, Felixstowe Dock and Railway Company Ltd. 
417 Court of Justice of the European Union, 18 July 2007, C-231/05, Oy AA. 
418 Dorigo, S., Mastellone, P., L’evoluzione della nozione di residenza fiscale delle persone giuridiche nell’ambito del Progetto 
BEPS, cited above, 66. 
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the recently adopted Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive419, provided for a general anti-abuse 
rule according to which “for the purposes of calculating the corporate tax liability, a Member 
State shall ignore an arrangement or a series of arrangements which, having been put into place 
for the main purpose or one of the main purposes to obtain a tax advantage that defeates the object 
or purpose of the applicable tax law, are not genuine having regard to all relevant facts and 
circumstances”, specifying that “an arrangement or a series thereof shall be regarded as non-
genuine to the extent that they are not put into place for valid commercial reasons which reflect 
economic reality”. 
 In its Cadbury-Schweppes judgement420, the Court has highlighted that, in order for a 
“wholly artificial arrangement” to exist, two elements should be verified, i.e. a subjective 
element (that is to say the will to obtain an undue fiscal advantage) and an objective 
element. With regard to the latter, the Judges, in their analysis, have implicitly described 
which should be the factual elements on which the effective and actual presence of a 
business entity within the Member States’ territory should be evaluated, i.e., briefly said, 
an “organisational element”, linked to the effective presence in the territory of 
objectively verifiable items such as personnel, real estate and machinery, and an 
“operative element”, which means that the structure located in the Member State’s 
territory should conduct a genuine and effective economic activity421. 
 In order to better understand the relevance of the concept of wholly artificial 
arrangements” and its relevance for the purposes of EU law one should recall that the 
objective of the freedom of establishment, as clarified in Cadbury Schweppes, is to allow “a 
national of a Member State to set up a secondary establishment in another Member State to carry 
on his activieis there and thus assist economic and social interpenetration within the Community 
in the sphere of activites as self-employed persons […]. To that end, freedom of establishment is 
intended to allow a Community national to participate, on a stable and continuing basis, in the 
economic life of a Member State other than his State of origin and to profit therefrom”. In light of 
this parameter, freedom of establishment cannot but only protect the “actual pursuit of an 																																																								
419 Council Directive 2016/1164/EU of 12 July 2016 “laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect 
the functioning of the Internal Market”. For further details, see the next chapter of the research, at paragraph 5. 
420 Court of Justice of the European Union, 12 September 2006, C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes. On a similar point, 
see also, more recently, Court of Justice of the European Union, 2 October 2013, C-282/12, Itelcar; Court of Justice 
of the European Union, 13 November 2014, C-112/14, Commission v. United Kingdom; Court of Justice of the 
European Union, 23 April 2008, C-201/05, Test Claimants in the CFC and Dividend Group Litigation, where the Court 
confirmed that CFC legislation can be justified under European Union law if targeted at wholly artificial 
arrangements intended to escape taxation, but it also specified that the compliance requirements provided for by 
CFC regimes cannot subject the taxpayer to undue administrative constraints or go beyond what is necessary to 
prevent abusive practices. 
421 It should also be noted that Advocate General Léger, in its Opinion on the Cadbury Schweppes case, had 
proposed a different three-part test for the evaluation of the effectiveness of the entity’s presence in the Member 
State of establishment, that is to say a test based only on objective elements, i.e. the level of physical presence, the 
effectiveness of the activity performed by the entity and the economic value of the activity if compared to the 
parent company and the group as a whole. See Advocate General Léger Opinion on Case C-196/04, 2 May 2006. 
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economic activity through a fixed establishment in that State for an indefinite period”, which 
“presupposes actual establishment of the company concerned in the host Member State and the 
pursuit of genuine economic activity there”422. From this point of view, the extension of a 
“worldwide-like” liability to tax to non-resident subjects as well could be allowed, from 
the EU perspective, in case a non-residents were to be found as not significantly and 
effectively linked with the territory where it is established423. 
 It should also be noted that this approach seems to be in line with the “Schumacker 
approach” as described above, which also essentially implies, inter alia, the 
acknowledgement of the relevance of the effective and actual level of “integration” of a 
certain subject in the host Member State for the purposes of the compatibility of the tax 
consequences of its behaviour with Treaty principles424. 
Going back to the main point, it should be recalled that, as well known, the 
Cadbury-Schweppes judgement concerned the compatibility of the United Kingdom 
Controlled Foreign Companies legislation. Since CFC rules imply that a country levies 
tax on a non-resident subject’s foreign income (i.e. an income which, from an objective 
point of view, has no tie with the country levying the tax whatsoever), entailing taxation 
of foreign subsidiaries at the level of the state of the parent company on the ground of 
the principle of worldwide taxation (while excluding domestic subsidiaries from the 
application of this regime), the question was whether or not freedom of establishment 
prevents the Member State of residence of the parent company from levying taxes on a 
non-resident subsidiary as it were a non-resident permanent establishment (or branch) of 
a resident company. The Court found that such a regime is inherently discriminatory 
from an European Union point of view, since, by its own nature, it does not apply in 
purely domestic circumstances (since parent companies of domestic subsidiaries were 
not currently taxed on the profits of their subsidiaries), but only when a cross-border 
situation is involved. 
The Judges, therefore, considered this sort of extensive application of a system of 
worldwide taxation to non-residents as, in principle, incompatible with EU law, with an 
approach that could seem, at least in part, as contrary to the rulings in Van Hilten and 
Saint-Gobain and, subsequently, in Columbus Container Services. The Court essentially 
found that taxation of foreign income constituted a restriction to a EU citizen’s right of 																																																								
422 This position has been confirmed in other CJEU cases, such as Court of Justice of the European Union, 26 
October 1999, C-294/97, Eurowings; Court of Justice of the European Union, 11 December 2003, C-364/01, Barbier; 
Court of Justice of the European Union, 21 February 2006, C-255/02, Halifax; Court of Justice of the European 
Union, 12 December 2002, C-324/00, Lankhorst-Hohorst; Court of Justice of the European Union, 13 March 2007, C-
524/04, Thin Cap Group Litigation. 
423 Dorigo, S., Residenza fiscale delle società e libertà di stabilimento nell’Unione Europea, cited above, 301. 
424 Dorigo, S., Residenza fiscale delle società e libertà di stabilimento nell’Unione Europea, cited above, 297. 
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movement and establishment, with the “worldwide principle” implying a difference in 
treatment between domestic and foreign subsidiaries. 
In its Glaxo Wellcome decision 425 , the Court allowed Germany to invoke 
justifications based on both the need to safeguard of a balanced allocation of taxing 
powers amongst Member States and to combat tax avoidance and purely artificial 
arrangements in order to prevent resident companies purchasing shares of resident 
companies from non-resident companies from enjoying a deduction for the decrease of 
value of the shares due to the distribution of dividends, which would have been allowed 
in case the seller would have been a resident subject. 
Perhaps the most interesting and emblematic judgement on this point, showing 
how the interpretation of the concept of “territoriality” has recently undergone yet 
another development, is, however, the decision rendered on the Argenta case426. 
From a first sight, the Argenta case would seem to only deal with the age-old 
question of whether or not Member States which, pursuant to a tax treat, relinquished 
their taxing powers over certain profits made outside their territories are obliged to 
extent the tax advantages provided for by their tax laws to assets and liabilities located 
outside their territory and which have given rise to such exempt profits427. However, the 
conclusions reached by the Court go beyond the boundaries of the above-mentioned 
question and have been considered as quite surprising by part of legal scholarship. 
At issue were, in short, the Belgian provisions concerning the so-called “notional 
interest deduction”, a tax-deductible allowance for corporate equity428. In brief, pursuant 
to that regime, in order to determine the amount of the notional interest deduction for 
each company several adjustments have to be made to the company’s equity, one of 
which is that the net book value of the company’s assets and liabilities invested in a 
permanent establishment in a country with which Belgium has entered into a double 
taxation convention is to be excluded from the company’s equity. That is because, under 
Belgian tax treaties, all of which follow the OECD Model Convention, Belgium exempts 
the income attributed to foreign permanent establishment. It follows that Belgium did 																																																								
425 Court of Justice of the European Union, 17 September 2009, C-182/08, Glaxo Wellcome Gmbh. 
426 Court of Justice of the European Union, 4 July 2013, C-350/11, Argenta Spaarbank. 
427 Neyt, R., Peeters, S., Balanced allocation and coherence: some thoughts in light of Argenta and K, in EC Tax Review, 
2014, 2, 64. For a comment on the case at issue, see also De Broe, L., The ECJ’s judgement in Argenta: narrow 
interpretation of ‘the preservation of the balanced allocation of taxing rights between Member States’: a headache for 
designers of tax incentives in the Union, in EC Tax Review, 2013, 3, 210. 
428 In force of that provision, each company is treated as if it had borrowed its equity at a certain yearly rate (equal 
to that of a ten-year Belgian government bond) and is therefore allowed to deduct a certain sum which is 
considered, for tax purposes, as the “fictional” interest paid on that loan. For a more detailed description of the 
regime at issue, its purposes and its problematic aspects, see De Broe, L., The ECJ’s Judgement in Argenta: narrow 
interpretation of the preservation of the balanced allocation of taxing rights between Member States. A headache for designers 
of tax incentives in the Union, in EC Tax Review, 2013, 5, 210. 
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not intend to extend a tax benefit to the equity that its companies use in foreign 
permanent establishments and which generate profits that Belgium cannot tax according 
to the allocation of taxing powers designed in its double taxation conventions. In this 
context, Argenta, a Belgian savings bank, had a permanent establishment in the 
Netherlands. It was argued that the exclusion of the net book value of said permanent 
establishment from the computation of the notional interest deduction had a restrictive 
effect on the exercise of Argenta’s freedom of establishment. 
For the purposes of the present research, the most interesting part of the 
judgement deals with the justifications put forward by the Belgian government, 
according to which the exclusion of the net book value of the permanent establishment at 
issue was justified by the need to ensure the coherence of the Belgian tax system and the 
balanced allocation of taxing powers in the tax treaty between Belgium and the 
Netherlands, largely based on the principle of territoriality. 
First of all, the Court denied the admissibility of the justification based on the 
coherence of the Belgian tax system, applying its traditional approach according to 
which, in order for that justification to be resorted to, there must be a direct link between 
the tax advantage and the tax levied and that, for this purpose, it is required that the tax 
advantage and the corresponding tax levy relate to the same tax and to the same 
taxpayer429. In Argenta, the Court found there not to be any direct link between the tax 
advantage which is computed on the company’s equity and the tax assessed on the 
profits generated by these assets, stating that, in order to qualify for the notional interest 
deduction, it would suffice for the profit generated by the company to be theoretically 
taxable in Belgium, while it would not be required for the profit to be effectively subject 
to any tax. 
Furthermore, and coming to the main point of interest of the judgement for the 
purposes of the present research, with regards to the justification based on the 
preservation of the balanced allocation of taxing powers, the Court stated that the fact 
that a Member State has agreed in a tax treaty with another Member State not to tax the 
profits of a permanent establishment located in the latter does not justify a systematic 
denial of a tax benefit to a company which is resident in the first Member State and has a 
permanent establishment in the other State. 
																																																								
429 The requirement of a “direct link” in order for the justification based on the coherence of the domestic tax 
system to be allowed is clearly explained by the Court in De Lasteyrie du Saillant (Court of Justice of the European 
Union, 11 March 2004, C-09/02), in Manninen (Court of Justice of the European Union, 7 September 2004, C-
319/02) and in Krankenheim (Court of Justice of the European Union, 23 October 2008, C-157/07). 
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According to the Court, the justification based on preserving the balanced 
allocation of taxing powers amongst Member States can only be relied upon only “where 
the system in question is designed to prevent conduct capable of jeopardising the right of a 
Member State to exercise its powers of taxation in relation to activities carried out in its 
territory”430, thus limiting the possibility to resort to the justification based on territoriality 
to cases where the conduct of the taxpayers constitutes a case of base erosion and 
jeopardises the right of a Member State to assert its tax jurisdiction on profits generated 
in its territory (e.g., non-arm’s length transactions, importation of losses from abroad 
under group relief regimes, exportation of profits to another country under group 
contribution rules, transfer of residence or appreciated assets…)431-432. 
A similar statement may also be found, for example, in the Court’s decision on 
the Timac Agro case 433 , where the Luxembourg Judges found that “the objectives of 
safeguarding the balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes between Member States and the 
prevention of tax avoidance are linked”. The reason underlying the existence of such a link 
between the need to safeguard the allocation of taxing powers amongst Member State 
and the prevention of tax evasion and tax avoidance has been clarified by the Court, for 
example, in its Van Caster judgement434, where it has been argued that “the preservation of 
the balanced allocation between Member States of the power to tax is a legitimate objective 
recognised by the Court […], since it may be accepted as a justification for a restriction, in 
particular, where the system in question is designed to prevent conduct capable of jeopardising 
the right of a Member State to exercise its fiscal jurisdiction in relation to activities carried out in 
its territory”. 
Such a reasoning, however, does not seem to be entirely convincing. In fact, the 
concept of “balanced allocation of taxing powers amongst Member States” cannot but 
refer, by its nature, to the “distribution” of fiscal jurisdiction between countries, i.e. to 																																																								
430 A similar statement was also made by the Court in its Papillon judgement, where the Luxembourg Judges 
seemed to draw a logical connection between the absence of the potential of tax avoidance and their subsequent 
refusal to accept the justification based on the need to ensure the balanced allocation of taxing powers amongst 
Member States. See Court of Justice of the European Union, 27 November 2008, C-418/07, Société Papillon. An 
entirely different principle was stated by the Court of Justice in the Oy AA judgement (case C-231/05), where the 
Judges found that even “if the legislation at issue in the main proceedings is not specifically designed to exclude from the 
tax advantage it confers purely artificial arrangements, devoid of economic reality, created with the aim of escaping the tax 
normally due on the profits generated by activities carried out on national territory, such legislation may nevertheless be 
regarded as proportionate to the objectives pursued, taken as a whole”. 
431 De Broe, L., The ECJ’s judgement in Argenta: narrow interpretation of ‘the preservation of the balanced allocation of 
taxing rights between Member States’. A headache for designers of tax incentives in the Union, cited above, 210. 
432 The Court concluded that the tax advantage resulting from the notional interest deduction does not jeopardise 
Belgium’s taxing rights to tax the profits generated by the activities carried out on its territory. The same applies 
to the Netherlands’ right to tax income generated on its territory. Essentially, according to the Court, the notional 
interest deduction regime does not lead to any profit shifting from one Member State to another, especially since 
said deduction is computed as a fictional lump sum as a percentage of the company’s equity, bearing no relation 
to the taxable profit generated by the company. 
433 Court of Justice of the European Union, 17 December 2015, C-388/14, Timac Agro Deutschland GmbH. 
434 Court of Justice of the European Union, 9 October 2014, C-326/12, Van Caster. 
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the (bilateral or multilateral) agreements reached by states in deciding which items of 
income each of them has the right to levy taxes upon. The risk of tax avoidance, on the 
other hand, does not threaten the distribution of taxing powers between countries per se, 
but, rather, the possibility for one country to levy taxes on certain items of income that 
were allocated to its fiscal jurisdiction. The link between “allocation of taxing powers” 
and “prevention of tax avoidance” does not, therefore, seem to be in any way 
conceptually direct and self-evident. 
This is one of the reasons why part of the legal scholarship has argued that the 
requirement of manipulative behaviour by the taxpayer seems an unnecessary restriction 
of the justification based on balanced allocation. Even though the Judges seems to ignore 
this point in Argenta, in Busley and Rewe, as noted above, the Court had defined the 
purpose of the principle of territoriality as “to establish in the application of EU law the need 
to take into account the limits of the Member States’ powers of taxation”435. As the justification 
based on territoriality is also incapable of justifying the application of restrictive 
measures enacted by the State of residence, it is not clear how can a Member State limit 
the scope of tax incentives which it grants to profits coming within the purview of its 
fiscal jurisdiction. In other words, it has been highlighted, on the point, that it would 
seem perfectly sound for a Member State to exclude certain assets from the scope of 
application of certain tax benefits granted to domestic companies if said Member State 
has also abandoned its taxing powers with regards to the profits deriving from the 
above-mentioned assets436. 
Scholars have, thus, wondered whether it should be assumed that the Court 
considers the justification based on the preservation of balanced allocation of taxing 
rights (i.e., the justification based on the principle of territoriality) not capable to justify 
per se legislation enacted by a Member State that reserves a tax benefit only to income 
that comes within the purview of that Member State’s fiscal jurisdiction in case there is 
no evidence of any manipulative and/or abusive conduct put in place by the taxpayer. A 
positive answer to the question would imply a re-thinking, on the part of the Court, of its 
previous rulings in cases such as Krankenheim and Lidl Belgium, where the relevance of 																																																								
435 Where, for example, in Timac, the Court argued that “the balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes has the 
objective of safeguarding the symmetry between the right to tax profits and the right to deduct losses”, with the 
justification based on balanced allocation of taxing powers entirely coinciding with the justification based on the 
concept of “fiscal coherence” as developed, inter alia, in Bachmann. Nonetheless, the Court, in the same Timac 
judgement, seemed to consider fiscal coherence as a different and separate concept, stating that “such offsetting is, 
moreover, capable of ensuring fiscal coherence since that offsetting is the indissociable complement of the losses having 
previously been taken into account”. See Court of Justice of the European Union, 17 December 2015, C-388/14, Timac 
Agro Deutschland GmbH. 
436 De Broe, L., The ECJ’s judgement in Argenta: narrow interpretation of ‘the preservation of the balanced allocation of 
taxing rights between Member States’. A headache for designers of tax incentives in the Union, cited above, 211. 
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the “logical symmetry” between tax advantages and subjection to tax of the assets 
concerned was recognised for the purposes of justifying possible discriminatory 
measures437. 
The Court dwelled more on this last point by comparing the case at issue with 
one which was dealt with in the Lidl Belgium case, which, as highlighted above, 
concerned an apparently similar fact pattern and an apparently similar regime, but 
involved a different answer from the Court than the one provided in Argenta. It should 
be recalled that in that case the Court held that allowing a German company to deduct 
from its German profits the losses incurred in its permanent establishment located in 
Luxembourg, on whose profits Germany had no taxing rights, would pose a threat to the 
balanced allocation of taxing powers as agreed in the double taxation convention 
between Germany and Luxembourg because the company would be able to unilaterally 
choose where to have its losses deducted. 
In its Argenta decision the Court has, therefore, traced a distinction between the 
two cases arguing that the Lidl Belgium judgement dealt with the conduct of a company 
that would have led to tax base erosion of the Member State of residence, while this risk 
was absent in the Argenta case, thus preventing Belgium from effectively using the 
balanced allocation justification. Some have seen this additional requirement of 
manipulative behaviour by the taxpayer as an unnecessary restriction to the scope of the 
justification as described by the Court in its previous case law and have argued that the 
distinction between Lidl Belgium and Argenta to be ill-founded. 
8. The case of exit taxation as a testing ground for an “European principle of 
territoriality”. 
 Residence-based taxation raises delicate questions of compatibility with European 
Union law where a EU citizen changes his/her/its taxing jurisdiction, thus exercising 																																																								
437 De Broe, L., The ECJ’s judgement in Argenta: narrow interpretation of ‘the preservation of the balanced allocation of 
taxing rights between Member States’. A headache for designers of tax incentives in the Union, cited above, 211. The 
Author also highlights that an a contrario interpretation of cases such as Jobra (case C-330/07) and Tankreederei 
(case C-287/10) would seem to contradict the position held by the Court in Argenta. In Jobra, Austria had refused 
an Austrian company a tax benefit related to an investment because the assets were used outside its territory and 
the Court rejected the argument stating that, as Austria had not relinquished its taxing powers on the assets at 
issue, the company was fully taxable in Austria on the income derived from such assets. On this point, it has been 
highlighted by legal doctrine that, since the Court seems to have resorted to the justification based on the need to 
preserve the balanced allocation of taxing powers as a means to avoid “loss trafficking”, this justification would 
not significantly differ from that underlying a measure aimed at preventing the risk of tax avoidance; see, for 
instance, Cerioni, L., The never-ending issue of cross-border loss compensation within the EU: reconciling balanced 
allocation of taxing rights and cross-border ability-to-pay, in EC Tax Review, 2015, 5, 269; Eden, S., The obstacles faced by 
the European Court of Justice in removing the ‘obstacles’ faced by the taxpayer: the difficult case of double taxation, in 
British Tax Review, 2010, 6, 613. 
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his/her/its fundamental freedoms of movement: in doing so, a resident ceases to be 
resident and becomes, for the purposes of tax law, a non-resident. 
According to the principle/criterion of territoriality, transfer of residence abroad 
determines the termination of unlimited tax liability in the emigration Member State and 
the beginning of a new unlimited tax liability in the country of immigration. Until 2016, 
when the so-called “Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive” has been issued438, no effective form 
of coordination amongst states (and Member States) existed in terms of the criteria used 
by each country’s tax system with regards to this circumstance and, therefore, it often 
happened that both the emigration state and the immigration state attempted to extend 
their taxing powers as much as they could, with consequent risks of double taxation and 
hindrance of freedom of movement for EU citizens. 
This is one of the reasons why the topic of exit taxation shows how impossible it 
is to consider direct taxation as not central in the process of integration of the European 
Internal Market439: for a EU citizen to be able to transfer his/her/its residence to another 
Member State without being impaired or limited or without suffering excessively 
burdensome consequences is essential to the very implementation of the Treaty 
freedoms, which all revolve around the concept of cross-border movement. 
 Exit taxes are generally levied on the income and the capital gains which are 
deemed accrued when a taxpayer which was a resident of a certain country emigrates to 
another country, becoming a resident of the latter, thus preventing the possibility of the 
emigration state losing its taxing prerogatives when the taxpayer changes his/her/its 
taxing jurisdiction, exercising his/her/its fundamental freedoms440: it can be stated, 
therefore, that exit taxes are generally levied as a direct consequence of the exercise of 
fundamental freedoms 441 . In other words, exit taxation is amongst the endeavours 
undertaken by Member States to counter measures aimed at avoiding fiscal erosion of 
the tax base, which, of course, have to be tested against the fundamental freedoms 
provided for by Union law. Typically, the tax consequence of the application of an exit 
tax is a deemed alienation of the asset in case said assets are transferred abroad or in case 
corporate taxpayers transfer their place of management to another country or, finally, in 
case an individual taxpayer migrates to another country: exit taxes anticipate taxation 																																																								
438 On the point, see next chapter, paragraph 5. 
439 Carinci, A., Il diritto comunitario alla prova delle exit taxes, tra limiti, prospettive e contraddizioni, in European Tax 
Studies, 2009, 1. 
440 Some authors consider as falling within the category of “exit taxation” also all measures by way of which a 
taxpayer is still considered as “fiscally resident” even after having transferred its residence outside the territory of 
the country concerned (so-called “unlimited extended tax liability”), by way of a presumption attracting income 
produced after emigration within the scope of application of a state’s tax jurisdiction. See Bizioli, G., Aporie e 
contraddizioni della giurisprudenza europea in materia di exit taxation, cited above, 381. 
441 Pistone, P., The impact of Community law on tax treaties. Issues and solutions, cited above, 188. 
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which would otherwise be due at the time of realisation, thus directly affecting the 
functioning of the Internal Market by being able to hinder the exercise of the taxpayer’s 
right of establishment442. 
 It is also true, however, that without exit taxes (or similar measures), taxpayers 
would enjoy the possibility to arbitrarily choose where their “hidden reserves” would be 
taxed, thus relocating companies to jurisdictions with the lowest tax rates in order to 
avoid the payment of higher amount of taxes and triggering base erosion phenomena. It 
has therefore been argued that exit taxation represents a tool used by states to adjust 
their fiscal models in coherence with the structure of national tax systems and to 
preserve the integrity of taxing jurisdiction in the emigration state. Such need could be, 
in theory, legitimate for the purposes of European Union law. 
 It should also be incidentally noted that the topic of exit taxation is not addressed 
by international tax law and conventions against double taxation. The OECD Model 
Convention does not take into account the problem either. Generally, however, 
conventional tax law allows the country of origin of the individual to levy taxes on the 
income accrued on its territory up until the moment of the transfer of the person’s 
residence abroad. 
 After the first approach of the Court to the topic had excluded the compatibility 
of such measures with European Union law443, in its subsequent case law, the Court of 
Justice has actually found that, in general terms, even though exit taxation restricts the 
exercise of the freedom of establishment on the part of European Union citizens, it may 
be justified by the need to safeguard the balanced allocation of taxing powers amongst 
the Member States. In doing so, the Court has also confirmed that Member States are free 
to choose the elements on which to levy tax within their own jurisdictions and that they 
are not compelled by any duty to align their tax laws with the tax laws of other Member 
States in order to ensure that transfer of companies are effectively neutral as far as 
taxation is concerned. Moreover, the case law of the Court of Justice generally 
distinguishes between emigration of legal entities and emigration of natural persons, 
																																																								
442 For a more detailed analysis of the mechanisms and general functioning of exit taxation, see Terra, B.J.M., 
Wattel, P.J., European tax law, cited above, 506; Bizioli, G., Aporie e contraddizioni della giurisprudenza europea in 
materia di exit taxation, cited above. See also De Pietro, C., Exit tax: territorialità e mobilità societaria, in European Tax 
Studies, 2009, 1; Cipollina, S., I confini giuridici del tempo presente. Il caso del diritto fiscale, cited above, 199; Betten, 
R., Income tax aspects of emigration and immigration of individuals, Amsterdam, 1998, 10. 
443 Court of Justice of the European Union, 11 March 2004, C-9/02, Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant. 
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since legal entities derive their very existence from the provisions of national legal 
orders444. 
 On the point, it should also be noted that if, pursuant to domestic law, a company 
is required to liquidate in order to relocate abroad, Member State could normally tax the 
unrealised capital gains upon dissolution, which would not constitute an exit tax in 
accordance with the Daily mail case law445. In that judgement, the Court of Justice found 
that Member States are not restricted by European Union law in deciding what should 
be the connecting factors which are relevant in order for a company to retain its legal 
status under their domestic law, being that it is left to the Member States to determine 
what is required for companies to come into existence as a legal person and how these 
companies continue their existence and maintain their legal personality446-447. 
 It has been argued that this solution would be somewhat paradoxical, since it 
would entail that, on one hand, a Member State that requires liquidation in order for a 
company to relocate and imposes immediate taxation upon dissolution would not 
breach European Union law, whereas, on the other hand, a Member State which allows 
companies to freely transfer to another Member State without having to liquidate while 
imposing an exit tax would restrict freedom of establishment448. 																																																								
444 On the point, see especially Court of Justice of the European Union, 27 September 1988, C-81/87, Daily Mail; 
Court of Justice of the European Union, 5 November 2002, C-208/00, Überseering; Court of Justice of the European 
Union, 16 December 2008, C-210/06, Cartesio. 
445 Court of Justice of the European Union, 27 September 1988, C-81/87, Daily Mail. 
446 With the only limit posed by the Cartesio judgement (Court of Justice of the European Union, 16 December 2008, 
C-210/06), where the Court of Justice ruled that, if the Member States to which the seat of the company is 
transferred accepts the immigration of such a company and allows it to “transform” into a company subject to its 
domestic corporate law without the need of necessarily winding up (so-called “inbound conversion”), the 
Member State of origin of that company may not prohibit the migration and make the relocation conditional 
upon the liquidation of the company. This principle has been, more recently, confirmed by the Court in its 
decision on the Vale case as well (Court of Justice of the European Union, 12 July 2012, C-378/10). 
447 Member States’ company law on the point is generally based on either the “incorporation principle” (according 
to which the company is governed by the law of the state where the company’s registered office or statutory seat 
is located) or the “real seat principle” (according to which a company can retain legal personality under the law 
of a certain state only if the relevant substantive connecting factors with that state’s legal order are and continue 
to be located in that state’s territory), although it may also provide for a sort of combination of both. In general 
terms, in the European Union’s context, Member States resort more frequently to the “incorporation principle”, 
even though the “real seat principle” has been adopted, for example, by Germany, Spain and Portugal. 
448 Especially since, pursuant to Article 54 TFEU, “companies […] formed in accordance with the law of a Member State 
and having their registered office, central administration or principal place of business” within the European Union “shall 
[…] be treated in the same way as natural persons who are nationals of Member States” for the purposes of the freedom 
of establishment. However, the Court’s approach as mentioned above had been, then, confirmed by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union in the Commission v. Portugal judgement as well (6 September 2012, C-38/10), 
where the Court concluded that immediate taxation upon the cessation of the economic activity of a permanent 
establishment cannot be considered as a restriction to the freedom of establishment since there is no 
discrimination, given that cessations of activities of permanent establishments in domestic situations are treated 
in the same way. On the point, see Sendetska, O., ECJ case law on corporate exit taxation: from National Grid Induc to 
DMC: what is the current state of law, in EC Tax Review, 2014, 4, 231; Van der Broek, H., Meussen, G., National Grid 
Indus case: re-thinking exit taxation, in European Taxation, 2012, 4, 193; Wattel, P.J., Exit taxation in the EU/EEA 
before and after National Grid Indus, in Tax Notes International, 2012, 5, 371; Vilagi, R., Exit taxes on various types of 
corporate reorganisations in light of EU law, in European Taxation, 2012, 7, 50; Potgens, F.P.G., van Os, P., Duran, 
P.H., et al., The compatibility of exit tax legislation applicable to corporate taxpayers in France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom with the EU freedom of establishment, in Intertax, 2016, 1, 41. 
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 Having established all of the above, it should also be noted that, for several years 
now, the main discussions on the point of exit taxation have focused on more practical 
issues, revolving around the need to ensure that exit taxation measures, though 
generally allowed by the Court of Justice, do not fail the proportionality test, i.e. do not 
go beyond what is necessary to attain their purposes and do not impose a 
disproportionate burden on taxpayers449. 
 For the purposes of the present research, the Court’s case law on exit taxation is 
relevant essentially because of the interpretation of the concept of “territoriality” thereby 
suggested by the Judges, and because of the consequent idea of a “proto-design” of the 
allocation of taxing powers amongst Member States. It is also one of the cases in which it 
is easier to examine the interaction between territorial tax systems and the need to 
counter tax avoidance as interpreted by the Court of Justice. 
 Starting from the N. v. Inspecteur case450, we should recall that the Court, in 
accepting, in general terms, the legitimacy of exit taxation, has stated, on the point of 
territoriality, that “preserving the allocation of the power to tax between Member States is a 
legitimate objective recognised by the Court of Justice” and, therefore, with regards to the 
regime at issue, “it is in accordance with the principle of fiscal territoriality, connected with a 
temporal component, namely residence within the territory during the period in which the taxable 
profit arises, that the national provisions in question provide for the charging of tax on increases 
in value recorded in the Netherland, the amount of which has been determined at the time the 
taxpayer concerned emigrated and payment of which has been suspended until the actual disposal 
of the securities”451. 
 It is clear that, in the N. case, the Court’s reference to an interpretation of 
territoriality as a principle, i.e. the principle according to which countries have the right 
to tax items of income which are charactarised by a (either subjective or objective) 
connection with their territory. 
 Therefore, the Court of Justice has noted that the Dutch legislation at issue is 
aimed at ensuring a proper allocation of tax jurisdiction amongst Member States because 																																																								
449 For an analysis of the “open questions” still left on the point of exit taxation, see, amongst others, Sendetska, O., 
ECJ case law on corporate exit taxation: from National Grid Indus to DMC: what is the current state of law, cited above, 
231, and the authors cited therein. 
450 Court of Justice of the European Union, 7 September 2006, C-470/04, N. v. Inspecteur. The case concerned a 
Dutch resident emigrating to the United Kingdom, who was issued a conservatory assessment for the unrealised 
capital gains in his shares in two companies located in the Antilles and who was required to provide security for 
payment upon realisation. 
451 It has been suggested that the approach taken in N. was to a large extent influenced by the evolution of the 
Court’s case law impressed by the Marks & Spencer judgement examined above, where, for the first time, the 
Luxembourg Judges had acknowledged that the protection of the allocation of taxing powers amongst Member 
States constitutes a legitimate justifying ground for national tax measures limiting the scope of application of 
consolidated group relief only to subjects residing within national territory. Bizioli, G., Aporie e contraddizioni della 
giurisprudenza europea in material di exit taxation, cited above, 384. 
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Member States retain the power to establish the criteria of the connection between the 
tax object and their territories452, and also because it seemed “reasonable” for the exercise 
of such power to be inspired by international tax law. The ruling followed the opinion 
rendered by AG Kokott on the N. case453, where it was observed that, even though a 
precise definition of the principle of territoriality does not currently exist, it would 
appear reasonable to conclude that the existence of a link between the tax object and the 
national territory is a sufficient condition for the exercise of taxing powers on the part of 
Member States. 
This justification finds its ground in the need to preserve the Member States’ fiscal 
interest, i.e. in the constant balancing between the interests constituting the bedrock of 
the Internal Market and national fiscal interest. In the Court’s case, one of the 
expressions of the constant search for this balance is the role granted to the principle of 
tax territoriality, which is here interpreted by the Luxembourg Judges as a criterion for 
the description of a connection between the tax object and the territory of the Member 
States and as a criterion for the allocation of tax bases and tax revenues amongst Member 
States454. 
From this perspective, the N. judgement constitutes an example of the “overall 
approach” of the Court of Justice or, for the purposes of our research, an example of the 
so-called “always somewhere approach”. Forcing the Member State of origin or, 
alternatively, the Member State of destination to take into account the decreases of value 
suffered by the goods after the transfer of residence, in fact, implies acknowledging that 
the lack of elimination of juridical double taxation constitutes a restriction of 
fundamental Treaty freedoms, but also, to a certain extent, implies denying the relevance 
of the allocation of taxing powers as a justifying ground455. 
A different solution can be found in what should be defined as the Court’s 
landmark decision in the field of the fiscal consequences of cross-border company 																																																								
452 The existence of such a discretionary power on the part of the Member States is consistently confirmed by the 
Court of Justice. See, for example, Court of Justice of the European Union, 22 December 2010, C-287/10, 
Tankreederei, and the decisions cited therein. 
453 Opinion of AG Kokott on Case C-470/04, N. v. Inspecteur. 
454 Bizioli, G., Aporie e contraddizioni della giurisprudenza europea in materia di exit taxation, cited above, 386; De Man, 
F., Albin, T., Contradicting views of exit taxes under OECD MC and TFEU: are exit taxes still allowed in Europe?, in 
Intertax, 2011, 617; Seiler, M., Exit taxation arising from a deemed disposal of shares, in Bulletin for International Fiscal 
Documentation, 2013, 583. 
455 Bizioli, G., Aporie e contraddizioni della giurisprudenza europea in materia di exit taxation, cited above, 391, which 
highlights that the proportionality judgement of the Court clashes with the general interest previously defined as 
preeminent. The Author, in fact, notes the contradiction between stating that the immediate taxation of latent 
capital gains at the moment of the transfer of residence realises a balanced allocation of taxing powers amongst 
Member States and, on the other hand, stating that the tax base of exit taxes should conform to the decreases of 
value occurred after the transfer of the taxpayer’s residence abroad, i.e. outside national borders. See also Wattel, 
P.J., Fiscal cohesion, fiscal territoriality and preservation of the (balanced) allocation of taxing power: what is the difference?, 
cited above, 155: according to the Author, “it is not the Court’s competence to allocate losses and gains, especially not 
asymmetrically, as these are, in the Court’s own words, two sides of the same coin”. 
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migration, and the consequences for the allocation of taxing powers amongst Member 
States, which was rendered in the National Grid Indus case456. In this judgement, in fact, 
notwithstanding the fact that the decision on comparableness and on the justifications 
for the restrictive measure follows the same criteria used in N., the Luxembourg Judges 
set out certain limits to the fiscal sovereignty of the Member States in the field of 
corporate exit taxation and also acknowledged the existence of a difference between the 
circumstances of individuals and legal persons as far as the compatibility of exit taxation 
with EU law is concerned457. 
With this decision, the Court, even though it held that applying immediate capital 
gains taxation at the moment of the transfer of the place of management and control 
constituted a restriction on the freedom of establishment (since such a transfer, if it were 
to be put in place in a purely domestic context, would not have triggered any specific tax 
measure), nonetheless stated that the objective to ensure a balanced allocation of taxing 
powers between Member States may, in principle, justify the taxation of the gains 
accrued at the time of migration, even though immediate taxation of such gains at the 
time of the transfer constitutes an excessive and disproportionate measure. The Court 
admittedly reached this conclusion referring essentially to the implication of the 
principle of fiscal territoriality interpreted as described above, arguing that the link 
between the company and the territory of the Member State constitutes a legitimate 
criterion for the allocation of taxing powers and that, therefore, taxing powers may be 
exercised on the value of the capital gains accrued up until the moment of the transfer of 
the company’s place of effective management. 
This conclusion is then confirmed in the final stage of the Court’s “rule of reason 
test”, i.e. the analysis of the proportionality of the measure. In contrast with the 
conclusions reached in N., in fact, the Judges rule that “establishing the amount of tax at the 
time of the transfer of a company’s place of effective management complies with the principle of 
proportionality, having regard to the objective of the national legislation at issue in the main 
proceedings, namely to subject to tax in the Member State of origin the capital gains which arose 
within the ambit of that State’s power of taxation” and that “it is proportionate for that Member 
State, for the purpose of safeguarding the exercise of its powers of taxation, to determine the tax 
due on the unrealised capital gains that have arisen in its territory at the time when its power of 																																																								
456 Court of Justice of the European Union, 29 September 2011, C-371/10, National Grid Indus BV. The case dealt 
with the transfer of the place of effective management of a Dutch company from the Netherlands to the United 
Kingdom, which triggered Dutch taxation on the company’s unrealised currency gains. 
457 On this distinction, see Dourado, A.P., Pistone, P., Looking beyond Cartesio: reconciliatory interpretation as a tool to 
remove tax obstacles on the exercise of the primary right of establishment by companies and other legal entities, in Intertax, 
2009, 342. 
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taxation in respect of the company in question ceases to exist, in the present case the time of the 
transfer of the company’s place of effective management to another Member State”458. 
In light of the fiscal principle of territoriality, therefore, the Court ruled that the 
Netherlands was not obliged, in the implementation of its exit taxes, to take into account 
decreases in value of the transferred assets that took place after the transfer, i.e. when the 
tax object has lost all of its connection with the taxing Member State. And that because, 
briefly said, such assets, after their transfer, produce profit in the Member State of 
destination and depreciate in the Member State of destination, which implies, always as 
a consequence of the “territorial symmetry” to which tax systems should be inspired, 
that it is also for the Member State of destination to tax the profits, and grant a deduction 
for the losses, arising from such assets after their transfer. 
This conclusion essentially amounts to reaffirming that Member States are free to 
choose what elements to tax within their own fiscal jurisdictions and that, since the 
capital gains arose within the ambit of the power of taxation of the departure State, said 
State has the right to its fair share of the capital gains accrued up until the time of 
transfer. Furthermore, Member States are not obliged to bring their tax regulations in 
line with those of other States so as to achieve complete and utter neutrality of transfers 
for companies459. As consistently noted by scholars and by the Court itself, a case of 
disparity of tax rules in two Member States, from which a prejudicial effect arises for 
taxpayers, is different than that of a restriction in one Member State which hinders or 
makes it more difficult to migrate to another country or discriminates against all 
taxpayers who relocate abroad460. 
The Court has confirmed the above-mentioned principles in all of its subsequent 
decisions on exit taxation, having stated, also in recent times, that “according to the fiscal 
principle of territoriality, a Member State is entitled, in the case of a transfer of assets to a 
permanent establishment located within another Member State, to impose tax, at the time of the 
transfer, on the capital gains generated on its territory prior to that transfer” and that “such a 
measure is intended to prevent situations capable of jeopardising the right of the Member State of 
origin to exercise its powers of taxation in relation to activities carried on in its territory”461. 																																																								
458 A similar statement can also be found in Court of Justice of the European Union, 25 April 2013, C-64/11, 
Commission v. Spain. 
459 Court of Justice of the European Union, 29 September 2011, C-371/10, National Grid Indus BV, par. 45-48. 
460 O’Shea, T., European tax controversies: a British-Dutch Debate: back to basics and is the ECJ consistent?, in World Tax 
Journal, 2013, 106. 
461 Court of Justice of the European Union, 21 May 2015, C-657/13, Verder LabTec, where the Court found that 
immediate taxation of he unrealised capital gains related to assets such as patents, trademarks and models 
transferred by a German partnership to its permanent establishment located in the Netherlands constituted a 
restriction of freedom of establishment because, in a purely domestic situation, a similar transfer would not 
determine the taxation of any unrealised capital gain. 
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The Court consistently upheld this reasoning in its following decisions 
concerning exit taxation and, specifically, with regards to infringement procedures 
brought by the European Commission against Portugal462, The Netherlands463, Spain464 and 
Denmark465. Furthermore, the DMC judgement by the Court466 extended the reasoning to 
cross-border corporate reorganisations as well: the Court, quoting from its National Grid 
Indus decision, ruled that the Member State losing its connection between the company’s 
goods at issue and its territory can legitimately levy tax on latent capital gains realised 
after the operation 467 . Furthermore, the DMC decision clarified that Member States 
entitled to tax capital gains generated when the assets in question were on their territory 
have the power to make provision for a chargeable event other than the actual realisation 
of those gains, in order to ensure that the assets at issue are taxed. 
Therefore, as the Court’s case law stands at the moment, exit taxes are deemed 
compatible with the freedom of establishment, as they pursue a legitimate objective in 
the public interest468, and Member States are allowed to introduce exit taxes on unrealised 
gains accrued during the time in which an individual or a company have been residing 
in their territory469. In other words, the Court of Justice has stressed the need to guarantee 
full freedom of movement within the Internal Market, though also acknowledging the 
need to protect the effectiveness of the exercise of the taxing powers of the Member State 
of emigration on the accrued capital gains. 
With regard to the main topic of our study, the principle of territoriality as 
developed by the Court’s case law on exit taxation, unlike the “principle” which would 
derive from the international tax law practice, does not exhaust its effects in the 
description of the factual elements which are territorially relevant (essentially, residence 
and source), by virtue of which countries may exercise their taxing powers, but it 
expands to encompass a “temporal component” that is traditionally unknown to the 
“classic” elaboration of the concept of territoriality. 																																																								
462 Court of Justice of the European Union, 06 September 2012, C-38/10, Commission v. Portugal. 
463 Court of Justice of the European Union, 31 January 2013, C-301/11, Commission v. The Netherlands. 
464 Court of Justice of the European Union, 25 April 2013, C-64/11, Commission v. Spain. 
465 Court of Justice of the European Union, 18 July 2013, C-261/11, Commission v. Denmark. 
466 Court of Justice of the European Union, 23 January 2014, C-164/12, DMC. 
467 For an overall analysis of the mentioned case law, see Von Brocke, K, Müller S, Exit taxes: the Commission versus 
Denmark case analysed against the background of the fundamental conflict in the EU: territorial taxes and an Internal 
Market without barriers, in EC Tax Review, 2013, 6, 299; Sendetska, O., ECJ case law on corporate exit taxation: from 
National Grid Indus to DMC: what is the current state of law?, cited above, 230. 
468 See also Court of Justice of the European Union, 18 July 2013, C-261/11, Commission v. Denmark; Court of Justice 
of the European Union, 23 January 2014, C-164/12, DMC; Court of Justice of the European Union, 16 April 2015, 
C-591/13, Commission v. Germany. 
469 Also, Member States are free to asses the corporate exit tax definitively on the date of the transfer and they do 
not have to take into account any future losses that may or may not occur after the migration of a company or of 
some of their assets, since they do not have any connection with the company or the asset by reason of a 
limitation of their jurisdiction. 
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In application of such a new dimension to the topic of the allocation of taxing 
powers between Member States - which determines not only which of the countries 
involved gets to tax the income concerned, but also the “intensity” of the tax burden 
countries may impose, which is directly proportional to the insentity of the temporal 
component - tax sovereignty and tax jurisdiction, therefore, end up being split - or, better 
said, shared - between the two Member States involved in the transfer of residence on 
the ground of an entirely new dimension of territoriality, which refers to a territory 
which coincides with the Internal Market470. 
In other words, intra-EU transfers of residence (either by individuals or 
corporations) cannot be conceived and analysed from a merely national perspective and 
as the sum of two distinct national operations (the loss of the former residence combined 
with the acquisition of a new residence), but as a single cross-border operation471, with the 
need to ensure the coordination between the national systems involved so as to avoid 
double taxation as much as double non-taxation, to enact a balanced allocation between 
the two Member States involved and to prevent undue limitations and obstacles to the 
achievement and implementation of an effectively integrated Internal Market. In other 
words, the purpose is to achieve neutrality (or the highest possible degree of neutrality). 
On the point, as we will see in the following chapter of the research, some steps have 
been taken with the recent adoption of the so-called “Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive”472. 
9. Concluding remarks: overall analysis of the Court of Justice’s case law on the 
tax treatment of non-residents and open questions for a hypothetical 
effective integration of the Internal Market. 
 As it has probably already been inferred from all of the above, it certainly is 
considerably difficult to “systematise” the orientations of the Court of Justice’s case law 
in the field of direct taxation, with specific regard to the problem of the allocation of 
taxing powers amongst Member States and to the related topic of the fiscal treatment of 
non-residents in the context of income taxation. The analysis of the case law described 
above shows the way the Court’s approach to territoriality has changed through the 
years. 
																																																								
470 More on the point of exit taxation will be seen in the next chapter of the research, when talking about the 
provisions of the new Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive, at paragraph 5. 
471 Carinci, A., Il diritto comunitario alla prova delle exit taxes, tra limiti, prospettive e contraddizioni, cited above; Greggi, 
M., Riflessi fiscali della mobilità all’interno della UE: per un nuovo Nomos europeo, in European Tax Studies, 2009, 1. 
472 See Chapter III, at paragraph 5. 
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The first thing that should be highlighted concerns the interpretation of the 
meaning of “territoriality”. The Court accepts the concept/principle/criterion of 
territoriality as, at least theoretically, relevant for the purposes of the allocation of taxing 
powers amongst Member States in the context of the Internal Market. In doing so, as 
shown above, it refers to the principle of territoriality “as it is used in international (tax) 
law”. However, the current understanding of the term in international tax law is, or 
should be, different from the meaning given to “territoriality” by the Court473, especially 
in light of the reasons that have been analysed in the previous chapter of the research. 
In fact, it is highly doubtful that a general principle of territoriality might actually 
be inferred from the current state of international (tax) law, given that, rebus sic stantibus, 
such a principle does not appear to be enshrined neither in a general principle of 
international law nor in a international customary rule and it is not in any way 
recognised as binding by any country in the international scenario. This assumption 
cannot but raise the question of which meaning of territoriality the Court makes 
reference to when expressly mentioning the “principle of territoriality as enshrined in 
international law”. In the international law context, territoriality is considered as simply 
a criterion on the ground of which countries may shape the extension of their fiscal 
jurisdictions, a mere parameter for the distribution of tax bases and fiscal revenues 
amongst states, whereas, as it has been highlighted above, in the European Union 
framework, territoriality has acquired, through the words of the Court of Justice, the 
considerably different meaning of “balanced allocation of taxing powers” amongst 
Member States. 
This is one of the reasons why there is a certain degree of uncertainty concerning 
the meaning and the relevance of “territoriality” in the Court of Justice jurisprudence on 
direct taxation, and especially on the role that territoriality might play in the definition of 
how far Member States can go when defining the extension of their taxing powers with 
specific regard to non-residents. Starting from Futura, where the Luxembourg Judges 
had used the concept of territoriality almost as a proxy for the fundamental difference 
between taxation by the state of residence and taxation by the source state, with a 
considerable justificatory potential for different treatment of residents and non-residents, 
to Marks & Spencer, Oy AA, Busley or National Grid, where the Court translated the 
principle of territoriality into one of the justifications developed by European Union case 
law as possible ground on which to base discriminatory or restrictive measures. In other 																																																								
473 According to Marres, the Court considers taxation of residents on their worldwide income “as a manifestation of 
territoriality”, even though “tax lawyers would call that worldwide taxation, as opposed to territorial taxation”; see 
Marres, O., The principle of territoriality and cross-border loss compensation, cited above, 125. 
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words, the fiscal territoriality principle is now treated as a justification for 
discrimination, instead of as the description of a set of rules that escapes the scope of 
application of European Union law474. In light of the somehow “vagary” approach of the 
Court of Justice on the point, it has been argued that the Luxembourg Judges have not, 
as of today, applied the principle of territoriality in a consistent manner, but as a concept 
suiting the result that the Court seeks to attain in each different specific case, e.g. 
sacrificing it to the “always somewhere doctrine” in the case of final losses in Marks & 
Spencer or to the “ability-to-pay principle” in Schumacker475. 
An inaccurate understanding of the meaning of “territoriality” might, however, 
lead to disconcerting results, especially in light of the unavoidable interaction between 
tax systems that is inherent to a globalised economy, where cross-border transactions are 
always in order, and even more so in the context of an Internal Market such as the one 
pursued by the Treaties. This interaction depends on many different factors that may 
also go beyond the mere scope of application of national tax provisions, e.g. specific 
forms of taxation, the existence and interpretation of bilateral tax treaties, the concrete 
methods employed to alleviate or prevent international double taxation, etc.476 
It has been already noted that the Court of Justice, in decisions such as Rewe and 
Busley, has defined the “purpose of the principle of territoriality” as “to establish, in the 
application of Community law, the need to take into account the limits on the Member States’ 
power of taxation”, thus referring to an interpretation of the states’ taxing powers as 
inherently limited, which is substantially different from which can be inferred from the 
analysis of the principles governing international (tax) law, if one is to disregard the 
merely contingent and “practical” asset arising from the network of tax treaties signed 
by countries. 
Some have interpreted this definition of “territoriality” as the declaration of a 
preference of the Court of Justice for strictly territorial tax systems, arguing that such a 
statement would entail the recognition that non-residents’ income which is not sourced 
within the territory of a Member States should not be taken into account by that Member 
State for tax purposes, irrespective of the place of residence of the taxpayer. We will 
come back on the point in the following pages and also in the next chapter of the 
research. Suffice it to say now that such an argument does not seem to be entirely 
convincing, especially if we consider that, in judgements such as Futura and Marks & 																																																								
474 Wattel, P.J., Fiscal cohesion, fiscal territoriality and preservation of the (balanced) allocation of taxing power: what is the 
difference?, cited above, 149. 
475 Wattel, P.J., Fiscal cohesion, fiscal territoriality and preservation of the (balanced) allocation of taxing power: what is the 
difference?, cited above, 150. 
476 Garcia Prats, F.A., EC law and direct taxation: towards a coherent system of taxation?, cited above, 5. 
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Spencer, seems to have embraced a vision based on an interpretation of “territoriality as a 
principle” (and not as a criterion), accepting that Member States can tax their residents 
on a worldwide basis and their non-residents only on the income having its source 
within their territory. Embracing this view of territoriality would mean that, according to 
the Court, a difference in fiscal treatment between residents and non-residents can be 
accepted for the purposes of European Union law. 
The evolution of the Court of Justice’s case law has, however, shown a 
progressive, and almost total, abandonment of the idea, stated for the first time in 
Schumacker, that non-residents should, unless under exceptional circumstances, never be 
comparable to residents in the field of direct taxation; on the contrary, the role of such an 
idea has been reduced to a limited area, which is that of personal and family 
circumstances of individuals477. On the other hand, in other areas, such as company 
taxation, the main reasoning applied by the Court is different, i.e. that residents and non-
residents are comparable for EU law purposes in the field of tax law. 
In the Court’s view, asserting the relevance of the concept of “territoriality” does 
not directly imply the need for a country to exercise its taxing powers only on domestic-
source income, i.e. on income originating within its territory. On the contrary, said 
concept (or “principle”, as the Court defines it) would have to support the choices made 
by each Member State in establishing connection criteria which are territorially relevant 
in modulating the extension of state fiscal sovereignty or, better said, fiscal jurisdiction, 
either from a “subjectively” or an “objectively” territorial perspective. This interpretation 
of “territoriality” would, therefore, seem to radically prevent any interpretation of the 
Court of Justice’s case law as an indication of a theoretical preference of the European 
Union legal order for a model based on capital import neutrality and on a tax model 
based on strict and “pure” territoriality (i.e. levying taxes only on domestic-source 
income). Even more so if we consider that, as we will see in the following chapter, the 
hypothetical preference of the EU legal order for such a model seems to be contradicted 
by the considerable predominance, in the provisions of the few Directives on (some 
aspects of) direct taxation, of fiscal models based on a substantially recessive role of the 
source state and on the affirmation of the exclusivity of the taxing powers of the country 
of residence. 
Which brings us to the evolution of the concept of “territoriality” in the Court of 
Justice’s jurisprudence. 																																																								
477 Cordewener, A., Personal income taxation of non-residents and the increasing impact of the EC Treaty freedoms, cited 
above, 71.  
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At first, as it has been highlighted above, the Court’s approach to the topic was 
essentially “radical”: if a national tax system adheres and is inspired to the principle of 
territoriality - meaning the implementation of a worldwide system for residents and a 
system of taxation at source for non-residents - then the relevant national measures 
cannot be considered as discriminatory or otherwise in breach of European Union law, 
which implies that the “rule of reason test” of the Court stopped at its “first step”, with 
no need for any analysis concerning possible justifications for the measure at issue. This 
is the conclusions reached by the Court, for instance, in its decision on the Futura case. 
The same result is achieved also by referring to the general statement according to which 
the positions of residents and non-residents are not generally comparable for the 
purposes of direct taxation, which, once again, precludes any possibility for a tax 
measure treating the two categories in a different way to be considered as in breach of a 
fundamental Treaty freedom or of the principle of non-discrimination. 
This approach is essentially in line with the so-called “parallel exercise of taxing 
powers” doctrine, inaugurated by the Court in decisions such as Schempp, Kerckhaert 
Morres, Damseaux and Block, which indeed takes a step further: Member States are free to 
shape their direct tax systems as they see fit, provided they do not discriminate in an 
unjustifiable manner, especially against non-residents, and, therefore, they are free to 
decide to tax residents on their worldwide income and non-residents only on the income 
generated within their territory, or even to tax both residents and non-residents on a 
strictly territorial basis; and, according to this approach, Member States are also free to 
decide which items of income not to tax. 
Subsequently, however, the tables have considerably turned, with the Court of 
Justice stepping away from its “Futura doctrine” and taking into consideration elements, 
such as ability-to-pay, that lead it quite far from the “parallel exercise doctrine” as well, 
even though such an approach has never been denied or refuted by the Court of Justice 
as of today. 
In judgements such as Marks & Spencer, territoriality is “demoted” to being one 
the possible justifications (i.e. legitimate purposes of primary interest) that can legitimise 
Member States’ discriminatory and/or restrictive tax measures. Territoriality becomes, 
in the words of the Court of Justice, what is currently known as “balanced allocation of 
taxing powers”. If, as we have seen earlier, at first compliance with the principle of 
territoriality in the sense described above excluded the possibility for a certain fiscal 
measures to be interpreted as breaching European Union law, now the analysis “through 
the territoriality lens” is shifted from the “first step of the rule of reason test” to the 
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“second step” of said test. Territoriality is thus treated as a possible justification in light 
of the Member State’s aim of attaining a legitimate objective in the public interest. 
In other words, the Court has recognised the relevance and value of the Member 
States’ fiscal interests and it did so, inter alia, through the elaboration of justifying 
reasons, specifically created by the Court for the field of taxation, that could legitimize 
national measures somehow discriminating against non-residents or restricting the 
possibility for EU citizens to exercise their Treaty freedoms478. 
 In applying its “rule of reason test”479, the Court has acknowledged the possibility 
to justify restrictive fiscal measures on the part of the Member States on the ground of 
the need to protect fiscal coherence, which essentially amounts to the need to match, 
within the same jurisdiction, negative elements of income (i.e., tax base reductions) and 
positive elements of income (i.e., the corresponding tax base increases), such as losses 
and corresponding profits, deductions and corresponding benefits, income and the 
expenses incurred in earning it, and so on. The need to ensure the coherence of the tax 
system was first accepted as justification for restrictive measures in the Bachmann 
judgement, but was later consistently rejected, only to be considered again as valid 
ground for justifying fiscal restrictions in other judgements, such as N. and Krankenheim. 
The Court has later specified that Member States may not justify a restrictive measure on 
the ground of the need to ensure coherence of its tax system from an internal perspective 
is such coherence is already preserved at an international level by way of a double 
taxation convention480. 																																																								
478 Isenbaert, M., The contemporary meaning of ‘sovereignty’ in the supranational context of the EC as applied to the income 
tax case law of the ECJ, in EC Tax Review, 2009, 6, 273. 
479 The Court summarised the common features of the “rule of reason test” in its Gebhard judgement (30 November 
1995, C-55/94, Reinhard Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano), where it stated that 
“national measures liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty 
must fulfil four conditions: 1) they must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner; 2) they must be justified by imperative 
requirements in the general interest; 3) they must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue; 
and 4) they must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it”. On the point, it has been shown that in more 
recent case law in direct tax matters the Court has “converted” to a three-step “rule of reason test”, having 
realised that having to judge justifications for certain tax systems would entail evaluations of a political nature. 
Therefore, the core of the test in direct tax matters is as follows: 1) does the Member State concerned distinguish 
between a purely national (domestic) situation and a comparable cross-border situation in such a way as to 
hinder the exercise of free movement? 2) in case it does, is such a measure justified by a legitimate aim? 3) in case 
it is, does the hindering effect of the measure go beyond what is necessary to attain that legitimate aim? On the 
point, see Terra, B.J.M., Wattel, P.J., European tax law, cited above, 45. For a criticism of the application of the “rule 
of reason test” to tax cases concerning discrimination, see Wattel, P.J., Red herrings in direct tax cases before the ECJ, 
cited above, 83, where the Author states that, on the basis of the Court’s ruling in the Gebhard case (case C-55/94), 
only a justification explicitly mentioned in the Treaties, such as public safety or public health, could allow the 
Court not to prohibit discriminatory national measures and that “the case law holding that measures with distinctions 
can only be justifies under explicit Treaty exceptions is incompatible with the case law holding that indirectly discriminatory 
tax measures may be justified under unwritten notions like the necessity to maintain the coherence of the tax system, the 
necessity to curb abuse and the need for fiscal supervision”. 
480 See, for example, Court of Justice of the European Union, 11 August 1995, C-80/94, Wielocks; Court of Justice of 
the European Union, 21 November 2002, C-436/00, X & Y; Court of Justice of the European Union, 15 July 2004, 
C-242/03, Weidert and Paulus. See also Neyt, R., Peeters, S., Balanced allocation and coherence: some thoughts in light of 
Argenta and K, cited above, 67. 
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 That being said, the concept of “the need to preserve fiscal coherence”, however, 
often seems to overlap, in the words of the Court of Justice, with another concept put 
forward by the Court to justify restrictive tax measures, i.e. the need to protect a 
balanced allocation of taxing powers amongst Member States481. In fact, even though the 
two concept would prima facie seem to be different in that “fiscal coherence” deals with 
the symmetry of the taxes levied on a single taxpayer from an internal point of view, 
whereas “balanced allocation” concerns the treatment of a taxpayer at international level 
through forms of coordination with other jurisdictions482, the Court has then clearly stated 
that “the requirements of coherence of the tax system and the balanced allocation of powers of 
taxation coincide” 483  and also, in the N. judgement 484 , equated the fiscal principle of 
territoriality as mentioned in Futura with the preservation of the allocation of the power 
to tax amongst Member States. It has been convincingly argued that all of the above-
mentioned concepts indicate the Court of Justice’s effort to reconcile the Internal Market 
perspective and the almost complete lack of harmonisation in the field of direct taxes, 
which, in theory, would allow Member States to act to protect their tax revenuse against 
“territorial mismatches” of profits and corresponding losses485. 
According to some authors, the justification based on the need to ensure the 
balanced allocation of taxing powers Member States is the most important of all the 
justifications put forward by the Court and part of the legal doctrine has seen it as the 
reflection of the principle of fiscal territoriality 486 . In fact, in the Marks & Spencer 
judgement, for example, the Court has recognised the value of the fiscal territoriality 
principle, which seems to be close to the concept of the preservation of the allocation of 																																																								
481 In fact, as highlighted by Wattel, P.J., Fiscal cohesion, fiscal territoriality and preservation of the (balanced) allocation of 
taxing power: what is the difference?, in cited above, 142, although the validity of the fiscal cohesion/coherence 
justification was formally reiterated, after Bachmann, in Danner (case C-136/00), the Court never accepted it again 
and the Author argues that it was nothing more than a “misnomer, or a slip of a pen, or a red herring”, since “it does 
not really exist as a justification, at least not separately from the analysis of the comparability of the cross-border and the 
internal situation”. On the same point, see also Cerioni, L., The never-ending issue of cross-border loss compensation 
within the EU: reconciling balanced allocation of taxing rights and cross-border ability-to-pay, cited above, 269; Eden, S., 
The obstacles faced by the European Court of Justice in removing the obstacles faced by the taxpayer: the difficult case of 
double taxation, cited above, 610. 
482 Bottazzi, C., Tra affermazione delle libertà comunitarie e difesa della sovranità statale: la Corte di Giustizia condanna 
l’Italia per il previgente sistema di ritenuta sui dividendi versati a non residenti, in Rassegna Tributaria, 2010, 2, 567; 
Zalasinski, A., The limits of the EC concept of ‘direct tax restriction on free movement rights’, the principles of equality and 
ability to pay, and the interstate fiscal equity, in Intertax, 2009, 5, 282. 
483 Court of Justice of the European Union, 29 November 2011, C-371/10, National Grid Indus BV. The same 
statement may be found, inter alia, also in Court of Justice of the European Union, 17 December 2015, C-388/14, 
Timac Agro Deutschland GmbH, where the Court, as we will see, also recognised that “the objectives of safeguarding 
the balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes between Member States and the prevention of tax avoidance are linked”. 
484 Court of Justice of the European Union, 7 September 2006, C-470/04, N. v. Inspecteur. 
485 Cerioni, L., The never-ending issue of cross-border loss compensation within the EU: reconciling balanced allocation of 
taxing rights and cross-border ability-to-pay, cited above, 269. 
486 Terra, B.J.M., Wattel, P.J., European tax law, cited above, 43; Cordewener, A., Kofler, G., Van Thiel, S., The clash 
between European freedoms and national direct tax law. Public interest defences available to the Member States, in 
Common Market Law Review, 2009, 1951; Lang, M., Direct taxation: is the ECJ heading in a new direction?, cited 
above, 421. 
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taxing powers amongst Member States, and in other occasions, such as in Oy AA, the 
Judges have referred to the same idea as the “principle of symmetry”. 
Notwithstanding all of the above, there is no doubt on the fact that, in this second 
“strain” of the Court’s case law, territoriality is given a new meaning and a new 
relevance, as a possible justification for objectively discriminatory measures. 
In Marks & Spencer, for instance, the Court has accepted that, by taxing resident 
companies on their worldwide profits and non-resident companies only on the income 
deriving from the activities carried out within its territory, a Member State acts in 
conformity with the principle of territoriality, derived from international tax law and, as 
seen in Futura, recognised by European Union law. It followed that territoriality implies 
that, if a Member State does not tax a foreign company on its foreign-source income 
because it is not established or resident in its territory, then it cannot be forced to allow 
said company to deduct its foreign losses against domestic profits of resident companies 
of the same group, since profits and losses are seen as “two sides of the same coin”, 
which, therefore, must be treated in a symmetrical manner. 
But, if we watch more closely, we cannot but notice that the Marks & Spencer 
judgement, even though, in principle, seems to “rehabilitate” the relevance of the role of 
the principle of territoriality in the shape of one of the possible justifications that can be 
put forward by Member States in case of differences in the fiscal treatment of cross-
border situations and comparable merely domestic circumstances, in more practical 
terms, on the other hand, overrules its own reasoning in the specific case: when a 
territorial matching of positive and negative elements of the tax base would lead to the 
impossibility for a taxpayer to use the losses in any Member State, the Court’s “always 
somewhere approach” comes to the rescue and limits the application of the principle of 
territoriality as not proportionate. Territoriality, therefore, cannot deprive the taxpayer 
of the right of deduction to which he/she/it was entitled in a merely domestic situation: 
that’s how the “final losses” criterion was created. 
In a certain sense, therefore, the Marks & Spencer judgement extended the 
application of the principle of territoriality at a truly “European level”, with a 
perspective on cross-border loss relief that treats the Internal Market as a sole and 
undivided territory for that purpose: losses must always be deductible somewhere 
within the territory of the European Union487. 																																																								
487 Even though this requirement has been partially limited by the Court of Justice in its Commission v. UK 
judgement (Court of Justice of the European Union, 3 February 2015, C-172/13), where it stated that, if “the 
legislation of the Member State of the subsidiary precludes all possibility of losses being carried forward”, the Member State 
of the parent company may refuse cross-border loss relief. 
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Also, it cannot go unnoticed that, always in Marks & Spencer, the compliance with 
the “fiscal principle of territoriality” is not even considered as sufficient per se to justify 
the restrictive measures enacted by the Member State concerned and needed to be paired 
with the analysis of two other justifications, i.e. the need to prevent tax avoidance and 
the need to prevent the double use of losses on the part of the taxpayer (so-called 
“double dip”). The same applied also in the Oy AA decision. 
It has been argued that, with regards to cross-border loss relief, if the fiscal 
principle of territoriality were accepted as a justification, this would imply that Member 
States have a right to apply a symmetrical treatment between taxing rights and 
obligations to grant tax deductions. Therefore, since the Member State of the parent 
company does not generally tax the profits of its foreign subsidiaries, this would mean 
that said State would not be required to allow deduction of their losses, thereby 
preventing cross-border loss relief within the Internal Market and undermining the 
achievement of a proper integration of such Internal Market, maintaining actual 
differences from what can be achieved within a domestic market and a “EU cross-border 
market”. This is probably one of the reasons that led the Court of Justice not to accept 
territoriality as a justification per se in the Marks & Spencer judgement. 
Which brings us to the third and last step of the evolution of the Court’s 
jurisprudence on territoriality and on the tax treatment of non-residents. 
In a considerable number of its latest judgements, in fact, the Court has made it 
clear that the justification based on the balanced allocation of taxing powers (in other 
words, on territoriality) can be resorted to only in case the restrictive measure at issue is 
aimed at preventing taxpayer’s behaviours which endanger a Member State’s right to 
exercise its fiscal jurisdiction with regards to activities taking place in its territory (or 
otherwise connected to said territory). Therefore, it could be inferred that in order for the 
argument based on the “balanced allocation of taxing powers” to be effective and 
relevant the measure concerned must be aimed at countering tax evasion, tax avoidance 
or, more in general, abuse of law. 
This, even though the Court has traditionally treated the “territorial justification” 
based on the balanced allocation of taxing powers and the justification based on the need 
to protect the financial interest of the state and to prevent tax evasion/avoidance as very 
different justifying grounds; even more so if we consider that the second justification has 
been traditionally very rarely accepted by the Court of Justice. Sometimes the two 
justifications were combined, as it happened, for instance, in the Marks & Spencer and Oy 
AA cases, but they always remained conceptually separated in the Court’s analysis. 
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Lately, on the contrary, the Luxembourg Judges seem to have “merged” the two 
concepts, conditioning the possibility for a Member State to avail itself of the “balanced 
allocation” justification upon the presence of an actual risk of evasion or tax avoidance 
that needs to be prevented. 
It should be incidentally noted that this approach of the Court finds its 
counterpart in the few positive rules posed by the European Union legislature, i.e. the 
Directives on (corporate) direct taxation, which enshrine specific anti-abuse clauses 
allowing Member States to dis-apply the benefits provided for by such Directives in case 
of abusive arrangements on the part of the taxpayers. 
The scenario is then further complicated by the so-called “Schumacker doctrine”, 
which has left a legacy which still has to be dealt with by the Court of Justice, since the 
Court has never actually completed the development of the doctrine, which could have 
led to the elaboration of a general ability-to-pay principle which, together with the non-
discrimination principle, could have played a significant role in a more comprehensive 
theory for the allocation of taxing powers amongst Member States in the European 
Union, with a re-thinking of the traditional concept of “limited liability to tax”488. 
The Court of Justice has thus built an EU law principle of ability-to-pay to be 
applied at least to all cross-border situations involving individual taxpayers. When the 
principle of ability-to-pay is invoked, the Court of Justice can, therefore, request Member 
States to extend to an EU-wide scale their national rules shaped on such principle489. As 
far as individuals are concerned, therefore, ability to pay allows derogations to the 
allocation of taxing powers as traced by the Member States, with a substantial 
equivalence of residents and non-residents for tax purposes. 
The approach held by the Court in Schumacker, and in subsequent judgements, 
even though not always coherent and consistent, has led the Court to implicitly trace a 
distinction between individuals and corporations as far as the allocation of taxing 
powers and the corresponding granting of tax allowances and other advantages amongst 
Member States are concerned. The principle of ability to pay seems, therefore, to 
constitute yet another derogation to what the Court defines as the “general principle of 
territoriality” recognised by Luxembourg Judges, to the aim of granting equal treatment 
of non-residents exercising their Treaty freedoms. 																																																								
488 Greggi, M., Revisiting Schumacker: the role of limited tax liability in EU law, cited above, 61. For an analysis of the 
implications of the “Schumacker doctrine” for Member States in terms of their sovereign powers to allocate tax 
incentives, see Traversa, E., Vintras, B., The territoriality of tax incentives within the Single Market, in Richelle, I., 
Schön, W., Traversa, E. (eds.), Allocating taxing powers within the European Union, Brussels, 2013, 171. 
489 Cerioni, L., The never-ending issue of cross-border loss compensation within the EU: reconciling balanced allocation of 
taxing rights and cross-border ability-to-pay, cited above, 274. 
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 It is, however, unclear how a Member State should apply the “Schumacker test”, 
verifying whether the major part of the taxable income is derived from an activity 
pursued in the Member State of source. Apart from the fact that it is not clear, from the 
Court of Justice’s case law, whether reference should be made to the net or gross income 
of the taxpayer, the question remains as to whether this test should be conducted on a 
yearly basis. It is, in fact, theoretically possible for an individual taxpayer to meet the 
“Schumacker threshold” in a particular year due to the presence of losses in his/her 
Member State of residence, which would probably imply that the Member State of 
source would be forced, under this case law, to allow deduction of these foreign losses490. 
With all the unavoidable consequences for the Member States’ treasuries, especially in 
terms of uncertainty. 
 Notwithstanding these more “technical” problems, which are not, however, to be 
disregarded as they are potentially significant, if ability-to-pay must prevail over 
territoriality, at least in the context of income taxation of individuals, this means that the 
non-resident subject should be able to ask the Member State where his/her income is 
located to be allowed to a sort of “worldwide taxation” in the source country, while 
staying subject to worldwide taxation in his country of residence, which would either 
have to exempt all of his/her foreign income or to grant him/her the tax credit 
connected to the tax paid abroad in relation to said foreign income. However, the same 
taxpayer would have the right to be granted a tax credit by the Member State of source 
as well, since tax credits generally constitute part of the treatment linked to worldwide 
taxation. A significant simplification of the system would be provided by the uniform 
implementation of purely territorial tax systems in the European Union context.  
On the other hand, as far as corporations are concerned, the validity of an 
allocation of taxing powers based on territoriality does not seem to be derogated by any 
principle concerning ability to pay, given that companies do not have family or personal 
circumstances that need to be taken into account. Thus, a higher degree of “fiscal 
symmetry” between positive and negative elements would be granted, with an 
exception linked to the “always somewhere approach” of the Court and, more 
specifically, to the “final losses doctrine”. On the point, it has correctly been noted that, 
rather than setting allocation criteria for expenses and losses, the Court of Justice has 
asserted the need to take into account them for tax purposes at least once491. 
																																																								
490 Marres, O., The principle of territoriality and cross-border loss compensation, cited above, 123. See also Bardini, C., 
The ability to pay in the European Union: an impossible Sudoku for the ECJ, in Intertax, 2010, 1, 20. 
491 Garcia Prats, F.A., EC law and direct taxation: towards a coherent system of taxation?, cited above, 13. 
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Since the Court of Justice has accepted that tax obstacles to free movement 
resulting from differences or overlaps in the assertion of taxing powers by Member 
States are outside the scope of the Treaty freedoms (because and insofar as they do not 
result in any discrimination on the part of the Member States involved), European Union 
law essentially contains no legal basis for choosing connecting factors for the definition 
of fiscal jurisdiction, which means that, on the ground of European Union law, it is not 
possible to state which one between the Member State of source and the Member State of 
residence has priority in its right to tax cross-border income. 
Sometimes the Court has ruled in a way that could be interpreted as meaning that 
preference should be given to the Member State of source over the Member State of 
residence. For example, on one hand, the Court has often stated that the Member State of 
residence of the taxpayer should extend tax credits or exemptions, i.e. a favourable tax 
regime provided for its residents, to non-resident subjects as well, whereas, on the other 
hand, the Court has not deemed that the Member State of source is obliged to grant a tax 
credit to non-residents as well, since that would have implied that said Member State 
would have had to renounce its right to tax an income generated from an activity 
performed in its territory492. This is what has happened, for instance, in the Class ACT IV 
case493. 
 In other cases, however, as it has been shown, the Court has allowed worldwide 
taxation based on the taxpayer’s residence as appropriate to ensure a balanced allocation 
of taxing powers, even allowing an extraterritorial extension of taxing powers to non-
resident subjects, for instance, in cases concerning CFC regimes, such as Cadbury 
Schweppes. 
Therefore, it does not appear possible to identify a clear preference on the part of 
the Luxembourg Judges on which of the two opposite tax models best fits with the 
European Union legal order and with the unity of the Internal Market. It follows that all 
common and “traditional” connecting factors that are currently used by Member States 
are, per se, compatible with European Union law494. For example, the Court explicitly 
accepted worldwide taxation by the residence Member State in its CIBA judgement495, 
where it stated that “the Member State in which the seat of the undertakings is located enjoys, 
in the absence of a double taxation convention, the right to tax that undertaking overall”. 
																																																								
492 De Pietro, C., Exit tax: territorialità e mobilità societaria, in European Tax Studies, 2009, 1. 
493 Court of Justice of the European Union, 12 December 2006, C-374/04, Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group 
Litigation. 
494 Terra, B.J.M., Wattel, P.J., European tax law, cited above, 454. 
495 Court of Justice of the European Union, 15 April 2010, C-96/08, CIBA. 
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 The implementation of a model based on source taxation for non-residents on 
their domestic-source income has been accepted as well by the European Union Judges, 
for example in the SGI judgement496, where it has been stated that “the right of a Member 
State to exercise its tax jurisdiction in relation to activities carried out in its territory”. The same 
goes for purely territorial taxation, i.e. the application by the Member State of residence 
of limited taxation and the source principle to its residents as well: on the point, the Lidl 
Belgium judgement497 should be mentioned, where the Court of Justice has found that “the 
preservation of the allocation of the power to impose taxes between Member States may make it 
necessary to apply to the economic activities of companies established in one of those States only 
the tax rules of that State in respect of both profits and losses”. 
 The Luxembourg Judges have even accepted as compatible with EU law a model 
of taxation based on nationality, irrespective of the “source” and “residence” concepts, 
even though in the context not of income taxation, but of inheritance taxation, in the 
above-mentioned Van Hilten judgement498. In that occasion, in fact, the Court concluded 
that “national legislation […] which provides that the estate of a national of a Member State who 
dies within 10 years of ceasing to reside in that Member State is to be taxed as if that national had 
continued to reside in that Member State, while providing for relief in respect of the taxes levied 
in the State to which the deceased transferred his residence, does not constitute a restriction on the 
movement of capital”, thus actually accepting a discrimination between nationals and non-
nationals. 
The Court of Justice, therefore, accepts both of the traditional models for the 
assertion of fiscal jurisdiction on the part of the states, which are considered to be 
inherenly “neutral”, per se, as far as European Union law is concerned and escaping the 
reach of the prohibitions deriving from the implementation of Treaty freedoms. 
According to the Luxembourg Judges, the fundamental freedoms and the principle of 
non-discrimination, in fact, do not necessarily entail any indication as to the priority of 
fiscal jurisdiction, but only provide that the exercise of the taxing jurisdiction on the part 
of the Member States must answer to the non-discrimination principle and must not 
hinder the exercise of free movement for European Union citizens499. 
It has been highlighted above that the Court has accepted that Member States are 
not limited by European Union law in their choice of connecting factors for the allocation 																																																								
496 Court of Justice of the European Union, 21 January 2010, C-311/08, Société de gestion industrielle. 
497 Court of Justice of the European Union, 15 May 2008, C-414/06, Lidl Belgium. 
498 Court of Justice of the European Union, 23 February 2006, C-513/03, Heirs of M.E.A. van Hilten - van der Heijden 
v. Inspecetur van de Belastingdienst te Heerlen. 
499 Wattel, P.J., Corporate tax jurisdiction in the EU with respect to branches and subsidiaries; dislocation distinguished from 
discrimination and disparity: a plea for territoriality, in EC Tax Review, 2003, 4, 199. 
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and exercise of their taxing powers and that residents and non-residents are not, as a 
rule, comparable for tax purposes, which essentially amounts to granting Member States 
the possibility to apply such connecting factors in an asymmetrical manner. With the 
exceptions of “final losses” for corporations and of the consequences of the need to take 
into account the taxpayer’s “ability to pay” for individuals. 
It goes without saying, and it has been abundantly highlighted in the previous 
chapter of the present research, that the simultaneous implementation of a regime 
entailing source taxation for non-resident subjects and worldwide taxation for residents 
(which constitutes a regime frequently implemented by capital-exporting countries) 
leads to double taxation of the income having its source in foreign territory. However, 
this situation does not fit into the definition of the “disparity” concept as designed by the 
Court in Damseaux or in Kerckhaert-Morres, since we are now analysing the hypothesis of 
both Member States involved implementing not different tax regimes, but, on the 
contrary, identical tax regimes500. The problem would most certainly arise also in the 
(hypothetical) case both Member States’ tax regime would entail worldwide taxation for 
both residents and non-residents, although per se consistent and non-discriminatory, 
since this situation would result in double taxation of the entire income of the taxpayer 
concerned. 
It has been observed, however, that not even the implementation, by all Member 
States, of a purely territorial tax regime, by virtue of which all Member States would tax 
both residents and non-residents only on the income produced within their respective 
territories, would effectively solve the problem at issue. Source taxation by both the 
residence and the source Member States for both residents and non-residents would, in 
fact, have the consequence of possibly splitting up one single tax base over two taxing 
jurisdictions, which would result in disadvantages for the taxpayer if his/her/its income 
is positive in one Member State and entirely negative in the other Member State (i.e. if a 
taxpayer receives his income in a Member State and suffers losses in another Member 
State), because the two categories of elements would not be able to cancel each other out, 
ensuring compensation of losses and the compliance with principles such as 
progressivity and ability-to-pay. This would lead to a situation which is similar to the 
one analysed by the Court in Schumacker. Therefore, the implementation of the ability-to-
pay principle, as imposed by the Court at least with regards to individual taxpayers, 
leads to the application of a criterion that is radically different from strict territoriality, 																																																								
500 Advocate General Geelhoed defined these situations as “quasi-restrictions” (see AG Geelhoed Opinion in Case 
C-374/04, Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation). 
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leaning towards the opposte model based on worldwide taxation. 
What changes is the perspective from which the Court looks at the Internal 
Market: either as one entity where the territorial dimension necessarily supersedes the 
borders of national countries or as a “sum of territories”, where each Member States 
constitutes a separate component of a larger Single Market. It all ultimately comes to the 
binomial “per country”-“overall” approach. 
It is certainly true that the Court’s “per country approach”, which seems to have 
prevailed in the Court of Justice’s jurisprudence until today, is more respectful of the 
sovereign prerogatives of the Member States, acknowledging that each Member State 
may decide how to structure its own tax system and that, in doing so, does not have to 
depend on any other country. The adoption of such a model, however, seems to 
contradict the application of the Court’s reasoning on “restrictions”, focusing on a mere 
“discrimination-analysis”. 
From the perspective of the “overall approach”, the combination of the 
obligations of the Member State of source and of the Member State of residence in light 
of the fundamental freedoms and of the principle of non-discrimination should be seen 
in its entirety, given that an analysis which is limited to the situation of a single taxpayer 
in the context of only one of the Member States involved in the cross-border transactions 
could provide a partial and unbalanced vision of the circumstances, not reflecting the 
economic reality in which said taxpayer acts. Furthermore, an “overall approach” to the 
topic would allow to take into account the allocation of taxing powers that the Member 
State involved, in the exercise of their sovereignty, have aimed at realising by way of 
bilateral tax treaties. 
This type of “global” reasoning probably constitutes, rebus sic stantibus, the closest 
solution to the model of a true Internal Market, calling for a coherence that is 
simultaneously internal and external to the Member States, operating not only at the 
level of the single Member State (and of its domestic tax system), but on a higher level, 
i.e. the one characterised by the need of coordinating the different tax systems of the 
Member States in order to guarantee the functioning of a proper, undistorted and 
unadulterated Internal Market. These are the values at play: the affirmation of state 
sovereignty, on one hand, and, on the other hand, the need for a coordination of tax 
measures in the name of the Internal Market. 
The question, therefore, is how to realise such a “coordination” of domestic tax 
systems without enacting interferences (which are not called for by the Treaty) in the 
Member States’ sovereignty, in absence of any homogeneous, and legislatively 
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approved, method for the allocation of taxing powers covering the entire European 
Union territory. In the context of such a “normative void” on the part of the European 
Union legislature, the Court of Justice, even though, on one hand, it expressly recognises 
the freedom for all Member States to choose how to limit the scope of their tax 
jurisdiction, on the other hand, interferes in the sovereign fiscal decisions of the Member 
States, sometimes shaping the borders of the Member States’ tax jurisdictions, even 
creating new taxing powers upon Member States which had previously decided, by 
virtue of their sovereign prerogative, not to exercise them. 
 Which brings us to the topic of double taxation. 
The Court generally interprets international double taxation as the result of “the 
exercise in parallel by two Member States of their fiscal sovereignty” (such as worldwide 
taxation in the Member State of residence and taxation at source in the Member State of 
source), which has led the Luxembourg Judges to stating that, although double taxation 
constitutes a major obstacle to the exercise of Treaty freedoms, it cannot be remedied by 
relying on the fundamental freedoms, but either through EU-level harmonisation 
measures or bilateral (or multilateral) agreements between Member States. 
One of the starting points of the discussion should, therefore, be the 
acknowledgement that maintaining, at the same time, the idea of a “common space” 
where human and productive factors are free to move without being hindered by 
national provisions, i.e. the Internal Market as envisaged in the Treaties as the ultimate 
purpose of the European Union, and the enduring power of each Member State to 
establish the extension of their taxing powers, even though not coordinating with other 
Member States’ tax system, is not possible and that a choice must be made. 
The Court’s powers have now reached an impasse: the Court cannot, and should 
not, proceed any further in the enhancement of the process of intergration of the 
European Union. In order for the Internal Market to progress further, with a proper 
integration of a single market with a single territorial dimension, a legislative 
intervention is needed, as the “case study” concerning exit taxation has clearly 
demonstrated. 
Exit taxation constitutes a problem which can be solved only by way of an 
intervention of the EU legislature: the Court has “stopped at the Member States’ national 
borders”, stating that the Member State of emigration has a right to tax the capital gains 
accrued at the time of exit, but has not gone as far as to stating that the Member State of 
destination cannot tax those items of income. This is a case in which the “balanced 
allocation of taxing powers” has actually failed to attain its purpose: for the Court to 
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state that the Member State of departure cannot tax the income accrued on its territory 
would have amounted to denying the Member States’ freedom with concern to their 
direct taxes and, ultimately, their territorial sovereignty. Which led the Court to allow 
restrictions based on the need to protect the Member State’s right to tax income 
produced within its territory, both from an anti-avoidance perspectice and from a more 
systematic and general point of view501. However, the Court has not even specified that 
the Member State of destination cannot tax the same item of income, which unavoidably 
leads to double taxation. 
The optimal solution would probably be the establishment of a regime by virtue 
of which the Member State of origin might levy tax on the income accrued up until the 
day of departure and the Member State of destination might only tax the part of the 
income accrued after the emigration. This, of course, is something that the Court cannot, 
and should not, do. Which demonstrates the need for an intervention of the EU 
legislature. Starting from this assumption, the next chapter of the research will, therefore, 
explore what the European Union legislature has achieved, as of today, in terms of 
positive integration of the Internal Market with specific concern to the allocation of 
taxing powers amongst Member States, and what should still be done to that purpose. 
Notwithstanding the conclusions that will be drawn from the analysis that is 
going to be conducted in the following chapter, one of the results that can be deducted 
from the overall examination of the Court’s approach to the topic is that, in the Court’s 
words and theories, fiscal territoriality does not appear to be a “principle” any more than 
under international (tax) law. The Court ultimately refers to territoriality simply by 
making reference to the evaluation of the criteria for the allocation of taxing powers 
across the Internal Market or, in any case, between two Member States in terms of their 
compatibility with the fundamental freedoms. That is because, as highlighted from the 
outset, The Court ultimately operates in a scenario that is characterised by a substantially 
“full” sovereignty on the part of the Member States, with no space being left to the 
affirmation of possible general “principles” other than those that can be directly inferred 
from the fundamental Treaty freedoms and the consequent need to verify the 
compatibility of national measures - and criteria - with the implementation of European 
Union law. 
 
 
 																																																								
501 De Pietro, C., Exit tax: territorialità e mobilità societaria, cited above. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE TAX TREATMENT OF FOREIGN (CORPORATE) INCOME IN POSITIVE EUROPEAN 
UNION LAW: THE ROAD SO FAR AND PERSPECTIVES FOR AN IMPROVEMENT OF THE 
INTEGRATION OF THE INTERNAL MARKET 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. The (limited) role played by the European Union legislature in the “fiscal 
integration” of the Internal Market. 
In the previous chapter we have tried to understand the role of territoriality in the 
“design” of a balanced allocation of taxing powers amongst Member States as developed 
by the Court of Justice’s case law, from the specific perspectives of the dialectical 
relationship between “source countries” and “residence countries” and of the fiscal 
treatment of foreign income, and whether (and how) this hypothetical “design” could 
actually be suitable for the attainment of the ultimate purpose of the Treaties, i.e. the 
creation of a truly integrated Internal Market. 
Such analysis has found there to be several inconsistencies in the way the 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice deals with the extension of the Member States’ 
taxing powers with regards to topics such as, for instance, international (juridical) 
double taxation, cross-border loss relief and exit taxation. 
We have also found there to be no clear indications coming from the Court’s 
decisions on how far Member States’ sovereign powers may actually go in determining 
the scope of their tax jurisdictions, especially in light of the recent tendencies on the 
substantial “primacy” of the need to prevent tax avoidance as a paramount goal, which 
seems to contradict, to a certain extent, the previous case law of the Court on the point of 
what is considered a balanced allocation of taxing powers. This absence of clear 
indications in the Court’s jurisprudence applies also to the question of which of the two 
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traditional “models” according to which countries generally shape the extension of their 
tax jurisdictions (worldwide taxation and territorial taxation) should be deemed as 
preferable for the purposes of the Internal Market, considered, as a whole, as an 
integrated tax jurisdiction. 
One of the conclusions was, therefore, that the Court’s analysis, especially as it is 
(necessarily) conducted on a case-by-case basis, is inherently not sufficient for the 
purposes of establishing a coherent approach to what should be a fair and efficient 
allocation of taxing powers at EU level for the purposes of the proper functioning of the 
Internal Market and that, consequently, an effective solution cannot but come from the 
intervention of the EU legislature. 
In light of the above, we should now examine the current situation of European 
Union secondary law on direct taxation in order to verify whether or not such provisions 
are proof of any hypothetical “preference” for one of the two above-mentioned tax 
models and whether or not this hypothetical preference is in line with the principles 
enucleated by the Court’s jurisprudence. 
It should be recalled, at the outset, as mentioned in the previous chapter of the 
research, that the field of direct taxation has been the object of limited legislative 
intervention on the part of the European Union bodies, which has been, so far, confined 
only to a certain number of specific matters mostly concerning corporate taxation and 
some of its effects on cross-border business activities. This characteristic should be duly 
taken into account when approaching the subject of the contents of secondary EU law on 
the point of direct taxation, especially in the attempt to draw any general principle from 
such provisions. 
In other words, one should always keep in mind that all positive interventions of 
the EU legislature in the field of direct taxation have not so far been “systematic” in any 
way, as they have been essentially limited to the attempt of finding solutions to very 
specific problems. These solutions, therefore, might not be necessarily inspired by an 
“overall” vision and/or interpretation of the Internal Market and of its functioning, even 
though it could be argued that a certain level of consistency should be sought and 
maintained between the general principles of the European Union legal order as 
described by the Treaties and by the judgements of Court of Justice, on one hand, and 
the normative activities of the EU legislative bodies, on the other hand. 
This is essentially due, as already highlighted in the previous chapter, to the lack 
of an exclusive competence of the European Union in the field of direct taxation, which 
adds to the complications inevitably connected to the need for unanimous approval of 
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any measure concerning direct tax. All of these factors have significantly influenced the 
evolution of the European Union legislative bodies to the issues related to the effects of 
direct taxation in the process of integration of the Internal Market502. 
Briefly said, the first significant efforts of the EU legislature in the field of direct 
taxation date back to 1990, with two directives dedicated respectively to cross-border 
mergers and other cross-border corporate reorganisations and to a common regime of 
taxation in the relationships between parent companies and subsidiaries. The subsequent 
developments in the field came thirteen years later with a new series of provisions 
concerning cross-border interest and royalty payments between related (corporate) 
parties and taxation of interest paid to non-resident individuals503. 
Other proposals were, nonetheless, put forward by the Commission but have 
found no definitive legislative approval by the competent EU bodies. This is the case, for 
instance, of the 1975 proposal concerning harmonisation of corporate income tax 
systems, of withholding taxes on dividends and of the systems of “integration” of 
corporate-level taxation and shareholder-level taxation, or the proposal concerning the 
harmonisation of the rules of the determination of corporate income, or the proposal 
concerning harmonisation of cross-border relief or the one related to the taxation of 
workers moving across the European Union504. 
In light of all of the above, it can hardly be doubted that the extent of 
harmonisation in the field of direct taxation has, so far, been considerably limited, 
especially as a consequence of the fact that each decision in said field needs, as of today, 
to be adopted through a unanimous vote. This circumstance has led the European Union 
institutions to considering the option of resorting to a different type of approach, based 
on coordinating, rather than harmonising, domestic tax regimes. Briefly said, if 																																																								
502 An overall analysis of the juridical, political, social and economic reasons for the substantial lack of any effective 
and all-encompassing approach to the topic of direct taxation in the EU, on the part both of the European Union 
and of its Member States, goes beyond the scope of the present research, which aims at analysing the current 
situation and the legal reasoning underlying the Court’s jurisprudence and the EU legislative approach to the 
subject of the allocation of taxing powers amongst Member States and of the fiscal treatment of non-residents. For 
a more detailed and reasoned analysis of such problems, see, amongst others, Di Pietro, A. (ed.), Per una 
costituzione fiscale europea, Padua, 2008, passim; Di Pietro, A., Tassani, T. (eds.), I principi europei del diritto tributario, 
Padua, 2013, passim; Boria, P., L’anti-sovrano, cited above, passim; Terra, B.J.M., Wattel, P.J., European tax law, cited 
above, passim. 
503 Reference is made to the so-called “Savings Directive”, i.e. Directive 2003/48/EC of 3 June 2003 “on taxation of 
savings income in the form of interest payments”, now repealed. The Savings Directive required automatic exchange 
of information amongst Member States on private savings income, enabling interest payments made in a Member 
State to subjects residing in other Member States to be taxed in accordance with the tax laws of the Member State 
of residence. The repeal was a consequence of the adoption, in December 2014, of Council Directive 
2014/107/EU, amending provision on the mandatory automatic exchange of information between tax 
administrations. Said Directive, in fact, which entered into force on 1 January 2016, aims at implementing the 
OECD Global Standard on automatic exchange of financial account information within the European Union, 
covering not only interest income, but dividends and other types of capital income as well, having, therefore, a 
broader scope than Directive 2003/48/EC. 
504  Melis, G., Tiscini, R., La tassazione del reddito di impresa: problemi attuali e prospettive di riforma in chiave 
comparatistica, in Rassegna Tributaria, 2014, 1, 97. 
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harmonisation consists in the introduction of a common normative body within national 
laws, coordination, on the other hand, does not affect domestic legislation, but aims, 
through recommendations and directives, at making them compatible not only with the 
Treaties, but also amongst themselves505. 
Also as a consequence of these “failures” to reach a unanimous consensus on 
many of the most crucial issues for the interaction between direct taxation and the 
integration of the Internal Market, the policy of the Commission and of the EU legislative 
bodies has, so far, been aimed essentially at solving specific and “sectorial” issues 
concerning the effect of taxation on transnational business activities. The EU legislature, 
therefore, has essentially acted in order to mitigate possible market distortions arising 
from fiscal factors in the field of direct taxation, in order to facilitate the exercise of cross-
border business activities and has, therefore, been focused almost exclusively on 
corporate taxation506. Thus, the Council enacted targeted measures aimed at removing 
specific obstacles to transnational economic activities, such as withholding taxes on 
cross-border income flows, taxation of cross-border mergers and other corporate 
reorganisations and burdens related to transfer pricing507, together with measures aimed 
at ensuring transparency, exchange of information and, ultimately, fair tax competition 
amongst Member States508. The same approach has, more recently, been adopted with 
regards to the topic of prevention of tax avoidance. 
In the following pages, therefore, we will analyse the most relevant provisions of 
the Directives on corporate taxation - and, particularly, the “Parent-Subsidiary” 
Directive, the “Interest and Royalty Directive” and the “Merger Directive” - in order to 
examine how, with regard to specific items of cross-border income, EU secondary law 
tries to strike a balance between the Member State’s (sovereign) fiscal jurisdiction and 
the integration of the Internal Market. The attention will, then, be moved to the most 																																																								
505 Aujean, M., Le fonti europee e la loro efficacia in materia tributaria, tra armonizzazione, coordinamento e concorrenza 
fiscale leale, cited above, 24. 
506 Little attention has been paid, on the other hand, to individual taxation, exception made for the - now repealed - 
“Savings Directive” mentioned above. The Commission had formulated some general indications on the point in 
its 1993 Recommendation “on the taxation of certain items of income received by non-residents in a Member State other 
than that in which they are resident” (Commission Recommendation 94/79/EC of 21 December 1993), concerning 
income from dependent personal services, pensions, income from professional occupations or other self-
employed activities, income from agricultural and forestry activities and income from industrial and commercial 
activities. The 1993 Recommendation called upon Member States not to subject such items of income, “in the 
Member State of taxation, to any heavier than if the taxpayer, his spouse and his children were resident in that Member 
State”, subject “to the condition that the items of income […] which are taxable in the Member State in which the natural 
person is not resident constitute at least 75% of that person’s total taxable income during the tax year”. Furthermore, the 
Recommendation specified that “the Member State in which a natural person is resident may decide not to grant 
deductions or other tax reliefs which it normally grants to residents if that person benefits from identical or similar 
deductions or other reliefs in the Member State which taxes the items of his income […]”. 
507 Terra, B.J.M., Wattel, P.J., European tax law, cited above, 125. 
508 Reference is made to Council Directive 2011/16/EU on “administrative cooperation in the field of taxation” and to 
Council Directive 2010/24/EU concerning “mutual assistance for the recovery of claims related to taxes, duties and other 
measures”, which both escape the scope of the present research. 
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recent initiatives in the field of direct taxation, namely the so-called “Anti-Tax 
Avoidance” Directive and the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base initiatives, so 
as to verify whether there has been any change, in more recent times, in the approach of 
the EU legislature to the topic of the allocation of fiscal jurisdiction and of the extension 
of Member States’ taxing powers. 
Notwithstanding what has been clarified above with concern to the limited scope 
of application of such provisions and to their specific purpose, and irrespective of the 
actual political will to seek such a result, it cannot be disputed that the mentioned 
Directives have the effect to constitute a first attempt of an EU-level allocation of taxing 
powers amongst Member States. At least with concern to the specific fields considered 
by the Directives, in fact, it is undeniable that the EU legislature has made specific 
choices as to which role should the Member State of source and the Member State of 
residence play with regard to certain cross-border items of income, in terms of which of 
the two States should have priority to levy tax on such income and to what extent, and of 
which of the two States should have the obligation to remove the prejudicial effects of 
any double taxation arising from the interplay of the taxing powers of the countries 
involved. 
In doing so, even though the original intention was certainly less ambitious, the 
European Union legislature has de facto taken its first (slow) steps towards the design of a 
“prototype” for a hypothetical future uniform allocation of taxing powers amongst 
Member States in the field of (corporate) income taxation, with (political) choices giving 
preference to one or the other Member State involved as far as taxation rights are 
concerned, thus implicitly recognising that the chosen model is functional and suitable 
for the purposes of the integration of the Internal Market, at least from the perspective of 
cross-border business activities and with regards to the specific items of income 
concerned. 
2. The Parent-Subsidiary Directive. 
Two different problems may arise, in the context of a group of companies, when a 
subsidiary located in a Member State distributes dividends to its parent company 
established in a different Member State: on one hand, the Member State of establishment 
of the subsidiary company might impose withholding taxes on such outbound 
dividends; on the other hand, the Member State where the parent company has its seat 
might include the inbound dividends within the parent company’s taxable base, which 
	 189 
would lead to the economic double taxation of the underlying profits from which the 
distributed dividends derive, which would be taxed upon the subsidiary as part of its 
corporate income and also, indirectly, upon the parent company in the form of the 
dividends that the parent company receives and which form part of its taxable base for 
the purposes of corporation tax. 
Acknowledging these problems and the risks they pose for the functioning of the 
Internal Market and for cross-border business activities, Council Directive 2011/96/EU 
(so-called “Parent-Subsidiary Directive”) on the common system of taxation applicable 
in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States509 seeks to 
abolish tax impediments to cross-border payment of dividends within groups of 
companies, thus aiming at improving the functioning of the Internal Market and the 
implementation of the free movement of capital and of the freedom of establishment510. 
The Directive essentially aims at eliminating differences between dividend distribution 
in purely domestic situations and dividend distribution in cross-border scenarios. 
However, as it will be shown, the Parent-Subsidiary Directive does not simply 
eliminate or alleviate double taxation on cross-border dividends, but reaches a sort of 
coordination of the taxing powers of the Member State of source of the dividends (i.e. the 
Member State where the subsidiary is located) and of the Member State of residence of 
the parent company, pursuing the objective of the highest possible level of fiscal 
neutrality of cross-border transfer of profits in the form of dividends. 
It goes without saying that the Directive applies exclusively to cross-border 
situations, with parent-subsidiary relations within the same Member State or third-states 
scenarios not being addressed. In fact, one of the conditions established in order for the 
provisions at issue to apply, is that the company must be resident for tax purposes in a 
Member State on the basis of the national tax law of that State and it may not be resident 
for tax purposes outside the European Union according to a tax treaty with a non-
Member State511. In other words, this provision disqualifies dual resident companies 
incorporated under the law of a Member State applying an incorporation or statutory 																																																								
509 Directive 2011/96/EU of 30 November 2011 replaced Council Directive 90/435/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the 
common system of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member 
States, which, as the Preamble of the new Directive states, had been substantially amended several times and, 
therefore, a new Directive had to be recast “in the interest of clarity”. The Parent-Subsidiary Directive has been 
modified in recent times by Directive 2015/121/EU, which introduced a specific anti-abuse clause. 
510 The preamble to the Directive states that the measure is aimed at eliminating the disadvantages of cooperation 
between companies of different Member States in comparison to cooperation between companies within one 
Member State and at facilitating the cross-border grouping together of companies within the European Union. 
511 Pursuant to Article 2 of the Directive, the term “company of a Member State” “means any company which: […] (ii) 
according to the tax laws of a Member State is considered to be resident in that Member State for tax purposes and, under the 
terms of a double taxation agreement concluded with a third State, is not considered to be resident for tax purposes outside 
the Union”. 
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seat criterion for tax subjection, and which are consequently resident for tax purposes in 
that Member State, but which are also resident in a non-Member State according to that 
State’s tax law on the basis of the place of effective management. Such third-State dual 
resident companies were probably excluded because they may be used in tax planning 
and avoidance schemes, as they may enjoy tax benefits (e.g. access to tax treaties) in both 
states where they resident for tax purposes512-513. 
The essence of the provisions of the Directive is that cross-border profit 
distributions paid out of after-tax profits by an EU subsidiary to its EU parent-company 
located in a different Member State must be exempt from dividend withholding tax in 
the Member State of source (provided that certain conditions are met as far as the parent 
company’s share of the subsidiary is concerned514) and free of double corporate income 
taxation in the Member State where the parent company is established. 
The Directive stipulates, therefore, that, on one hand, intragroup cross-border 
payments of dividends must be exempted from withholding tax by the Member State of 
the subsidiary and that, on the other hand, the Member State of the recipient parent 
company shall either abstain from levying taxes on the incoming dividend altogether or 
tax it and then grant a credit for the corporation tax already paid by the subsidiary in its 
Member State of establishment515. Furthermore, not a full credit, but only an “ordinary 																																																								
512 Terra, B.J.M., Wattel, P.J., European tax law, cited above, 307; Tenore, M., Taxation of dividends: a comparison of 
selected issues under Article 10 OECD MC and the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, in Intertax, 2009, 222; Tenore, M., 
Taxation of cross-border dividends in the European Union from past to future, in EC Tax Review, 2010, 2, 74 
513 The Directive, however, does not provide an autonomous definition of what should constitute the elements 
depending on which a company should be considered as a “resident” of a Member State, simply referring to the 
criteria employed by the Member State concerned, as was highlighted above. It is commonly observed, in fact, 
that European Union positive law does not entail any specific definition of “residence”, not even in the context of 
corporate taxation or corporate law in general, and, therefore, does not establish which should be the linking 
criteria which should be accepted by the EU legislature for the identification of residence. See, on the point, 
Marino, G., Residenza - Diritto tributario, in Enciclopedia Giuridica Treccani, vol. XVII, Rome, 2008, 1, where the 
Author state that EU law does not entail any autonomous definition of “residence” for the purposes of preventing 
double taxation because this aim should be pursued by Member States through bilateral tax treaties. Another 
Author observes that the notion of residence, though not clearly and autonomously defined by EU positive law, 
has been traced in a more precise way by the Court of Justice’s case law; see Ballancin, A., Note in tema di 
esterovestizione societaria tra i criteri costitutivi della nozione di residenza fiscale e l’interposizione elusiva di persona, in 
Riv. dir. trib., 2008, 1, 987. Furthermore, as observed by Dorigo, S., Mastellone, P., L’evoluzione della nozione di 
residenza fiscale delle persone giuridiche nell’ambito del Progetto BEPS, cited above, 64, an “impulse” towards a more 
autonomous EU definition of “residence” is contained in the 2011 Commission proposal for a Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base, which suggested a tie-breaker rule pursuant to which a company that is 
resident in more than one Member State should be considered as residing in the Member State where its place of 
effective management is located. 
514 Pursuant to Article 3 of the Directive, “the status of parent company shall be attributed at least to a company of a 
Member State which fulfils the conditions set out in Article 2 and has a minimum holding of 10% in the capital of a 
company of another Member State fulfilling the same conditions”, provided that Member States enjoy the option of 
requiring that the parent company maintain such holding for an uninterrupted period of up to two years (this 
option has been resorted to by a considerable number of Member States). 
515 Article 5 of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive provides that “profits which a subsidiary distributes to its parent 
company shall be exempt from withholding tax”, while Article 4 of the Directive sets out that “Where a parent company 
or its permanent establishment, by virtue of the association of the parent company with its subsidiary, receives distributed 
profits, the Member State of the parent company and the Member State of its permanent establishment shall, except when the 
subsidiary is liquidated, either: (a) refrain from taxing such profits; or (b) tax such profits while authorising the parent 
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indirect credit” should be granted, since the credit for the underlying foreign corporation 
tax cannot exceed the amount of domestic corporation tax the Member State of 
establishment of the parent company levies on the gross amount of the dividends. 
It should also be highlighted that the Parent-Subsidiary Directive allows the 
Member State of establishment of the parent company to deny the deduction from the 
taxable profit of such parent company of any charges related to the holding in the 
subsidiary (e.g. management charges, interest paid on the financing of the holding 
company, etc.). In fact, if a Member State opts for the exemption method, such charges 
must be attributed to the exempted income, and, therefore, they should be “exempted” 
as well, otherwise the Member State of the parent company would be essentially 
required to refund domestic taxes on taxable income from other sources. Under the 
indirect credit system, such charges are also attributed to the dividends for which credit 
is granted, thus reducing the amount of the maximum credit granted516. Many Member 
States have established a rule pursuant to which, in order to be deductible, expensed 
incurred shall be sufficiently connected to taxable income. 
Such a rule has been the object of the Court of Justice’s attention in the Bosal 
Holding case517, which concerned a Dutch domestic provision pursuant to which expenses 
incurred by a parent company to finance or manage its subsidiary (either domestic or 
foreign) could be deducted by that parent company only if, and insofar as, they had been 
instrumental in earning profits subject to tax in the jurisdiction where the parent 
company sought to deduct those expenses. The fact pattern had as its object a Dutch 
parent company with foreign subsidiaries which were not subject to tax in the 
Netherlands: this situation led the Netherlands to deny the deduction from the Dutch tax 
base of the parent company of expenses incurred by that same parent company that 
were instrumental in earning such exempted income from subsidiaries that were not 
subject to tax. 
Although the Parent-Subsidiary Directive left Member States with the choice to 
disregard such expenses and, therefore, the Dutch measure at issue was compliant with 
the provisions of the Directive, the Court nonetheless found that said Directive should 																																																																																																																																																																													
company and the permanent establishment to deduct from the amount of tax due that fraction of the corporation tax related 
to those profits and paid by the subsidiary and any lower-tier subsidiary, subject to the condition that at each tier a company 
and its lower-tier subsidiary fall within the definitions laid down in Article 2 and meet the requirements provided for in 
Article 3, up to the limit of the corresponding tax due”. The Court has found that Article 5 of the Directive has direct 
effect and can therefore be relief upon by individual taxpayers before national tax courts with priority over 
derogating national tax provisions: on the point, see Court of Justice of the European Union, joined cases of 17 
October 1996, C-283/94, C-291/94 and C-292/94, Denkavit Internationaal BV, VITIC Amsterdam BV and Voormeer 
BV vs. Bundesamt für Finanzen. 
516 Terra, B.J.M., Wattel, P.J., European tax law, cited above, 316. 
517 Court of Justice of the European Union, 18 September 2003, C-168/01, Bosal Holding BV v. Staatssecretaris von 
Financiën. 
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not be interpreted as “isolated”, being it necessary to consider whether or not the 
measure at hand was contrary to the Treaty as well, thus interpreting the Directive in 
light of the conclusions reached in this respect518. 
It should be noted that the Court of Justice has subsequently upheld this 
reasoning, for example, in its Groupe Steria judgement519, where it stated that “it is evident 
from settled case law that the decision which Article 4(2) of Directive 90/435 leaves in the hands 
of the Member States may be exercised only in compliance with the fundamental provisions of the 
Treaty, in this instance Article 49 TFEU”. 
Going back to Bosal Holding, this reasoning led the Court to consider the Dutch 
measure at issue to be contrary to the freedom of establishment and required the 
Member States to make the same choice irrespective of whether or not the subsidiary 
company was subject to tax in the State of establishment of the parent company and 
irrespective of whether or not the parent company was taxed on the capital gains of its 
subsidiaries. In other words, the Court did not accept that the discretion granted by the 
Parent-Subsidiary Directive be exercised in a different way depending on whether or not 
a domestic parent company holds subsidiaries subject to the taxing powers of the 
Member State of residence of said parent company. 
The decision was met with a considerable level of surprise and criticism by legal 
scholarship, since, as it was shown in the previous chapter of the research, the 
Luxembourg Judges had previously recognised - e.g. in cases such as Futura and N. v. 
Inspecteur - the relevance of the “fiscal principle of territoriality”, intended as the 
principle according to which Member States are allowed, inter alia, not to grant 
deductions for expenses and other negative elements connected to items of income on 
which they choose not to levy tax. Pursuant to this more “traditional” line of thinking, it 
would have been expected that the Court, in the Bosal Holding, case would allow the 
Netherlands to ensure that only charges attributable to the Dutch taxable profit could be 
deductible from Dutch tax base. 
In Bosal Holding, however, the Court seems to recognise its previous acceptance of 
territoriality as a reason to exclude the discriminatory nature of a tax provision, 
nonetheless explicitly specifying that the “Futura doctrine” concerned the taxation of a 
single company carrying on business in two Member States through a permanent 
establishment (branch), thus tracing a difference between that circumstance and the 
situation of a parent company in relation to the profits of its subsidiaries, since parent 																																																								
518 Weber, D., The Bosal Holding case: analysis and critique, in EC Tax Review, 2003, 4, 222; Lyons, T., Tax in a Single 
Market: Bosal and Marks and Spencer PLC, in British Tax Review, 2003, 6, 444. 
519 Court of Justice of the European Union, 2 September 2015, C-386/14, Groupe Steria SCA. 
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companies and their subsidiaries constitute separate legal entities: the profits of the 
subsidiaries are not, in fact, generally taxed in the hands of the parent company520. 
The Court essentially argued that the principle of territoriality, as recognised and 
described in Futura, concerned only the situation of one taxpayer. The Judges, therefore, 
seem to have somehow disregarded the relevance of territoriality as postulated in the 
Futura judgement521: it has been argued, in fact, that, in terms of discrimination, the 
situations of two different taxpayers are only comparable to the extent that the Member 
State exercise the same tax jurisdiction over both of them, which could be consistent with 
the general principle according to which it is for the Member States to decide what falls 
within their respective fiscal jurisdictions522. 
The Court’s ruling in Bosal Holding, therefore, has shed a different light on the 
Court’s interpretation of the concept (or principle) of “territoriality”, which might seem 
to be, in Bosal Holding, partially different than the one on which the Futura judgement 
was based. As highlighted above, in Futura the Court, resorting to a notion of 
“territoriality as a principle”, as opposed to the concept of “territoriality as a criterion” 
(as a synonym of “limited taxation” or “taxation at source”), assumed the principle of 
territoriality to be applied to residents when they are taxed on their worldwide income 
and to non-residents subject to limited liability. It did not consider the admissibility, 
under European Union law, of a measure by way of which tax is levied on residents not 
on their worldwide income, but rather only on domestic income, thus applying what has 
been defined as “territoriality as a criterion”. The reasoning seems quite similar to the 
“always somewhere approach” which the Court applied, for example, in the Marks & 
Spencer case523. 
In Bosal Holding, the Court did not reject the application of “territoriality as a 
criterion” to residents as such, but limited it to the taxation of one single taxpayer, 																																																								
520 Weber, D., In search of a (new) equilibrium between tax sovereignty and the freedom of movement within the EC, cited 
above, 595; Kingston, S., The boundaries of sovereignty: the ECJ’s controversial role applying Internal Market law to direct 
tax measures, cited above, 301. 
521 Wattel, P.J., Red herrings in direct tax cases before the ECJ, cited above, 89. 
522 For example, AG Geelhoed has stated, in its Opinion on the Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation 
case (C-374/04), that in Bosal Holding the Court of Justice showed insufficient respect for the allocation of taxing 
rights amongst Member States, pointing out as follows: “The division of tax jurisdiction between the Netherlands and 
the Member States of residence of the subsidiaries was such that jurisdiction to tax the foreign subsidiaries’ profit fell solely 
to the latter, i.e. the source State. As a result it would seem to be wholly consistent with this division of jurisdiction for the 
Netherlands to allocate those charges paid by the Dutch parent, which were attributable to the exempted profits of the foreign 
subsidiaries, to the Member States of the subsidiaries. In other terms, it would seem clear that the position of a domestic 
parent company with a subsidiary whose profits are taxable in the Member State, on the one hand, and such a parent 
company with a subsidiary whose profits are not taxable (exempt) in that Member State, on the other hand, are not 
comparable. In sum, this would appear to be a classic example of a difference in treatment resulting directly from dislocation 
of tax base. It seems to me that the result of the ECJ’s judgement was to override the Member States’ choice of division of tax 
jurisdiction and priority of taxation, which choice lies solely within Member States’ competence” (point 63). On the point, 
from a critical perspective, see also Wattel, P.J., Red herrings in direct tax cases before the ECJ, cited above, 89. 
523 On the point, see the previous chapter, paragraph 6. 
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disallowing the allocation of the parent company’s costs and losses to the activities of a 
different taxpayer, i.e. a subsidiary established abroad524. Therefore, the Court of Justice 
has not, so far, ever denied the possibility for a Member State to apply a strictly 
territorial tax system with respect to residents as well.  
Going back to the provision of the Directive, it has been highlighted above that 
the Member States of establishment of the parent companies are left with a choice 
between exempting the incoming dividend from tax and granting a credit for the 
corporation tax already paid by the subsidiary in its Member State of establishment. Both 
methods were and still are used by Member States in their domestic laws525. 
The wording of the Directive does not prevent Member States from applying both 
methods in the implementation of the Directive itself, depending on the circumstances 
(e.g., on whether a tax treaty is in force with the Member State of the subsidiary, on 
whether the level of effective taxation in the Member State of the subsidiary is 
comparable with the level of effective taxation in the Member State of the parent 
company). 
The Court of Justice of the European Union accepted, for example, in the Test 
Claimants FII GLO526 case and in the joined cases Haribo and Salinen527, an asymmetrical 
choice by the Member State of the parent company, exempting domestic dividends on 
one hand and granting a credit for cross-border dividends on the other hand, since, 
according to the Luxembourg Judges, neither the Parent-Subsidiary Directive nor the 
fundamental Treaty freedoms require the Member State of the parent company to apply 
the same system of prevention of economic double taxation to cross-border and domestic 
intercompany dividends, as exemption and credit are considered as “equivalent”. 
It could be argued, however, that such a statement goes in the opposite direction 
of what the Court of Justice had previously found in its Bosal Holding judgement528, where 
an almost identical “asymmetrical” choice made on the basis of the same provision of the 
Directive was deemed incompatible with the fundamental Treaty freedoms. 
Also, irrespective of what has been stated in Bosal Holding, it should also be noted 
that the exemption method and the credit method are not really “equivalent” as far as 																																																								
524 Weber, D., Is the limitation of tax jurisdiction a restriction of the freedom of movement?, Paper for the Annual 
Conference of the European Association of Tax Law Professors, cited above. 
525 It has already been noted in the first chapter of the research that, in general terms, states exempting foreign-
source income adhere to a model of capital import neutrality, whereas states implementing the credit method are 
closer to the idea of investment neutrality in the home market, i.e. to capital export neutrality. 
526 Court of Justice of the European Union, 12 December 2006, C-446/04, Test Claimants in the Franked Investment 
Income Group. 
527 Court of Justice of the European Union, 10 February 2011, joined cases C-436/08 and C-437/08, Haribo and 
Österreichische Salinen. 
528 Court of Justice of the European Union, 18 September 2003, C-168/01, Bosal Holding BV v. Staatssecretaris von 
Financiën. 
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the position of the taxpayers is concerned, leading to possible discriminatory effects on 
parent companies of foreign subsidiaries. Just to mention one of the differences between 
the two methods, the credit method implies considerable administrative burdens (and 
costs), which makes said method significantly more cumbersome for the parent 
company, which must demonstrate the amount of the foreign corporation tax 
attributable to the distributed profit of the foreign subsidiary, whereas the exemption of 
domestic dividends fully protects a parent company of domestic subsidiaries against 
these procedural and administrative obstacles529. Yet, the Court of Justice has consistently 
stated that the fundamental freedoms prohibit all discrimination, including minor one 
and administrative ones530. 
 Moreover, one should also consider that the tax at the level of the subsidiary 
company may be lower than at the level of the parent company, as an effect of benefits 
such as loss relief, foreign tax credit, tax incentives and so on. The effect of such 
advantages at the level of the subsidiary would not be touched by taxation in the state of 
establishment of the parent company under an exemption system. By contrast, similar 
foreign reliefs and incentives at the level of the subsidiary company could be deprived of 
any actual effect under an indirect credit system531: reducing the amount of tax paid 
abroad means also reducing the amount of credit granted by the state of establishment of 
the parent company, thus impairing the effects of the advantages granted by the source 
state. 
That being stated, and even though the Directive leaves the Member State a 
choice between exemption and credit, some authors have argued that there would be 
signs that exemption might become the only single method applied at the European 
Union level for the prevention of double taxation of intra-group profit distributions. This 
opinion is based on the fact that, as it has been observed, that many Member States that, 
in their domestic tax laws, generally resort to the credit method prefer the exemption 
method when implementing the Parent-Subsidiary Directive 532 . Also, the CCCTB 
proposal only provides for exemption of third-state subsidiary dividends as well. 
All of the above demonstrates that the “Parent-Subsidiary” Directive is not 
merely aimed at the elimination or alleviation of (both juridical and economic) double 
taxation on cross-border intra-EU dividends, but also constitutes a first attempt of 
coordinating the exercise of taxing powers of the Member State of source, on whom is 																																																								
529 Terra, B.J.M., Wattel, P.J., European tax law, cited above, 312. 
530 On the point, see, for example, Court of Justice of the European Union, 28 April 1998, C-118/96, Jessica Safir. 
531 Terra, B.J.M., Wattel, P.J., European tax law, cited above, 313. 
532 Terra, B.J.M., Wattel, P.J., European tax law, cited above, 314. 
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imposed a duty to refrain from levying withholding taxes on outbound dividends, and 
of the Member State of residence, which is called to remedy the problems related to 
economic double taxation of the underlying profit either by way of the exemption 
method or by way of the credit method. 
That being said, in light of all of the above, it can be stated that the analysis of the 
Parent-Subsidiary Directive does not show any definite preference, on the part of the 
European Union legislature, for one of the two traditional tax models, the provisions of 
said Directive being substantially “neutral” on the point. The choice concerning which of 
the two models to implement is, in fact, essentially left to the Member States. This 
characteristic can also be seen as the consequence of the fact that the Directive aims at 
preventing both juridical double taxation of cross-border dividends and economic 
double taxation of the underlying profits, with two perspectives necessarily 
intertwining: the perspective of the Member State of establishment of the subsidiary - 
which is treated both as the “Member State of residence” with regard to the subsidiary 
and the “Member State of source” with concern to the dividends - and the perspective of 
the Member State of establishment of the parent company, which, from the point of view 
of the Directive, assumes only the role of “Member State of residence”. 
On one hand, therefore, if we analyse the Directive from the subsidiary’s point of 
view, its provisions show a substantial tendency towards the guarantee of effective tax 
territoriality: the subsidiary’s income is taxed by the country where the subsidiary 
resides, but that country’s taxing powers do not extend to the outbound dividends, 
which become part of the income attributed to a different subject, i.e. the parent 
company, with the “source Member State” having to refrain from imposing any sort of 
withholding tax on such items of income. 
On the other hand, if we analyse the Directive from the point of view of the 
parent company, the choice between the implementation of a “worldwide tax model” 
and the implementation of a “territorial tax model” is left to the Member State where the 
such parent company resides. In fact, inbound dividends might theoretically be taxed in 
the Member State of residence of the parent company, which, however, must grant a 
credit for the foreign tax paid abroad on the subsidiary’s underlying profits: in this case, 
the Member State concerned would substantially opt for the implementation of a 
“worldwide tax model”, adhering to a perspective of capital export neutrality. As an 
alternative, the Member State might exempt inbound dividends and, in doing so, would 
essentially enact a more strictly territorial tax model. Such freedom of choice has been 
generally confirmed also by the Court of Justice’s jurisprudence, as shown above. 
	 197 
This apparent “interchangeability” of tax models and the freedom of choice of the 
Member States concerned on the point is confirmed by the fact that the Directive leaves 
to the Member State of residence of the parent company the choice on whether or not to 
grant a deduction from the parent company’s corporate income of expenses connected to 
the foreign subsidiary: this choice would prove a tendency, on the part of the Member 
State concerned, either towards territorial (source) taxation or worldwide taxation. The 
choice, however, seems to have been somehow limited and, to a certain extent, “steered” 
by the Court of Justice, as the analysis of the Bosal Holding judgement has demonstrated, 
looking at the Internal Market and at the European Union territory as a whole, from an 
“overall” perspective, and applying the “always somewhere” approach, with a 
consequent derogation to tax territoriality. 
That being established, it is also interesting to note that the Court of Justice, in 
application of its “restriction analysis” as described in the previous chapter of the 
present research, has progressively widened the scope of application of the Parent-
Directive Directive both in the Member State of residence and in the Member State of 
source of the income533. 
For example, in its judgement on the Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group 
Litigation case, the Court stated that “the mere fact that, for holdings to which Directive 
90/435 [i.e. current Directive 2011/96/EU] does not apply, it is for the Member States to 
determine whether, and to what extent a series of charges to tax and economic double taxation are 
to be avoided and, for that purpose, to establish, either unilaterally or through DTCs concluded 
with other Member States, procedures intended to prevent or mitigate such a series of charges to 
tax and that economic double taxation, does not of itself mean that the Member States are entitled 
to impose measures that contravene the freedoms of movement guaranteed by the Treaty. Thus, 
where a Member States has a system for preventing or mitigating a series of charges to tax or 
economic double taxation for dividends paid to residents by resident companies, it must treat 
dividends paid to residents by non-resident companies in the same way”534. 
Notwithstanding this statement, the Court, however, has never, until today, 
interpreted the obligation imposed on Member States to equally prevent double taxation 
for foreign-source dividends and for domestic-source dividends as entailing a 
prohibition for Member States to resort to different methods for doing so (e.g., a tax 
credit for foreign-source dividends and exemption for domestic-source dividends). It has 																																																								
533 Traversa, E., Il divieto di doppia imposizione, cited above, 343; Rainegard de la Bléthiere, E., EU Report, in Key 
practical issues for the elimination of double taxation, IFA Cahiers, vol. 96b, 2011, 64. 
534 Court of Justice of the European Union, 12 December 2006, C-374/04, Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group 
Litigation. A similar statement may be found in Court of Justice of the European Union, 8 November 2007, C-
379/05, Amurta. 
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been argued that this approach is the result of a wider implementation, on the part of the 
Court, of the same mechanisms enshrined in the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, which, as 
seen above, leaves Member States with the possibility to freely choose which of the two 
methods to implement535. 
Finally, it should be recalled that all of the above is made conditional upon the 
“anti-abuse clause” which has been recently added to the Parent-Subsidiary Directive536, 
by virtue of which Member States shall not grant companies the benefits provided for by 
the Directive “to an arrangement or a series of arrangements which, having been put into place 
for the main purpose or one of the main purposes of obtaining a tax advantage that defeats the 
object or purpose of this Directive, are not genuine having regard to all relevant facts and 
circumstances”. 
3. The Interest and Royalty Directive. 
It has been argued that, in the context of the European Union Internal Market, 
withholding taxes on cross-border interest and royalty payments between EU companies 
pose less of a problem as far as risks of double taxation are concerned than withholding 
taxes on dividends, since many Member States, in practice, do not levy any withholding 
tax on outbound interest and royalties. Furthermore, unlike dividend payments, interest 
and royalty payments, if we exclude the effects of thin capitalisation regimes and similar 
limitation on interest deduction posed by domestic laws, are generally deductible from 
the taxable profit of the company making the payments, which considerably prevents 
the effects of double taxation amongst European Union Member States537. 
Notwithstanding all of the above, Directive 2003/49/EC on a common system of 
taxation applicable to interest and royalty payments made between associated 
companies of different Member States (the “Interest and Royalty Directive”) was put in 
place in order to eliminate juridical double taxation and administrative and cash-flow 
disadvantages of cross-border intra-group interest and royalty payments as compared to 
similar purely domestic payments. According to the Preamble of the Directive, one of its 
collateral aims is to ensure that interest and royalty payments are taxed at least one in a 
Member State. 																																																								
535 Traversa, E., Il divieto di doppia imposizione, cited above, 344; Rainegard de la Bléthiere, E., EU Report, cited above, 
64. 
536  Article 1(2) of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive. The provision has been added by Council Directive 
2015/121/EU of 27 January 2015 “amending Directive 2011/96/EU on the common system of taxation applicable in the 
case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States”. 
537 Terra, B.J.M., Wattel, P.J., European tax law, cited above, 387. 
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The subjective requirements for the possible application of the Interest and 
Royalty Directive are the same as for the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and the Merger 
Directive: the benefits must be granted exclusively to companies which are resident, for 
fiscal purposes, in one of the Member States without at the same time being considered 
as residents of a third country under a tax treaty. With one more specification which 
further restricts the scope of application of the measure: in order to qualify for the 
benefits granted by the Directive, a company of a Member State must also be associated 
with the company of another Member State in favour of which the payment of interest or 
royalties is made538. 
The core of the Interest and Royalty Directive is that taxation of interest and 
royalty payments in their Member State of source is prohibited, while taxation in the 
Member State of the beneficial owner of such payments is imposed. The Member State of 
the paying company, therefore, must exempt from tax, whether levied by withholding 
tax at source or by assessment, any royalty or interest payment made to a beneficial 
owner which is an associated qualifying company located in another Member State539. 
The idea behind this choice is that interest and royalty income within groups of 
companies should be taxed in the jurisdiction where the related expenditure (e.g. the 
cost of raising capital, the cost of research and development activities, etc.) is deducted, 
thus implementing a sort of alignment between positive elements and negative elements, 
in light of a mechanism similar to what constitutes “balanced allocation” according to 
the Court of Justice. 
As opposed to what has been highlighted above concerning the Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive, it is somehow easy, with regard to the Interest and Royalty Directive, to 
identify a substantial preference for a fiscal system based on taxation in the Member 
State of residence. The operative part of the Directive, in fact, does not take into account 
the country of origin of the interest and royalty payments concerned and the Member 
State of source does not have any right to tax such outbound payments paid by a 
company residing in its territory, which form the taxable base of a foreign company 
(from its point of view): taxation is, therefore, left to the Member State of residence of the 
company receiving such payments. Obviously, in this case no problem regarding 
economic double taxation arises, since the items of income concerned represent a cost for 																																																								
538 For a definition of what constitutes an “association” for the purposes of the Interest and Royalty Directive, see 
Article 3(b) of the Directive itself. 
539 In order to qualify as “beneficial owner” of such payments, the recipient company must receive the payments 
for its own benefit, i.e. not as an intermediary for another (physical or legal) person. Briefly said, the provision 
aims at excluding conduit companies, artificially interposed by non-qualifying creditors (for example, third-state 
subjects) in order to become eligible for the benefits granted by the Directive. 
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the company paying such sums (which, depending on the national regime applicable, 
could also be deducted from the company’s taxable income). 
Some authors have criticised the allocation of tax revenue put in place by the 
Interest and Royalty Directive, stating, for example, that provisions such as those 
enshrined in the Directive would encourage fiscal competition amongst Member States 
and provides tax-planning opportunities. Part of the legal literature has also noted that, 
if, on one hand, there is a certain level of coherence in granting the Member State of 
residence of the creditor the right to tax the proceeds of the capital or of the piece of 
intellectual property at issue (since it is in that State that the expenditure for raising 
capital or for research and development has been suffered and can generally be 
deducted), on the other hand, abolition of source taxation on deductible payments 
would amount to an arbitrary division of tax revenue amongst Member States: the only 
reason underlying such mechanism would be that income from equity investment is 
taxed in the Member State of investment because dividends are not deductible, whereas 
income from loan investment is taxed in the State of residence of the investor because 
interest is deductible540. 
4. The Merger Directive.  
Council Directive 2009/133/EC of 19 October 2009 on the common system of 
taxation applicable to mergers, divisions, transfers of assets and exchanges of shares 
concerning companies of different Member States541 has, amongst its main objectives, the 
removal and prevention of the tax issues arising from the joining together of two or more 
companies from different Member States and from the division of a company into 
separate entities from different Member States542. The Directive, in other words, is aimed 
at ensuring that Member States do not hinder the enactment of cross-border company 																																																								
540 Terra, B.J.M., Wattel, P.J., European tax law, cited above, 400. 
541 Initial proposals for a “Merger Directive” date back to 1969. In 1990, Council Directive 90/434/EEC of 20 
August 1990 was adopted, covering mergers, divisions, transfers of assets and exchanges of shares concerning 
companies of different Member States. The text was then amended by Directive 2005/19/EC of 17 February 2005, 
which substantially widened the subjective and objective scope of application of the first version of the Directive, 
thus including the Societas Europaea (SE), the Societas Cooperativa Europaea (SCE) and several entities not 
covered by the former version as well as hybrid entities. With regards to the objective scope, partial divisions and 
the transfer of the registered office of an SE or SCE from one Member State to another were covered. Because of 
the several amendments, the Merger Directive was codified in 2009 to enhance clarity; however, the codification 
did not lead to changes of the content of the Directive. 
542 In order to be entitled to the benefits provided by the Merger Directive, the companies involved in the 
operations covered must qualify as a “company from a Member State”. Article 3 of the Directive establishes the 
same requirements for that status as those listed in Article 2 of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive: legal form, fiscal 
residence in the EU (and the companies may not be resident for tax purposes outside the Union pursuant to a tax 
treaty concluded between a Member State and a third country) and the need for such companies to be subject to a 
corporation tax- 
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reorganisations by way of restrictions of a fiscal nature: as clarified in its Preamble, the 
ultimate objective of the Merger Directive is to ensure that cross-border company 
reorganisations are “fiscally neutral” in the same way as purely domestic reorganisations 
are543. 
Starting from the assumption that, in absence of any specific tax provision, 
company reorganisations will generally trigger immediate taxation of unrealised capital 
gains, the Directive basically provides for a common system of deferral of taxation of 
capital gains and tax-free reserves on the occasion of a cross-border merger, division, 
asset merger or share merger: tax liability at the time of the operation is thus deferred to 
the later moment of realisation by way of a carry-over of the tax value of the assets and 
liabilities transferred and the shares exchanged. 
Therefore, Member States must refrain from taxing any capital gains arising on 
the occasion of a cross-border operation falling within the scope of application of the 
Directive544. The potential tax due on such reserves accrued prior to the transaction is 
shifted to the receiving company, which must enter the transferred assets and liabilities 
in its account at the same tax value as that assigned to them in the transferring 
company’s accounts prior to the transfer. Where the receiving company disposes of the 
assets transferred by way of such an operation, tax will be levied on that occasion on the 
difference between the disposition price and the book value of the assets prior to the 
merger545-546. 
The Merger Directive provides for another requirement in order for the operation 
to enjoy the above-mentioned benefits: cross-border mergers, cross-border divisions and 
cross-border assets transfers shall not give rise to any taxation of capital gains only if and 
insofar as the assets and liabilities transferred remain effectively connected, through a 																																																								
543 Traversa, E., Il divieto di doppia imposizione, cited above, 340. 
544 More specifically, in a merger, a division or an asset merger, the assets and liabilities transferred must enter the 
accounts of the receiving company at the same tax value assigned to them in the transferring company’s accounts 
immediately prior to the transfer. 
545 Similarly, a person which, in the context of a merger, exchanges his/her/its shares in a company for shares in 
another company shall not be taxed on the consequent possible capital gain at the time of such exchange. The 
2005 amendment of the Directive added a similar tax deferral rule for the case of a transfer of the registered office 
of a Societas Europaea (SE) or of a Societas Cooperativa Europaea (SCE) from one Member State to another and 
for mergers involving SEs or SCEs. 
546 Whereas, in the case of SEs or SCEs transferring their effective management abroad, no assets are transferred, 
not shares, but a resident taxpayer becomes a non-resident taxpayer in the Member State of departure, thus 
becoming subject to tax in such State only with regards to income having its source therein, and at the same time 
becoming resident, thus subject to unlimited tax liability, in the Member State of entry. According to the case law 
of the Court of Justice, also national legal forms of company may benefit from comparable deferral and carry-over 
rules on the basis of the freedom of establishment provided by the Treaty, as the requirement to pay tax upon the 
cross-border transfer of the seat of an undertaking, when no gains are realised nor any income is derived, was 
held to be disproportionate by the Court in the National Grid Indus case (C-371/10), as we will see more in detail 
when talking about exit taxation in the context of European Union law. It has also been observed that the tax 
claim on the capital gain is connected to the assets, but is then carried over to another person, i.e. the receiving 
company, while, in the context of a share merger, the tax claim on the capital gain remains with the same person, 
i.e. the shareholder, but is rolled over to other shares, i.e. the shares received in exchange 
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territorial nexus, to a permanent establishment in the State of their fiscal location before 
the operations547. The rationale behind this requirement is to ensure that the Member State 
within whose jurisdiction the unrealised gains have accrued retains fiscal jurisdiction 
over the assets to which such unrealised gains are attached, thus safeguarding the taxing 
rights and financial interest of the Member State of the transferring company, especially 
since, in general terms, under international tax treaty law a state may only tax profits 
derived by non-residents if those profits are sources within its territory548. 
Like the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and the Interest and Royalty Directive, the 
Merger Directive includes a general anti-abuse clause, pursuant to which a Member 
State may deny the Directive benefits where it appears that one of the operations at issue 
“has as its principal objective or as one of its principal objectives tax evasion or tax avoidance”549. 
In light of all of the above, with regard to the Merger Directive, the tendency of 
EU secondary law appears to be substantially different from the ones described above 
with concern to the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and the Interest and Royalty Directive. It 
would, in fact, appear that, in the dialectical relationship between “residence countries” 
and “source countries”, the Merger Directive gives preference to the Member State of 
source, thus being in line, at least partially, with the Court of Justice’s jurisprudence on 
exit taxation and calling for an allocation of taxing powers based on criteria of a 
territorial nature. 
That being established, it should be noted that part of the legal scholarship has 
also observed that the “permanent establishment requirement” is aimed at ensuring both 
jurisdiction for the source Member State and prevention of double taxation in the home 
State, as the presence of a branch is the connecting factor for source state taxing 
jurisdiction and for the home state obligation to prevent double taxation under 																																																								
547 If Article 4.1 provides that “a merger, division or partial division shall not give rise to any taxation of capital gains 
calculated by reference to the difference between the real values of the assets and liabilities transferred and their values for tax 
purposes”, Article 4.2 establishes that “for the purpose of this Article, the following definitions shall apply: […] (b) 
‘transferred assets and liabilities’: those assets and liabilities of the transferring company which, in consequence of the 
merger, division and partial division, are effectively connected with a permanent establishment of the receiving company in 
the Member State of the transferring company and play a part in generating the profits or losses taken into account for tax 
purposes”. A similar requirement is established by Article 12 of the Directive for the case of migration of a SE or 
SCE, which must remain effectively connected with a branch of the SE or of the SCE in the Member State of 
departure in order to enjoy the benefits provided for by the Directive. 
548 As clarified in the Preamble of the Directive, these provisions - starting from the assumption that “in respect of 
mergers, divisions or transfers of assets, such operations result either in the transformation of the transferring company into 
a permanent establishment of the company receiving the assets or in the assets becoming connected with a permanent 
establishment of the latter company” - create a system of “deferral of the taxation of the capital gains relating to the assets 
transferred until their actual disposal which applied to such of those assets as are transferred to that permanent 
establishment, permits exemption from taxation of the corresponding capital gains, while at the same time ensuring their 
ultimate taxation by the Member State of the transferring company at the date of their disposal”. 
549 Article 15 of the Directive specifies that “the fact that the operation is not carried out for valid commercial reasons such 
as the restructuring or rationalisation of the activities of the companies participating in the operation may constitute a 
presumption that the operation has tax evasion or tax avoidance as its principal objective or as one of its principal 
objectives”. For an interpretation of such a rule, see Court of Justice of the European Union, 17 July 1997, C-28/95, 
Leur-Bloem v. Inspecteur. 
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international tax treaty law: if the assets and liabilities transferred in a cross-border 
merger were not part of a branch in the Member State of the transferring company (i.e. 
the departure Member State), then that Member State would lose tax jurisdiction over 
them and would not be able to enforce its taxing rights with regards to the capital gains 
and tax reserves in the future. In light of these considerations, several authors have 
defined the provisions described above as “claim savers”, ensuring that future 
realisation of the deferred capital gains will be part of the tax base allocated to the 
Member State of the transferring company550. 
However, as highlighted by part of the legal scholarship, it would appear that the 
Court of Justice of the European Union prohibited the imposition of such “permanent 
establishment requirement” as disproportionate in case of corporate migration in the 
context of exit taxation, as consistently stated by the Luxembourg Judges with regard to 
cases like National Grid Indus551, Commission v. Denmark552, DMC553 and Verder554. If viewed 
from this perspective, then the fact that gains on assets that do not remain connected to a 
permanent establishment located in the Member State of residence of the transferring 
company would be subject to immediate taxation in the event of a cross-border corporate 
reorganisation, without any option for a deferral of such tax, could theoretically 
constitute a hypothetical undue restriction on freedom of establishment. 
On the other hand, some authors have argued that the provision at issue would 
not automatically generate any restriction on Treaty freedoms, since the Merger 
Directive simply provides a sort of “safe harbour” for the assets that, in the context of a 
cross-border reorganisation, retain their territorial connection with the Member State of 
“emigration”, or, better said, the Member State of the transferring company, 
guaranteeing that the gains accrued on such assets at the time of the transfer must escape 
immediate taxation. With regards to assets that do not remain territorially linked with 
the Member State of the transferring company, the Directive does not (explicitly) allow 
Member States to immediately levy tax on the relevant capital gains at the time of the 
transfer, but simply remains silent on the point, which, according to some authors, 
would be different than implicitly justifying immediate tax charges555. 																																																								
550 Terra, B.J.M., Wattel, P.J., European tax law, cited above, 347. 
551 Court of Justice of the European Union, 29 November 2011, C-371/10, National Grid Indus BV. 
552 Court of Justice of the European Union, 18 July 2013, C-261/11, Commission v. Denmark. 
553 Court of Justice of the European Union, 23 January 2014, C-164/12, DMC. 
554 Court of Justice of the European Union, 21 May 2015, C-657/13, Verder LabTec GmbH & Co. KG. 
555 Jiménez-Valladolid de L’Hotellerie-Fallois, D.J., The permanent establishment: still a (permanent) requirement?, in 
EC Tax Review, 2014, 4, 13. For a different opinion, see, for instance, Velde, I.V., How does the CJEU’s case law on 
cross-border loss relief apply to cross-border mergers and divisions?, in EC Tax Review, 2016, 3, 144: according to the 
Author the “recapture rule” established for by Article 10 of the Directive, according to which the Member State of 
the transferring company “may reinstate” the losses of the permanent establishment that had previously been 
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A similar problem has been identified by legal scholarship with regards to 
another aspect of the Merger Directive’s provision, with specific concern to the issue of 
losses. 
With regards to the question of relief for the unused losses possibly accrued by 
one of the companies involved in the cross-border reorganisation, Article 6 of the Merger 
Directive provides that, to the extent the Member State of the transferring company 
would, in a comparable purely domestic situation, allow the receiving company to take 
over, and use for tax purposes, the losses of the transferring company that had not yet 
been exhausted, such treatment must be extended to cross-border reorganisations of 
companies as well, allowing the receiving company’s permanent establishment to take 
them over556. 
This provision appears to be substantially “neutral” from the point of view of the 
allocation of taxing powers amongst Member States, its rationale being based simply on 
the need to prevent discriminatory treatments for cross-border situations if compared to 
purely domestic ones. 
It is also true, however, that, according to the “principle of territoriality” as 
developed by the Court of Justice, every country should levy tax on the income of a non-
resident only if said income is somehow connected to its territory, which also means 
that, in general terms, according to this interpretation of territoriality, deductions should 
be granted only in relation to costs which are connected to the income-producing process 
having place in the relevant country. This is the consequence of the principles 
formulated by the Court, for instance, in its Futura judgement557. 
If seen from this perspective, Article 6 of the Merger Directive would seem to 
sacrifice the principle of territoriality as developed by the Court of Justice “at the altar” 
of the need to prevent possible discriminatory measures, thus implementing a logic 
which seems similar to the one followed by the Court, for instance, in the Marks & 
Spencer case: from this point of view, the losses suffered by the transferring company 
could be seen as “final losses”558, since the transferring company would not be able to use 
them any longer as a result of the cross-border reorganisation it took part in. 
This is even truer if we consider that the apparent “neutrality” of the Mergers 																																																																																																																																																																													
deducted in the taxable profits would seem to suggest a confirmation that such recapture is indeed allowed by 
the Merger Directive. 
556 On the point, see Helminem, M., Must the losses of a merging company be deductible in the state of residence of the 
receiving company in EU?, in EC Tax Review, 2011, 4, 172. See also Larking, B., The Merger Directive: will it work?, in 
European Taxation, 1990, 366. 
557 See the previous chapter of the research, at paragraph 4. 
558 For an analysis of the Court’s “Marks & Spencer doctrine”, see the previous chapter of the research, at paragraph 
6.  
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Directive’s measures concerning losses has been somehow limited and tempered by the 
Court of Justice’s intervention. 
In fact, the Directive does not encompass any explicit provision with regards to 
the possibility for the losses of the merging company to be considered as tax-deductible 
by the receiving company in its Member State of residence. In other words, the Merger 
Directive does not require that the Member State of residence of the receiving company 
allow such company to deduct the losses of the foreign merging company, even if a 
permanent establishment would be left in the Member State of residence of the merging 
company. Therefore, the fiscal treatment of such cross-border losses depends on the 
domestic provisions of the Member State concerned559. 
However, the fact that the Member State of the receiving company is under no 
obligation, under the Merger Directive, to allow the “import” of the losses of the 
transferring company does not automatically exclude that such an obligation could exist 
not based on the Directive, but rather on primary law560. 
This was the question the Court dealt with in the A Oy case561. The Judges, after 
having confirmed that Article 49 TFEU applied to the case at hand and that Member 
States are under the obligation to respect not only the Directive, but also the freedom of 
establishment when cross-border mergers are concerned, acknowledged that the 
Directive does not concern the problem of whether the Member State of the receiving 
company should grant relief for the transferring company’s unused losses. 
More in detail, AG Kokott, in her Opinion on the case at issue, recognised that, 
under the Merger Directive, losses can only be used in the transferring company’s 
Member State, but also argued that this circumstance does not rule out that the tax law 
of the Member State of establishment of the receiving company could be considered as 
being in breach of the fundamental freedom of establishment if it prevents losses from 
being taken into account in the latter Member State. On this point, the Advocate General 
also considered that the Merger Directive “may not have done everything that is necessary to 
ensure the removal of tax disadvantages for cross-border mergers”, which gives the Court 
space to intervene to “fill in the gaps” left by the European Union legislature. 
And that is precisely what the Court did. The Judges, in fact, ruled that the 
national measure restricting the possibility to use such losses in the Member State of the 																																																								
559 As observed by Helminem, M., Must the losses of a merging company be deductible in the state of residence of the 
receiving company in EU?, cited above. 173, many Member States do not allow such losses to be taken into account 
for tax purposes, with problems of compatibility with European Union law arising with regard to those Member 
States applying the credit method instead of the exemption method in relation to permanent establishments. 
560 Velde, I.V., How does the CJEU’s case law on cross-border loss relief apply to cross-border mergers and divisions?, cited 
above, 134. 
561 Court of Justice of the European Union, 21 February 2013, C-123/11, A Oy. 
	 206 
receiving company generated an undue restriction of freedom of establishment, since it 
prevented the taking into account of losses in a cross-border merger with a subsidiary 
located in another Member State, whereas in a purely domestic merger such takeover of 
losses would have been allowed. The measure was considered as being, in principle, 
justified by the need to safeguard the balanced allocation of taxing powers amongst 
Member States, combined with the need to avoid the risk of losses being used twice 
(“double dip”). However, the Luxembourg Judges ruled that the provision was 
disproportionate since those losses should have been considered as “final losses” under 
the meaning of the Marks & Spencer case law, given that all possibilities to use them in 
the Member State of the transferring company had been exhausted, and, therefore, their 
deduction should have been allowed “somewhere” in the Internal Market, i.e. in the 
Member State of establishment of the receiving company. In doing so, the Court 
explicitly clarified its position according to which the (still vague) “final losses criterion” 
does not apply only to group relief cases, but also to situations concerning cross-border 
mergers, such as that at issue in A Oy562. 
Embracing the reasoning of the Court of Justice as described above implies 
acknowledging that a national measure which is compliant with European Union 
secondary law is not also necessarily compatible with EU primary law and, in particular, 
with the Treaty freedoms or the principle of non-discrimination. Some authors have 
even argued that the Court’s reasoning underlying the A Oy decision would imply that a 
provision of the Merger Directive can be considered as in breach of EU primary law and 
thus be overruled by the Treaty principles563. 
This last conclusion, however, does seem to take a step too far and does not 
coincide with the Court’s ruling or even the findings of AG Kokott, since the Directive is 
not in any way concerned with the issue of the hypothetical duty for the Member State of 
the receiving company to grant loss relief in case no permanent establishment were to 
remain in the Member State of the transferring company, only providing under which 
circumstances losses incurred in the Member State of the transferring company should 
be offset against the profits of the permanent establishment remaining in that Member 
State. 																																																								
562 With regards to the A Oy case, AG Kokott was of a different opinion, having argued that, in the context of a 
merger, losses cannot be properly considered as “final”, since such an operation is the consequence of a deliberate 
decision by the companies involved and because accepting that, after a cross-border merger, the subsidiary’s 
losses should be relieved at the level of the receiving company would imply accepting that the companies 
involved had the right to freely choose where to claim relief for the losses, thus going against what the Court had 
previously considered inadmissible in cases such as Lidl Belgium. 
563 Velde, I.V., How does the CJEU’s case law on cross-border loss relief apply to cross-border mergers and divisions?, cited 
above, 143. 
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That been clarified, what is certain is that the Merger Directive, not unlike the 
Parent-Subsidiary Directive and the Interest and Royalty Directive, is not, and is not 
intended to be, a comprehensive and all-encompassing piece of EU legislation, not 
covering all implications of cross-border corporate reorganisations, but only some 
“selected issues”. All other issues of compatibility with European Union law that are not 
specifically addressed by the Directive and which may nonetheless arise in case of such a 
cross-border operation cannot but be solved be making reference to the fundamental 
freedoms and the principle of non-discrimination, as clarified by the Court in it’s A Oy 
judgement. 
 5. The Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive. 
 Another piece of the puzzle was recently added to the dialectical relationship 
between “source countries” and “residence countries” in the context of the European 
Union secondary law in the field of direct taxation, as a result of the new level of 
attention being paid to the topic of the prevention of tax evasion and tax avoidance in 
the international context564. 
 On the point of the preferable criteria for the allocation of taxing powers amongst 
Member States, the solutions proposed by the Commission, at least as far as prevention 
of tax avoidance is concerned, seemed, to a certain extent, to favour the interests of the 
source country, as a consequence of the need for taxation to effectively reflect the actual 
reality of the business activities. More in detail, in fact, the Commission had stated that 
“a new approach to corporate taxation is needed in the EU, which should be driven by the 
following objectives: re-establishing the link between taxation and where economic activity takes 
place, and ensuring that Member States can correctly value corporate activity in their 
jurisdiction”565 and that “companies that benefit from the Single Market and generate profits 
there should pay tax on those profits within the EU, at the place of activity”566. 																																																								
564 The European Council has welcomed the work of the OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting initiative in its 
conclusions of 13-14 March 2013 and 19-20 December 2013, after which the Commission, in its communication of 
17 June 2015, set out an action plan for fair and efficient corporate taxation in the European Union. The final 
report on the fifteen OECD Actions against Base Erosion and Profit Shifting were released to the public on 5 
October 2015. 
565 European Commission, COM (2015) 302 final, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the 
European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, A fair and efficient corporate tax system in the 
European Union: 5 key areas for action. 
566 European Commission, COM (2016) 198 final, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of income tax information by certain undertakings and branches. It 
should also be noted that the Commission had voiced similar opinions in other cases where it had highlighted the 
need for a higher degree of symmetry between the country where tax is levied and the place where the 
underlying income is actually earned. For example, in 2014 the Code of Conduct for Business Taxation Group 
agreed that preferential regimes, such as patent boxes or other fiscal advantages linked to R&D activities, should 
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 A considerable number of authors has argued that this approach would appear to 
be based on the - somehow misguided - idea that global profits of multinational 
enterprises have an actual and clearly identifiable “source“ and can easily be fragmented 
and apportioned amongst the taxing jurisdictions concerned. However, as already 
highlighted in the first chapter of the research, this assumption is not necessarily true, 
since it can be particularly complicated, without going to further details that escape the 
scope and purpose of this study, to identify the actual source of the income. 
 On the point, while highlighting the “urgent need to challenge […] corporate tax 
abuse and to review corporate tax rules in order to better tackle aggressive tax planning”, the 
European Commission itself has acknowledged that, given that “business models and 
corporate structures have become more complex, making it easier to shift profits”, it is now 
“more difficult to determine which country is supposed to tax a multinational company’s 
income”567. 
The elaboration of such principles has led to the recent adoption of Council 
Directive 2016/1164/EU, also known as the “Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive”568, which 
constitutes part of a larger “Anti-Avoidance Package” intended to address a series of 
issues connected to the OECD “BEPS Project”569-570. 
It should be noted at the outset that, like for all of the other pieces of EU 
secondary law which have been described above, the scope of application of the 
Directive is limited to corporations, as, pursuant to its Article 1, “this Directive applies to 
all taxpayers that are subject to corporate tax in one or more Member States, including 
permanent establishments in one or more Member States of entities resident for tax purposes in a 
third country”. 
The Anti-Avoidance Directive aims at establishing common rules against tax 
avoidance affecting the functioning of the Internal Market571. In other words, the main 																																																																																																																																																																													
be based on the so-called “modified nexus approach” and, in its Communication on “A fair and efficient corporate 
tax system in the European Union: 5 key areas for action”, COM (2015) 302 final, the Commission stated once again 
that there should be a direct link between the tax benefits and the underlying R&D activities. 
567 European Commission, COM (2015) 302 final, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the 
European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, A fair and efficient corporate tax system in the 
European Union: 5 key areas for action. 
568 The Directive came into force on 8 August 2016 and Member States are expected to implement its provisions 
within their domestic legal orders within 31 December 2018, exception made for the articles of the Directive 
concerning exit taxation (Article 5), which must be implemented within 31 December 2019, and for the provisions 
regarding interest deductibility (Article 4), concerning which, in case a Member State has already enacted 
domestic provisions on the point which could be considered as equally effective in countering base erosion and 
profit shifting, it is allowed to apply the same rules until 1 January 2024. 
569 Together with the 2015 Action Plan for Fair and Efficient Corporate Taxation intended to re-launch a proposal 
for a CCCTB in the context of the European Union, a recommendation on tax treaties, a revision of the Directive 
on Administrative Cooperation and a Communication on an External Strategy for Effective Taxation. 
570 Moscovici, P., Tough measures needed to reform tax on corporate profits, in EC Tax Review, 2016, 1, 2,. 
571 Proposal for a Council Directive laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the 
functioning of the Internal Market, COM(2016) 26 final. 
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purpose of the Directive, containing specific measures operating in different fields of 
direct taxation, including, but not limited to, rules on limits for the deductibility of 
interests, exit taxation, switch-over clauses, a general anti-abuse clause and CFC 
legislation, is to determine minimum anti-abuse standards enabling Member States to 
counter situations in which taxpayers, especially of a corporate nature, take advantage of 
the disparities amongst the different domestic tax systems in the Member States572. 
Very few pointers may indeed be derived from the provisions of the Anti-Tax 
Avoidance Directive that might actually be relevant for the purposes of the design of an 
overall model of allocation of taxing powers amongst Member States. The Directive, in 
fact, is essentially aimed at solving very specific problems with an approach that cannot 
be easily reconciled with a more encompassing view of the structure of Member States’ 
tax systems. 
However, even though the Directive, like any other piece of EU secondary law in 
the field of direct taxation, does not aim at establishing any sort of overall allocation of 
taxing powers between countries in the Internal Market, it is undoubtedly true that the 
new rules cannot but have consequences on the exercise, and on the extension, of the 
Member States’ taxing powers in the field of corporate taxation, especially since, as has 
been highlighted in the previous chapter of the research573, anti-avoidance provisions 
often entail some sort of extraterritorial exercise of taxing powers on the part of 
countries: this is the case, for example, of CFC regimes or of regimes revolving around 
on the “deemed residence” of corporations, which ultimately constitute an extension of 
worldwide taxation covering foreign items of income accruing on non-resident subjects 
that would normally escape the fiscal jurisdiction of the country levying the tax. It is, 
therefore, interesting, for the purposes of the present research, to examine how the 
Directive deals with the question of the allocation of the Member States’ taxing powers 
between “residence countries” and “source countries” with regards to the taxation of 
foreign items of income. 
The Preamble of the Directive contains a general statement according to which 
“the current political priorities in international taxation highlight the need for ensuring that tax 
is paid where profits and value are generated”. Some commentators have interpreted this 
statement as the affirmation of a hypothetical preference of the EU legislature for a 
territorial tax model based on taxation at source. This thesis, however, would appear to 																																																								
572 Navarro, A., Parada, L., Schwarz, P., The proposal for an EU Anti-avoidance Directive: some preliminary thoughts, in 
EC Tax Review, 2016, 3, 117; Ginevra, G., The EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive and the Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting (BEPS) Action Plan: necessity and adequacy of the measures at EU level, in Intertax, 2017, 2, 120. 
573 See Chapter 2, paragraph 7. 
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be substantially contradicted by the subsequent provisions of the Directive, which, as we 
will see, show a certain tendency for favouring worldwide taxation in the Member State 
of residence and also a certain degree of tolerance towards some examples of 
extraterritorial exercise of taxing powers. 
 Having established all of the above, the most interesting parts of the Proposal at 
issue, at least for the purposes of the present study and also in light of the analysis 
conducted in the previous chapter of the research, are those dealing with exit taxation 
and CFC legislation. 
 5.1. Exit taxation. 
As far as exit taxation is concerned, Article 5 of the Directive provides a common 
framework for taxation of capital gains generated in the territory of the Member State of 
origin at the time of the taxpayer’s emigration and of certain cross-border transfers of 
assets within the European Union or to a third country as well, in so far as the Member 
State of emigration loses the right to tax such gains as a consequence of the transfer. 
More specifically, Article 5 provides that Member States shall impose an exit tax 
in case of cross-border transfers of residence, in order to prevent EU citizens (individuals 
and companies) from moving their fiscal residence to another tax jurisdiction without 
paying taxes on unrealised capital gains. In case the taxpayer were to move its residence 
to another EU Member State, that taxpayer would be subject to tax on an amount equal 
to the market value of the transferred assets, at the time of emigration, less their value 
for tax purposes, insofar as the Member State of departure no longer has the right to tax 
the transferred assets because of said transfer574. 
																																																								
574 Pursuant to Article 5 of the Directive, immediate taxation is triggered if “a) a taxpayer transfers assets from its head 
office to its permanent establishment in another Member State or in a third country in so far as the Member State of the head 
office no longer has the right to tax the transferred assets due to the transfer; b) a taxpayer transfers assets from its 
permanent establishment in a Member State to its head office or another permanent establishment in another Member State 
or in a third country in so far as the Member State of the permanent establishment no longer has the right to tax the 
transferred assets due to the transfer; c) a taxpayer transfers its tax residence to another Member State or to a third country, 
excepts for those assets which remain effectively connected with a permanent establishment in the first Member State; d) a 
taxpayer transfers the business carried on by its permanent establishment from a Member State to another Member State or 
to a third country in so far as the Member State of the permanent establishment no longer has the right to tax the transferred 
assets due to the transfer”. A similar provision has also been included in the 2016 proposal for a Council Directive 
on a Common Corporate Tax Base put forward by the European Commission, COM(2016) 685 final of 25 October 
2016. Article 29 of the proposal (“Exit taxation”), in fact, provides that “an amount equal to the market value of the 
transferred assets, at the time of exit of the assets, less their value for tax purposes, shall be treated as accrued revenues” in 
similar circumstances as those listed above and that “the Member State to where the assets, tax residence or the 
business carried on by a permanent establishment are transferred shall accept the value established by the Member State of 
the taxpayer or of the permanent establishment as the starting value of the assets for tax purposes”. 
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That being established, the provision of the Directive, broadly reflecting the well-
established Court of Justice’s case law in the field of exit taxation575, secures the right of a 
taxpayer to defer, by way of instalments, the payment of exit charges in case of transfers 
or migrations within the European Union576, whereas, in case the taxpayer were to move 
its residence to a third country, Member States shall provide for the immediate recovery 
of the entire tax due on unrealised gains577. 
Coming to the main purpose and object of the research, it should be noted that 
exit taxation regimes are not easily reconciled with the analysis of the allocation of taxing 
powers amongst countries in terms of the dialectical relationship between “source 
country” and “residence country” and, therefore, in terms of the trade-off between 
worldwide taxation and territorial taxation. Thus, no relevant pointers on the 
hypothetical preference, on the part of the European Union legislature, for one of the two 
models can be found in the Directive’s provisions on exit taxes. 
Nonetheless, the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive’s rule on exit taxation might 
perhaps be considered as the first actual example, enshrined in a piece of EU secondary 
legislation, of the idea of an entirely new and integrated territorial dimension applying 
in the context of the Internal Market for the purposes of direct tax law (at least as far as 
corporate income taxation is concerned). 																																																								
575 Reference is made to judgements such as National Grid Indus, Commission v. Portugal, DMC and Verder, all 
mentioned and examined in the previous chapter of the research (see Chapter II, paragraph 8), even though the 
provision seems to lack any explicit reference to the “temporal component” of territoriality as mentioned in 
National Grid Indus. 
576 Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 5 of the Directive, “a taxpayer shall be given the right to defer the payment of an 
exit tax […] by paying it in instalments over five years, in any of the following circumstances: a) a taxpayer transfers assets 
from its head office to its permanent establishment in another Member State or in a third country that is party to the 
Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA Agreement); b) a taxpayer transfers assets from its permanent 
establishment in a Member State to its head office or another permanent establishment in another Member State or a third 
country that is party to the EEA Agreement; c) a taxpayer transfers its tax residence to another Member State or to a third 
country that is party to the EEA Agreement; d) a taxpayer transfers the business carried on by its permanent establishment 
to another Member State or a third country that is party to the EEA Agreement”, provided, however, that the possibility 
of a deferral shall apply to third countries that are parties to the EEA Agreement only “if they have concluded an 
agreement with the Member State of the taxpayers or with the Union on the mutual assistance for the recovery of tax claims, 
equivalent to the mutual assistance provided for in Council Directive 2010/24/EU”. In these cases, nonetheless, the 
Member State of emigration may, under certain circumstances, charge interest in accordance with its national law 
and may also request the issuance of a bank guarantee (in contrast with the Court’s ruling in DMC, where the 
Luxembourg Judges held that the requirement of a bank guarantee constitutes a restriction of the fundamental 
freedoms that cannot be justified without prior assessment of the risk of non-recovery. More in detail, the Court, 
in the DMC judgement, stated that Member States are only permitted to request a guarantee in respect of the 
payment of exit taxes “on the basis of the actual risk of non-recovery of the tax”, with an assessment having to be made 
on a case-by-case basis: when it is established that there is no particular risk of non-recovery, Member States are 
generally prevented from requiring guarantees. Furthermore, an interpretation of the Court’s Commission v. 
Denmark case (where the Court ruled that the provision of guarantees in relation to an exit tax is disproportionate 
when the taxpayer concerned continues to be a resident of its Member State of origin) may hint to the fact that the 
above-mentioned risk might be considered as lacking in a situation where the taxpayer concerned remains a 
resident of the Member State of origin, since that Member State, in this case, would enjoy alternative options to 
guarantee the safeguard of its tax claims. On the point, see Potgens, F.P.G., van Os, P., Duran, P.H., et al., The 
compatibility of exit tax legislation applicable to corporate taxpayers in France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain and the United Kingdom with the EU freedom of establishment, cited above, 2, 165; Navarro A., Parada, L., 
Schwarz, P., The proposal for an EU Anti-avoidance Directive: some preliminary thoughts, cited above, 121. 
577 Pinetz, E., Schaffer, E., Exit taxation in third-country situations, in European Taxation, 2014, 3, 10. 
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The functioning itself of a rule on exit taxation, in fact, revolves around the idea of 
a “relevant territory”, exiting which taxation is triggered on the emigrating taxpayer as a 
consequence of the emigration578. In other terms, whenever a (corporate) subject (or 
certain assets of the corporate subject) lose their connection to the territory of the 
Member State where said subject resides, the Member State has the right to levy taxes on 
the accrued but still unrealised capital gains related to that corporate subject (or to the 
assets concerned). This rule would appear to be grounded on a “traditional” application 
of fiscal territoriality. 
However, through the implementation of the new norm on exit taxation, a 
company’s migration from a Member State to establish its seat in another Member State 
(or the transfer of certain assets from a Member State to another by a corporation) - being 
it that the corporate subject (taxpayer) remains within the “Internal Market territory” - 
becomes fiscally neutral for the emigrating taxpayer, which would enjoy a deferral of its 
tax liability arising from the emigration. Whereas, on the other hand, such “neutrality” 
would not be granted in case of migration to a third country not constituting part of the 
Internal Market. 
In other terms, the consequence of this mechanism is that, as far as exit taxation is 
concerned, the relevant territorial dimensions shifts from a “compartmentalised view”, 
in which the territory of each single Member State is considered as a monad, to a broader 
and integrated vision at the level of the entire Internal Market: the relevant territory, 
within the borders of which neutrality- or, better said, the highest possible level of 
neutrality - is granted, becomes the territory of the Internal Market. Which implies an 
entirely new and integrated dimension of territoriality, which refers to a territory that 
ultimately coincides with the EU Internal Market579. 
It could be argued that this kind of view is not entirely new as far as secondary 
EU law on direct taxation is concerned. 
A similar perspective and functioning could, in fact, actually be found in the 
provisions of the Merger Directive as well580, even though, in that case, the element of the 
“broadening” of the territorial dimension was considerably less evident, mainly because 
of the fact that the Merger Directive essentially applies to situations where two subjects 
(two taxpayers) are involved, i.e. the transferring/merging company and the receiving 																																																								
578 This is the reasoning followed by the Court of Justice in its National Grid Indus decision, where, in order to 
conclude that the relevant provisions gave rise to a restriction of freedom of establishment, the Judges held that 
the transfer of the seat abroad should be compared to domestic situations in which a company transfers its seat 
within the territory of its Member State of establishment. 
579 More on the point of exit taxation will be seen in the next chapter of the research, when talking about the 
provisions of the new Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive, at paragraph 5. 
580 As also noted above, at paragraph 4. 
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company located in another Member State, each one of which has/had its own fiscal 
liability in its Member State of establishment, which naturally applies its tax laws to its 
fiscal residents. With regard to exit taxation, on the contrary, the tax liability being 
considered is only one, as only one taxpayer is involved in the relevant cross-border 
movement, which makes the exit taxation case “exceptional”, being it an example of an 
actual coordination of concurring taxing powers exercise by two different Member States 
on the same subject: the same (corporate) subject emigrates and moves across the 
Internal Market as it was a single territory, with no fiscal consequences (immediately) 
arising as a direct consequence of such movement. 
 5.2. Controlled Foreign Company regimes. 
 Moving on to the other provisions of the Directive which may be relevant for the 
purposes of the present research, Articles 7 and 8 of the Directive concern CFC regimes, 
allowing the tackling of base erosion and profit shifting phenomena through the 
reattribution of the income of a foreign company, usually if located in a low-tax 
jurisdiction, and making it taxable in the fictitious “home jurisdiction”. CFC regimes, 
therefore, basically revolve around the extension of worldwide taxation also towards 
subjects and/or items of income that should generally escape the tax jurisdiction of the 
home country581 . According to the Preamble of the Directive, in fact, through this 
provision, the EU legislature aim at “re-attributing the non-distributed income of a low-taxed 
controlled subsidiary to its parent company”, which “becomes taxable on this attributed income 
in the State where it is resident for tax purposes”. 
As we will also see in the following chapter of the research582, a considerable 
number of Member States’ tax systems already embed such rules but, however, their 
application varies so much that taxpayers may take advantage of these differences in 
order to circumvent the application of the rules583. It was thus considered necessary to 
provide Member States with a common pattern for the implementation of these regimes, 
in order to grant their extensive and uniform application in the Internal Market. 
Article 7 of the Directive provides that, where a Member State treats an entity or 
permanent establishment as a “controlled foreign company”584, that Member State is 																																																								
581 For a clear description and analysis of the functioning and mechanisms underlying CFC regimes, see Cipollina, 
S., Profili evolutivi della CFC legislation: dalle origini all’economia digitale, in Rivista di Diritto Finanziario e Scienza 
delle Finanze, 2015, 3, 356. 
582 See Chapter IV, paragraph 5. 
583 On the point, see the Chapter IV of the research, paragraph 5. 
584 Pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article 7, Member States shall treat an entity or a permanent establishment whose 
profits are not subject to tax or are exempt from tax according to their tax systems as a “controlled foreign 
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allowed to attribute part of the non-distributed income of such foreign company to the 
resident taxpayers controlling it, with that attribution being made, pursuant to Article 8, 
“in proportion to the taxpayer’s participation in the entity”. 
In this case, the Directive provides EU Member States with two alternatives 
between which they must choose. These two alternatives are broadly based on the 
traditional distinction, traced by legal scholarship, between two different “categories” of 
CFC legislation585: the so-called “transactional approach”, aimed only at the attribution, 
on the ground of a rule of transparency, of the controlled foreign company’s passive 
income to the parent company, and the so-called “jurisdictional approach”, which, on 
the other hand, aims at subjecting to taxation the entire income accrued on the controlled 
company established in a low-tax jurisdiction586. 
Therefore, Member States, on one hand, may choose to include in the tax base of 
the resident holding subject the non-distributed income accrued to the entity or 
permanent establishment “arising from non-genuine arrangements which have been put in 
place for the essential purpose of obtaining a tax advantage”, it being specified that, for the 
purposes of the Directive, an arrangement is regarded as “non-genuine” “to the extent 
that the entity or permanent establishment would not own the assets or would not have 
undertaken the risks which generate all, or part of, its income if it were not controlled by a 
company where the significant people functions, which are relevant to those assets and risks, are 
carried out and are instrumental in generating the controlled company’s income”. 
In this case, pursuant to Article 8, the Member State shall include the foreign 
income in the tax base of its resident taxpayer only up to the amounts “generated through 
assets and risks which are linked to significant people functions carried out by the controlling 
company”, applying the arm’s length principle. 
On the other hand, as an alternative, the Member State of the holding company 
may choose to include in the tax base of the resident subject holding the controlled 
foreign company only the non-distributed income of the entity or the income of the 
permanent establishment having a “passive nature” (i.e. interest and other income 
generated by financial assets, royalties and other income generated from intellectual 																																																																																																																																																																													
company” for the purposes of the Directive if a) a corporate taxpayer liable to tax in that same Member State 
“holds a direct or indirect participation of more than 50 percent of the voting rights, or owns directly or indirectly more than 
50 percent of capital or is entitled to receive more than 50 percent of the profits of that entity” and b) “the actual corporate 
tax paid on its profits by the entity or permanent establishment is lower than the difference between the corporate tax that 
would have been charged on the entity or permanent establishment under the applicable corporate tax system in the Member 
State of the taxpayer and the actual corporate tax paid on its profits by the entity or permanent establishment”. 
585 This distinction is also mirrored in the OECD elaboration on the point of CFC legislation. On the point, see, 
amongst others, Sandler, D., Tax treaties and Controlled Foreign Company legislation: pushing the boundaries, 
Amsterdam, 1998, passim; Maisto, G., Pistone, P., A European model for Member States’ legislation on the taxation of 
controlled foreign subsidiaries (CFCs), in European Taxation, 2008, 10, 503. 
586 For instance, the Italian CFC regime adheres to the second category. 
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property, dividends and income from the disposal of shares, income from financial 
leasing, income from insurance, banking and other financial services, etc.)587. 
In this case, an exemption from the regime shall be granted if the relevant 
controlled foreign company carries on a “substantive economic activity supported by staff, 
equipment, assets and premises, as evidenced by relevant facts and circumstances”, but, in case 
that controlled foreign company is located in a country which is not a member of the 
European Economic Area Agreement, Member States are at liberty to decide not to apply 
this exemption. 
Furthermore, pursuant to Article 8 of the Anti-Avoidance Directive, in case the 
Member State of residence of the holding company chooses to implement the “passive 
income approach” described above, then the passive income to be included in the tax 
base of the resident taxpayer shall be calculated in accordance with the tax laws of the 
Member State of residence of that taxpayer588. 
Irrespective of which of the two options the Member States of residence of the 
controlling company choose to follow, they, pursuant to paragraphs 5 an 6 of Article 8, 
shall have to grant relief for the taxes already paid by the parent company on the profits 
of the controlled foreign company concerned when an actual distribution of such profits 
is made, or when the parent company disposes of its shares in the controlled company. 
Furthermore, Member States, pursuant to Article 8, paragraph 7, shall grant the parent 
company a deduction of the tax paid by the entity or permanent establishment in its state 
of tax residence. Said deduction, which practically amounts to a tax credit, shall be 
calculated in accordance with the national tax law of the Member States of residence of 
the controlling company. 
It should be noted that, on the point, the Preamble of the Directive clearly states 
that “where the application of those rules [i.e. CFC rules] gives rise to double taxation, taxpayers 
should receive relief through a deduction for the tax paid in another Member State or third 
country” and that CFC rules “should not only aim to counter tax avoidance practices but also 
avoid creating other obstacles to the market, such as double taxation”.  
The first commentators of the Directive have highlighted that these provisions 
would seem to be in line with the Court of Justice’s jurisprudence on CFC rules and anti-
avoidance provisions and, in particular, with the “Cadbury Schweppes doctrine”, 
requiring the controlled company at issue to be engaged in a “substantive economic 																																																								
587 It being specified, however, that, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article 7, the Member State concerned “may opt not 
to treat an entity or permanent establishment as a controlled foreign company under paragraph 1 if one third or less of the 
income accruing to the entity or permanent establishment” can be considered as income of a passive nature. 
588 Paragraph 1 of Article 8 specifies that “losses of the entity or permanent establishment shall not be included in the tax 
base but may be carried forward, according to national law, and taken into account in subsequent tax periods”. 
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activity” which must not be “wholly artificial” in order for the CFC provision not to 
apply589. It has also been noted that the CFC regime, from the point of view of the Court’s 
case law, can be seen as an “allocation of taxing rights rule”, which further justifies rules 
such as those embedded in Articles 7 and 8 of the Directive590. Even more so if we 
consider that, as highlighted in the previous chapter of the research, according to the 
more recent Court’s judgements on the point, a measure concerning the allocation of 
taxing powers amongst Member States and also aimed at preventing the risk of tax 
avoidance can be considered as proportionate even if not specifically addressed at 
“wholly artificial arrangements”. 
As they are aimed at preventing the possible abuses connected to the transfer of 
profits to low-tax jurisdictions, CFC regimes are, by their nature, a clear expression of 
capital export neutrality and of a tax model based on a worldwide structure. As already 
highlighted above, and in the previous chapter of the research, CFC regimes constitute 
one of the clearest example of worldwide taxation. 
Therefore, confirming the most recent trends of the Court of Justice’s case law on 
the point, the Directive explicitly allows Member States to derogate from a rigorously 
territorial structure of the extension of their taxing powers in favour of the application of 
worldwide liability to tax to items of income (and taxpayers) that are not directly 
connected to the territory of the taxing country. Thus de facto allowing an extraterritorial 
exercise of taxing powers on the part of the Member State of residence of the parent 
company. 
6. Concluding remarks: general tendencies and the missing pieces of the 
puzzle. 
Many have argued that it would be, to a certain extent, “naïve”, as of today, to 
think of an “authentically European corporate income tax” aimed at raising common 
resources for the Union’s coffers and that it would be preferable, and also more easily 
attainable, to limit the intervention of the EU legislature only to preventing, eliminating 
or alleviating the so-called “negative tax externalities”, such as the prejudicial effects of 
tax avoidance, base erosion, profit shifting and fictitious transfers of residence and/or 
income to territories located outside the European Union591. 																																																								
589 Ginevra, G., The EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive and the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action Plan: 
necessity and adequacy of the measures at EU level, cited above, 129. 
590 Dourado, A.P., The EU Anti-Avoidance Package: moving ahead of BEPS?, in Intertax, 2016, 6, 440. 
591 Garbarino, C., Harmonisation and coordination of corporate taxes in the European Union, in EC Tax Review, 2016, 5-6, 
277. The Author highlights, in particular, from a “diachronic” point of view, the “failure” of any EU fiscal 
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The picture emerging from the overall analysis of EU secondary law in the field of 
direct taxation is somehow fragmented and, in any case, partial, which makes it 
particularly difficult to draw general principles and criteria that might be considered as 
suitable to guide Member States in the interpretation of the positions and tendencies of 
European Union law on the point of the allocation of taxing powers amongst member 
States in the dialectical relationship between “source taxation” at “residence taxation” 
and of hypothetical preferences for one of the two models. 
On one hand, in fact, it is certainly true that the Directives examined above give 
rise, to a certain extent, to a “prototype” of an overall allocation of taxing powers at the 
level of the Internal Market, establishing whether the Member State of residence or the 
Member State of source should have priority to tax certain cross-border items of income 
and, consequently, which of the two countries should eliminate possible issues 
concerning double taxation. On the point of double taxation, furthermore, it should be 
noted that, notwithstanding the absence of a specific prohibition in the Treaties and in 
the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice as well, double taxation is expressly considered 
by the Directives as an undesirable consequence of the “parallel exercise of taxing 
powers” on the part of the Member States and a potential obstacle for the integration and 
the proper functioning of the Internal Market and thus should be eliminated. 
On the other hand, the allocation of taxing powers enacted by the Directives is 
partial, being it inherently sectorial. Directives apply only to corporations and only to 
certain items of the overall income of such corporations (dividends, interest, royalties, 
etc.), as they are aimed at solving specific problems at not at providing an overall design 
encompassing a solution on a larger scale. 
Having established all of the above, what can be stated with a considerable level 
of certainty is that EU secondary law shows a global tendency towards the 
implementation of fiscal structures based on worldwide taxation and on priority to tax 
cross-border items of income being granted to the country of residence of the taxpayer. 
This is what may be derived, for instance, from the analysis of the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive, also as interpreted and applied by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union. In fact, even though the analysis of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive has 
not shown a clear preference, on the part of the EU legislature, for one of the two 
traditional tax models, the provisions of said Directive being substantially “neutral” on 																																																																																																																																																																													
measure which has aimed at such a purpose, from the first steps taken in 1960s to the current “soft law” approach 
adopted by the Commission. Of the same opinion, see also Esson, A., Harmonisation of direct taxation in the 
European Community: from Neumark to Ruding, in Canadian Tax Journal, 1992, 600; Eden, S., Corporate tax 
harmonisation in the European Community, in British Tax Review, 2011, 6, 627; Cerioni, L., The quest for a new 
corporate taxation model and for an effective fight against international tax avoidance within the EU, in Intertax, 2016, 463. 
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the point, this apparent “interchangeability” of tax models seems to have been somehow 
limited and “steered” by the Court of Justice, as the analysis of the Bosal Holding 
judgement has demonstrated, with a consequent derogation to tax territoriality. 
A more definite answer can be drawn from the analysis of the Interest and 
Royalty Directive, which shows a substantial preference for a fiscal system based on 
taxation in the Member State of residence. 
This tendency would appear to have been somehow confirmed, even though for 
different purposes, by Articles 7 and 8 of the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive on CFC 
legislation, where the EU legislature, picking up from the well-established Court’s case 
law on the point, expressly allows, for the specific purpose to prevent tax avoidance 
through profit shifting and base erosion, forms of extraterritorial exercise of taxing 
powers on the part of the Member States: Member States may, thus, extend their fiscal 
jurisdiction even to cover items of income which cannot be considered as effectively 
linked to their territory, neither subjectively or objectively. 
However, it is also true that this statement might as well be read in an opposite 
sense, i.e. as the demonstration that EU legislature does not allow departures from a tax 
model based on territoriality apart from “extreme cases” that may justify an exception to 
this general rule, one of which would be the implementation of CFC regimes. According 
to the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive, such regimes would, in fact, be applicable only to 
exceptional circumstances, i.e. constructions that can be defined as “wholly artificial 
arrangements”, and/or only to certain types of income (passive income). 
Notwithstanding all of the above and the considerable difficulty to draw general 
conclusions from very specific and sectorial provisions, the analysis of EU secondary law 
on direct taxation has nonetheless led to interesting results concerning a new possible 
“territorial dimension” which might be relevant, in a future perspective, from the point 
of view of a more integrated and functioning EU Internal Market. 
Reference is made, more specifically, to the provisions of the Merger Directive 
and especially to Article 5 of the Anti-Avoidance Directive on the point of exit taxation. 
These provisions, as highlighted above, can be considered as the first “rehearsal” of a 
shift from a “compartmentalised view”, where the territory of each single Member State 
is considered as a “monad” for the purposes of direct taxation in the EU, to an integrated 
vision of a new “territory” from an overall perspective and ultimately coinciding with 
the borders of the Internal Market. 
The change of perspective on exit taxation measures is evident: national tax 
systems on exit taxation serve (or used to serve) national fiscal and financial interests; in 
	 219 
a context such as the European Union, deprived of any direct actual taxing power, a 
legislation on exit taxation can only be justified as a limit to the exercise of the Member 
States’ taxing powers or with a view to the prevention of abusive behaviours on the part 
of taxpayers592. 
It is, however, abundantly clear that the road ahead is still considerably long, 
especially if, as declared by the Commission and recognised by the Court, the ultimate 
purpose of the European Union legal order should be the attainment and 
implementation of a properly functioning and integrated Internal Market. 
One of the topics which has not been included within the scope of secondary EU 
law yet is cross-border loss relief, even though, as has been demonstrated through the 
analysis of the Court’s case law conducted in the previous chapter of the research, the 
issue has constituted one of the most crucial problems for the actual integration of the 
Internal Market, with considerable reflections on the question of the relationship 
between source taxation and residence taxation593. 
Acknowledging that the allocation of profits and losses amongst Member States 
constitutes a major policy issue and that the Court of Justice has decided many cases on 
cross-border migrations of losses and profits, holding that they are able to affect the 
balanced allocation of taxing powers amongst Member States, the Commission, in 2005, 
proposed a solution for small and medium-sized enterprise, suggesting that Member 
States should allow them to compute their taxable profits according to the tax rules of 
the Member State of residence of the parent company or of the head office594. According to 
this proposal, each Member State would then tax, at its own corporate tax rate, its share 
of the profits. 
This action was subsequently upstaged, in 2011, by the proposal for a Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB). The proposal started from the assumption 
that residence and source countries unilaterally protect their tax bases from erosion and 																																																								
592 Di Pietro, A., Past and perspectives of exit tax, in European Tax Studies, 2009, 1. 
593 On the point, in 1990 the Commission had adopted a proposal for a directive on the accounting of the losses 
suffered by permanent establishments and subsidiaries located in different Member States from that of 
establishment of their head office or parent company: see Commission Proposal COM/1990/595, 24 January 
1990. The proposed directive would have envisaged two different methods in order to allow companies to take 
into account the losses suffered by their foreign permanent establishments: an imputation method, based on the 
granting of a credit for taxes paid abroad, and an exemption method, allowing for the permanent establishment’s 
losses to be deducted from the head office’s profits. On the point, see Carinci, A., Stabile organizzazione e 
circolazione transnazionale delle perdite, in Diritto e Pratica Tributaria, 2014, 5, 10855. The proposal was then 
withdrawn in 2004. In 2006 the Commission put forward a Communication concerning the tax treatment of losses 
for cross cross-border business activities, acknowledging the considerable differences amongst the domestic tax 
systems of the Member States on the point and calling for the introduction of new and effective systems suitable 
to guarantee cross-border loss relief in the context of the Internal Market: see Commission Communication 
COM(2006) 824, 19 December 2006. 
594 European Commission, COM (2005) 702, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, Tackling the corporation tax obstacles of small and medium-sized 
enterprises in the Internal Market - outline of a possible home state taxation pilot scheme. 
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shifting of profits and losses through uncoordinated strategies that are liable to create 
disparities, discriminations and restrictions. 
On 16 March 2011, the Commission put forward its proposal for a directive on a 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base595, whose functioning mechanisms would 
basically revolve around a sort of global formulary apportionment596. The overall goal of 
the CCCTB proposal is to enhance intra-EU cross-border investment and fair 
competition in the Internal Market, while its main fiscal purpose would be to enhance 
efficiency and simplicity of corporation taxes in the European Union and to reduce 
market distortions caused by corporate taxation. 
 The CCCTB mechanism would essentially allow Member States to determine the 
taxable base of groups of companies across the European Union’s territory according to 
uniform rules, thus enabling either cross-border offsetting of profits and losses of 
different subsidiaries located in different Member States or cross-border offsetting of 
profits and losses of head office and braches established in different Member States. This 
mechanism would lead to the determination of the consolidated corporate tax base, 
which would then be shared amongst the Member States where the different group units 
are located (or amongst the Member State where the head office is located and the 
Member States where the single permanent establishments are located) according to a 
pre-determined formula based on elements such as capital, assets and labour. 
 The essential idea underlying the CCCTB is based on an implicit 
acknowledgement of the fact that the harmonisation of the corporate tax base would 
arguably solve a series of complicated issues concerning the allocation of taxing powers 
amongst Member States, ultimately favouring the activity of multinational groups in the 
European Union and taking a step towards a more integrated Internal Market597. 
																																																								
595 Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base addressed to the 
Council of the European Union, the European Economic and Social Committee and the European Parliament, 
COM(2011)121. The legal basis for this proposal is Article 115 TFEU on the approximation of national rules 
directly affecting the establishment or the functioning of the Internal Market. For some comments on the first 
CCCTB proposal, see, amongst others, O’Shea, T., The Common Consolidated Corporate Tax BASE (CCCTB). Issues for 
Member States opting out and third countries: a critique and some in-depth analysis, in EC Tax Journal, 2008, 1; Cerioni, 
L., The Commission’s proposal for a CCCTB Directive: analysis and comment, in Bulletin of International Taxation, 
2011, 515; Vascega, M., Van Thiel, S., The CCCTB proposal: the next step towards corporate tax harmonisation in the 
European Union?, in European Taxation, 2011, 374; Pistone, P., Double taxation: selected issues of compatibility with 
European law, multilateral tax treaties and CCCTB, in Rust, A. (ed.), Double taxation within the European Union, 
Alphen aan den Rijn, 2011, 187; Cerioni, L., Postponement of the Commission’s Proposal for a CCCTB Directive: possible 
ways forward, in Bulletin for International Taxation, 2010, 2, 98. 
596 It should be noted that global formulary apportionments are generally rejected by the OECD because they are 
considered to be too complicated to implement, entailing risks of different interpretations and applications of 
their criteria, political and administrative complexities which could lead to high costs and are essentially based on 
arbitrary elements. For an overview of the most recent tendencies of the debate between “source taxation” and 
“residence taxation”, see the first chapter of the research, at paragraph 4. 
597 Aujean, M., Le fonti europee e la loro efficacia in materia tributaria, tra armonizzazione, coordinamento e concorrenza 
fiscale leale, cited above, 25. 
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 The purpose of the CCCTB is admittedly quite ambitious. However, objections 
have been raised from the very beginning of the process for its approval. Member States, 
for example, have voiced some concerns on whether the proposal was compatible with 
the principle of subsidiarity on which the distribution of competences between the 
Union and national parliaments is based598. This explains, at least in part, why the works 
on the proposal have reached a substantial halt. 
The Commission acknowledged the unlikeliness of a unanimous approval of the 
CCCTB Proposal as originally envisaged in 2011 in its entirety, without what the 
Commission now called a “staged approach”. Therefore, the Commission, in its 2015 
Action Plan 599 , advocated a “step-by-step approach” to the topic of the Common 
Corporate Consolidated Tax Base, suggesting that work on the aspects linked to 
consolidation be postponed until agreement is secured on a mandatory (and no longer 
optional) set of rules for the common tax base. The 2016 Proposal is thus limited to the 
rules for the calculation of the corporate tax base of companies across the Internal 
Market, whereas consolidation is envisaged to be addressed in a separate proposal for a 
directive, which is set to be put forward and examined only after a consensus has been 
reached, at political level, on the elements of the common corporate tax base. 
It should also be noted that, while the regime provided for by the original CCCTB 
proposal was of a merely optional nature, since it did not force companies with purely 
domestic business activities to adhere to the regime, the new CCCTB proposal entails a 
regime that is no longer optional, at least for multinational groups. 
The explanatory memorandum annexed to the 2016 CCTB Proposal highlights 
that the “mismatches” that are likely to arise “in the interaction between disparate national 
corporate tax regimes” generate “risks of double taxation and double non-taxation and thereby 
distort the functioning of the Internal Market”. It follows that, since “Europe’s priority today is 
to promote sustainable growth and investment within a fair and better integrated market, a new 
framework is needed for a fair and efficient taxation of corporate profits”. Ultimately, therefore, 
the CCCTB is supposed to “contribute to the elimination of obstacles which create distortions 
that impede the proper functioning of the Internal Market”. 
Starting from these assumptions, the Commission argues that “the CCCTB features 
as an effective tool for attributing income to where the value is created” and it would do so by 																																																								
598 Pistone, P., Double taxation: selected issues of compatibility with European law, multilateral tax treaties and CCCTB, 
cited above, 207; Munin, N., Tax in troubled time. Is it the time for a Common Corporate Tax Base in the EU?, in EC Tax 
Review, 2011, 3, 124; Cerioni, L., Postponement of the Commission’s proposal for a CCCTB Directive: possible ways 
forward, cited above, 99. 
599 Commission Communication COM(2015) 302 on an Action Plan for a Fair and Efficient Corporate Tax System 
in the European Union, 17 June 2015. 
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way of a formula based on three factors, i.e. assets, labour and sales, which are supposed 
to be inherently attached to the country where companies earn their profit.  
 Coming to the substance of the proposal, for the purposes of the present research, 
it should be noted that, as already highlighted above, the declared purpose of the 
CCCTB regime is not in any way the drafting of a model for the homogeneous allocation 
of taxing powers between Member States, being it limited to the aim of reducing the 
administrative burden for companies, especially with regards to transfer pricing rules, 
and, indirectly, of regulating fiscal competition amongst countries to a higher level of 
transparency600. Indeed, the proposal aims only at the harmonisation of corporate tax 
bases: each Member State would still apply its own tax rates to its share of the taxpayer’s 
tax base. 
However, the proposed CCCTB directive would entail the implementation of a 
common corporate tax base through the entire European Union, i.e. one single set of 
rules for determining corporate profits for European groups of companies opting for the 
common system601: profits and losses of group companies would be aggregated into one 
single overall group tax base, with automatic and full cross-border loss relief and 
prevention of international double taxation (and also the elimination of the need to 
implement transfer pricing rules)602. 
More specifically, Article 41 of the new CCTB proposal provides that “losses 
incurred in a tax year by a resident taxpayer or a permanent establishment of a non-resident 
taxpayer may be carried forward and deducted in subsequent tax years”. The 2016 Proposal, 
however, entails a number of limits to this faculty. First of all, the consequent reduction 
of the tax base as a result of the taking into account of losses from previous tax years 
may not result in a negative amount. Secondly, previous losses shall not be deducted if 
another company acquires a participation in the taxpayer concerned, which thus 
becomes a qualifying subsidiary of the acquirer, and there is a “major change of activity of 
																																																								
600 Lang, M., The principle of territoriality and its implementation in the proposal for a Council Directive on a Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), WU International Taxation Research Paper Series, 2012, 9, 2. 
601 The CCCTB system as originally proposed by the Commission would, in fact, be optional. Eligible groups of 
companies would have been able to decide whether or not to join this system, being also able to decide to ignore 
it and remain subject to the existing national rules for the determination of corporate tax bases. This option, as 
originally drafted, would have been a sort of “all-in option”, meaning that, if a company belonging to a group 
would have opted for the CCCTB regime, then all of its qualifying EU subsidiaries would have been 
automatically subjected to the CCCTB regime as well, for at least five years. 
602 From an administrative point of view, the system would entail that a group of companies which has opted into 
the CCCTB regime would not have to deal with all of the different tax authorities of the Member States any more, 
but with only one tax authority, i.e. the “principal tax authority”, meaning the tax administration of the Member 
Stare where the main holding company of the group is established. 
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the acquired taxpayer”, with the discontinuance of the previous main activity of the 
taxpayer603. 
It goes without saying that the consolidation proposed by the Commission would 
concern the tax base only, or, better said, the determination of the consolidated taxable 
profits of the group of companies. Once determined, the consolidated tax base would be 
subsequently divided, according to an apportionment formula604, amongst the Member 
States where single group companies are located (and subject to tax), which may, then, 
apply their own tax rates to the part of the consolidated tax base that has been allocated 
to them. 
 According to some, the CCCTB scheme would, thus, make it possible to consider 
the overall ability to pay of a group of companies, viewed in its own economic unity 
(despite being composed of subjects with separate legal personality), from an 
authentically “European” perspective, thus proportionally allocating such ability to pay 
to each Member State in relation to the elements on which the above-mentioned formula 
would be elaborated (essentially, labour, assets and sales)605. 
 It has also been noted by part of the legal doctrine that the implementation of the 
proposed CCCTB Directive would reinforce the link between taxation and the place 
where profits are generated, from an overall “Internal Market perspective”606. Certainly 
the implementation of a CCCTB would allow the European Union Member States to 
overcome the traditional distinction between “source state” and “residence state”, which 
would ultimately become irrelevant, at least with regard to corporate taxation and 
insofar as corporations located within the Internal Market. 
It would, in fact, seem, at least from a theoretical point of view, that the CCCTB 
would entail a new kind of implementation of territorial connections between Member 
States and the companies’ business income. The current territorial connections based 
mainly on the source of the income and on the residence of a company would be, at least 																																																								
603 According to Article 42 of the 2016 CCTB Proposal, the loss relief shall be given “in proportion to the holding of the 
resident taxpayer in its qualifying subsidiaries” (whereas it would be “full for permanent establishments”) and for a 
limited period of time. 
604 It goes beyond the purposes and scope of the present research to dwell on the technical details of how this 
hypothetical global apportionment formula would work. Suffice it so say here that the proposed formula contains 
three apportionment criteria, all equally relevant, i.e. capital (fixed assets), labour (personnel and wages) and 
turnover (sales). Several Member States have objected to the presence of the asset factor in the apportionment 
formula, since, according to their position, it would not reflect economic reality and would favour Member States 
where “old industries” are located, as the formula ignores intangible and financial assets. 
605 Cerioni, L., The never-ending issue of cross-border loss compensation within the EU: reconciling balanced allocation of 
taxing rights and cross-border ability-to-pay, cited above, 277. The Author also suggested that, since the CCCTB 
legislation would introduce a “fractional application of the ability-to-pay principle”, the general principle of equality 
would offer a strong base for the Commission to issue a piece of soft law on the proportional application of the 
ability-to-pay principle across the European Union’s territory to all taxpayers falling outside the scope of 
application of the CCCTB provisions, thus developing the ability-to-pay principle into a part of the acquis 
communautaire. 
606 Garbarino, C., Harmonization and coordination of corporate taxes in the European Union, cited above, 282. 
	 224 
in part, replaced by an “economic territorial connection” based on the actual presence of 
a company or a group across the Internal Market607, with, once again, a new territorial 
dimension covering the entire European Union. Fiscal jurisdiction would be exercised on 
the ground of the territorial connection between a Member State and the physical 
presence on its territory of the elements of a formula (assets, labour and capital). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
607 Monsenego, J., Taxation of foreign business income within the European Internal Market, Amsterdam, 2011, 460. 
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CHAPTER IV 
TAXATION OF FOREIGN INCOME FROM A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: 
FISCAL TERRITORIALITY AND THE DEGREE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRINCIPLES 
AND RULES ESTABLISHED BY EUROPEAN UNION LAW 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. The comparative perspective for the integration of the Internal Market. 
 As highlighted in the first chapter of the research, national governments and 
parliaments are faced with two basic problems concerning international tax law, 
intended as the law governing taxation of cross-border circumstances: whether resident 
subjects should be taxed on their worldwide income or exclusively on income having its 
source within their country of residence and whether or not non-residents should be 
taxed on the income sourced within a country which is not their country of residence608. 
The answers given to these issues gave rise to the affirmation of two basic models of 
taxation: worldwide taxation and “territorial” taxation609. 
 It has also been noted in previous pages of the research that, in common income 
tax law practice, two main connecting criteria generally operate: the “subjective” 
criterion based on residence, corresponding to a worldwide tax model, and the 
“objective” criterion based on the place where the income is produced, which 
corresponds to a model of taxation at source, also defined as “territorial”610. Countries 
adhering to the worldwide tax model generally implement taxes of a “personal” nature 
(so does Italy, for example), levying them to all of the resident taxpayers’ income, 																																																								
608 See Chapter I, paragraph 4. 
609 Avi-Yonah, R.S., Sartori, N., Marian, O., Global perspectives on income taxation law, cited above, 150. 
610 Some authors have even argued that these criteria should be considered as actual general principles recognised 
by civilised nations, pursuant to Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Of this opinion, 
Garbarino, C., La tassazione del reddito transnazionale, cited above, 95; Melis, G., La nozione di residenza fiscale delle 
persone fisiche nell’ordinamento tributario italiano, cited above, 1034. 
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wherever accrued, while countries adhering to the “territorial” model levy taxes only on 
income which is produced within their territory (as France does, as far as corporate 
income tax is concerned), by applying their own sets of criteria and sourcing rules aimed 
at the localisation of the production of the income. 
 Both the above-mentioned “objective” and “subjective” criteria are declinations of 
the territorial connection which, according (not to internationally recognised principles 
or customary law, but) to common state practice, is necessary for a state to exercise its 
taxing powers on a certain item of income: one focuses on the source of the income 
rather than on which subject owns it, whereas the other focuses on the person producing 
or owning that income and his/her/its allegiance to a certain state611. 
 This is the reason why the comparative perspective, that will be adopted in the 
present chapter, is functional to the completion of the present research. Such analysis 
will be useful in two “directions”: a “horizontal” one, in order to verify how certain 
selected states have chosen to allocate their taxing powers and to implement the 
“territorial” concepts of “residence” and/or “source” in their own domestic systems; a 
“vertical” one, in order to verify how the choices of each single Member State analyses 
affect the overall possibility of reaching an effectively integrated Internal Market. 
 On how states decide to implement such territorial connection, in fact, revolve the 
actual extension of their taxing powers, the amount of the burden imposed on taxpayers 
and the amount of the “sacrifice” possibly being imposed on another country’s taxing 
rights, either by way of bilateral agreements in the form of conventions against double 
taxation or, for European Union Member States, as a consequence of the necessary 
compliance with European Union law, whose primacy may be ensured by the 
intervention of the Court of Justice or by single pieces of secondary EU law. 
 The ways states implement these criteria is, therefore, crucial in the attempt to 
reach a hypothetical balanced allocation of taxing powers within the European Union, 
i.e. a hypothetical territorial allocation of taxing powers where the relevant “territory” 
cannot but coincide with the dimension of the entire Internal Market. 
Legal scholarship has identified two main approaches to defining what 
constitutes “source” for the purposes of (international and domestic) tax law, i.e. the so-
called “formal approach” and the so-called “substantive approach”. It is generally 
believed that the substantive approach is more suitable to attain anti-avoidance 
purposes, being it more focused on concepts such as economic substance, which are not 																																																								
611 Even though, as we will see, states still envisage forms of “extraterritorial” exercise of their taxing powers, i.e. 
cases where the territorial connection between their territory and the items of income on which tax is levied is 
particularly feeble and, sometimes, even fictitious. 
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under the full control of the taxpayer, whereas formal criteria, being them based on 
“technical” tests, are more easily “steered” by the taxpayer612. The formal approach is 
usually adopted to define the source of passive income, such as interest and royalties, 
whereas the substantive approach is mainly adopted with concern to active income, 
being it focused on where the actual business activity giving rise to the income has taken 
place. 
As we will see in the following pages, a similar distinction can be traced also with 
regards to the criteria on the ground of which states define which taxpayers should or 
should not be considered as their “residents” for fiscal purposes, with all evident 
consequences on the extension of such taxpayers’ tax liability (limited or unlimited). The 
great divide, once again, is between formal criteria, such as those based on a subject 
being listed, for example, in the civil registry of the population or the place of 
incorporation of a certain company, and substantial criteria, i.e. the place of effective 
management of a company or the place where the individual taxpayer has his/her 
family and/or business ties. 
However, in order to verify the actual existence of a tie with the taxing state is not 
sufficient to stop at the mere content of the provision which states that a certain criterion 
is relevant to justify the exercise of taxing powers by the state. 
If we go deeper into details, we can see, for example, that there are legal orders 
(e.g. the United States) that consider the subjective status of citizenship as sufficient to 
tax the worldwide income of their taxpayers/citizens. We could also see that the rules 
regulating the acquisition and preservation of citizenship allow for hypothesis in which 
a citizen is considered as such even in absence of any actual and constant connection 
with the national community, thus indirectly leading to a system that taxes a “citizen” 
for income produced abroad even if there is no effective link with the state: the 
consequence would be a purely extraterritorial income tax. 
The same could be also said with regards to the provisions establishing the notion 
of “residence”, which, especially in the current context characterised by a higher level of 
mobility, tend to an increasing extension of the definition of “residence” for tax purposes 
and to put on taxpayers the burden of proof in order to demonstrate that they do not 
reside within a certain state and should not, therefore, be taxed on their worldwide 
income by that state. 
 The interplay between the “objective” and the “subjective” declinations of 
territoriality (not as a principle, but, more correctly, as a criterion) and their combined 																																																								
612 Avi-Yonah, R.S., Sartori, N., Marian, O., Global perspectives on income taxation law, cited above, 155. 
	 228 
integration in countries’ tax models has led to the development of two main models, as 
already observed in the first chapter of the research: worldwide taxation and “territorial” 
taxation. 
Some scholars have made and still make strong arguments advocating the 
application of territorial tax systems, which they view as the most efficient way to reach 
international tax neutrality with regards to cross-border moving of enterprises, capital 
and investments and to guarantee fair competition between residents and non-residents 
carrying out the same economic activities in the same territory and under the same 
market conditions613. 
The United States, the United Kingdom and Italy are examples of countries that 
have chosen to adhere to the “worldwide tax jurisdiction model” and, therefore, tax their 
residents on worldwide income from whatever source derived. On the other hand, 
France and the Netherlands, for example, as well as other continental European 
countries, have implemented, at least in part, a fundamentally territorial tax system, thus 
taxing residents and non-residents only on income derived from sources within their 
respective taxing jurisdictions. 
 However, whereas, on one hand, worldwide taxation has been widely 
implemented in the 1970s by the majority of Western countries (for example, with the 
implementation of Controlled Foreign Companies regimes), in more recent years, there 
has been a substantial reversal of scenario, with the tendency, on the part of countries, to 
reduce the scope of their fiscal jurisdiction and the consequent implementation of 
“hybrid” tax models with a large number of influences coming from territorial taxation 
(e.g., France, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Hong Kong and many Latin American 
countries)614. 
More in particular, some countries currently tax business income exclusively on a 
source basis. For instance, since the Montevideo conference in 1956, many Latin 
American countries consider that international law limits fiscal jurisdiction only to 
income sourced within the territory of the state615. This view has been embodied in the 
model tax treaty elaborated by the Andean group, even though several Latin American 
countries, such as Brazil and Argentina, have recently moved to a fiscal system entailing 
taxation of worldwide income for residents. 																																																								
613 Amongst them, see, for example, Kemmeren, E.C.C.M., Double tax conventions on income and capital and the EU: 
past, present and future, cited above, 157; Vogel, K., Worldwide vs. source taxation of income - A review and re-evaluation 
of arguments, cited above, 8-10; Desai, M.A., Hines, J.R., Evaluating international tax reform, National Tax Journal, 
2003, 56, 487. 
614 Ault, H., Comparative income taxation: a structural analysis, The Hague, 1997, 23. 
615 Monsenego, J., Taxation of foreign business income within the European Internal Market, cited above, 79. 
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According to Vogel, only Argentina, Uruguay and Hong Kong have, as of today, 
implemented a “purely” territorial tax system, while all other countries have either 
implemented a traditional “hybrid worldwide” tax system (worldwide taxation for 
residents and “territorial” taxation at source for non-residents) or have enhanced certain 
territorial characteristics of their tax system, thus adhering to a fiscal model based on a 
sort of “tempered territoriality” (this is the case, for example, of the French tax system, as 
we will see, where only corporations are a priori subject to an essentially territorial model 
of taxation)616. 
With regards to the taxation of income earned abroad by multinational 
companies, it has been highlighted that, over the past forty years, there has been a 
pronounced shift, at international level, on the part of capital-exporting countries, 
towards use of territorial tax systems, with the implementation of “participation 
exemption” regimes by way of which active business income earned abroad by foreign 
subsidiaries is (wholly or partially) exempt from taxation by the home country and no 
tax credit for foreign taxes is granted617. On the other hand, non-equity income, such as 
interest and royalties, remains generally taxable in countries with both “worldwide” and 
“territorial” tax systems, with a tax credit for foreign withholding taxes being generally 
allowed. 
 In the European Union context, many studies have observed a substantial degree 
of “homogenisation” of the tax systems of different Member States, especially as 
corporate income taxation is concerned, with a clearly identifiable “circulation” of tax 
models618. Examples of this tendency can be found, for instance, in the steps taken 
towards the abandonment of the traditional tax credit system and the adoption of the 
exemption method with regards to dividends and capital gains on participations in 
companies (participation exemption regimes)619, in the adoption of Controlled Foreign 
																																																								
616  Vogel, K., General Report, in International Fiscal Association, Interpretation of double taxation conventions, 
Rotterdam, 1993, 66. 
617 It has been documented that the number of current OECD member countries with territorial tax systems has 
doubled since 2000. Countries resorting to participation exemption regimes are, for instance, Italy, Belgium, 
France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Greece (amongst which 
some countries exempt 100 per cent of the foreign subsidiaries’ dividends, while some other countries exempt at 
least 95 per cent of such dividends), while countries such as the United States, Ireland and Mexico still encompass 
a “worldwide” tax systems with a tax credit being granted for foreign taxes. Many countries resorting to 
participation exemption regimes also exempt gains deriving from the sale of shares of the foreign subsidiary. 
618 Garbarino, C., Tax transplants and circulation of corporate tax models, in British Tax Review, 2011, 158. 
619 Barassi, M., Circolazione dei modelli tributari e comparazione, in Rivista di Diritto Tributario, 2013, 2, 513. 
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Companies regimes 620  and in the establishment of forms of group consolidation 
sometimes going beyond the borders of the Member States concerned621. 
 In light of all of the above, and coming to the specific purpose of the research, we 
will now analyse and compare the main functioning of the tax systems of three different 
European countries and how they have chosen to identify the territorial connections 
which they deem necessary in order to exercise their taxing powers on transnational 
items of income. The choice of the countries that will constitute the focus of the following 
analysis has been made on the ground of the need to take into consideration radically 
different tax models in light of the traced distinction between worldwide tax systems 
and “territorial” tax systems. 
 Therefore, the first of the chosen countries has been Italy, which has a long-
standing tradition of adhering to the worldwide tax model in its “conventional” form, 
with both individuals and legal entities being taxed on all of their income, wherever 
accrued, if they reside in Italy and non-residents (regardless of them being individuals or 
corporations) being taxed only on the portion of their income which is produced within 
Italian territory. Then, the analysis will move to the opposite model, with attention being 
paid to France, which has an equally long-standing tradition of territorial taxation, even 
though limited to corporate taxation: whereas French-resident individuals are taxed on 
their worldwide income as Italian-resident individuals are, France levies corporate taxes 
only on the income produced within French territory, either accrued or owned by 
resident corporations or by non-resident corporations. Finally, we will examine a 
“hybrid” system, that is to say the United Kingdom’s tax system, which can generally be 
defined as adhering to the worldwide tax model, but which, nonetheless, in more recent 
times, has been gradually shifting towards more territorial inclinations. 
 In the analysis of all three of the mentioned tax models specific attention will be 
paid to the level of integration of those countries’ fiscal systems in general and more 
specific tax measures with the provisions of European Union law and with the principles 
developed by the Court of Justice of the European Union. The last part of the present 
chapter will, therefore, focus on the recent evolutions of the three countries’ fiscal 
measures on exit taxation and Controlled Foreign Companies, and especially on how 
such measures have evolved after the judgements rendered by the Court of Justice on the 
																																																								
620 Stizza, P., La disciplina fiscale delle Controlled Foreign Corporations in Italia, Francia e Regno Unito, in Diritto e Pratica 
Tributaria Internazionale, 2010, 1403. 
621 Marino, G., L’IRES nel contesto della tassazione delle società nella UE: bilanci e prospettive, in Rassegna Tributaria, 
2015, 1, 131. 
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point, and their compatibility with the recently adopted relevant measure of the Anti-
Tax Avoidance Directive. 
2. Italy: a “traditional” worldwide tax model. 
 The current Italian tax system is structured so as to resident taxpayers are taxed 
on their worldwide income (so-called “utile mondiale”) regardless of that income having 
being produced in Italian territory or abroad and non-resident taxpayers are taxed only 
on the portion of their income produced within Italian territory. In the late 70s, Italy has, 
in fact, shifted from an income tax model of a mostly “real” nature to the 
implementation of an income tax which is essentially “personal” and based on the 
worldwide taxation model, as far as resident taxpayers are concerned, while a more 
territorial approach is implemented concerning non-residents622. 
 As unanimously observed, therefore, the nature of the connection between the 
taxpayer and the Italian territory influences the extension of the tax charge: if a taxpayer 
is bound to Italy by way of a strong and stable connection - i.e. residence - he/she/it 
shall have a more “intense” duty to contribute to public expenditure, with the amount of 
taxes due being computed with regard to all of his/her/its income, wherever accrued; 
on the other hand, in case of a subject not so strongly bound to Italy, such as a non-
resident (being him/her/it an Italian citizen or a “foreigner”), the intensity of the duty to 
contribute to the Italian public coffers is lessened ad tax will be imposed only on such 
items of income as they are objectively connected with the Italian territory623. 
 According to the most authoritative doctrine, this particular structure of Italian 
tax law finds its roots in Constitutional provisions and, more specifically, in Article 53 of 
the Italian Constitution. Pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article 53, in fact, “Anybody must 
contribute to public expenditure depending on their ability to pay”624. It should be highlighted 
from the outset, before proceeding in the analysis of the repercussions of such a 
statement on the structure of the Italian tax system, that the English term “ability to 
pay”, especially as developed by the Court of Justice of the European Union’s 
jurisprudence, does not exactly coincide with the actual meaning of the Italian concept of 
“capacità contributiva”: in fact, whereas the concept of “ability to pay”, in the words of the 																																																								
622 For a brief overview of the evolution of the Italian income tax system from a “real” model to a “personal” 
model, see, amongst others, Melis, G., La nozione di residenza fiscale delle persone fisiche nell’ordinamento tributario 
italiano, cited above, 103. For a historic overview, see also Baggio, R., Il principio di territorialità ed i limiti alla potestà 
tributaria, cited above, 271-279. 
623 Baggio, R., Il principio di territorialità ed i limiti alla potestà tributaria, cited above, 270. 
624 The original text of Article 53, paragraph 1, of the Italian Constitution reads as follows: “Tutti sono tenuti a 
concorrere alle spese pubbliche in ragione della loro capacità contributiva”. 
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Luxembourg Judges, is generally described and resorted to as a criterion for the 
allocation of taxing powers amongst Member States - which, to a certain extent, 
functions as the “theoretical counterpart” of allocating criteria based on the “principle of 
territoriality” - the Italian “capacità contributiva” concept refers to a more general 
principle based on the need to guarantee substantial equality and social justice between 
citizens, even in the levying of taxes, and according to which the State must levy taxes on 
its taxpayers on the grounds of their actual wealth, without any direct or indirect 
discrimination625. 
 Italian legal scholarship has found that the term “anybody” (“tutti”), in Article 53 
of the Constitution, is a sign of a necessary wide involvement in the contribution to 
public expenses626, including foreigners and non-residents, since the wording of Article 53 
does not limit the extension of the duty to contribute to the public coffers to citizens 
and/or residents only. It goes without saying that such a wide definition of the subjects 
that have to contribute to the Italian public expenditure needs to be limited and better 
defined, especially with regard to foreigners and non-residents, on the ground of a stable 
and significant link of an economic nature between these subjects and the territory of the 
Italian State627. 
 Said link may either have an “objective” nature, as in the case of the enactment of 
an economic activity or the simple possession of an item of income in the territory of the 
State, or a “subjective” nature, thus linking the definition of who should contribute to the 
State’s public expenditure on the ground of a certain status, such as citizenship or the 
habitual presence of a subject within the territory of the State628. 
 The choice of the Italian tax legislature has been to identify that significant link on 
the basis of a distinction based on the paramount concept of residence, as the expression 																																																								
625 On one hand, a considerable number of Italian authors, together with the Italian Constitutional Court, interpret 
the principle enshrined in Article 53 of the Constitution as an expression of the general principle of equality 
provided for by Article 3 of the Constitution, ensuring that all those who are called to contribute to public 
expenditure do so on the basis of their actual possibility and economic capacity. Of this opinion, see, for example, 
Fedele, A., Appunti dalle lezioni di diritto tributario, Rome, 2003, 32; Fedele, A., La funzione fiscale e la capacità 
contributiva nella Costituzione italiana, in Perrone, L., Berliri, C. (eds.), Diritto tributario e Corte Costituzionale, Naples, 
2006, 1; Gallo, F., Le ragioni del fisco. Etica e giustizia nella tassazione, Bologna, 2007, 97. Another part of the Italian 
doctrine has, however, argued for the need to separate the analysis of the concept of “capacità contributiva” from 
the principle of equality enshrined in Article 3 of the Constitution, i.e. as an autonomous concept based on the 
recognition of the fiscal interest of the State and forcing the legislature to always look for a connection between 
the tax imposed and the tax object, in a perspective based on the “internal coherence” of the fiscal measure. Of 
this opinion, see Falsitta, G., Manuale di diritto tributario. Parte generale, Padua, 2015, 151. Adhering to the first 
theory, which is nowadays the prevalent one, implies recognising the existence of limits of the possibility, for the 
State, to levy taxes. On the point, see Moschetti, F., Il principio di capacità contributiva - espressione di un sistema di 
valori che informa il rapporto tra singolo e comunità, Padua, 1993, 18. 
626  Antonini, L., Dovere tributario, interesse fiscale e diritti costituzionali, Milan, 1996, passim; Sacchetto, C., 
Territorialità, cited above, 304; Moschetti, F., Il principio di capacità contributiva, cited above, passim. 
627 Moschetti, F., Il principio di capacità contributiva, cited above, 215. 
628 Melis, G., La nozione di residenza fiscale delle persone fisiche nell’ordinamento tributario italiano, cited above, 1045; 
Fregni, M.C., La residenza fiscale delle persone fisiche, in Giurisprudenza Italiana, 2009, 2564. 
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of a particularly relevant and intense connection between a subject and the territory of 
the State, justifying a higher tax burden. The worldwide nature of the Italian tax model 
has always been accompanied by the adoption of the credit method for the elimination 
of international double taxation. 
 As far as individual income taxation is concerned, Article 3 of Presidential Decree 
917/1986 (“Testo Unico delle Imposte sul Reddito”, i.e. the Italian “Income Tax Code”) 
established that all subjects that are resident in the territory of the State are taxed on their 
income wherever accrued, with a correspondent tax credit being granted to residents for 
taxes paid abroad pursuant to Article 165 of Presidential Decree 917/1986. On the other 
hand, as far as non-residents are concerned, tax is levied only exclusively on income 
produced within the territory of the Italian State. 
The same applies with regards to corporate income taxation. Article 73, 
paragraph 1, letter d), of Presidential Decree 917/1986 lists, amongst the subjects that are 
considered as taxable for the purposes of Corporate Income Tax (“Imposta sul Reddito 
delle Società”, also known as “IRES”), “companies and entities, including trusts, with or 
without juridical personality” that do not reside within the territory of the State and 
paragraph 2 of the same Article specifies that partnerships (“società di persone”) and 
similar subjects fall within the scope of application of Italian Corporate Income Tax629. 
Furthermore, Articles 151 and 153 of Presidential Decree 917/1986 establish that 
commercial and non-commercial non-resident entities are taxed in Italy “only on income 
produced in the territory of the State, with the exclusion of income that is exempted from taxation 
and of income that is subject to a final withholding tax or a substitute tax”. 
As already highlighted in other parts of the present research, it might prove 
considerably difficult to identify the “source” of a certain item of income and, therefore, 
to understand when that item of income can be considered as produced in the territory 
of the State. Article 23 of Presidential Decree 917/1986 provides for specific connecting 
criteria with regard to income that is considered as produced in Italian territory630. We 
will not dwell on the content of such a provision, as the analysis of the single linking 
criteria would go beyond the scope of the present research. Suffice it here to say, without 
claiming to be complete, that the criteria envisaged by Article 23 are, in general terms, 																																																								
629 Whereas, with regard to resident taxpayers that are subject to Corporate Income Tax, Article 73 of Presidential 
Decree 917/1986 distinguishes between “commercial entities” and “non-commercial entities” and between 
partnerships and corporations. Furthermore, partnerships (“società di persone”) and similar subjects, if they are 
considered as residing in Italian territory, are taxed according to a mechanism based on transparency, while, on 
the other hand, this is not the case if such subjects do not reside in Italy. On the point, see Perrone, L., 
L’imposizione del reddito delle società e degli enti non residenti, in Rassegna Tributaria, 1989, 3, 570. 
630 Rosenbloom, H.D., Garbarino, C., Analisi comparata delle norme per la localizzazione dei redditi negli ordinamenti 
tributari italiano e statunitense, in Diritto e Pratica Tributaria, 1988, 529. 
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based either on the location of the income-producing assets, on the place where the 
income-producing activity is put in place or on the place of residence of the subject 
paying the amount constituting the income. 
For the sake of completeness, it should also be recalled that non-residents subjects 
having a permanent establishment in Italy are taxed, pursuant to Article 152 of 
Presidential Decree 917/1986, on the income attributable to that permanent 
establishment. In this case, the income attributable to the permanent establishment is 
subtracted from the implementation of the “isolated treatment” that is applied to single 
items of non-residents income produced in Italy, being unitarily considered through the 
general criteria applicable to business income produced by resident subjects631. We will 
not dwell, here, and also for all other tax systems that will be analysed in the following 
pages, on the implications of the notion of “permanent establishment” on corporate 
taxation, since the issues concerning permanent establishments (how to define it, which 
consequences should be attributed to their presence within a certain territory…) would 
deserve an in-depth analysis which cannot be conducted here and which is ultimately 
not essential to the purpose of the present research. 
2.1. The Italian concept of “fiscal residence” and its possible extraterritorial 
extensions. 
 Italy bases its definition of the residence status on a “hybrid” system, where one 
of the relevant criteria is of a formal nature (based on the civil registry of the resident 
population), whereas two of them (domicile and residence pursuant to Article 43 of the 
Civil Code) are more focused on substantial approach, aimed at verifying the actual 
reality of the condition of the subject concerned. However, contrarily, for example, to UK 
tax law632, Italian tax law does not encompass any definition of a “non-resident”, which 
should, therefore, be derived a contrario from the definition of “resident” provided for by 
Article 2. 
More in detail, Article 2, paragraph 2, of Presidential Decree n. 917/1986 provides 
that an individual is considered as residing in Italy for tax purposes if he/she is either 
listed in the civil registry of the resident population, or has his/her domicile in the 																																																								
631 In light of the characteristics of the regime, many authors have defined the permanent establishment as, 
according to Italian tax law, a “quasi-subject”, halfway between a mere connecting criterion and a proper tax 
subject. On the point, see Gallo, F., Contributo all’elaborazione del concetto di ‘stabile organizzazione’ secondo il diritto 
interno, in Rivista di Diritto Finanziario e Scienza delle Finanze, 1985, 1, 385. 
632 Reference is made to the so-called “statutory residence test”, which will be further analysed in the present 
Chapte. 
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territory of the State (interpreted as the main location of moral, material and business 
relation pursuant to Article 43 of the Civil Code), or has his/her habitual abode in Italy 
pursuant to Article 43 of the Civil Code. No attention is paid, for these purposes, to the 
element of the continual permanence within the territory of the State, with prevalence 
being given to “qualitative”, rather than “quantitative”, criteria633. 
 The jurisprudence of the Italian Supreme Court has substantially found that the 
particular relevance of the civil registry of the population for tax purposes, as described 
by Article 2 of Presidential Decree 917/1986, constitutes a clear example of form 
prevailing over substance, with the criterion based on being listed in that registry 
constituting an absolute presumption for tax purposes634, whose existence precludes any 
other possible check aimed at ascertaining fiscal residence and any possibility for the 
taxpayer to present evidence to the contrary635. 
 It should, however, be recalled that large part of the Italian legal scholarship has 
strongly criticised the use of a purely formal requirement such as being listed in the civil 
registry of the resident population in order to define an individual as fiscally resident in 
Italy, with the consequent levying of taxes on all of its worldwide income, wherever 
originated636. Many have, in fact, interpreted this criterion as not actually able to be 
grounded on a real attachment between the taxpayer and the Italian territory, which 
would justify the exercise of taxing powers, on the part of the Italian State, even in the 
absence of an effective connection with the taxpayer, i.e. a sort of “extraterritorial” 
exercise of taxing powers. Many have even argued for a hypothetical constitutional 
incompatibility of such a provision with Article 53 of the Italian Constitution, in its 
interpretation according to which, as seen above, there needs to be a certain, effective 
and stable (and not merely formal) link between the taxpayer and the territory of the 																																																								
633 Fantozzi, A., Paparella, F., Lezioni di diritto tributario dell’impresa, Padua, 2014, 42; Marongiu, G., Domicilio, 
residenza, dimora nel diritto tributario, in Dig. disc. priv. sez. comm., Turin, 1990, vol. V, 142. 
634 Whereas, according to general Italian civil law, such data can constitute the ground only for relative 
presumptions. On the point, see Piantavigna, P., La funzione della nozione di ‘residenza fiscale’ nell’IRPEF, in Rivista 
di Diritto Finanziario, 2013, 3, 275. 
635 Supreme Court of Cassation (Corte di Cassazione), 20 April 2006, 9319; Supreme Court of Cassation, 3 March 
1999, 1783; Supreme Court of Cassation, 6 February 1998, 1215. 
636 Melis, G., La nozione di residenza fiscale delle persone fisiche nell’ordinamento tributario italiano, cited above, 1045; 
Melis, G., Riflessioni intorno alla presunzione di residenza fiscale di cui all’art. 10 della l. 23 dicembre 1998, n. 448, in 
Rassegna Tributaria, 1999, 4, 1082; Maisto, G., Iscrizione anagrafica e residenza fiscale ai fini dell’imposta sul reddito 
delle persone fisiche, in Rivista di Diritto Tributario, 1998, 4, 222; Maisto, G., La residenza fiscale delle persone fisiche 
emigrate in Stati o territori aventi regime tributario privilegiato, in Rivista di Diritto Tributario, 1999, 4, 57; Marino, G., 
La residenza nel diritto tributario, cited above, 30; Lupi, R., Territorialità del tributo, cited above, 4. Contra, see 
Fransoni, G., La territorialità nel diritto tributario, cited above, 360: the Author, in fact, distinguishes between the 
case where the insertion in the civil registry of the resident population has been asked and obtained by the 
taxpayer and, on the other hand, the case where the inserion in such registry has not been asked by the taxpayer 
and does not reflect the actual reality of the circumstances. In the first case, according to the Author, the criterion 
based on the analysis of the civil registry of the resident population can be considered as suitable to the purpose 
of identifying a resident individual because the circumstance would reflect the actual will of the taxpayer, who 
has voluntarily declared his/her attachment to the Italian State. The last-mentioned thesis is not supported by 
Baggio, R., Il principio di territorialità ed i limiti alla potestà tributaria, cited above, 229. 
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State levying taxes: legal doctrine has, therefore, highlighted that an element such as 
being listed in the civil registry of the population, which has been created essentially for 
“statistical” purposes, would not actually reflect any actual connection with Italy on the 
part of a certain subject. 
 These arguments may also be upheld by the analysis of the international tax 
practice, constituted by the network of tax treaties concluded by the states and by the 
OECD Model Convention, where the notion of “residence” (enshrined, for instance, in 
Article 4 of the above-mentioned OECD Model Convention) is based on the adoption of 
“substantial” connecting criteria, aiming at reflecting, at least on a theoretical level, an 
actual and effective tie between the taxpayer and the territory637. 
Some authors have found another reason to sustain the criticism to the criterion 
based on the public registry of the population in the hypothetical rules deriving from 
international tax law, arguing, more specifically, that the rule at issue would be contrary 
to the principle enshrined in general international law, pursuant to which a foreigner 
cannot be taxed by any state if not by virtue of a sufficient or reasonable connection 
between that foreigner and the state levying taxes. According to this position, Article 2 of 
Presidential Decree 917/1986 would even be contrary to the Italian Constitution and, 
more in detail, with Article 10 of the Constitution, which prescribes the need for Italy to 
conform to general international law638. However, this theory does not appear as entirely 
convincing, given all that has been highlighted in the previous chapters of the present 
research, as to the absence, in international law, of any effective and binding principle as 
the one mentioned above and, in particular, the fact that countries seem to adhere to the 
“reasonable connection theory” not because they consider they are bound to do so by 
international law, but because of more practical and “political” reasons639-640. 
																																																								
637 Piantavigna, P., La funzione della nozione di ‘residenza fiscale’ nell’IRPEF, cited above, 280; Marello, E., La residenza 
fiscale nelle convenzioni internazionali, in Giurisprudenza Italiana, 2009, 2591; Baggio, R., La perdita e l’acquisto della 
residenza fiscale: quadro d’insieme ed aspetti controversi, in Rivista di Diritto Tributario, 2006, 1, 537. 
638 Baggio, R., Il principio di territorialità ed i limiti alla potestà tributaria, cited above, 282. 
639 On the point, see Chapter 1 of the present research. 
640 Some authors have also highlighted that another important suggestion has come from European Union law 
and, in particular, from the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which has elaborated a 
notion of “normal residence” based on the (now repealed) provision of Article 7 of Directive 82/182/EEC on tax 
exemptions within the European Union for certain means of transport temporarily imported into one Member 
State from another Member State. More specifically, the Luxembourg Judges, with regards to cases not 
concerning direct taxation, have stated that, in order to identify the place of a person’s normal residence, an 
evaluation concerning all relevant factual elements should be put in place, with attention having to be paid to the 
place where the permanent centre of such person’s interest lies, giving prevalence to “business ties” over 
“personal ties”, which should be looked at only if the analysis of the “business ties” proves not to be conclusive. 
On the interpretation of the concept of “normal residence”, see Court of Justice of the European Union, 12 July 
2001, C-262/99, Louloudakis; Court of Justice of the European Union, 23 April 1991, C-297/89, Ryborg; Court of 
Justice of the European Union, 26 April 2007, C-392/05, Alevizos. On the point, see also Piantavigna, P., La 
funzione della nozione di ‘residenza fiscale’ nell’IRPEF, cited above, 288; Tassani, T., Transfer of residence and exit 
taxation in EU law: the Italian approach, in European Tax Studies, 2009, 1. 
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 For all of these reasons, some Italian authors have concluded that, in order to 
ensure the compatibility of Article 2 of Presidential Decree 917/1986 with the Italian 
Constitution, the element of proof based on a subject being listed in the civil registry of 
the population should not be deemed as a sufficient condition in order for him/her to be 
considered as fiscally resident in Italy (and thus being subject to taxation on all of 
his/her income, wherever accrued), but should be turned into a relative presumption of 
fiscal residence, open to the possibility for the taxpayer to demonstrate otherwise in 
order to escape worldwide taxation641. 
 This hypothesis would, on one hand, eliminate a difference between Italy and 
other European countries, which focus more on substantial elements for the purposes of 
defining fiscal residence and would also probably, on the other hand, be in line with 
European Union law and, in particular, with the “Cadbury Schweppes” doctrine on 
prevalence of substance over form. 
 Going back to the main topic, it should also be highlighted that Article 2, 
paragraph 2-bis, of Presidential Decree 917/1986 also provides for a presumption of 
residence in the territory of the State for all citizens who remove themselves from the 
civil registry of the resident population so as to migrate to certain other countries642, listed 
in a specific Ministerial Decree, i.e. to countries with more favourable fiscal regimes. In 
this case, such migrating citizens are tasked with the onus probandi to demonstrate, 
through any mean possible, that their transfer abroad has not been put in place only in 
light of tax purposes and, therefore, that they do not maintain the centre of their main 
interests in Italy and that they have severed all significant relations with the Italian State. 
This measure has been defined as a sort of “exit taxation provision” concerning 
individual taxpayers643. 
2.2. Corporate fiscal residence and deemed residence in Italian tax law: the 
measures countering “esterovestizione” and the extraterritorial extension of 
the State’s taxing powers. 
Italian tax law grounds the fiscal residence of companies and other entities 
different from individuals, which entails worldwide taxation on such entities on all of 																																																								
641 Melis, G., La nozione di residenza fiscale delle persone fisiche nell’ordinamento tributario italiano, cited above, 1045; 
Baggio, R., Il principio di territorialità ed i limiti alla potestà tributaria, cited above, 282. 
642 Italian citizens, when migrating abroad, have to be listed in the registry of the Italian population residing 
abroad (“AIRE”), which constitutes a distinct registry system which is not, per se, enough to demonstrate the 
absence of a domicile or of residence in the Italian territory. 
643 Fantozzi, A., Paparella, F., Lezioni di diritto tributario dell’impresa, cited above, 43. 
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their income, wherever produced, on three criteria, that is to say the entity’s legal seat, its 
administrative seat or its main object, with the burden of proof concerning the existence 
of these conditions lying on the tax administration. As for individuals, the structure of 
the rule, therefore, requires the presence of two conditions: a “temporal” one, i.e. the 
entity needs to reside in Italy “for the most part of the tax period”, and a “factual” and 
“substantial” one, which is described by Italian tax law by reference to three alternative 
conditions (legal seat, administrative seat or main object of the activity). 
More in detail, Article 73 of Presidential Decree 917/1986 establishes that “for 
income tax purposes, companies and legal entities are considered residents if, for the most part of 
the tax period, they have their legal seat or their administrative seat or the main object within the 
territory of the State”. This wide-ranging definition of corporate residence actually mirrors 
the characteristics of the Italian worldwide income tax model, with resident corporations 
being subject to income taxation in Italy on their income, wherever accrued, with an 
extension of the relevant connecting factors with the domestic legal order. 
The criterion based on the location of the company’s legal seat is of an essentially 
formal nature. However, scholars are essentially unanimous in stating that such a 
criterion cannot encounter the same criticism concerning the application, to individuals, 
of the formal parameter based on being listed in the civil registry of the resident 
population in order for an individual to be subject to Personal Income Tax644. As far as 
corporations are concerned, in fact, the legal seat has a considerably more significant role 
than the simple inclusion in the civil registry for individuals, being it generally 
enshrined in the corporate statutes, as the result of a specific willing choice on the part of 
the company concerned and as the primary indication as to which law should be 
interpreted as the law governing the corporation, with all consequent rights and 
obligations connected to the applicable law. Referring to the legal seat of a company, 
therefore, means referring to a concept which is significantly less “formal” than the one 
applicable to individuals. 
On the other hand, the concept of “administrative seat” broadly coincides with the 
concept of “place of effective management” mentioned by Article 4 of the OECD Model 
Convention and aims at identifying, on a factual basis, the place where the company’s 
administrative body exercises the strategic management power relevant for the purposes 
of governing the company and adopts the most relevant decisions for the organisation 
																																																								
644 Authors have highlighted that the rule based on the entity’s legal seat in order to determine its fiscal residence 
is of a “formal, but not formalistic” nature. Of this opinion, for example, Baggio, R., Il principio di territorialità ed i 
limiti alla potestà tributaria, cited above, 300. 
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and management of the entity645. Part of the legal scholarship argues that, in identifying 
the company’s administrative seat, reference should be made to the place where the 
ordinary day-to-day management takes place646, whereas larger part of the doctrine 
considers as relevant to these purposes the place where the main and top-tier managing 
guidelines are adopted.647  
The third “factual” condition for locating the company’s residence within Italian 
territory is constituted by the localisation of the company’s “main object”. On this point, 
Article 73 specifies that “the exclusive or principal object […] is determined on the ground of 
the law, the memorandum and articles of association or the company’s statutes, if existing in the 
form of authentic instrument” and that “the main object is the essential activity for the direct 
realisation of the primary purposes established by law, by the memorandum and articles of 
association or by the statutes”. With regard to this last concept, it has been highlighted by 
part of the Italian legal scholarship that the criterion would not be sufficiently clear, since 
it would not be possible to identify the place where “a purpose is located”. 
Ultimately, the above-mentioned provision clarifies that, in case the 
memorandum and articles of association or the statutes are lacking, the resident entity’s 
main object is determined on the basis of the activity effectively exercised in the territory 
of the State and that this criterion is the only one applicable to non-resident entities: in 
other words, the analysis on the “main object” of a foreign corporation cannot be 
conducted with regards to that corporation’s statutes, but only with regard to the 
activity actually conducted in the territory of the State. 
Authors have generally highlighted that, as opposed to the mechanisms 
regulating the concept of “residence” in other fields of law (e.g. conflict of laws), the 
above-mentioned provisions result, in the administrative practice, in a general 
predominance of the “effective seat” criterion over the criterion based on the “formal 
seat”, which is considered relevant by Italian tax law only insofar as every other 
connecting criteria would locate the company outside the scope of application of the 
Italian legal order648. Prevalence is, therefore, generally granted to the “substantial” 																																																								
645 Fantozzi, A., Paparella, F., Lezioni di diritto tributario dell’impresa, cited above, 288; Marino, G., La residenza nel 
diritto tributario, Padua, 1999, 104; Zizzo, G., Reddito delle persone giuridiche, in Rivista di Diritto Tributario, 1994, 1, 
650; Garbarino, C., La tassazione del reddito transnazionale, cited above, 186; Manzitti, A., Considerazioni in tema di 
residenza fiscale delle società, in Rivista di Diritto Tributario, 1998, 1, 181; Iascone, E., La residenza fiscale delle società: il 
caso delle holding di partecipazioni, in Rivista di Diritto Tributario, 2008, 1, 178. 
646 Covino, E., Sede dell’amministrazione, oggetto principale e residenza fiscale delle società, in Dialoghi di Diritto 
Tributario, 2005, 2, 927. 
647 Marino, G., La residenza nel diritto tributario, cited above, 118; Baggio, R., Il principio di territorialità ed i limiti alla 
potestà tributaria, cited above, 302. 
648 Dorigo, S., Residenza fiscale delle società e libertà di stabilimento nell’Unione Europea, cited above, 55; Melis, G., La 
residenza fiscale dei soggetti IRES e l’inversione dell’onere probatorio di cui all’art. 73, commi 5-bis e 5-ter T.U.I.R.”, in 
Diritto e pratica internazionale, 2007, 3, 781; De Broe, L., Corporate tax residence in civil law jurisdictions, in Maisto, 
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connecting criteria, with Italian fiscal residence being attributed to entities that, in their 
day-to-day activities, are linked to the Italian legal order, irrespective of where they have 
been incorporated or of where their “official” legal seat is located. With all consequent 
issues concerning the difficulty of providing a uniform definition of “effective legal seat” 
and of finding criteria to define the cases in which the administration of a company is 
actually conducted within Italian territory. 
For decades, rules concerning fiscal residence have not attracted the attention of 
the Italian lawmaker. Starting from 2006, however, several modifications have been put 
in place with regard to the general criteria concerning corporate residence, with the 
introduction of presumptive mechanisms aimed at countering phenomena leading to 
base erosion and profit shifting by way of the fictitious and elusive delocalisation of 
income in foreign territory through the establishment of companies which are effectively 
deprived of any actual and real connection with their territory of establishment649. 
Pursuant to the criteria described by Article 73, Italian tax law, as many other 
national legal orders, encompasses provisions revolving around an inversion of the 
burden of proof between taxpayers and tax authorities, with a presumption of fiscal 
residence within the territory of the State where certain pre-determined circumstances 
occur. 
Therefore, paragraph 5-bis of above-mentioned Article 73 of Presidential Decree 
917/1986 provides that it is presumed that the administrative seat of foreign companies 
or entities directly controlling Italian companies or entities is located in Italian territory 
for tax purposes; the same also applies to entities that are (also indirectly) controlled by 
subjects residing in the territory of the State or that are managed by a board of directors 
which is mainly made up of subjects residing in Italian territory 650 . Furthermore, 
paragraph 5-quater of Article 73 establishes that, unless proven otherwise, companies or 
entities are considered as residing in Italian territory for tax purposes if their capital is 																																																																																																																																																																													
G. (ed.), Residence of companies under tax treaties and EC law, Amsterdam, 2009, 95. For a comparison with other 
normative experiences, see Avery Jones, J., Corporate residence in common law: the origins and current issues, Maisto, 
G. (ed.), Residence of companies under tax treaties and EC law, Amsterdam, 2009, 121; Sasseville, J., The meaning of 
‘place of effective management, in Maisto, G. (ed.), Residence of companies under tax treaties and EC law, Amsterdam, 
2009, 287. 
649 Tassani, T., Autononia statutaria delle società di capitali e imposizione sui redditi, Milan, 2007, 221; Marino, G., Lupi, 
R., Quale valore sistematico per le nuove disposizioni sulla residenza in Italia delle holding estere?, in Dialoghi di Diritto 
Tributario, 2006, 1013; Ballancin, A., Note in tema di esterovestizione societaria tra i criteri costitutivi della nozione di 
residenza fiscale e l’interposizione elusiva di persona, cited above, 975. 
650 More specifically, paragraph 5-bis of Presidential Decree 917/1986 provides that “unless proven otherwise, the seat 
of the administration of companies and entities holding controlling shares pursuant to article 2359, paragraph 1, of the civil 
code in the subject mentioned by letters a) and b) of the first paragraph are considered as existing in the territory of the State 
if, alternatively, a) they are controlled, even indirectly, pursuant to article 2359, par. 1, of the civil code, by subjects residing 
in the territory of the State; b) are managed by a board of directors or other equivalent managing body mainly constituted of 
members residing in the territory of the State”. Similar provisions have been introduced in other states’ tax laws as 
well, as we will see: on the point, see Melis, G., Trasferimento della residenza all’estero ed elusione fiscale, in Maisto, G. 
(ed.), Elusione ed abuso del diritto tributario, Milan, 2009, 231. 
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mainly invested in shares or participations of collective property investment entities and 
if are directly or indirectly controlled by Italian residents. 
The consequence of this attribution of residence to “formally foreign” subjects can 
be easily understood: such subjects will be taxed on their worldwide income, wherever 
accrued. An exception being made for all cases where the foreign entity provides proof 
as to the effectiveness of its foreign residence. 
With regard to the scope of application of the rules at issue, Italian doctrine and 
case law have generally referred to the concept of “esterovestizione”, which roughly 
translates to a company’s or an item of income’s “relocation abroad” and refers to the 
setting up of companies (generally shell corporations) in countries with more favourable 
tax regimes (compared to the Italian tax regime), with the purpose of imputing to those 
companies item of income which would otherwise be accrued to Italian residents and 
would, therefore, be subject to tax in Italy. “Esterovestizione” is, therefore, generally 
considered as the operation by way of which a company formally allocates its fiscal 
residence in another country, even though it conducts its main activity in Italian territory 
or even though its administrative seat is located in Italy: the non-resident nature of the 
entity would, thus, be merely apparent, whereas the centre of its management, of its 
business and of its investments would be substantially located in Italy651. 
In light of this phenomenon, Italian tax law has established rules allowing to 
disregard, for tax purposes, the apparent collocation of companies in different countries, 
thus treating them like Italian resident and consequently taxing them on their worldwide 
income, like all other Italian residents, with the application of a substance-over-form 
provision in order to counter avoidance practices. The rationale behind the measure is 
the suspicions connected to the fact that the foreign company is linked to subjects 
residing in Italy both from the “active” side and from the “passive side”. 
Legal doctrine has, therefore, stated that, if viewed from this perspective, the very 
concept of “residence” and the traditional connecting criteria employed by states are 
used as anti-avoidance and anti-evasion tools652-653, notwithstanding the fact that part of the 
Italian legal scholarship has argued - in a not entirely convincing way - that the above-																																																								
651 Greggi, M., Recenti sviluppi e questioni di compatibilità comunitaria delle disposizioni di contrasto al fenomeno della 
cosiddetta esterovestizione societaria, in Rassegna Tributaria, 2009, 1, 105. 
652 Cordeiro Guerra, R., Il legislatore nazionale e l’elusione fiscale internazionale, in Maisto, G. (ed.), Elusione ed abuso del 
diritto tributario, Milan, 2009, 211. 
653 According to part of the legal doctrine, however, the measures at issue are not entirely useful to the purpose for 
which they have been introduced. This is mainly due, according to this position, to the fact that the rules on 
countering phenomena of “esterovestizione” do not concern foreign companies, either controlled or managed by 
resident subjects, which produce in Italian territory other types of income, such as interest and royalties, through 
the fictitious transfer of the underlying properties to the foreign companies. On the point, see Baggio, R., Il 
principio di territorialità ed i limiti alla potestà tributaria, cited above, 326; Marino, G., Lupi, R., Quale valore sistematico 
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mentioned rules are supposed to have a merely procedural function, simplifying, to a 
certain extent, the tax authorities’ task and placing on the taxpayer the burden to 
demonstrate the insufficiency of the company’s attachment with the Italian legal order, 
but would have no substantial modifying influence on the functioning of the relevant 
connecting criteria for the purposes of the attribution of fiscal residence654. 
Which does not seem to be entirely true. Especially if we consider that the rules at 
issue, on the grounds of the elements described above (the control thresholds), 
effectively lead to the consequence of establishing a legal presumption of localisation of 
the seat of a company’s administration and, therefore, of the fiscal residence of foreign 
companies, thus modifying to a considerable extent the relevance of the traditional 
connecting criteria which are necessary to consider an entity as an Italian resident. In 
other words, the Italian lawmaker has considered the above-mentioned circumstances as 
able to actually be the expression of a connection between a foreign subject and the 
Italian State (and territory), thus integrating the rules concerning residence. Not with 
new criteria, but on a different application of traditional criteria (such as the 
“administrative seat”), which essentially focus on the localisation of entities that are 
different from the one that constitutes the object of the analysis. Criteria that, according 
to some, are not able to be the expression of a true connection between the foreign 
subject and the territory of the State. 
As it has been correctly highlighted, in fact, in order to counter phenomena such 
as those described above, the Italian lawmaker had two possible means: it could either 
modify the territorial criteria concerning the specific items of income produced abroad 
(especially passive income) or modify the territorial criteria concerning the residence of 
the subject receiving such items of income, thus extending the State’s taxing powers not 
over the single item of income, but rather on the subject receiving it (and all of its 
income, wherever accrued and regardless of it being active or passive) 655 . 
Notwithstanding the fact that the Italian lawmaker opted for the second solution, which 
is characterised by a more “systematic” approach to the problem, both solutions would 
have in any way entailed a modification of the traditional territorial connecting criteria, 
either in an objective or subjective manner. 
																																																								
654 Dorigo, S., Residenza fiscale delle società e libertà di stabilimento nell’Unione Europea, cited above, 58. 
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Provisions such as those described above show specific problems of compatibility 
with European Union law and, in particular, with the Treaty freedom of establishment, 
since they have the effect of essentially disregarding the choices made by entrepreneurs 
with regards to the place where they choose to conduct business, continuing to consider 
a company as (fiscally) resident in a certain country even after that entity has exercises 
its right to move across the territory of the Internal Market. 
Doubts concerning the measures at issue and its compliance with European 
Union law have been voiced by influential Italian authors, wondering about the 
compatibility with EU law of a regime which, on the ground of objective elements such 
as the element of control (either active or passive), draws quite radical conclusions, such 
as the assignment of Italian residence and the consequent application of an unlimited 
liability to tax on worldwide income on subjects which are (more or less formally) not 
Italian residents. On paper, the measure constitutes an example of extraterritorial 
exercise of taxing powers on the part of the Italian State, which also leads to wonder 
whether or not there is an effective and substantial attachment connecting the foreign 
subject to the State levying taxes. Doubts have also been raised concerning the 
proportionality of the measure and its effective suitability to apply only to purely 
artificial arrangements aimed exclusively at tax avoidance. 
The Court of Justice has only dealt with similar issues in non-tax judgements such 
as Factortame656 and Eurofood657, where the Judges have considered that the criteria which 
were similar to those around which the Italian measure at hand were not able to reflect 
any real link between the company that is controlled and managed from another 
Member State and that Member State658, which has led some authors to extend the above-
mentioned rulings to tax cases as well, arguing that the Italian provisions countering 
“esterovestizione” could not be considered as compatible with European Union law since 
they revolve on a merely “fictitious” and “unreal” link between the State and the 
taxpayer concerned. Some have even highlighted that the attitude that part of the Italian 
judges have assumed towards the problem of “esterovestizione” and the application of the 
rules at issue has been, so far, too extreme, with some decisions of local tax courts which, 
even though concerning companies duly constituted pursuant to the laws of another 																																																								
656 Court of Justice of the European Union, 19 June 1990, C-213/89, The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex 
parte Factortame Ltd and others. 
657 Court of Justice of the European Union, 2 May 2006, C-341/04, Eurofood IFSC Ltd. 
658 Dorigo, S., Residenza fiscale delle società e libertà di stabilimento nell’Unione Europea, cited above, 299; Pistone, P., EC 
law and tax residence of companies, in Maisto, G. (ed.), Residence of companies under tax treaties and EC law, 
Amsterdam, 2009, 183. Of the same opinion, Melis, G., Trasferimento della residenza all’estero ed elusione fiscale, cited 
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Member State, have found them to be mere instruments for the relocation abroad of 
income on the ground of the characteristics of the decision-making processes, revolving 
around Italian directors659. 
However, coming to the specific fiscal measure at hand, it is probably sound to 
state that the “Cadbury Schweppes doctrine” should apply to the evaluation of the 
existence of a possible infringement of EU law concerning Article 73 of Presidential 
Decree 917/1986, together with all the more recent case law on the point of the 
compatibility between European Union law and anti-avoidance measures660. According to 
said jurisprudence, a country’s fiscal measure against tax avoidance, even though 
objectively discriminatory or restrictive of a fundamental Treaty freedom, may be 
justified in the light of relevant general interests, such as the need to guarantee a 
balanced allocation of taxing powers amongst Member States and the need to prevent 
abuse, and can be considered as proportionate if aimed at countering only the so-called 
“wholly artificial arrangements”, i.e. structures deprived of any substantial effectiveness 
and established only for the purpose of obtaining undue tax advantages661. Moreover, the 
rule does not revolve around an absolute presumption, but entails the possibility for the 
taxpayer to provide proof as to the authenticity of the corporate structure concerned. 
It cannot be doubted that, with regards to the measures at issue, there could be, in 
fact, hypothetical problems of compatibility with the Treaty fundamental freedoms in 
cases where the rule at issue applies to other Member States of the European Union, 
given that the provision, constituting an example of an “extraterritorial” exercise of 
taxing powers on the part of the Italian State, might have a dissuasive effect on persons 
residing in Italy planning to move to another EU Member State, exercising their freedom 
of movement and/or their freedom of establishment662. However, the mechanism of the 
rule at issue and its purpose might actually justify the measure in light of the 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, as examined in the second chapter of the research, 
since it is aimed at countering tax avoidance and purely artificial constructions. 
Furthermore, the presumption on which the rule is built is not absolute, but relative, and 
the rule does not pose any limit to the kind of evidence that the taxpayers concerned 																																																								
659 Marino, G., Marzano, M., La residenza delle società e controllo tra schemi OCSE ed episodi giurisprudenziali interni, in 
Dialoghi di diritto tributario, 2008, 91; Dorigo, S., Residenza fiscale delle società e libertà di stabilimento nell’Unione 
Europea, cited above, 322. 
660 On the recent evolution of the Court of Justice’s jurisprudence on measures countering tax avoidance and its 
interaction with the need to ensure a balanced allocation of taxing powers within the Internal Market and the 
consequent implications on territoriality, with judgements such as Argenta, see Chapter 2 of the present research, 
at paragraph 8. 
661 Whitehead, S., Practical implications arising from the European Court’s recent decisions concerning CFC legislation and 
dividend taxation, in EC Tax Review, 2007, 2, 176. 
662 Greggi, M., Recenti sviluppi e questioni di compatibilità comunitaria delle disposizioni di contrasto al fenomeno della 
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might present the tax authority in order to escape from the scope of application of the 
provision663. 
Some Italian authors, nonetheless, still express doubts concerning the 
compatibility of the measure at issue with European Union law, arguing that the Italian 
provisions against phenomena of “esterovestizione” would not be sufficiently selective 
and would enjoy a scope of application that is too wide, possibly including 
circumstances which do not pose any specific problem connected to the risk of undue tax 
savings as a consequence of the localisation of the company in foreign territory, 
especially since the protection of the State’s fiscal interest may justify a restriction of the 
freedom of establishment only in case of artificial practices or arrangements: this would 
constitute a problem for the Italian measures at issue because, according to this position, 
they would apply not only to purely artificial structures, but alto to subjects putting in 
place commercial enterprises and trades abroad664. 
3. France: (pure?) territoriality “à la française”. 
France’s tax system has been traditionally defined as “purely territorial”, at least 
prima facie, with specific regards to juridical persons, which can be taxed only on their 
business income whose source can be located within French territory (or, better said, as 
we will see, only on income realised in the context of enterprises operating in France), 
while foreign-source income of French-resident companies generally is not subject to 
French tax. Over time, however, France has modified the structure of its tax regime with 
the introduction of some provisions that further enhanced the “territorial” characteristics 
of the French fiscal model. 
This general criterion reflects a more global vision of state taxing powers, 
developed by French legal scholarship over the years. If, in fact, on one hand, Anglo-
Saxon authors assimilate fiscal territoriality to the need to trace a connection between the 
territory of the State and the tax object, French authors generally treat territoriality as a 
widely applicable general concept, that is to say as a set of rules concerning the 
geographical area for the possibility of the state to levy taxes and by virtue of which it is 
necessary that, in the absence of any applicable double taxation convention, all 
connecting criteria allowing the state to exercise its taxing powers on a certain subject are 
of a territorial/objective nature, rather than of a subjective one. 
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The concepts of “territory” and “territoriality” have, nonetheless, always played a 
more than central role in French legal scholarship with regards to the question of the 
extension, and the very justification, of the State’s taxing powers, with French doctrine 
having traditionally developed a “territorial” vision of the state fiscal competence. The 
majority of French scholars agree on the fact that the state’s tax jurisdiction is exclusively 
territorial, being it necessary to find a connection of a territorial nature between the tax 
object/subject and the state levying the tax665. Starting from these assumptions, French tax 
law has traditionally adopted a principle of territoriality of taxation for corporations, by 
virtue of which companies, regardless of them being either resident or non-resident for 
fiscal purposes, are taxed only on their income having their source within French 
territory, and, more precisely, on their income realised by and within enterprises 
exploited in France666. 
It should be highlighted at the outset that, although technically the ability-to-pay 
principle is not expressly mentioned in the 1958 French Constitution, a general (and 
constitutional) principle similar to the Italian “capacità contributiva” is nonetheless 
enshrined in Article 13 of the 1789 Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen, which 
states: “Pour l’entretien de la force publique, et pour les dépenses d’administration, une 
contribution commune est indispensable; elle doit être également repartie entre tous les citoyens, 
en raison de leurs facultés”667. French authors consider this principle as a corollary of a more 
general equality principle and highlight its essential role in a fair and equitable allocation 
of tax burden amongst taxpayers (residents and non-residents)668. 
As far as individuals are concerned, the French tax system appears considerably 
similar to the Italian one, as described above, and to the essential traits of the UK tax 
model (exception being made for the distinction between “residence” and “domicile” 
and the specific provisions on taxation on a remittance basis), that we will see in the 
following pages of the present research, which is one of the reasons why we will not 
dwell on the details of the extension of French taxing powers with concern to individual 
taxpayers. Suffice to say here that, according to French tax law, individuals residing in 
France for fiscal purposes are taxed on their worldwide income, wherever accrued, 																																																								
665 Melot, N., Territorialité et mondialité de l’impôt: étude de l’imposition des bénéfices des sociétés de capitaux à la lumiere 
des expériences française et américaine, Paris, 2004, 1; Cartou, L., Droit fiscal international et européen, Paris, 1986, 14; 
Mann, F., The doctrine of international jurisdiction revised after twenty years, in Collected Course of the Hague 
Academy of International Law, Boston, 1984, 20; Gest, G., Tixier, G., Droit fiscal international, Paris, 1990, 14; 
Cozian, M., Les grands principes de la fiscalité des entreprises, Paris, 1999. 
 
666 Douvier, P.J., Droit fiscal dans les relations internationales, Paris, 1996, 125; Castagnède, B., Précis de fiscalité 
internaitonale, Lyon, 2002, passim. 
667 The 1958 French Constitution’s preamble expressly references the 1789 Declaration of rights. 
668 Bouvier, M., Introduction au droit fiscal générale et à la théorie de l’impôt, Dalloz, 2008, 53. 
	 247 
whereas non-resident individuals are charged to tax only on the income produced 
within French territory669. 
Attention should, on the other hand, be paid to the field of corporate taxation. 
Article 205 of the French Code Général des Impots (CGI) provides that “il est établi 
un impôt sur l’ensemble des benefices ou revenus réalisés par les sociétés et autres personnes 
morales désignées à l’article 206”. Pursuant to Article 206 CGI, a list is established of legal 
entities subjected to corporation tax: that list is mainly drafted on the ground of French 
commercial law, but it is open to all other juridical persons which conduct business or 
otherwise lucrative activities, which means that the taxing powers of the French State 
extend to foreign corporations as well, by way of a qualification based on the analogy 
between said foreign entities and the companies envisaged in the list enshrined in Article 
206, provided that it conducts a lucrative/business activity within French territory670. 
The scope of French taxing powers with regards to corporations is, then, further 
specified and limited by Article 209-I CGI, pursuant to which “les bénéfices passible de 
l’impôt sur les sociétés sont déterminés […] en tenant compte uniquement des bénéfices réalisés 
dans les entreprises exploitées en France ainsi que de ceux dont l’imposition est attibuée à la 
France par une convention internationale relative aux double impositions”. In determining the 
taxable income for the purposes of French corporation tax, French tax law provides, 
therefore, that one should take into account only income produces in France and that 
which is attributed to the French tax jurisdiction by way of a bilateral tax treaty entered 
into by France671. 
 More specifically, this “territorial” tax model applies to all French companies 
conducting business, either entirely or partially, outside French territory and to all 
foreign companies conducting business within French territory. Business profits earned 
abroad are, therefore, in principle, not taxable, nor are related losses deductible. 
In tracing the contours of its taxing powers, France has, therefore, adopted a 
peculiar national provision allowing double taxation conventions to “take precedence” 
over domestic tax rules, even derogating to the implementation of the principle of 
territoriality with regard to income produced in a country with which France has 																																																								
669 It should also be recalled that Article 4 B CGI envisages three different and alternative criteria for the definition 
of the fiscal residence of an individual for the purposes of French tax law: a “personal criterion” (based on the 
“foyer du contribuable”, i.e. the location of his/her family ties, and, as an alternative, on his/her “lieu du principal 
séjour” for at least 183 days during the tax year), a “professional criterion” (taking into account the exercise of the 
taxpayer’s main professional activity in France) and an “economic criterion” (based on the place where the 
taxpayer’s centre of economic interests lies). 
670 Melot, N., Territorialité et mondialité de l’impôt: étude de l’imposition des bénéfices des sociétés de capitaux à la lumiere 
des expériences française et américaine, cited above, 46. 
671 The third loi de finances rectificative for year 2009 has completed the “traditional” nature of France’s territorial tax 
system with a second rule pursuant to which French tax is imposed on certain revenue deriving from real estate 
located in France. 
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concluded a bilateral tax treaty: in other terms, in all cases where a double taxation 
convention applies, France allows a “substitution” of territorial taxation in favour of 
worldwide taxation with regards to French residents who produce income in countries 
with which France has entered into a bilateral tax treaty. 
More in detail, companies not residing in France are taxed on the income 
produced within French territory, whereas resident companies are exempted from 
taxation on their income produced abroad if and insofar as said income is effectively 
connected to an activity performed in foreign countries through a permanent 
establishment672. If a French business operates abroad, the possibility for France to levy 
taxes on the income produced abroad is, therefore, conditioned on the existence of a 
foreign permanent establishment and to the possibility to consider the foreign income as 
effectively connected to that permanent establishment673. 
In case of a double taxation convention being in place between France and the 
host country, in fact, France will have to verify whether not, pursuant to the terms of 
such convention, it is possible to identity a relevant fiscal presence of the French 
entrepreneur in the other contracting state. In case it is possible to ascertain the existence 
of such a presence, France will not tax the income deriving from the activity conducted 
abroad. If, on the other hand, pursuant to the terms of the applicable double taxation 
convention, it is not possible to consider the French entrepreneur’s presence in the host 
country as sufficient, France might theoretically be able to levy taxes on the income 
produced abroad, if its own domestic tax law allows France to do so. 
In case there is no double taxation convention in place between France and the 
host country where the French entrepreneur operates, France will implement its own 
domestic tax provisions, thus verifying whether or not the activity performed abroad by 
the French entrepreneur constitutes an activity that, pursuant to Section 209-I of the 
French Income Tax Code, can be considered as taxable. 
 French legal scholarship has developed two different interpretations of the above-
mentioned provisions of Article 209-I CGI, given that there is still no unanimous 
																																																								
672 Melot, N., Territorial and worldwide tax systems: should France adopt the U.S. system?, in International Journal, 2004, 
1, 47; Pouletty, M., Smith, N., The territoriality principle as applied in Denmark, France and Hong Kong, in Tax 
Planning International Review, 2005, 1, 89. 
673 It must, however, be highlighted that, pursuant to French domestic tax law, the notion of “permanent 
establishment” is considerably wider than the common notion of “permanent establishment” approved by the 
OECD (and by the majority of Western countries that are members of the OECD). The French “permanent 
establishment” concept, in fact, goes beyond the traditional distinction between “physical permanent 
establishment” and “personal permanent establishment”, also considering whether or not the enterprise residing 
in France puts in place a complete cycle of services or commercial transactions in a foreign country in order to 
verify the actual presence of a permanent establishment in that country. 
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agreement on the fact that such provisions lead to the implementation, with regard to 
companies, of a strictly territorial tax system674. 
Some authors have, in fact, argued that France has adopted a fiscal model based 
on worldwide taxation of corporate income of the enterprises located within French 
territory, at least with regard to those enterprises’ passive income. More in detail, 
according to these authors, French companies conducting business in France would be 
levied taxes not only on their income having its source in French territory, but on their 
foreign-source income as well. According to this view, French tax law, much like Italian 
tax law, would entail a distinction between foreign companies and French companies, by 
way of which foreign companies are subject to corporate taxation on their income having 
source within French territory and French companies would be taxed on all of their 
passive income, wherever originated, and on their active income having its source 
within French territory675. 
Adhering to this view would imply the denial of the “purely territorial” character 
of French corporate tax law, arguing for a “hybrid” definition of “territoriality”, a sort of 
“territoriality à la française” or a sort of “tempered worldwide tax model”, where French 
companies are taxed on their worldwide income, but, in line with the overall territorial 
nature of the French tax model, an exemption from French tax base is granted to resident 
corporate subjects with regard to all of their foreign-source income676. 
However, the literal wording of the tax provisions cannot but lead to adhering to 
the theory which defines the French tax system as “purely territorial” with regard to 
corporate income: foreign companies are taxed only on their French-source income and 
an exemption from French income tax is provided for French companies on their income 
that they produce abroad through establishments or activities (“entreprises exploitées”) 
located in foreign territories. 
On the other hand, French administrative and judicial practice has traditionally 
developed a distinction between the extension of French taxing powers applicable to 
foreign companies and French companies, it being noted that French corporate tax law 
defines corporate residence on the ground of the company’s legal seat, following the so-
called “incorporation principle”. Once again, therefore, attention cannot but shift to the 																																																								
674 Melot, N., Territorialité et mondialité de l’impôt: étude de l’imposition des bénéfices des sociétés de capitaux à la lumiere 
des expériences française et américaine, cited above, 46. 
675 Gest, G., Tixier, G., Manuel de droit fiscal, Paris, 1998, 251. 
676 Melot, N., Territorialité et mondialité de l’impôt: étude de l’imposition des bénéfices des sociétés de capitaux à la lumiere 
des expériences française et américaine, cited above, 474. French domestic law generally does not provide for credit 
for foreign taxes, which means that income subject to foreign tax that is not exempt from French taxation under 
the French “territorial” tax regime is taxable net of foreign tax paid. However, most tax treaties entered into by 
France provide for a credit mechanism, which generally corresponds to the withholding tax paid in the source 
country, though capped at the French tax actually due on such net income. 
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definition of “residence” for fiscal purposes, which becomes the real “key-concept” in 
defining the extension of a state’s taxing powers. 
Whereas, according to French tax law, an individual is considered, for fiscal 
purposes, as residing in France if he/she has his/her permanent home therein or is 
physically present in the country for at least 183 days, with regard to companies, France 
has shifted from a system based on the mere “principle of incorporation” as a criterion 
for identifying corporate residence, according to which a company was considered as 
fiscally resident in the country where it was registered, to a sort of “hybrid” system. In 
fact, under current French law, a company is considered as fiscally resident in France if 
and insofar as its legal seat (“siège”) is located in French territory, but also if its place of 
effective management (“siège social effectif”) is located within French territory. More in 
detail, according to French tax authorities and jurisprudence, the place of effective 
management is located in the country where the management discretion is exercised677. 
Therefore, even though this analysis is generally conducted on a case-by-case basis, the 
place of effective management, under French tax law, will generally coincide with the 
place where the directors conduct the board meetings678. 
It should, however, be noted that, for decades, the question of corporate 
residence, in the context of French law, was seen as considerably less important for the 
purposes of taxation, since France still adheres to a strictly territorial approach with 
regard to corporate income taxation, according to which a company doing business in 
France, regardless of whether or not should be considered as fiscally resident in France, 
is taxed only on the income deriving from “French operations”679. 
It is also evident that the core of the doctrinal debate on which nature should be 
attributed to the extension of French taxation with regard to companies - either 
worldwide or territorial - is the interpretation of the words “entreprises exploitées” 
enshrined in Article 209-I CGI, constituting the threshold indicating when and to what 
extent foreign and resident corporations may be taxed on their active income in and by 
France. Notwithstanding its evident importance for the purposes of French tax law, this 
notion is not expressly defined by French law. 
French jurisprudence, and, in particular, the case law developed by the Conseil 
d’Etat, has progressively substituted the notion of “entreprise exploitée” with the concept 
of “habitual exercise of a commercial activity”, which means that putting in place an 
investment giving rise to passive income cannot imply that the person upon whom the 																																																								
677 Avi-Yonah, R.S., Sartori, N., Marian, O., Global perspectives on income taxation law, cited above, 135. 
678 Lescot, M., France issues Circular on branch tax exemption, in Tax Notes International, 1998, 3, 77. 
679 Avi-Yonah, R.S., Sartori, N., Marian, O., Global perspectives on income taxation law, cited above, 135. 
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income accrues is engaged in a commercial activity in French territory, thus limiting the 
notion to active income only680. 
More in detail, French courts generally consider as “exercising commercial 
activity” for the above-mentioned purposes all non-resident companies holding an 
establishment in French territory or conducting therein a “commercial cycle”, where, 
according to the French tax administration, a “cycle commercial complet” (“complete 
commercial cycle”) corresponds to a “série d’opérations commerciales, industrielles ou 
artisanales dirigées vers un but déterminé et dont l’ensemble forme un tout cohérent”681 and the 
activity must be “complete”, in the sense that it is not sufficient for the activity in 
question to have just contributed to the production of the income, but it must have 
directly led to the production of such income itself and by itself. The test is less strict in 
case the activity in question is performed by a non-resident company through an 
establishment located in French territory: in that case, in fact, it is generally considered 
sufficient for that establishment to contribute to the active production of the income in 
order for that income to be taxable in France682. 
French law does not provide for detailed rules concerning how to determine the 
source of corporate income. Pursuant to section 164B-I of the Code général des impôts, 
“sont considérés comme revenus de source française […] les revenus d’exploitation sises en 
France”. Besides this general statement, the conditions for income to be taxed in France 
are determined by case law and administrative guidelines. There are three alternative 
criteria determining whether a business activity is carried out in France: existence of an 
“établissement” (establishment), of a “représentant” (agent) acting on behalf of the 
company, existence of a “cycle commercial complet” (complete business cycle) separate 
from the other activities of the company. 
It should also be highlighted that, in practical terms, foreign companies are 
subject to tax not only on their income originated within French territory, but also on 
their passive income (dividends, royalties, interest…) having their source in France, 
regardless of such income being linked or attached to an enterprise conducted in France. 
Such passive income is, in fact, subject to withholding taxes at source, either definitive or 
not, calculated on their gross amount683. The question is whether or not these levies are 
autonomous from French corporate taxation, constituting a sort of “separate taxation”, 																																																								
680 Melot, N., Territorialité et mondialité de l’impôt: étude de l’imposition des bénéfices des sociétés de capitaux à la lumiere 
des expériences française et américaine, cited above, 250. 
681 Doc. adm. 4-H 1412, n. 18-20, 1 March 1995, cited by Melot, N., Territorialité et mondialité de l’impôt: étude de 
l’imposition des bénéfices des sociétés de capitaux à la lumiere des expériences française et américaine, cited above, 254. 
682 Melot, N., Territorialité et mondialité de l’impôt: étude de l’imposition des bénéfices des sociétés de capitaux à la lumiere 
des expériences française et américaine, cited above, 255. 
683 Articles 119-bis, 125A, 182B and 244-bis CGI. 
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which, therefore, can escape the general rules regulating French corporate taxation as 
described above, or simply constitute a different way to collect corporate taxes684: the 
answer to the question leads to understanding whether or not the “territorial criterion” 
developed by general French corporate tax law is derogated. Such withholding taxes are 
generally considered as autonomous and separated from general French corporate 
taxation, with corporations being subject, on one hand, to corporate taxation determined 
(in absence of any applicable tax treaty) on the ground of income produced in the 
context of the enterprises conducted in France and, on the other hand, to withholding 
taxes, separate from corporate taxation, on certain French-source items of passive 
income, even in absence of any related enterprise activity being conducted in France. 
The “other side of the coin” of the territorial nature of French corporate taxation is 
constituted, as predictable, by the prohibition for French companies to have the losses 
incurred abroad taken into account for the purposes of diminishing their French tax 
liability: in general terms, resident and non-resident corporations which have suffered 
losses through an “entreprise exploitée” in a foreign country cannot deduct such losses 
from their profits which are taxable in France685. Thus, France realises symmetry of tax 
treatment of positive and negative items of income, which is typical of territorial income 
tax models686. 
 3.1. French deviations from territoriality. 
As highlighted at the outset, in recent times, the French lawmaker has enacted 
provisions enhancing, to a certain extent, the territorial characters and nature of France’s 
tax system. Previous French law, in fact, used to provide for several regimes derogating 
from the territoriality of French corporate taxation with rules providing for favourable 
options for the corporate taxpayers. 
One of said provisions concerned the so-called “régime du bénéfice mondial simple” 
and the so-called “régime du bénéfice mondial consolidé”, which were repealed in 2011 
because of their particularly burdensome nature, on an administrative level, both for the 																																																								
684 Melot, N., Territorialité et mondialité de l’impôt: étude de l’imposition des bénéfices des sociétés de capitaux à la lumiere 
des expériences française et américaine, cited above, 87. 
685  It should be noted, however, that, pursuant to Article 39-octies CGI, French companies establishing a 
commercial plant in a foreign country may constitute a tax-suspended “provision” related to the losses suffered 
by that plant or establishment in foreign territory. 
686 However, if the losses suffered by French companies in the context of their “enteprises exploitées” in a foreign 
territory are not directly deductible from the corporate profits which are taxable in France, they may nonetheless 
be taken into account as an effect of the rules concerning depreciation of those French companies’ participations 
in the foreign business activity, even though this possibility largely depends on the possible effects played by an 
applicable double taxation convention. 
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State and for taxpayers. The regimes at issue basically allowed companies subject to 
corporate taxation in France to opt, by way of an agreement with the tax authorities, for 
retaining their “worldwide fiscal unity”, thus being taxed on all of the results of their 
“exploitations”, both direct and indirect, and conducted both in France and in foreign 
territories687. 
The main advantage which was granted by those regimes was the possibility for 
French companies to deduct from their French profits losses and expenses incurred 
abroad by their subsidiaries (“filiales”) and permanent establishments, with considerable 
tax savings for the companies concerned. 
The “régime du bénéfice mondial simple” allowed French companies to determine 
their French tax base with reference to the French-source profits and the profits from 
“exploitations directes” conducted outside French borders, thus basically applying to 
bodies corporate the same income tax rules applicable to individuals: simple and 
unadulterated worldwide taxation, with the possibility for French companies to deduct 
from their French tax bases the taxes paid abroad in relation to the “foreign component” 
of their tax base. A system which was quite similar to the current Italian one. 
On the other hand, the “régime du bénéfice mondial consolidé” was a sort of 
“extension” of the above-mentioned “régime du bénéfice mondial simple”. It entailed an 
exception to territorial corporate taxation, allowing French companies operating at the 
international level to consolidate their profits which would have been normally taxed in 
France with their profits deriving from “exploitations directes” conducted outside French 
territory and also with their profits deriving from “exploitations indirectes”, regardless of 
them being conducted in France or abroad. The notion of “exploitations indirectes” 
included, in particular, the French companies’ share of the profits of the foreign 
companies participated by French corporate taxpayers, subject to certain holding 
thresholds. 
Another regime allowing for a partial derogation from territorial taxation was the 
one concerning the possibility for French small and medium-sized enterprises (which 
were de facto excluded from the scope of application of the above-mentioned “régimes du 
bénéfice mondial”) to enjoy consolidation, for tax purposes, of their foreign losses. 
Pursuant to said regime, small and medium-sized enterprises could, under certain 
conditions, deduct the losses suffered abroad by their subsidiaries and/or 
establishments from their French profits688. The measure was repealed in 2014. 																																																								
687 Former Article 209-quinquies CGI. 
688 The effects of the regime were temporary, since the amounts corresponding to the deducted foreign losses were 
progressively reintegrated into the SME’s taxable profits. 
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That being said, it should also be noted that French tax law still provides several - 
though more limited - exceptions to the general “territorial” nature of corporate taxation. 
Some examples are, for instance, the granting of the possibility of a ”worldwide tax 
consolidation” (the so-called “regime des groups fiscalement intégrés”), the possibility of a 
deduction for contributions sent by resident companies to foreign related companies, 
CFC rules689, etc. Furthermore, Article 209-C of the Code général des impôts provides that, in 
certain conditions, small and medium-sized enterprises may deduct losses incurred by 
foreign permanent establishments or foreign subsidiaries. 
 Moreover, French groups of companies are entitled to opt for the consolidation of 
a domestic parent and any 95%-or-more domestic subsidiaries (so-called “intégration 
fiscale”). As an exception to the principle of territoriality that generally shapes the entire 
French tax system and according to which active income is taxable in France only if its 
attributable to a French trade or business (mainly a branch or dependent agent), groups 
may also obtain the consolidation of a domestic corporation and its foreign branches and 
its 50%-or-more domestic or foreign subsidiaries (“bénéfice mondial et consolidé”). From 
2009, small-sized or medium-sized corporations (with less than 2.000 employees) may 
opt for the deduction of losses of foreign branches or 95%-directly-held foreign 
subsidiaries. Such losses are recaptured as and when profits are made by such entities, 
and in any case no later than five years thereafter. 
According to French tax law, 95% of the dividends received by a French company 
from one of its subsidiaries are exempt from corporate income tax - provided that the 
distributing subsidiary is located in a “non-black list” country and that the French 
holding company has held at least 5% of its share for a minimum period of two years - 
whereas 5% of those dividends remain taxable at the standard corporate tax rate690. This 
exemption applies to capital gains arising from the sale of shares in a subsidiary if said 
shares had been held for at least two years before being sold. 
An issue of compatibility with European Union law has been raised with regards 
to the interaction between the French participation exemption scheme and the French 
group-consolidation regime. In fact, in case of a dividend distribution within a tax-
consolidated group, of which only companies or permanent establishments established 
in France can be part of, the 5% portion of distributed dividends which is taxable under 																																																								
689 For an overview of the French CFC tax regime, compared with the Italian and UK regimes, see paragraph 5 
hereinafter. 
690 It is generally believed that, in the absence of a specific rule disallowing the deduction by the French holding 
company of the expenses linked to its shares in the subsidiary distributing the dividends, the 5% portion of 
dividends remaining taxable in France would reflect the expenses deducted by the French holding company with 
regard to the dividends that are exempted from corporate taxation. 
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French law was neutralised in the computation of the consolidated taxable income, 
effectively resulting in a full exemption of intra-group dividends from corporate 
taxation. The same advantage was not granted to groups of companies formed by 
foreign subsidiaries, which is not eligible for being admitted to the tax-consolidation 
scheme and, therefore, did not enjoy the advantage at issue. 
The Court of Justice has dealt with the problem in its Groupe Steria judgement691, 
where it ruled that fully exempting dividends received from French tax-consolidated 
subsidiaries and exempting only 95% of the dividends received from a subsidiary 
located in a EU Member State amounted to a discriminatory treatment infringing 
freedom of establishment. 
Following this decision, France has recently modified its provisions on the tax 
treatment of certain kinds of dividend distributions received by French companies. As 
an effect of this amendment, starting from 2016, the portion of qualifying dividends that 
generally remains taxable under the French participation exemption regime (i.e. 5%) is 
no longer exempt with regards to distributions made within a French tax-consolidated 
group of companies. Consequently, only 1% of the distributed dividends are now 
considered taxable with regards to distributions made in the context of a French tax-
consolidated group. The same applies also to dividends received by a member of a 
French tax-consolidated group from 95%-owned subsidiaries located in another Member 
State of the European Union or of the European Economic Area. 
Notwithstanding all of the above, the most evident derogation from the general 
territorial nature of the French tax system is the anti-avoidance provision enshrined in 
Article 209 B CGI692, aimed at preventing the abusive employment of interposed entities 
by French companies through CFC rules. The French CFC regime will be analysed in the 
continuation of the research, alongside the Italian and UK regimes and the provisions of 
the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive. 
4. The United Kingdom: a “worldwide” tax model leaning towards 
territoriality. 
 The United Kingdom’s entire legal system has unique traits setting it apart from 
all other juridical orders of the world and even from all other common law systems such 
as the United States. Notwithstanding the fact that it lacks a written constitution, the UK 																																																								
691 Court of Justice of the European Union, 2 September 2015, C-386/14, Groupe Steria. 
692 Melot, N., Territorialité et mondialité de l’impôt: étude de l’imposition des bénéfices des sociétés de capitaux à la lumiere 
des expériences française et américaine, cited above, 684. 
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system comprises some “constitutional” norms or, at least, provisions with a 
“constitutional nature”, such as the 1689 Bill of Rights, which, however, could be 
modified with a simple Parliamentary law. 
 Nonetheless, this does not seem to in any way rule out the relevance, in the UK 
common law juridical system, of a general principle essentially similar to the one the 
Italian legal order defines as “capacità contributiva” as far as income tax law is concerned, 
despite the fact that any actual mention of such a principle by British judges is on the 
whole infrequent693-694. However, since this principle is not enshrined in any constitutional 
norm, a tax not complying with the “capacità contributiva” general standard would not be 
considered as per se illegitimate in the UK legal order. 
 In other words, the existence of a general principle of “capacità contributiva” in the 
United Kingdom legal order can be inferred by way of interpretation and generalisation 
of the tax provisions enacted in the UK. However, such a principle does not rise to the 
level of a constitutional precept and, therefore, is not hierarchically superior to the 
provisions establishing - or in other ways concerning - taxes695 . It follows that the 
principle at issue cannot be considered as a legally binding criterion or standard for the 
legislature, neither as a part of the taxpayer’s rights. Therefore, the only test that judges 
can resort to in evaluating the fairness of a tax provision amounts to the check of the 
conformity between the tax established by law and its tax object. 
As a general rule, a resident of the United Kingdom is subject to UK income tax 
on all his/her income worldwide wherever its source, whereas a foreign resident is only 
liable to UK income tax on income arising in the United Kingdom, with that individual 
not being charged to UK income tax on foreign source income. 
With an important distinction between individuals and corporations. 
A non-resident individual taxpayer will be taxable as trading or professional 
income on the profits of any trade carried on within the United Kingdom, as opposed to 
with the United Kingdom. When a trade is carried on within the United Kingdom, the 
profits are computed under the normal rules applicable to the calculation of residents’ 
income. For these purposes, however, the maintenance of an administrative or 
																																																								
693 Barassi, M., La capacità contributiva in una prospettiva comparatistica, in Salvini, L., Melis, G. (eds.), L’evoluzione del 
sistema fiscale e il principio di capacità contributiva, Padua, 2014, 185. 
694 With regards to the reasons why it would not be correct to use the term “ability to pay” as a synonym or 
substitute for the Italian “capacità contributiva”, see what was said in the previous chapters (Chapter II, paragraph 
4). 
695 In lack of a written constitution, the supremacy of the Parliament is paramount and, therefore, taxes find their 
legitimate basis in the democratic consensus and representation. Limits to Parliamentary supremacy exist, but 
they are not of an “internal” nature, stemming essentially from the EU legal order, at least until UK’s formal exit, 
and from the European Convention on Human Rights. 
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representative office (as opposed to a branch or permanent establishment) in the United 
Kingdom will not per se constitute trading within the United Kingdom696. 
On the other hand, for non-resident companies, even if they are trading within 
the United Kingdom, no liability to UK corporation tax arises unless that trade is carried 
on through a permanent establishment located in the territory of the United Kingdom 
and liability will be restricted to the chargeable profits from that permanent 
establishment697. If that is not the case, the non-resident company’s liability to tax will not 
be to corporation tax, but rather to income tax, at the basic rate698: in other words, a non-
resident company with income arising in the United Kingdom but not trading through a 
permanent establishment in the United Kingdom cannot be assessed to corporation tax, 
but may be subject to UK income tax699. Moreover, under Corporation Tax Acts 2009, 
Section 19, capital gains are chargeable to UK tax only if they arise from property 
associated with the trade carried on by the permanent establishment. 
That being said, it should also be highlighted at the outset that, as we will see in 
further details in the following pages, an individual which is domiciled abroad and 
which resides in the United Kingdom may be taxed on his/her foreign income only if 
that income is remitted in the United Kingdom700: this is the so-called “remittance basis 
regime”, according to which, as we will see, individuals who are resident but not 
domiciled in the UK can elect to pay tax on the remittance basis of taxation, thus paying 
income tax on income from the UK and capital gains on gains arising in the UK and only 
pay UK tax on their overseas income and capital gains if they are brought into the UK 
(even though, after a certain amount of years during which an individual has been 
resident in the UK, a charge will be imposed if that individual wants to continue 
enjoying the benefits of the remittance basis system). 
As far as international double taxation relief is concerned, in case there is no 
bilateral tax treaty applicable, unilateral relief is granted by the United Kingdom by way 
of a credit against the UK tax equal to the foreign tax paid, limiting that credit to taxes 
that are similar to UK taxes against which the relief is claimed701. Although the credit 
method constitutes the general rule for the United Kingdom, the exemption method is 																																																								
696 Lee, N. (ed.), Revenue law: principles and practice, London, 2012, 484. 
697 Corporation Tax Act (CTA) 2009, Section 19 (“The company’s chargeable profits are its profits that are a) of a type 
mentioned in subsection (3), and attributable to the permanent establishment in accordance with sections 20 to 32”). 
698 Corporation Tax Act (CTA) 2009, Section 3 (“The provisions of the Income Tax Acts relating to the charge to income 
tax do not apply to income if a) the company is UK resident, or b) the company is not UK resident and the income is within 
the chargeable profits as defined by Section 19”). 
699 This is frequently the case where a non-resident company owns investment property in the United Kingdom, 
thus giving rise to rental income. Lee, N. (ed.), Revenue law: principles and practice, cited above, 1133. 
700 Lee, N. (ed.), Revenue law: principles and practice, cited above, 461. 
701 Lee, N. (ed.), Revenue law: principles and practice, cited above, 488. 
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nonetheless applied in respect of dividends received by resident parent companies from 
their foreign subsidiaries. Within the European Union, in fact, the tax laws of the 
majority of countries provide for some form a participation exemption (also known as 
“affiliation privilege”) in order to prevent economic international double taxation on 
profits distributed by foreign subsidiaries to resident parent companies holding a 
specific amount of capital and/or voting power in said foreign subsidiaries. 
Having established all of the above, it should also be highlighted that, in more 
recent times, the United Kingdom has been moving from a worldwide taxation system 
for resident companies to a more territorial tax system, in broad terms, pursuant to 
which the focus is mainly put on profits earned in UK territory702. The key-areas for the 
implementation of such a change of perspective are the introduction of a dividend 
exemption regime, together with the establishment of the so-called “elective branch 
exemption” and the reformation of the UK CFC regime. As recognised by economic 
studies, however, moving from worldwide to territorial taxation does not eliminate the 
need for CFC regimes and other anti-avoidance rules, on the contrary increasing their 
importance, especially since the “fiscal gap” between active and passive foreign income 
widens. Moreover, the UK fiscal system now features a full exemption for various classes 
of foreign-source dividends and allows domestic tax deduction for foreign-source 
expenses, similarly to most other territorial systems. 
4.1. Residence, ordinary residence and domicile. The “remittance basis”. 
As far as individual income taxation is concerned, British tax law has traditionally 
entailed a well-grounded distinction, which is (or was) typical of the Anglo-Saxon 
tradition, between the three concepts of “residence”, “ordinary residence”, intended as 
the place where the individual customarily has his/her home, as the place where the 
person habitually lives, and “domicile”, which is linked to the person’s origin rather 
than the person’s physical presence in a certain place703. 
More specifically, “ordinary residence” has been held to be the individual’s 
residence based on the choice of abode that he/she adopted voluntarily and which forms 
part of that individual’s life. A person may, therefore, be resident without being 
																																																								
702 With regard to the 2011 budget, Chancellor George Osbourne proclaimed that the highest ambition for the 
British economy was to “have the most competitive tax system in the G20” and “be the best place in Europe to 
start, finance and grow a business”. Along with tax rate reductions, the transition to a territorial tax system seems 
to have served British ambitions. 
703 Green, S., Domicile and revenue law: the continuing need for reform, in British Tax Review, 1991, 1, 21. 
	 259 
ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom and vice versa704. In some cases, liability to UK 
tax was, then, only imposed on individuals who were considered as ordinarily residing 
in the United Kingdom, whereas, in other cases, liability to UK tax arises if the 
individual is either resident or ordinarily resident. 
The concept of ordinary residence has been abolished for tax years starting after 5 
April 2013, with the introduction of a new statutory residence test, which has 
superseded the previous case-law-based approach and all previous rules and criteria on 
residence, and all reference in UK tax legislation to “ordinary residence” has now been 
replaced with reference to a unitary concept of “residence”. 
The statutory residence test determines whether an individual is resident or non-
resident in the United Kingdom in a certain tax year, for the purposes of income tax, 
capital gains tax and inheritance tax, through a two-step approach, composed of the 
“automatic residence text” and the “sufficient ties test”705. 
The “automatic resident test” is met if the individual meets any of the following 
conditions: he/she is present in the United Kingdom for at least 183 days in a tax year; 
he/she has a home in the United Kingdom for more than 90 days and visits that home 
for thirty days in the tax year; he/she works full time in the United Kingdom for 365 
days without a significant break and in any one tax year more than 75% of these days are 
in the United Kingdom. Residence is, on the other hand, automatically excluded if one of 
the so-called “automatic overseas tests” applies706. 
If an individual does not meet any of the “automatic resident tests” or if he/she 
meets any of the “automatic overseas tests”, the so-called “sufficient ties test” must be 
considered, which are based on the existence of family ties, the availability of an 
accommodation, work ties, and so on. 																																																								
704 HMRC guidelines (HMRC 6, paragraph 3.2) state that an individual will be considered as “ordinarily resident” 
in the United Kingdom if a) he comes to the United Kingdom voluntarily, b) his/her presence in the United 
Kingdom has a settled purpose and c) his/her presence in the United Kingdom forms part of the regular and 
habitual mode of the individual’s life. It has also been suggested by HMRC that going to the United Kingdom to 
live and work for three years or more will establish a habitual mode of life in the United Kingdom. Furthermore, 
if a person goes to the United Kingdom with the intention of visiting regularly for at least four tax year, ordinary 
residence will be presumed from the outset. If there is no such intention, HMRC guidelines (HMRC 6, paragraph 
7.5) provide that HMRC will consider ordinary residence will commence from the beginning of the tax year after 
the individual has visited the United Kingdom over four years. On the point, see Lee, N. (ed.), Revenue law: 
principles and practice, cited above, 467. 
705 Prior to the introduction of the “statutory residence test”, pursuant to Sections 831 and 832 of Income Tax Act 
2007, in order for an individual to be considered as residing in the United Kingdom for UK tax purposes, he/she 
must have spent 183 days of the relevant fiscal year in the United Kingdom or have his/her only home in the UK, 
having spent at least thirty days there during the relevant fiscal year. The “183-day rule” is absolute, and will 
apply even if the days spent in the UK by the individual have been spent for exceptional circumstances. 
706 The automatic overseas tests are based on the following circumstances: UK residence is automatically excluded 
if i) an individual who has been resident in the United Kingdom for any of the previous three years spends less 
than 16 days in the United Kingdom; ii) an individual who has not been resident in the United Kingdom for any 
of the previous three years spends less than 46 days in the United Kingdom; iii) an individual works full time in a 
foreign country and spends less than 91 days in the tax year in the United Kingdom and less than 31 days where 
he/she works in the United Kingdom for more than three hours. 
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For income tax purposes, however, especially in the context of tax provisions 
operating with regards to transnational income, greater relevance is given to the concept 
of “domicile”, since residence is generally considered as easier for the taxpayer to 
manipulate, being it strictly connected to factual elements that the taxpayer may more 
easily alter, such as the period of time spent in a certain country or the physical presence 
of the person. Which does not apply to domicile: in order for a person to be able to 
modify his/her “domicile of origin” in favour of another “domicile of choice”, he/she 
must, in fact, demonstrate his/her intention to permanently and indefinitely reside in 
another country and his/her physical presence in that country707. 
The concept of “domicile” for tax purposes is not specifically defined by statutory 
law, but its meaning has been defined from the general law which has developed over 
time: an individual’s domicile is generally the country that he/she regards as his/her 
home, where he/she has his/her closest ties708-709. 
An individual’s “domicile of origin” - generally defined by reference to the 
domicile of his/her father at the time of his/her birth - is retained by that individual 
unless and until it is abandoned through the acquisition of a “domicile of choice”: in that 
case, the domicile of origin could be “revived” only if the domicile of choice is later 
abandoned by the individual without him/her acquiring a new one. 
A domicile of choice is acquired by simultaneously satisfying two conditions, i.e. 
the individual’s physical presence in the territory of his/her election and his/her 
intention to permanently and indefinitely reside in that territory (which is automatically 
excluded by HMRC practice if there is an intention, on the part of the individual, to 
return to his/her country of origin or if there is an intention to leave the country of 
choice and live somewhere else710. 
For the purposes of UK taxation, an individual can never be without a domicile, 
which means that, if he/she is unable to satisfy the conditions for any domicile of choice, 
his/her domicile of origin would automatically apply, even if that individual has no 
continuing connection with the country of his/her domicile of origin711. 
Having established what “domicile” means for the purposes of UK income tax 
law, we must now analyse the impact of that concept of the delimitation of the United 																																																								
707 The loss of a person’s “domicile of choice” automatically leads to regaining his/her “domicile of origin”. 
708 Lee, N. (ed.), Revenue law: principles and practice, cited above, 471. 
709 A special rule on the definition of “domicile” applies in the United Kingdom for the purposes of inheritance 
taxes only: an individual is deemed to be domiciled in the United Kingdom if he/she has been resident for tax 
purposes for seventeen out of the preceding twenty years, with the actual domicile being disregarded and 
liability to inheritance taxation being determined as if the individual was an actual UK-domiciled person, 
becoming chargeable to inheritance taxation on the whole of his/her worldwide assets. 
710 Lee, N. (ed.), Revenue law: principles and practice, cited above. 472. 
711 Lee, N. (ed.), Revenue law: principles and practice, cited above. 472. 
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Kingdom’s taxing powers with regards to items of income which are considered as 
somewhat “foreign”. Reference should, therefore, be made to the so-called “remittance-
basis taxation”. 
A foreign domiciled individual resident in the United Kingdom may claim to be 
taxed on the remittance basis, i.e. being chargeable to UK income tax only on his/her 
income received in the United Kingdom and on his/her foreign income exclusively if 
and insofar as that income is actually brought by the taxpayer to the United Kingdom712: 
unless foreign income is actually brought to or enjoyed in the United Kingdom there is 
no tax charge713-714. It follows that an individual which resides in the United Kingdom but 
does not have his/her domicile there, i.e. the so-called “non-domiciled resident”, will be 
taxed exclusively on his/her income that is produced in the United Kingdom, whereas 
the “domiciled resident” will be taxed by the United Kingdom on his/her worldwide 
income, wherever accrued. 
This is the reason why a considerable number of individuals have tried to transfer 
their residence to the United Kingdom, while maintaining their domicile elsewhere and 
producing a limited amount of income in UK territory, thus being able not to pay tax on 
their worldwide income in their country of residence (since they could not be considered 
as residing there any longer) and to pay a limited amount of tax in the UK, since, being 
“non-domiciled residents”, they could be taxed only on the income produced in the 
territory of the United Kingdom. For all individuals trying to avoid the acquisition of a 
domicile of choice, it is, therefore, necessary to demonstrate that their period spent in the 
United Kingdom is for specific or limited purpose and that their long-term intention is to 
leave the United Kingdom; it is also necessary, according to HMRC practice, to preserve 
ties in the country of origin or develop ties elsewhere, indicating a lack of commitment to 
the United Kingdom. 
As it has been shown, therefore, the analysis on the point of domicile and, 
consequently, on the non-remitted income being subject to UK tax is based on a factual 
and very “practical” examination. 
As far as corporate residence is concerned, UK tax law mainly resorts to what has 
been defined above as the “legal seat” criterion. It should be highlighted that it is 																																																								
712 UK tax law provides for similar mechanisms to apply also in the context of capital gains tax and inheritance 
taxes. 
713 However, in order to enjoy the benefits of taxation on a remittance basis, an individual who has been resident in 
the United Kingdom for seven out of the previous nine tax years must pay a special charge each year. 
714 It should be noted that, with effect from 6 April 2008, the taxation of UK resident individuals with a foreign 
domicile was profoundly changed, with a recast of the remittance basis so as to bring foreign income and capital 
gains into the scope of UK taxation in a much wider set of circumstance. Changes were also made to the taxation 
of offshore trusts by UK-resident foreign-domiciled individuals. 
	 262 
possible, under UK law, for a company to be “dual resident”, i.e. to reside in more than 
one country. 
Prior to 15 March 1988, in fact, any company was considered as a UK resident, 
thus being subjected to UK corporate income tax on its worldwide profits, wherever 
accrued, if its central management and control was located in the United Kingdom715. 
Central management and control was deemed to be located at the place where board 
meetings were held and not necessarily where the company was incorporated or 
registered716. 
After 15 March 1988, another corporate residence test was added to the traditional 
“control and management test”, with attention being paid to the place of company 
incorporation717. Finally, under UK tax law, a company is considered as fiscally resident 
in the UK if it is incorporated under UK law but also, in case it is incorporated abroad, if 
its central management and control is located in the United Kingdom718. 
Therefore, the current “residence test” for companies operates to the effect that a 
company will be considered as residing in the United Kingdom if either it was 
incorporated there or, in the case of companies incorporated abroad, its central 
management and control is located in the United Kingdom719. 																																																								
715 Lee, N. (ed.), Revenue law: principles and practice, cited above, 467. 
716 On the point, see the judgement rendered by the House of Lords on the De Beers Consolidated Mines v. Howe case 
in 1906. 
717 Corporation Tax Act (CTA) 2009, Section 14 (“A company which is incorporated in the United Kingdom is UK resident 
for the purposes of the Corporation Tax Act. Accordingly, even if a different place of residence is given by a rule of law, the 
company is not resident in that place for the purposes of the Corporation Tax Act”) and Section 18 (“This section applies to 
a company which is treated as a) resident in a territory outside the United Kingdom, and b) non-UK resident, for the 
purposes of any double taxation arrangements. For the purposes of the Corporation Tax Acts the company is a) resident 
outside the United Kingdom, and b) non-UK resident”) 
718 The main criterion on the point has been developed by the House of Lords’ judgement on the De Beers case 
(House of Lords, De Beers Consolidated Mines Limited v. Howe, 17 April 1906), where the question was whether a 
company registered and having its main office abroad can be assessed in the United Kingdom on the grounds of 
having an office in London and its managers residing in the UK. The House of Lords rejected the “place of 
incorporation test” as the only parameter to determine corporate fiscal residence, asserting that “a company resides 
for purposes of income tax where its real business is carried on” and that “the real business is carried on where the central 
management and control actually abides”. Another essential benchmark concerning the same issue is the judgement 
rendered by the House of Lords in the Unit Construction case (House of Lords, Unit Construction co. Ltd. v. Bullock, 
30 November 1959). The case concerned three subsidiaries of a UK company which were registered in Kenya, 
where all board members were located as well. In order to use the losses suffered by the Kenyan subsidiaries 
against the parent company’s profits, the UK company argued that the Kenyan directors did not exercise any 
actual discretion in the management of the subsidiaries and received all of their instructions from the UK head 
offices of the parent company. The House of Lords ruled that the subsidiaries were, in fact, all domiciled in the 
UK for fiscal purposes, concluding that “only authorised […] management and control are relevant to an inquiry as to 
the residence of a company”. For a more detailed review of the cases, see Avi-Yonah, R.S., Sartori, N., Marian, O., 
Global perspectives on income taxation law, cited above, 134, and also Couzin, R., Corporate residence and international 
taxation, cited above, 25. However, according to HMRC guidelines, the place where the board of directors’ 
meetings are held is not per se decisive for the purposes of UK tax law, since substantive management decisions 
must be taken in these meetings in order for them to be relevant for the purposes of determining a company’s 
fiscal residence. 
719 In the Wood v. Holden judgement (England and Wales Court of Appeal, 26 January 2006), the British Court ruled 
that, if a foreign company’s board meetings are held outside the United Kingdom, then the place of central 
management and control is considered to be outside the United Kingdom unless it can be shown that a UK 
resident subject had dictated or usurped the powers of the board. Later on, in the case of Laerstate BV v. HMRC 
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The result of this combination of factors has clearly led to a wide-ranging concept 
of “residence” and to a vast extension of UK worldwide corporate liability to tax for 
companies. In fact, companies incorporated in the United Kingdom will always be 
considered as residing in the United Kingdom for UK tax purposes and will remain UK 
resident even if control and management is exercised abroad, unless under the terms of a 
“tie-breaker rule” enshrined in a double taxation convention they would prove to be 
resident of another country. Furthermore, foreign incorporated companies may become 
resident in the United Kingdom if their central management and control is located in the 
United Kingdom720. 
A similar “central management and control test” applies to partnerships. 
Therefore, if the management and control of the business is exercised abroad, the firm is 
deemed to be non-resident even though individual partners may be resident in the 
United Kingdom; on the other hand, a partnership established abroad is treated as 
residing in the United Kingdom if it is managed and controlled in the United Kingdom721. 
However, since a partnership is generally not taxed in the United Kingdom as a separate 
entity, the individual partners’ residence is more important for the purposes of UK 
taxation722. 
 4.2. The UK Diverted Profits Tax. 
 With Finance Bill 2015, the UK Government has introduced a new anti-avoidance 
measure by way of a new tax, i.e. the so-called Diverted Profits Tax (DPT), which is 
intended to apply, from 1 April 2015, to large multinationals conducting business in the 
United Kingdom and escape UK taxation diverting profits from the UK by avoiding a 
UK taxable permanent establishment. 
 The measure seems to follow the purpose to ensure that income is taxed where it 
is generated, notwithstanding the practical difficulty to understand where the actual 																																																																																																																																																																													
(UK First Tier Tribunal, 25 November 2009), the Judges have found that, while the board meetings took place 
outside the United Kingdom, the high-level decisions were not taken by the board, but rather by one of the 
directors, predominantly in UK territory, which led the Court to rule that the company’s central management and 
control was in the United Kingdom. 
720 The traditional “De Beers doctrine” continues to apply to foreign corporations, as clarified by HMRC guidance 
in a note rendered in July 2010. 
721 Lee, N. (ed.), Revenue law: principles and practice, cited above, 468. 
722 HMRC will, therefore, “look through” a partnership to the residence of its individual members in order to 
determine the tax liability of each partner. Therefore, as far as UK-source income of a partnership is concerned, 
single members of that partnership are subject to income tax irrespective of the fact that they are resident in the 
United Kingdom. With regards to income of a partnership having its source outside the United Kingdom, 
members of the partnership who are UK-resident are subject to tax in the United Kingdom on their share of that 
income, whereas partners who do not reside in the United Kingdom for tax purposes are not taxed on their share 
of that income. 
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“source” of the income lies and the possible confusion between the concepts of 
“production of the income” and “consumption of wealth”. However, the application of 
the Diverted Profits Tax depends on the assessment of an elusive behaviour on the part 
of the taxpayer and does not have a “systematic” purpose, being it more aimed at 
preventing tax avoidance. It constitutes, nonetheless, a new example of “extraterritorial” 
exercise of taxing powers on the part of a state, through a mechanism that, to a certain 
extent, is relatable to that of the CFC regime. 
 Diverted Profits Tax is charged, with a rate higher than the ordinary UK 
corporate tax rate, in situations where the taxpayer’s behaviour challenges the traditional 
connecting criteria defined by law to justify the exercise of taxing powers, on the part of 
the source state, with regard to a certain item of income, by avoiding the creation of a UK 
taxable presence723. 
The DPT charge applies in two situations724. In the first case, it requires there to be 
a company that is not resident in the United Kingdom and another subject which is 
carrying on activity in the United Kingdom in connection with the supply of goods or 
services by the non-resident company to customers in the United Kingdom. Therefore, in 
case a non-resident UK company carries on an activity in the UK in connection with the 
supply of goods or services to UK customers, conducting a business activity that 
generates income within UK territory, and it is reasonable to assume that any of the 
activity is designed to ensure that the foreign company does not have a UK permanent 
establishment (the so-called “avoided permanent establishment”), the charge applies. 
In this case, the Diverted Profits Tax is applied on the amount that is just and 
reasonable to assume would be the chargeable profit, if computed in accordance with the 
principles regulating attribution of income to permanent establishments, according to 
OECD practice, had the “avoided permanent establishment” been a UK permanent 
establishment through which the non-resident company carried on the relevant trade in 
the United Kingdom725. 
More specifically, in order for the rule to apply, it must be reasonable to assume 
that either or both of the following conditions are met: the so-called “mismatch 
condition” or the “tax avoidance condition”. 
																																																								
723 Diverted Profits Tax, however, does not apply to small and medium-sized enterprises, with a threshold of 10 
million GBP. 
724 The assessment and collection of the Diverted Profits Tax is based on a duty on the companies concerned to 
notify HMRC within three months of the end of an accounting period where it is reasonable to assume that 
diverted profits might have arisen. 
725 The rule, however, does not apply where the total UK sales revenue of the company together with any 
connected companies in a twelve-month accounting period  are less than ten million pounds. 
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The “mismatch condition” requires an agreement to be made between the foreign 
company and another person where one of the subjects is directly or indirectly 
participating in the management, control or capital of the other or another person is 
directly or indirectly participating in the management, control or capital of both subjects, 
thus resulting in an effective tax mismatch between the foreign company and the other 
person which is not mirrored by an effective economic substance. The “tax mismatch” 
conditions is considered as met if the foreign tax is lower than 80% of the equivalent UK 
corporation tax. 
The “tax avoidance condition” is considered as met if, in connection with the 
supply of goods or services, arrangements are in place with the purpose (even if not 
exclusive purpose) to avoid a charge to corporation tax in the United Kingdom. This 
analysis must be conducted on an objective basis, with regard to the full context and 
facts of the circumstances. 
Secondly, the Diverted Profits Tax is charged on a transactional basis, making 
reference to transfer pricing rules, i.e. where a company puts in place arrangements 
lacking economic substance: in case a subject, irrespective of it being or not a UK-
resident, enters, together with a UK-resident, into a transaction which is deprived of an 
underlying effective economic substance, with the purpose to divert profits from the 
United Kingdom to other countries, the DPT is charged on the amount constituting the 
difference between what that taxpayer has actually paid and what ought to be paid in 
“normal conditions”, according to criteria based on the arm’s length principle, on 
“reasonableness” and on the common practice of business models. In other words, the 
rule applies where both an “effective tax mismatch outcome” results and an “insufficient 
economic substance” condition is met. 
It is particularly important to highlight that the Diverted Profits Tax is a separate 
tax from UK income or corporation tax, which is why any payment of Diverted Profits 
Tax is not relevant in any way for the purposes of calculating income or corporation tax. 
Which means that no deduction or relief is allowed with regard to the Diverted Profits 
Tax paid by the company and that no amount paid by the company can be treated as a 
distribution. 
The European Commission has made known that it is examining the rule at issue 
in order to ensure that the measure is compliant with European Union law and with the 
Internal Market rules. It has been suggested, for instance, that the rule might have a 
negative impact on the Treaty freedom to provide service and that the higher rate of 
Diverted Profits Tax compared to the regular UK corporate income tax rate might be 
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seen as a discrimination or restriction imposed on companies established in the 
European Union outside the United Kingdom. 
Some of the first commentators of the relatively new UK tax measure have argued 
that the Diverted Profits Tax runs the risk of not being considered as sufficiently targeted 
to “wholly artificial arrangements” exclusively, thus failing the “Cadbury Schweppes test”, 
as described in previous pages of the research, especially since the above-mentioned 
“lack of economic substance test” does not seem to require any examination of the 
purposes of the arrangements at issue726. 
5. Derogations from territorial taxation and extensions of worldwide liability to 
tax: CFC regimes in Italy, France and the United Kingdom. 
As has been shown above, in general terms, applying either one of the traditional 
system of worldwide taxation based on personal connection to the territory (e.g. 
residence, nationality…) or the traditional model of territorial taxation based on the 
place of production of the income, a country should not be able to tax income produced 
by a non-resident in a place located outside its territory: in that case, in fact, both 
“subjective” and “objective” connecting criteria would essentially be missing and the 
exercise of taxing powers would have a strong “extraterritorial” nature, which would go 
against common international practice and, possibly, as was shown in the second 
chapter of the research, also European Union law. 
 However, in order to curb tax avoidance by resident companies possibly 
diverting passive investment income to offshore corporations located in tax havens, 
almost all European Union Member States resort to some instruments allowing them to 
levy taxes also on income produced abroad by subjects that do not formally reside 
within their territory and that have not produced the relevant income within their 
territory, thus entailing an extraterritorial exercise of taxing powers 727 . The 
implementation of such rules has been strongly suggested by the OECD as well728. 																																																								
726 Self, H., The UK’s new Diverted Profits Tax: compliance with EU law, in Intertax, 2015, 4, 333. 
727  Maisto, G., Pistone, P., A European model for Member States’ legislation on the taxation of controlled foreign 
subsidiaries (CFCs), cited above, 503. 
728 On the point, see the OECD 2015 Final Report developed in the context of the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
Project on “Designing effective Controlled Foreign Company rules”, published October 5, 2015. The Report sets out 
recommendations which are theoretically designed to ensure that jurisdictions choosing to implement CFC 
regimes have rules that would be able to effectively prevent taxpayers from shifting income into foreign 
subsidiaries. The report concerns the definition of a CFC, the topic of CFC exemptions and threshold 
requirements, the definition of “income” for the purposes of CFC regimes, the ways to compute the relevant CFC 
income and to properly attribute to resident companies and the prevention and elimination of double taxation. 
Acknowledging that each country generally responds to different policy objectives, such recommendations 
attempt to provide flexibility to implement CFC rules in a manner consistent with the policy objectives of their 
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This is the mechanism around which Controlled Foreign Companies (CFC) 
regimes are built: the controlled foreign company is, thus, either treated as a branch of 
the resident parent company, allowing taxation of said subsidiary’s profits on an accrual 
basis in the parent company’s hand, or it is deemed to have distributed its profits every 
year to the parent company, allowing for the same current taxation in the country where 
the parent company is located. 
As a result of the wide evolution of the CFC regimes, the distinction between 
global and territorial jurisdictions seems to have lost much of its importance. On one 
hand, in fact, territorial jurisdictions seek to tax passive income earned by their residents 
from foreign sources through the operation of CFC rules and many have endorsed 
worldwide taxation of individuals. On the other hand, countries with worldwide tax 
systems tend to allow deferral for active income earned by their residents through 
controlled foreign companies and the recent trend has been to go even further and 
exempt dividends distributed by CFCs to their parents. 
National tax provisions concerning controlled foreign companies share a common 
core, but are partially different from one another729, even though the latest developments 
of European Union law have led to a considerable level of uniformity of such regimes 
amongst Member States’ tax laws. As it has been highlighted in the previous chapter of 
the present research, the Court of Justice has, in fact, narrowed the possibility to 
implement such legislations under the freedom of establishment to “wholly artificial 
arrangements”, as such regimes subject parent companies holding foreign subsidiaries to 
less favourable tax treatment than parent companies of domestic subsidiaries730. The 
Court, therefore, requires an analysis for whether or not abuse is present on an 
individual case-by-case basis in order for a CFC regime to compatible with European 
Union law. Nonetheless, as it was shown in the second chapter of the research, in a 
																																																																																																																																																																													
tax systems and the “international legal obligations of the country concerned”: a specific part of the Report is, in fact, 
dedicated to the compatibility of CFC regimes with European Union law. 
729 For a comparative analysis, see Cipollina, S., Profili evolutivi della CFC legislation: dalle origini all’economia digitale, 
cited above, 356; Arnold, B.J., The taxation of Controlled Foreign Corporations: an international comparison, Toronto, 
1986, passim; Kane, M.A., The role of Controlled Foreign Company legislation in the OECD Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting Project, in Bulletin for International Taxation, 2014, 2, 321; Dourado, A.P., The role of CFC rules in the BEPS 
initiative and in the EU, in British Tax Review, 2015, 1, 340; Stizza, P., La disciplina fiscale delle Controlled Foreign 
Corporations in Italia, Francia e Regno Unito, cited above, 1403. 
730 Court of Justice of the European Union, 12 September 2006, C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes. It should be noted, 
however, that the more recent SGI case (Court of Justice of the European Union, 21 January 2010, C-311/08, 
Société de gestion industrielle) suggested that necessary measures against base erosion may legitimately distinguish 
between domestic and cross-border situations if it would make no sense to apply them in purely domestic 
circumstances (as CFC legislation makes no sense as regards domestic subsidiaries, which are fully subject to 
domestic corporation tax). 
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number of more recent cases, the Court has accepted a general presumption of abuse in 
entire categories of cross-border circumstances731. 
The most recent chapter of the evolution of CFC regimes in the European Union 
context is constituted by the enactment of the recently adopted Anti-Tax Avoidance 
Directive, which, confirming the most recent trends of the Court of Justice’s case law on 
the point732, explicitly allows Member States to derogate from a rigorously territorial 
structure of the extension of their taxing powers in favour of the application of 
worldwide liability to tax to items of income (and taxpayers) that are not directly 
connected to the territory of the taxing country. As highlighted in the previous chapter 
of the present research733, Articles 7 and 8 of the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive provide 
general standards to which Member States’ CFC tax regimes are called to adhere, so as to 
endow Member States with a system to counter aggressive tax competition and 
international tax avoidance in a way that could minimise the impact of the rules at issue 
on the fundamental freedom of establishment. 
5.1. The Italian experience. 
Italian tax rules on Controlled Foreign Companies have, over time, undergone 
several changes, frequently as the result of drives coming from international 
organisations, i.e. essentially OECD, and from European Union law, either by way of 
judgements of the Court of Justice or by way of directives or recommendations from the 
EU legislature. The latest reform dates back to 2016 and have been enacted by Legislative 
Decree n. 147/2015 and Italian Law n. 208/2015 in order to “align” the Italian CFC 
regime to international standards734. 
Italian scholars have long debated on the rationale behind the CFC provisions. 
According to some of them, the purpose of the regime would be to prevent undue 
tax deferrals on the part of the companies concerned as a result of the decisions of the 
managers of the foreign company to delay the distribution of dividends to the 
shareholders, including those residing in Italy735. Others have, on the other hand, stressed 																																																								
731 See, for example, Van Hilten and Thin Cap Group Litigation order. 
732 On the point, see the previous chapter, at paragraph 5. 
733 See Chapter III, paragraph 5. 
734 Provisions on the tax treatment of controlled foreign companies were introduced for the first time in Italian tax 
law with Italian law n. 342/2000, which provided for the insertion of a brand new Article 127-bis in Presidential 
Decree 917/1986 (the Italian “Income Tax Code”). The rule was subsequently modified in 2003, with the 
extension of its scope of application to “related companies” as well. In 2009, then, the regime was modified with 
regards to the requirements for the rule to apply. 
735 Stevanato, D., Controlled foreign companies: concetto di controllo e imputazione del reddito, in Rivista di Diritto 
Tributario, 2000, 3, 790; Fantozzi, A., Paparella, F., Lezioni di diritto tributario dell’impresa, cited above, 246. 
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the existence of a particular analogy of nature and purpose between the CFC regime and 
the Italian rules on fictional relocation of income and companies (“esterovestizione”), with 
CFC provisions aiming at subjecting to taxation all item of income that are apparently 
produces outside Italian territory, even though they are generated by way of a business 
activity directed and managed in the territory of the State736. Finally, other authors have 
argued that the Italian CFC regime would not be characterised by purposes of mere 
prevention of tax evasion and/or avoidance, but that it would be aimed at guaranteeing 
capital export neutrality, granting substantially equal treatment between those who 
produce income in foreign territories and those who produce income within the territory 
of the State737. 
It should also be highlighted that the Italian Supreme Court (“Corte di Cassazione”) 
has recently ruled in favour of the compatibility of the Italian CFC regime with the 
Treaty freedom of establishment enshrined in Articles 49 and 54 TFEU, as interpreted by 
the Court of Justice of the European Union in its Cadbury Schweppes judgement738. 
The Supreme Court recognised that, according to the Court of Justice’s 
jurisprudence, CFC regimes can be considered as compliant with the freedom of 
establishment if they are specifically addressed at circumstances where either the 
controlled foreign company is an artificial arrangement aimed at avoiding taxes or the 
controlled foreign company is not really located and established in the country of its 
formal residence or does not pursue any actual business purpose. Starting from this 
assumption, the Court found the Italian CFC regime to be compliant with the above-
mentioned principles, since it allows the taxpayer to provide proof as to the 
circumstances that are necessary to demonstrate such conditions, with the consequent 
possibility to be exempted from the application of the regime. 
Currently, Article 167 of Presidential Decree 917/1986 essentially establishes that 
a taxpayer residing in Italy for fiscal purposes is subject to tax on the income produced 
by certain controlled foreign companies in which said resident taxpayer, directly or 
																																																								
736 Cordeiro Guerra, R., Riflessioni critiche e spunti sistematici sulla introducenda disciplina delle Controlled Foreign 
Companies (art. 127-bis del T.U.I.R.), in Rassegna Tributaria, 2000, 6, 1399; Greggi, M., Recenti sviluppi e questioni di 
compatibilità comunitaria delle disposizioni di contrasto al fenomeno della cosiddetta esterovestizione societaria, cited 
above, 115. 
737 Ballancin, A., Note ricostruttive sulla ratio sottesa alla disciplina italiana in tema di controlled foreign companies, in 
Rivista di Diritto Tributario, 2008, 1, 27; Marino, G., Il regime di imputazione del reddito dei soggetti partecipati 
residenti o localizzati in ‘paradisi fiscali’, in Uckmar, V. (ed.), Diritto tributario internazionale, Padua, 2005, 928; 
Dominici, R., Lo spirito della legislazione cfc e i suoi intrecci con la deducibilità dei costi verso paradisi fiscali, in Dialoghi 
di Diritto Tributario, 2005, 2, 1190; Cipollina, S., Profili evolutivi della CFC legislation: dalle origini all’economia 
digitale, cited above, 356. 
738 Reference is made to the judgement rendered by the Supreme Court (Corte di Cassazione) on 16 December 2015, 
n. 25281. 
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indirectly, holds a dominant influence739. In this case, the income of the controlled foreign 
company is taxed directly on the Italian resident shareholder at the standard corporate 
income tax rate and according to the business income rules provided for by Italian tax 
law. 
However, the losses incurred by the foreign company cannot be deducted of the 
income of the Italian shareholder, also because, pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article 167, 
the portion of the controlled foreign company’s income which is taxed directly on the 
resident shareholder does not constitute part of that resident’s shareholder general tax 
base, but is subject to separate taxation with the application of the average corporate tax 
rate. The resident taxpayer is, on the other hand, allowed to a proportionate deduction 
from the taxable amount of the attributed income of the taxes incurred abroad by the 
controlled foreign company. 
 The regime applies to controlled foreign companies located in countries or 
territories, other than Member States of the European Union or of the European 
Economic Agreement (with which Italy has entered into an agreement for the exchange 
of information), whose ordinary or special tax regimes lead to a nominal level of taxation 
that is less than half the nominal level of corporate income taxation in Italy. 
 Furthermore, the Italian CFC regime allows for the possibility, for the resident 
taxpayer, to be exempted from the application of said regime if proof is provided that 
either the controlled foreign company actually and effectively operates and trades on the 
market of the country or territory where it is located or that the result of the Italian-
resident’s participation in the foreign company does not lead to the localisation of 
income in a country with a more favourable tax regime. However, such possibility is not 
entirely granted if more than 50% of the controlled foreign company’s income is of 
passive nature. In that case, exemption from the CFC regime can only be allowed if proof 
is given that that the result of the Italian-resident’s participation in the foreign company 
does not lead to the localisation of income in a country with a more favourable tax 
regime. 
 The provisions of Article 167, however, also apply if the relevant controlled 
foreign company is located in a EU or EEA Member State if that company is subject to an 
effective (not nominal) taxation which is lower than half of the tax level which would be 
applied in Italy and more than half of its income is of passive nature. The application of 
the regime to EU/EEA controlled foreign company can be avoided if the taxpayer 
																																																								
739 The relevant “control” threshold is determined pursuant to Article 2359 of the Italian Civil Code. 
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provides proof that the establishment located abroad does not constitute an artificial 
arrangement aimed at generating an undue tax advantage. 
 The current Italian CFC regime appears to be essentially in line with the general 
standards set out by the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive. There are, nonetheless, some 
minor discrepancies that should be highlighted. 
 The first of these differences concerns the relevant definition of “control”. On one 
hand, in fact, Article 7 of the Directive provides that, in order for the CFC regime to 
apply, the foreign entity has to be controlled by a resident subject holding a participation 
in the foreign company that must be higher than 50% of voting rights or rights of 
distribution. On the other hand, the Italian CFC regime, applying a definition of 
“control” which is the one provided for by Article 2359 of the Italian Civil Code, extends 
its application to situations characterised by a de facto control as well740. 
  Secondly, the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive specifies that the application of the 
CFC regime must be conditioned to the circumstance that the effective tax level in the 
country where the foreign company is established must be lower than 50% of the tax 
level which would be virtually applicable if the foreign company were considered as 
being resident of the country where the controlling company is established. However, 
the Italian CFC regime, as modified in 2015, provides that, in order to identify a country 
as a “favourable tax regime” for the purposes of the application of the rules at issue, the 
administration must refer (not to the effective level of taxation, but) to the nominal level 
of taxation of the state of residence of the controlled foreign entity, which must not be 
lower than 50% of the Italian nominal tax level. 
 Furthermore, the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive establishes that, in case of 
application of the CFC regime, the controlling subject’s tax base should only include the 
passive income attributable to the foreign entity, whereas Italian tax law provides for the 
inclusion of all of the controlled foreign company’s income within the tax base of the 
resident controlling subject. 
Notwithstanding all of the above, it should be recalled that Article 7 and 8 of the 
Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive are aimed at establishing minimum standards to which all 
Member States’ CFC regimes must comply, which does not prevent such Member States 
to enact stricter rules, as far as such rules do not infringe European Union law and the 
fundamental Treaty freedoms. Which means that stricter rules such as the Italian 																																																								
740 Pursuant to Article 2359 of the Italian Civil Code, in fact, a company is considered as “controlled” by another 
company if that other company holds the majority of the votes in the controlled company’s ordinary assembly or 
a number of votes which is sufficient to exercise a dominant influence in the controlled company’s ordinary 
assembly or, finally, if it is under the dominant influence of that other company by virtue of specific and 
particular contractual bounds with it. 
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provisions described above do not necessarily imply that Italy has failed to comply with 
European Union standards. 
 5.2. The French experience. 
France’s CFC regime constitutes an evident derogation to the general territorial 
nature of the French tax system, according to which only profits generated in France are 
liable to tax. The regime appears to be quite similar to the newly modified Italian CFC 
regime: it entails a distinction between controlled foreign companies located within the 
European Union or within the territory of the European Economic Agreement, on one 
hand, and companies located in third countries, on the other hand. It also does not limit 
its application only to the foreign company’s income of a passive nature. 
France has been one of the first countries to implement fiscal CFC rules, also 
initially extending them to subjects operating in other EU Member States as well. Such 
rules, however, have been deemed as incompatible with the European Union legal order 
and Internal Market by the French judicature741, which has led to a modification of these 
provisions, with the application of the French CFC regime to all foreign companies, 
wherever located, specifying that, in case the activity is located within the European 
Union, in order for the rules to apply the structure must be purely artificial and only 
aimed at obtaining a tax saving. 
The French CFC regime has been modified in 2012, extending the tax treatment of 
companies operating in non-cooperative jurisdictions to companies operating in low-tax 
jurisdictions and shifting the burden of proof necessary to be exempted from the 
application of the regime at issue entirely on the corporate taxpayer742, which is now 
required to demonstrate that the foreign company is carrying on genuine business 
activities in the foreign territory of its establishment and that the developed business 
structure has “main justifications” other than simple tax avoidance motives. 
The French CFC regime is enshrined in Article 209 B CGI, which provides that, if 
a French corporate taxpayer owns, directly or indirectly, more than 50% of either the 
share capital or the voting rights or the “financial rights” of a foreign corporate entity 																																																								
741 Conseil d’Etat, 28 June 2002, Société Schneider Electric, which even precedes the Court of Justice’s judgement on 
the Cadbury Schweppes case. On the point, see Maisto, G., Pistone, P., Modello europeo per le legislazioni degli Stati 
membri in materia di imposizione fiscale delle società controllate estere (CFC), cited above, 193. 
742 Under the previous version of Article 209 B CGI, the burden of proof rested entirely on the French tax authority, 
and CFC rules applied where either at least 20% of the CFC income was passive, or at least 50% of the CFC 
income was either passive or derived from performing intragroup services. In order to combat tax avoidance and 
reduce uncertainty for the taxpayer, France has now eliminated these thresholds and shifted towards a legislation 
that is more focused on a “substance over form” approach. 
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benefitting from a “privileged tax regime” in the country where it is located743, that 
French corporate taxpayer will be considered as if it has received “deemed dividends” 
from the foreign entity, in proportion to its participation in the latter, and such dividends 
will be taxed in the hands of the French-resident corporate taxpayer. 
However, as mentioned above, the regime entails two kinds of “safe harbour 
rules”, which were introduced in order to ensure that the regime complies with EU law, 
as interpreted by the Court of Justice. 
First of all, in case the foreign entity is located within the European Union, a “safe 
harbour rule” applies, whereby Article 209 B can be applied exclusively if the 
participation held by the French corporate taxpayer in the foreign EU-located entity 
constitutes an artificial scheme with the purpose of circumventing French taxation. 
Moreover, in case the foreign entity is located in a third country outside the 
European Union, CFC provisions may not be applied if the French corporate taxpayer 
demonstrates that the main purpose and effect of the operations conducted by the 
controlled foreign company is not to enact an undue transfer of profits to a tax-
privileged jurisdiction and that said foreign company conducts an effective industrial or 
commercial activity in the jurisdiction where it is located (“une activité industrielle ou 
commerciale effective exercée sur le territoire de l’Etat de son établissement ou de son siege”)744. 
This is the so-called “general safe harbour rule”. 
 In light of the above, it would appear that the French CFC regime already 
complies with the standards set out by the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive. In fact, the 
relevant definition of “control” provided by French law is strictly coinciding with the 
one provided by the Directive; the regime already entails carve-outs and specific rules 
for controlled foreign companies located in the territory of the European Union, with a 
different burden of proof on the taxpayer. 
5.3. The UK experience. 
																																																								
743 Such non-French entity is deemed as benefitting from a "privileged tax regime" in the jurisdiction where it is 
located if its effective tax rate in such jurisdiction is more than 50% lower than the effective French tax rate that 
would have been applicable “under normal conditions”. 
744 Article 209 B, paragraph 3, CGI. The French provision expressly mentions tjhe object of the activity, taking a 
definitive position on a question that had given rise to an age-old debate between French judges, tax authorities 
and legal scholars on whether the possibility to escape from the scope of application of the CFC regime should be 
granted provided that the taxpayer demonstrates that the object of the activity is effective and not aimed at 
avoiding French taxes or, on the other hand, by judging the overall effect of the activity conducted by the foreign 
company. The French Conseil d’Etat had advocated the need to limit the analysis to the object of the activity only, 
while the previous project of CFC reform focused on the effect of the operation. 
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The United Kingdom CFC regime provides for chargeable profits of the foreign 
entities to be apportioned to those with an interest in the controlled foreign company 
and for a UK-resident company holding, with connected persons and associates, at least 
a 25% interest in the foreign company will be assessed on its apportioned share of the 
profits. The provisions apply if the controlled foreign company is under UK control (40% 
being the relevant threshold) and is resident in a “low-tax country”; for the purposes of 
UK CFC legislation, a country is considered as being “low-tax” if the tax imposed therein 
is lower than three-quarters of the tax that would be levied in the United Kingdom745. 
The British CFC regime incurred extensive reform after the Court’s judgement on 
the Cadbury Schweppes case746, after the Luxembourg Judges found that an EU subsidiary 
of a UK company should not be subjected to the UK CFC provisions, even if the 
establishment of the foreign company was put in place explicitly for the purposes of 
benefiting from favourable tax regimes, unless the foreign company has no real 
substance, constituting a “wholly artificial arrangement”. The Court, thus, ruled that the 
UK CFC regime in place at the time was incompatible with European Union law insofar 
as it applies to situations other than “wholly artificial arrangements”, but that it is for the 
domestic court to analyse the legislation as a whole in order to define whether or not the 
scope of application of the regime was properly limited. 
After the judgement, new legislation was, therefore, introduced, with effect from 
December 2006, applying to subsidiaries of UK companies that are subject to an 
apportionment under CFC rules and have a business establishment in a Member State of 
the European Union747. 
The regime previously encompassed, inter alia, provisions aimed at ensuring that 
the charge will only arise where a controlled foreign company is used to the purpose of 
avoiding taxes, excluding from the scope of application of the regime all controlled 
foreign companies pursuing an acceptable distribution policy748 or conducting exempt 
activities749. Both of these exemptions have been repealed in 2009. 
																																																								
745 There used to be an exemption for controlled foreign companies quoted on foreign stock exchanges, but it has 
been removed with effect from December 2006. 
746 On the point, see Chapter II of the present research, paragraph 7. It should be noted that, in the United 
Kingdom, three references to the Court of Justice of the European Union were made with regard to the 
compatibility of the UK CFC regime with European Union law, i.e. the Cadbury-Schweppes case, the CFC Group 
Litigation order case (Case C-201/05) and the Vodafone 2 v. HMRC case (2005). 
747 Lee, N. (ed.), Revenue law: principles and practice, cited above, 1140. 
748 More in detail, in order to qualify for the exclusion from the scope of the CFC regime, trading companies must 
distribute 90% of their taxable profits less capital gains and foreign tax. 
749 The rules restrict the use of intra-group service companies and limit the cases where a foreign holding company 
qualifies for the exemption from the regime at issue. On the point, Lee, N. (ed.), Revenue law: principles and practice, 
cited above, 1139. 
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The most recent reform of UK CFC provisions, which are now enshrined in Part 
9A of TIOPA 2010, introduced by Finance Act 2012 and in place since 1 January 2013, has 
constituted an essential part of a larger strategy, with the clear political purpose of 
attracting foreign business and especially holding companies through measures making 
steps towards a more territorial tax model, with the United Kingdom not levying taxes 
on the worldwide income of a corporate group having its main holding in UK territory, 
but concentrating the tax levy on the profits deriving from activities taking place in that 
territory, with the prevalence of a source-based approach750. 
The new UK CFC regime conforms to this “territorial” tendency751. 
Finance Act 2012 has introduced the concept of a “CFC charge gateway” through 
which profits of a controlled foreign company must pass in order to be considered as 
chargeable profits. Depending on certain criteria, profits are considered for the purposes 
of said gateway if they are attributable to activities conducted in the United Kingdom, if 
they are finance profits and if they derive from captive insurance business. An 
exemption has also been introduced for companies that are newly under UK control, for 
companies conducting business in excluded territories and for companies with low 
profits. An exemption is also provided for finance profits arising from intra-group 
loans752. 
First of all, it provides for an exemption for “foreign-to-foreign” infra-group 
operations, which are not related to the UK tax base, and also for an exemption 
concerning financial companies, which is linked to the debt-equity ratio: a CFC charge is 
levied when the balance between debt and equity in the financing of the foreign 
company significantly shifts towards equity. 
Special attention is paid to income deriving from the employment of intellectual 
property: the regime provides for a number of exemptions with regards to all cases 
which are characterised by a feeble connection with the territory of the United Kingdom 
and to all cases where the presence of a non-significant territorial connection combines 
with reduced dimensions of the company, with a sort of “de minimis” exemption of IP 
income. The CFC regime is, however, applied when the relevant underlying intellectual 
property has been created in the United Kingdom and then transferred to a low-tax 
country or is effectively managed in the United Kingdom, even though being detained 
by a subject located in a foreign country or, finally, is the result of an investment made 
abroad, but financed through UK funds. These are all cases characterised by a strong 																																																								
750 Avi-Yonah, R.S., The structure of international taxation: a proposal for simplification, cited above, 15. 
751 Cipollina, S., Profili evolutivi della CFC legislation: dalle origini all’economia digitale, cited above, 364. 
752 Lee, N. (ed.), Revenue law: principles and practice, cited above, 1140. 
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territorial connection between the intellectual property and the United Kingdom, thus 
justifying the application of the CFC regime. 
What has been highlighted above constitutes only the peculiar traits of the United 
Kingdom’s CFC regime, constituting an example of how the United Kingdom has 
implemented a “territorial CFC regime”. Which sounds like an oxymoron, given what 
has been said above on CFC regimes constituting, by nature, an extraterritorial exercise 
of taxing powers on the part of the states. However, the United Kingdom, with specific 
carve-outs and exemptions has tried to implement a system by virtue of which the 
application of the CFC regime is, to a certain extent, limited to the income that can be 
considered as somehow connected to the territory of the United Kingdom. This is one of 
the reasons why it does appear there not to be any problem of compatibility of the UK 
CFC regime with the standards enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the new Anti-Tax 
Avoidance Directive. 
6. A comparative perspective on exit taxation. 
As already highlighted in the previous chapters of the research, exit taxation has 
always constituted a natural test bench for the compatibility of Member States’ national 
tax regimes with European Union law. In the context of the European Union, exit tax 
measure, in fact, by their nature, can only apply at the moment when an EU citizen 
exercises his/her/its right of cross-border movement, thus impacting directly on the 
possibility to exercise freedom of movement of persons and/or workers or freedom of 
establishment and, in any case, freedom of movement of capital. Exit tax measures 
operate at the moment where the taxpayer changes his/her/its status, becoming a non-
resident when he/she/it was previously a resident. 
As far as corporate taxation is concerned, the topic of exit taxation is inevitably 
intertwined with the perspective of the Member States’ commercial law, as far as 
corporate taxation is concerned. 
With regard to the aspect concerning the maintaining of the status of “national 
company” or similar, in fact, countries can generally be divided into two main 
categories: those countries, such as Italy and the United Kingdom, applying the so-called 
“incorporation theory”, according to which a company is subject to the laws of the state 
where it was constituted, and those countries, on the other hand, applying the so-called 
“real seat theory”, according to which the law applicable to companies is the law of the 
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state where the company’s administration is located on a factual basis753. For countries 
belonging to the second category, the transfer of the company’s administrative seat 
abroad implies the loss of its effective nexus with the territory of the State, which also 
implies the loss of its fiscal residence (and the consequent exit taxation). 
On the point, as highlighted by the Court of Justice in the Daily Mail and Cartesio 
judgements754, Member States are free to identify the connecting criteria on the ground of 
which a company may be considered as incorporated pursuant to their national law and 
also the criteria which are necessary in order to a company to maintain that status. The 
only limit posed by the Luxembourg Judges to the Member State of departure (i.e. the 
Member State of incorporation of the company) is the general prohibition to enact 
measures aimed at preventing a company’s transfer abroad with the switch to another 
applicable law, i.e. with the conversion of that company into a corporate form which is 
compatible and subject to the laws of the Member State of destination, with a consequent 
restriction imposed on the company’s freedom of establishment. 
 As also noted in the previous chapter of the present research, it cannot be 
doubted that there has been a substantial change of perspective with regards exit 
taxation in recent times: national tax systems on exit taxation serve (or used to serve) 
national fiscal and financial interests; in a context such as the European Union, deprived 
of any direct actual taxing power, a legislation on exit taxation can only be justified as a 
limit to the exercise of the Member States’ taxing powers or with a view to the 
prevention of abusive behaviours on the part of taxpayers755. 
The implementation of European Union law in the field of exit taxation has led to 
a dissociation between taxing powers and their exercise, with the first being, in principle, 
legitimate and compatible with EU law, and the second being compatible under certain 
circumstances. From this perspective, it is essential to turn to the analysis of domestic 
regimes in order to verify whether or not the somehow limited territorial exercise of 
taxing powers on the part of the Member States may be effectively justified against the 
unity of the Internal Market. 
According to the Court’s jurisprudence, for instance, the source Member State 
cannot immediately exercise its taxing power on unrealised capital gains at the moment 
of the transfer of residence to another tax jurisdiction being part of the European Union, 
postponing the collection of the taxes to a later moment: this was the compromise 																																																								
753 Sallustio, C., Il trasferimento della sede e della residenza fiscale all’estero e dall’estero in Italia. Profili sistematici, in 
Rivista di Diritto Tributario, 2014, 3, 353. 
754 Respectively, Court of Justice of the European Union, 27 September 1988, C-81/87, Daily Mail and Court of 
Justice of the European Union, 16 December 2008, C-210/06, Cartesio. 
755 Di Pietro, A., Past and perspectives of exit tax, cited above. 
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reached by the Luxembourg Judges in order to guarantee the effectiveness of the 
primacy of European Union law and of the protection of the Internal Market, though, on 
the other hand, without sacrificing the interests of the source Member State. 
Therefore, through its rulings, the Court of Justice has clarified which elements 
cannot be part of an exit taxation measure, at least with regard to those measures 
applicable to intra-EU transfers, thus developing an “EU exit tax negative model” for all 
Member States to adhere to. According to the Court, for instance, Member States may 
not charge immediate taxation at the moment of the intra-EU transfer, but taxes must be 
levied at the moment of the actual realisation of the capital gain, also to the purpose of 
duly taking into account losses possibly deriving from the disposal of the concerned 
asset; furthermore, Member States may not impose excessively burdensome guarantees 
on migrating taxpayers, given the possibility to resort to the mutual cooperation and 
exchange of information procedures provided by EU law756. 
 Notwithstanding the establishment of these judge-made criteria, Member States’ 
law on the point of exit taxation has for a long time been quite different from one 
country to another, leading to uncertainties for taxpayers and for tax authorities. With 
the enactment of the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive, as it has been shown in the previous 
chapter of the present research757, the EU legislature has tried to reach a harmonisation of 
exit taxation. 
 6.1. The Italian experience. 
 Under Italian tax law, the transfer of an Italian company’s fiscal residence and the 
cross-border transfer of assets belonging to a permanent establishment located in Italy of 
a non-resident company to another country, including a Member State of the European 
Union, both trigger exit taxation. 
Before continuing with the analysis of the provision, it is relevant to highlight at 
the outset that, according to Italian law, a migrating company can maintain its legal 
personality, without the need to liquidate and then re-incorporate into a new corporate 
form in the host country758, which would argue in favour of the compatibility of Italian 
law with the “Cartesio doctrine”. Therefore, a company can transfer its registered office 
in a foreign territory provided that the legal requirements set out by Italian law and the 
legal requirements set out by the host country are met. Italian law also allows companies 																																																								
756 Di Pietro, A., Past and perspectives of exit tax, cited above; Carinci, A., Il diritto comunitario alla prova delle exit taxes, 
tra limiti, prospettive e contraddizioni, cited above. 
757 See Chapter III, at paragraph 5. 
758 See Article 25, paragraph 3, of Italian Law n. 218 of 31 May 1995. 
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to transfer their administrative office abroad while maintaining their legal personality: in 
this case, the problem concerning which law applies to the company which has 
transferred its administrative office is solved by the conflict of law provisions of the 
relevant jurisdictions. 
It should also be noted that, according to the majority of Italian legal scholarship, 
if a resident company maintains at least one of the connecting criteria with the territory 
of the State, as established by Article 73 of Presidential Decree n. 917/1986759, said 
company will continue to be considered as fiscally resident in Italy for the purposes of 
Italian tax law and fiscally resident in the country of destination only for the purposes of 
the applicable double taxation convention. Which prevents the application of exit 
taxation measures, that are applicable only in case of loss of fiscal residence on the part 
of a former resident760. 
 That being said, according to Italian tax law, all taxpayers are subjected to specific 
forms of tax provisions in case they transfer their residence to a foreign country, 
irrespective of them being subject to Corporate Income Tax (“IRES”) or Personal Income 
Tax (“IRPEF”), even though the applicable provisions differ depending on the 
characteristic of the migrating taxpayer, i.e. whether he/she/it is a company or an 
individual conducting business activities in Italy or an individual not conducting any 
business activity. 
 The transfer of residence abroad by a company or enterprise is expressly 
considered as an event giving rise to a capital gain for the purposes of Article 166 of 
Presidential Decree n. 917/1986. Furthermore, the transfer or residence abroad is 
specifically regulated by anti-avoidance and anti-evasion provisions, with a presumption 
of residence in Italy for companies residing abroad but maintaining a substantial 
presence in the Italian territory761. 
Italian tax law does not impose an “authentic” exit tax in case of transfer of 
residence by individuals not conducting business activities, which means that the 
specific problems examined by the Court of Justice in cases such as De Lasteyrie du 
Saillant do not appear to exist with regard to the Italian legal order762. It should, however, 
be highlighted that where a foreign individual transfers his/her residence to Italy and 
subsequently disposes of assets that he/she had held in the period of time before 																																																								
759 See above, at paragraph 2. 
760 Sallustio, C., Il trasferimento della sede e della residenza fiscale all’estero e dall’estero in Italia. Profili sistematici, cited 
above, 357. 
761 Tassani, T., Transfer of residence and exit taxation in EU law: the Italian approach, cited above. 
762 Tassani, T., Transfer of residence and exit taxation in EU law: the Italian approach, cited above; Lupi, R., Coerenza del 
sistema fiscale tra dividendi esteri ed exit tax, in Dialoghi di Diritto Tributario, 2004, 3, 1365; De Pietro, C., 
Compatibilità comunitaria di exit tax su partecipazioni rilevanti, in Rassegna Tributaria, 2006, 4, 1377. 
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transferring his/her residence to Italy, the capital gain is taxed in its entirety by the 
Italian State. 
Nonetheless, the current version of Article 166 of Presidential Decree n. 917/1986763 
applies to all “subjects exercising a commercial enterprise” only, that is to say individuals, 
non-commercial entities, partnerships, corporations and commercial entities, while other 
persons not exercising a trade fall within the scope of application of paragraph 2-bis of 
Article 2 of Presidential Decree n. 917/1986, pursuant to which, as we have already seen, 
a resident individual who transfers his/her residence to a tax haven will nonetheless be 
treated as residing in Italy for fiscal purposes unless he/she is able to prove that the 
transfer of residence really coincides with the substantive nature of his/her abode: the 
result is, therefore, an inversion of the regular burden of proof. 
 The difference in treatment between individuals not conducting business 
activities and subjects exercising a commercial enterprise is justified by the fact that it is 
common for Italian corporate tax law to allow either an exemption or a deferral of 
taxation (carry-forward) on unrealised capital gains based on the fact that they are going 
to be taxed at a later time and, in any case, when the business is wound up. However, if 
before that event, circumstances occur which give rise to the transfer abroad of the 
wealth that has not been taxed yet, the State risks not to recuperate the deferred taxation 
on capital gains which was “suspended” until realisation764. This phenomenon obviously 
does not occur with regards to individuals that do not conduct any business activity, 
since they are generally not granted deferral advantages such as those mentioned above 
in the field of business taxation. 
Furthermore, the “loss of a resident”, for a country such as Italy, following a 
traditional “worldwide” approach to taxation of residents and taxing non-residents only 
on their income produced in Italian territory, implies a significant change of perspective: 
when a resident person becomes a non-resident, taxation shifts from that person’s 
overall income, wherever accrued, to a more “territorial” approach, with taxes being 
levied exclusively on income having its source within Italian territory, and with the 
consequence of capital gains not yet accrued and other items of income possibly 
“suspended” for tax purposes escaping from the tax net of the Italian Republic765. The 
main issue, therefore, is centred, as we will see, on the relevant connecting criterion 
applicable to the circumstances and whether or not the “personal” connection based on 																																																								
763 As modified by D.L. n. 1/2012 of 24 January 2012, ultimately approved by l. n. 27/2012 of 24 March 2012, 
following an infringement procedure initiated by the Commission against Italy (n. 2010/4141). 
764 Fantozzi, A., Paparella, F., Lezioni di diritto tributario dell’impresa, cited above, 232; Pizzoni, B.E., La compatibilità 
delle exit tax con il diritto comunitario, in Rivista di Diritto Tributario, 2004, 3, 51. 
765 Fantozzi, A., Paparella, F., Lezioni di diritto tributario dell’impresa, cited above, 233. 
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residence is replaced by an “objective” connection (i.e. the presence of a permanent 
establishment). 
 Pursuant to Article 166, both the transfer of an Italian corporation’s residence to a 
foreign territory and the cross-border transfer of assets allocated to an Italian permanent 
establishment of a non-resident company to another country generally trigger the 
immediate application of exit tax measures, with levies being imposed on the unrealised 
capital gains, which are calculated with reference to the difference between the normal 
value of the assets and their fiscally recognised cost. Which does not happen in case of a 
purely domestic transfer. Nonetheless, Article 166 provides for the possibility to ask for a 
deferral of the payment of the exit tax due in that case. 
However, such exit taxation measures do not apply in case the assets previously 
constituting part of the Italian company that has been transferred abroad remain 
somehow connected to a permanent establishment located in Italian territory: in this 
case, in fact, the transfer of residence does not ultimately imply any subtraction of tax 
base to the detriment of the Italian public coffers, since the connection to the Italian State 
is not lost766. This is, in fact, a case where the connecting criterion based on residence is 
replaced by a source-based connecting criterion, i.e. the presence of a permanent 
establishment, allowing the Italian State to extend its taxing powers, to a certain extent, 
to a “newly foreign” subject as well. 
The provision links the taxation of unrealised gains to the continuity of the 
application of the Italian fiscal regime to the business, at least with regard to the business 
income attributable to the permanent establishment that remains located in Italian 
territory even after the transfer abroad of the home office. For the same reason, Italian 
tax law provides that, in case of a transfer abroad of a “formerly Italian” company, the 
unrealised gains related to the permanent establishment held by that company are 
deemed as realised at the moment of the transfer, since after said transfer, there is no 
way to provide for any continuity of the connecting criterion767. 
As an effect of the above-mentioned regime, the unrealised capital gains are 
deemed as realised, after the transfer, with taxation being consequently triggered, if the 
assets which have become part of the permanent establishment located in Italian 
territory are subsequently disposed of. The capital gain is determined on the basis of the 
fair market value of the assets at the time of transfer. 
																																																								
766 Fantozzi, A., Paparella, F., Lezioni di diritto tributario dell’impresa, cited above, 233; Melis, G., Trasferimento della 
residenza all’estero ed elusione fiscale, cited above, 516. 
767 Tassani, T., Transfer of residence and exit taxation in EU law: the Italian approach, cited above. 
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Article 166, paragraph 2-quater, establishes the possibility to apply for a deferred 
payment of the exit tax due with respect to transfers of tax residence to another EU 
Member State or a country adhering to the EEA or a country ensuring an adequate level 
of exchange of information with Italy768. More specifically, taxpayers may ask for the 
suspension of the payment of the taxes due on the capital gains that have been deemed 
as realised at the moment of the transfer769 until the time of actual realisation of the capital 
gains connected with the relevant assets transferred abroad. It is also possible to opt for 
the payment by way of instalments. 
Regardless of whether the taxpayer has applied for deferred taxation or the 
payment in instalments, the exit tax relating to a transferred asset is immediately due 
when realisation occurs in the host Member State770. 
It has been debated in Italian scholarship whether the provisions of Article 166 of 
Presidential Decree 917/1986 constitute new rules having anti-avoidance nature or rules 
that can be traced back to a more systematic view of the Italian tax system and, in 
particular, with the fiscal treatment of capital gains771. Part of legal scholarship has argued 
that the current provisions of Article 166 of Presidential Decree 917/1986 seems to have 
put in place a significant change of perspective, stepping away from the traditional 
nature of anti-avoidance rules and paying a higher degree of attention to the systematic 
coherence of the tax system, thus taxing latent capital gains when the assets finally exit 
the enterprise772. 
This is one of the reasons who has led many scholars to exclude the possibility to 
consider the Italian exit taxation regime as contrary to European Union law, since the 
rule does not constitute a derogation from the general principles regulating the Italian 
tax system, but rather an application of general tax principles in cases where the 
company’s assets are used for purposes other than the main business of the company or 
exit the scope of application of the Italian business tax regime773. 
																																																								
768 On the point, see Ministerial Decree of 2 July 2014 implementing the optional deferral regime. 
769 Said value is generally calculated as the difference between the normal market value and the fiscal value of the 
transferred assets. 
770 Potgens, F.P.G., van Os, P., Duran, P.H., et al., The compatibility of exit tax legislation applicable to corporate 
taxpayers in France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom with the EU freedom of 
establishment, cited above, 58 
771 Sallustio, C., Il trasferimento della sede e della residenza fiscale all’estero e dall’estero in Italia. Profili sistematici, cited 
above, 358; Melis, G., Trasferimento della residenza all’estero ed elusione fiscale, cited above, 516. 
772 Fantozzi, A., Paparella, F., Lezioni di diritto tributario dell’impresa, cited above, 236; Melis, G., Trasferimento della 
residenza all’estero ed elusione fiscale, cited above, 516; Tassani, T., Transfer of residence and exit taxation in EU law: the 
Italian approach, cited above. This position seems to solve the age-old debate, in the context of Italian legal 
scholarship, on the (systematic or purely anti-elusive) nature of exit taxation provisions. 
773  Tassani, T., Transfer of residence and exit taxation in EU law: the Italian approach, cited above; Ficari, V., 
Trasferimento della sede all’estero, continuità della destinazione imprenditoriale e contrarietà al Trattato CE dell’exit tax 
sulle plusvalenze latenti, in Rassegna Tributaria, 2004, 6, 2146. 
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Consequently, it would not be possible to attribute to the provisions at issue any 
discriminatory purpose with regards to those subjects transferring their residence in a 
foreign country or, in any case, any discriminatory or restrictive measure would have to 
be considered as justified by the need to ensure the coherence of the tax system. In other 
words, the Italian exit taxation regime seems to be in line with an allocation of taxing 
powers amongst Member States based on territorial criteria, which leads to concluding 
in favour of the compatibility of the measure with EU law, since, in application of the 
“Futura doctrine”774, taxation reflecting the principle of territoriality can be considered as 
balanced and proportioned775. 
6.2. The French experience. 
Current French tax law entails a provision pursuant to which, briefly said, a 
corporate taxpayer relocating its place of effective management, statutory seat or 
permanent establishment located in France to another country, including another 
Member State, with the operation thus resulting in a transfer of assets, would trigger the 
application of exit taxation measures. 
 France has introduced measures on exit taxation for the first time in 1998, 
providing for the taxation of unrealised capital gains accrued on a French-resident 
taxpayer at the moment of his/her/its emigration to another country. In 2004, the exit 
tax measure at issue was considered as incompatible with European Union law and with 
the freedom of establishment by the Court of Justice with the Lasteyrie du Saillant 
judgement776, which led to a series of subsequent reforms on the point, until the last 
modification to the rule, enacted in 2012777.  
Over the years, the French exit taxation regime has evolved through the 
interpretation given and the limits provided by judicial intervention. For example, on the 
application of the above-mentioned provisions with specific regard to emigration to a 
non-EU Member State, reference should also be made to a judgement rendered by the 
French Conseil d’Etat in 2013778. The case dealt with the application of exit taxation 
provisions in relation to the rules enshrined in the double taxation convention between 
France and Switzerland. Under article 15 of said convention, in fact, the right to tax 																																																								
774 See Chapter II of the present research, paragraph 4. 
775 Tassani, T., Transfer of residence and exit taxation in EU law: the Italian approach, cited above. 
776 On the point, see Marchessou, P., Exit tax under French law in the light of the case De Lasteyrie du Saillant, in 
European Tax Studies, 2009, 1, 1. 
777 Gouthière, B., New exit tax for individuals, in European Taxation, 2012, 1, 42. 
778 Conseil d’Etat, 29 April 2013, n. 357576, Mr. Picart. 
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capital gains on shares and securities is attributed to the state of residence of the 
taxpayers. On the point, the Conseil d’Etat considered that the French exit tax was due 
before the completion of the transfer of residence and not after said transfer, i.e. in a 
moment when the taxpayer was still a French resident for tax purposes, thus ruling that 
the exit tax measure at hand was not contrary to the provisions of the double taxation 
convention between France and Switzerland. 
In 2012, following the National Grid Indus and Commission v. Portugal decisions of 
the Court of Justice, the French Government has once again modified the fiscal regime 
connected to the transfer of assets, explicitly making reference to the need to establish a 
balanced allocation of taxing powers amongst Member States and also clarifying that the 
legislation is supposed to act as a “deterrent aiming at depriving the tax refugee of the benefits 
of his expatriation by taxing him in the same manner as if he had never left France”779. 
As far as individuals are concerned, after years during which France has never 
imposed any sort of exit taxation on individuals, Article 167-bis CGI currently establishes 
that individuals transferring their fiscal residence outside French territory are taxable, at 
the time of the transfer, on any unrealised increase in value of shares, earn-out 
receivables and rolled-over capital gains under certain conditions. With regards to 
capital gains (especially on shares, constituting the main target of the legislation at 
issue), exit taxation applies if the concerned individual has been domiciled in France for 
at least six years during the ten years preceding the emigration780. Tax is charged on 
unrealised capital gains on shares or rights held directly or indirectly by the migrating 
individual if certain thresholds are met781 and the taxable gain is computed making 
reference to the difference between the fair market value of the individuals’ chares at the 
time of the transfer and their cost base. 
Individuals may benefit from a suspension of payment under certain conditions 
depending on their country of destination. If they move to another EU Member State, the 
individuals concerned automatically benefits from an automatic suspension of payment 
of the exit tax due without any condition, without having to provide guarantees and 
without the need to require prior authorisation to the tax authority, which seems to 
advocate in favour of the compatibility of the measures at issue with European Union 
law and with the Court of Justice’s jurisprudence on exit taxation782. Even more so if we 																																																								
779 Amending Finance Law for 2012, 29 December 2012, n. 2012-1510. 
780 This condition is applicable to earn-out receivables as well, but not to rolled-over capital gains. 
781 The members of the taxable unit must own either a direct or indirect shareholding of at least 1% in the profits of 
a company or in the same companies, a direct or indirect shareholding the value of which exceeds 1.3 million 
Euros at the time of the transfer of residence. On the point, see Gouthière, B., New exit tax for individuals, in cited 
above, 42. 
782 Gouthière, B., New exit tax for individuals, cited above, 44. 
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consider that the tax base may be corrected after the transfer of residence in order to take 
into account the actual gain realised by the taxpayer, so as to prevent the individual from 
being taxed on a non-existing gain, and that a number of provisions have been 
introduced to ensure that the migrating taxpayer is not subject to more burdensome 
taxation than if he/she had not exercised his/her right to free movement within the 
Internal Market. 
In case of transfer of residence to a country which is not a EU Member State, the 
individual taxpayer may also benefit from a suspension of payment of the exit tax due at 
the moment of his/her transfer but he/she must provide appropriate guarantees and 
designate a fiscal representative in France, with the necessary authorisation of the French 
tax authority. Which has led some commentators to wonder about the compatibility of 
such a measure with the Treaty freedom of movement of capital, i.e. the only 
fundamental freedom applying to third-country scenarios as well. 
The 2012 reform concerned French corporate exit taxation as well. 
The previous version of Article 221-2 CGI, in fact, called for all transfers of assets 
accompanied by a transfer of seat or for all transfers of permanent establishments to 
trigger an immediate French taxation to latent capital gains, with no possibility for any 
payment by way of instalments. 
 Nowadays, the current version of Article 221-2 CGI establishes the fiscal 
consequences of a company’s transfer of seat or permanent establishment, distinguishing 
between, on one hand, the case in which said seat or permanent establishment is 
transferred to a country that is not a Member State of the European Union and, on the 
other hand, the case in which said seat or permanent establishment is transferred to 
another Member State783. 
It should be noted, first of all, that, according to French law, in absence of any 
specific rule on the point, the transfer of a company to a foreign territory does not 
generally entail the necessary loss of its legal personality from the perspective of the 
French legal order784 and a French company is not prevented from being converted into a 
company incorporated under the law of another Member State, depending on the 
treatment applicable in the host Member State. Thus, French (company and tax) law 																																																								
783 For further details on the more practical aspects of the topic, see the French Tax Authorities’ guidelines BOI-IS-
CESS-30-20130903. 
784 French company law adheres, in general terms, to the “incorporation principle” for the purposes of determining 
the law applicable to a certain corporation. Article 1837 of the French Civil Code and Article L. 210-3 of the 
French Commercial Code provide that all companies whose seat is located in French territory are subject to 
French law, with that place generally coinciding with the place of incorporation of those companies. However, 
pursuant to the same articles mentioned above, third parties may claim that a certain company’s statutory seat is 
fictitious or does not coincide with the place of effective management of that company: in this case, the company 
would be considered as located at the place of its real seat. 
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appears to be in line with the Court of Justice’s “Cartesio doctrine” 785  from this 
perspective786. 
 Therefore, in case of a transfer of seat (with no distinction being traced between 
the transfer of a company’s statutory seat or the transfer of the place of effective 
management) or of permanent establishment to another Member State that is not 
accompanied by a simultaneous transfer of (either material or immaterial) assets, the 
transaction is considered as fiscally neutral with regard to corporate income taxation: 
therefore, there is no restriction for cross-border transfers if compared to purely 
domestic ones787. 
 However, if a French company transfers its place of effective management, its 
statutory seat or one of its permanent establishments together with qualifying fixed 
assets (e.g. intangibles, property, plants, equipment, equity and debt securities, certain 
financial assets, etc. 788 ) to another country, such a transfer triggers the taxation of 
unrealised capital gains, that are deemed realised at the moment of the transaction and 
the taxation of any deferred capital gains. On the other hand, however, a French 
corporation transferring its seat within French territory would not be taxed on any of its 
unrealised gains at the moment of the transfer. 
Like Italy, France, therefore, applies the fiction that the relevant assets are 
disposed of at their fair market value at the date of the transfer and determines the 
amount of exit tax due by the company with regard to that value. Therefore, any capital 
gains or capital losses that may occur subsequently concerning the transferred assets will 
have no impact on the amount of exit tax due, which is definitively determined at the 
date of the transfer789. 
																																																								
785 According to the Court of Justice of the European Union, when the host Member State allows the possibility of 
the conversion of a company incorporated under its law, freedom of establishment requires that Member State to 
allow for the conversion of a company incorporate under the law of another Member State into a company that is 
governed by its law under the same conditions as a “purely domestic” conversion and the Member State of origin 
to allow for the “outbound conversion” of a company incorporated under its law while maintaining its legal 
personality: these principles have been voiced by the Court in its Cartesio decision (Court of Justice of the 
European Union, 16 December 2008, C-210/06), as well as, more recently, in its Vale judgement (Court of Justice 
of the European Union, 12 July 2012, C-378/10). On this point, see also the second chapter of the research, at 
paragraph 9. 
786 Potgens, F.P.G., van Os, P., Durand, P.H., et al., The compatibility of exit tax legislation applicable to corporate 
taxpayers in France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom with the EU freedom of 
establishment, cited above, 45. 
787 Potgens, F.P.G., van Os, P., Duran, P.H., et al., The compatibility of exit tax legislation applicable to corporate 
taxpayers in France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom with the EU freedom of 
establishment, cited above, 56. 
788 See the French Tax Authorities guidelines BOI-IS-CESS-30-20130903 n. 50. 
789 Potgens, F.P.G., van Os, P., Duran, P.H., et al., The compatibility of exit tax legislation applicable to corporate 
taxpayers in France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom with the EU freedom of 
establishment, cited above, 169. 
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Pursuant to Article 221-2 of the French Tax Code, in that case, the taxpayer may 
choose between paying the tax immediately at the moment of the transfer and paying 
the taxable amount through five annual instalments.  
 Furthermore, if a company transfers all of the assets that it owns at the moment of 
the transfer abroad, another tax consequence follows: since the company will no longer 
be taxed in France, the transfer will entail the consequences of the termination of a 
company, that is to say immediate tax being levied on all of that company’s profits that 
have not been taxed yet at the moment of the transfer. 
 Moreover, pursuant to Article 38 of the French Tax Code, in case of a separate 
transfer of assets to a foreign permanent establishment, not connected to any transfer of 
seat or permanent establishment, immediate taxation of capital gains would be triggered, 
while the same would not apply in case of a purely domestic transfer of assets. The 
corporate taxpayer has the option to pay the exit charge either in full or, upon request, in 
five-year instalments. In that second option, the exit tax would become payable 
immediately in the event of the sale of the assets, the dissolution of the company, the 
failure to comply with the five-year payment schedule or the transfer of the assets to a 
country other than a EU Member State. 
 6.3. The UK experience.  
 UK exit taxation has always been designed as capital gains taxation concerning 
both individuals and corporations, even though this trait has been, in recent times, 
modified, thus turning exit taxation measure into charges concerning exclusively 
companies and targeting disposals of assets by a UK corporate taxpayer to an affiliate 
residing in another country (if the assets are not attributable to a UK permanent 
establishment of that affiliate), the transfer of an asset attributable to a UK permanent 
establishment to a person located in another country and the transfer of the place of 
effective management of a UK company to another country790. 
A “return tax” had been established for those individuals that, after having left 
the United Kingdom, came back to the UK after a certain period of non-residency, with a 
charge payable on return into the United Kingdom, but said charge has now been 
repealed, as part of the general policy purpose of attracting holding companies and high-
wealth individuals to the UK791. 																																																								
790 Marrani, D., Contribution to the study of ‘exit tax’ in the UK, in European Tax Studies, 2009, 1. 
791 More in detail, Finance Act 1998 introduced a section 10A to the Taxation of Chargeable Capital Act (TCGA) 
1992, imposing taxation on gains accruing from sales of assets, on the part of individuals who had been resident 
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However, a sort of “exit charge” - even though it is not an exit taxation measure 
in the strict sense of the concept of what has been called “exit taxation” - is still in place 
as regards individual taxpayers as well. 
UK legislation concerning the tax consequences of transfers of assets abroad by 
individuals is, in fact, contained in Chapter 2 of the Income Tax Act 2007. The provisions 
at issue have a declared anti-avoidance purpose: more in detail, Income Tax Act 2007, 
Section 720(1) reads as follows: “the charge under this section applies for the purpose of 
preventing the avoiding of liability to income tax by individuals who are ordinarily UK resident 
by means of relevant transfers”792. 
 Therefore, under ITA 2007, Section 720, if an individual transfers assets and, as a 
result of that transfer, income becomes payable to any person, including a corporation793, 
resident or domiciled outside the United Kingdom and the transferor either maintains 
the power to enjoy that income or receives a capital sum, the income of the non-resident 
person is taxed as that of the transferor794. Nonetheless, an individual is not chargeable to 
income tax under the above-mentioned rules in respect of any income if he/she is 
domiciled outside the United Kingdom and subject to the condition that, if the income 
had in fact been that individual’s income, because of him/her being domiciled abroad, 
that income would not have been chargeable to income tax795. 
 A tax charge will, thus, only apply if an individual ordinarily resident in the 
United Kingdom has the power to enjoy the income of a person resident or domiciled 
outside the United Kingdom. This “power of enjoyment” must be held by the transferor 
or his/her spouse. Pursuant to ITA 2007, Section 722, “in determining whether an individual 
has power to enjoy income […] regard must be had to the substantial result and effect of all the 
relevant transactions” and “in making that determination all benefits which may at any time 
accrue to the individual as a result of the transfer and any associated operations must be taken 
into account, irrespective of the nature or form of the benefits or whether the individual has legal 
or equitable rights in respect of the benefits”. The charge to tax will also apply where, in 																																																																																																																																																																													
of the United Kingdom for any part of the previous four years out of the seven tax years immediately preceding 
the year of departure and who had become non-residents (and not ordinary resident) for a period of less than five 
tax years and owned assets before leaving the United Kingdom. Section 10A TCGA 1992 was modified after the 
Court of Justice of the European Union’s judgement on the De Lasteyrie du Saillant case, taking into account the 
possibility of the legislation being contrary to EU law, and then repealed. On the point, see Marrani, D., 
Contribution to the study of ‘exit tax’ in the UK, cited above. 
792 Pursuant to Income Tax Act (ITA) 2007, Section 716, “a transfer is a relevant transfer for the purposes of this Chapter 
if a) it is a transfer of assets, and b) as a result of i) the transfer, ii) one or more associated operations or iii) the transfer and 
one or more associated operations, income becomes payable to a person abroad”. 
793 For the purposes of the application of the rules at issue, pursuant to Income Tax Act (ITA) 2007, Section 718, a 
company incorporated outside the United Kingdom is always considered as a non-resident even if it is, in fact, a 
UK-resident. 
794 Lee, N. (ed.), Revenue law: principles and practice, cited above, 488. 
795 Income Tax Act (ITA) 2007, Section 726. 
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connection with a transfer of assets abroad, the transferor of such assets or his/her 
spouse receives or is entitled to receive a capital sum796, whether before or after the 
transfer. 
 An individual has a right to avoid the application of the above-mentioned 
provisions if either it would be unreasonable to conclude, from a factual and objective 
analysis of the circumstances, that tax avoidance was the purpose, or one of the 
purposes, of the assets’ transfer abroad, or that the relevant transactions were genuine 
commercial transactions and that it would not be reasonable to conclude that any of the 
relevant transactions were more than incidentally designed for the purpose of avoiding 
taxes797. The relevant burden of proof is put on the taxpayer. 
 British jurisprudence has accepted that, in order for a taxpayer to be exempted 
from the application of the above-mentioned rules, it can be considered as sufficient to 
demonstrate that tax avoidance was not the only, or principal, aim of the transactions at 
issue. More specifically, in the IRC v. Willoughby judgement 798, the House of Lords 
accepted that, if the overall objective of the transaction was not tax avoidance, the 
“motive defence” could apply even if the purpose was achieved in a tax-efficient 
manner. 
 The measure described above, however, does not constitute a “proper exit tax 
provision”, but rather a measure falling within the category of anti-avoidance 
provisions, with no systematic purpose whatsoever. A “proper exit taxation measure” is, 
on the other hand, provided by UK tax provisions with exclusive regard to corporate 
entities, being enshrined and regulated in Section 185 of the Taxation of Chargeable 
Gains Act 1992799. 
As highlighted above, a company incorporated in the United Kingdom is 
generally deemed to be resident in the United Kingdom for tax purposes regardless of its 
place of effective management, the United Kingdom giving prevalence to a strict 
application of the so-called “incorporation principle”. 
A company incorporated pursuant to UK law cannot transfer its registered office 
to a territory located outside the United Kingdom: a UK company can move its fiscal 																																																								
796 A “capital sum” for the purposes of the legislation at issue is defined as a sum paid or payable by way of loan 
or repayment of a loan or any sum, not constituting income, which is paid or payable otherwise than for full 
consideration in money or money’s worth (ITA 2007, Section 728). 
797 Income Tax Act (ITA) 2007, Section 737. 
798 House of Lords, 16 July 1997, Inland Revenue Commissioner v. Willoughby (“It would be absurd […] to describe as tax 
avoidance the acceptance of an offer of freedom from tax which Parliament has deliberately made. Tax avoidance within the 
meaning of s. 741 is a course of action designed to conflict with or defeat the evident intention of Parliament”). 
799 The measure was introduced for the first time with Finance Act 1998. Originally the regulation of the measure 
was complemented by Sections 186 and 188, which were both repealed, which means that Section 185 is currently 
the “key provision” with regard to British exit taxation. 
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residence offshore in fairly limited circumstances and such migration, where and insofar 
as it is allowed, has no effect on the remaining legal personality of the company or its 
status under UK company law: in other terms, a UK-incorporated company cannot lose 
its UK residence. 
Therefore, there is no procedure, under UK company law, through which a UK 
company can be converted into a company governed by another country’s law, even in 
case the “conversion” would be made with another subject located in a EU Member 
State. However, as the United Kingdom does not provide for a procedure for a UK 
incorporated company to be converted into another UK incorporated company, the fact 
that this possibility is denied in cross-border circumstances as well might not constitute a 
breach of the principle of non-discrimination, while it remains to be seen whether or not 
it might constitute an undue restriction of the Treaty freedom of establishment, even 
though the regime at issue would seem to be compatible with the “Cartesio doctrine”. 
On the other hand, the transfer of an asset from a UK company to another 
European Union Member State (including a transfer of a permanent establishment of 
that same company in foreign territory) is not a taxable event per se for the purposes of 
UK tax. Therefore, the transfer of an asset by a UK company to another Member State 
potentially triggers UK taxation only if accompanied by a “disposal” of the asset for the 
purposes of UK capital gains taxes, such as a sale. Therefore, the transfer of an asset 
without a simultaneous change of its ownership status from the United Kingdom to 
another Member State does not trigger the levy of any UK tax if the transferor is a 
company subject to UK corporate taxation. By contrast, tax may be charged if a non-
resident company established in another Member State with a UK permanent 
establishment transfers an asset located in the UK from that permanent establishment to 
another Member State800. 
In the case of foreign companies, in fact, if central management and control 
becomes located in another country, UK residence will cease and, in that case, a tax 
charge will be levied on the unrealised capital gains of the company immediately prior 
to the change of residence801. In that case, Section 185 of the Taxation of Chargeable Gains 
Act (TCGA) 1992 deems the company to have disposed of all its assets at market value 
immediately before it becomes non-resident and to have immediately reacquired them. 																																																								
800 If the tax due remains unpaid for more than six months, said tax may be recovered from a controlling director 
or another company belonging to the same group. 
801 The company will have to inform HMRC in advance of its intention to leave the United Kingdom by notice in 
writing, specifying the tie when the change will occur and including a statement of UK tax payable together with 
details of the ways that tax is going to be paid. Failure by the company to comply with the notification duty 
before ceasing to be resident in the United Kingdom may lead to a penalty. See Lee, N. (ed.), Revenue law: 
principles and practice, cited above, 1135. 
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If, at any later time, the company carries on a trade in the United Kingdom through a 
permanent establishment, the deemed disposal does not apply to any assets located in 
the United Kingdom and are used in or for the trade or are used or held by that 
permanent establishment. 
 In case a non-resident company residing in another EU Member State carrying on 
a trade through a permanent establishment located in the United Kingdom transfers out 
of the UK territory assets that, until the moment of transfer, had been held for the 
purposes of the permanent establishment’s trade, such a transfer will in general give rise 
to a deemed disposal of the assets at their open market value802: in that circumstance, in 
fact, the assets cease to exist within the scope of UK capital gains tax. This rule applies 
regardless of whether the permanent establishment in the context of which the assets 
transferred were used continues to carry on its trade and also regardless of whether the 
movement of the asset out of the United Kingdom involves the transfer of its ownership 
to another subject803. 
 Moreover, while the transfer of the ownership of an asset from a UK company to 
an affiliate residing in the United Kingdom does not generally give rise to any tax 
charge, a transfer of ownership of a certain asset from a UK company to an affiliate 
residing in another EU Member State may give rise to tax liability, unless a territorial 
nexus is maintained between such assets and the United Kingdom, i.e. unless the non-
resident company has a permanent establishment located in the United Kingdom and 
uses the assets for the purposes of that permanent establishment’s activity. 
More in detail, while no tax liability arises in case of a disposal of an asset by a 
UK company to a corporate affiliate which is fiscally resident in the United Kingdom, the 
same cannot be said for the case in which the transferee affiliate does not reside in the 
territory of the United Kingdom: in that circumstance, pursuant to Section 171 of the 
Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992 (TCGA 1992), the transaction is considered as 
“fiscally neutral” only if and to the extent that the transferee carries on a trade through a 
UK permanent establishment and uses the transferred assets in the context of that 
permanent establishment, which essentially means that the transferred assets, even 
when held by the non-resident transferee, still remain within the scope of UK capital 
gains taxation804. 																																																								
802 Section 25(1) TCGA 1992. 
803 An exception is made for the case where the assets are transferred to a corporate affiliate of the transferor which 
is a company subject to UK corporate taxation: in this case, in fact, the transfer is considered as “fiscally neutral” 
for the purposes of UK capital gains taxation and no charge to tax arises. 
804 Potgens, F.P.G., van Os, P., Duran, P.H., et al., The compatibility of exit tax legislation applicable to corporate 
taxpayers in France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom with the EU freedom of 
establishment, cited above, 61. 
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 In all other cases, the disposal of an asset in favour of a non-resident transferee is 
treated, for the purposes of UK taxation, as conducted at the “open market value” of the 
disposed asset, so that the transaction gives rise either to a gain or a loss805. 
In light of the above, we can state that there are two cases where the United 
Kingdom taxes domestic transactions more favourably than cross-border ones involving 
another Member State, with a consequent possible restriction of freedom of 
establishment. First of all, the transfer of an asset without a consequent change of its 
ownership from the United Kingdom to another Member State does not trigger any 
charge to tax, whereas, on the other hand, a charge to tax arises where a corporate 
taxpayer established in another Member State with a UK permanent establishment 
transfers an asset located in the United Kingdom from that permanent establishment to 
another Member State. Secondly, the transfer of the ownership of an asset from a 
company established in the United Kingdom (and resident therein) to an affiliate which 
is another company residing in the United Kingdom does not give rise to any charge to 
tax; however, the transfer of ownership of an asset from a UK company to an affiliate 
from another Member State may potentially be chargeable to UK tax, unless the 
corporate taxpayer established in the other Member State has a UK permanent 
establishment and uses the transferred asset in the context and for the purposes of that 
permanent establishment806. 
7. Concluding remarks: “residence” as the key-concept for international 
taxation. 
What can be drawn from all that has been highlighted above is, first of all, the 
confirmation that the states’ choices on whether to implement worldwide, semi-
territorial or strictly territorial tax models (and the consequent implications on the 
debate concerning capital import neutrality and capital export neutrality) have evolved 
through the years on the ground of reasons related essentially to economic policy rather 
than principles of social justice or adherence to hypothetical international binding 
principles. 
This has proven to be true for Italy, which has, a long time ago, switched to a 
“traditional” worldwide tax model characterised by some examples of extraterritorial 
extension of taxing powers over subjects with arguably feeble ties to the territory of the 																																																								
805 Section 171(1A) TCGA 1992. 
806 Potgens, F.P.G., van Os, P., Durand, P.H., et al., The compatibility of exit tax legislation applicable to corporate 
taxpayers in France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom with the EU freedom of 
establishment, cited above, 62. 
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Italian State (e.g. measures countering “esterovestizione”) in pursuit of the practical 
purpose of fighting tax avoidance. Even France, with its “semi-territorial” tax system for 
corporate entities resorts to non-territorial measures to extend its taxing powers beyond 
the borders of its territory and, however, does not extend its territorial tax measures to 
individuals, who are perceived as more mobile and hardly controllable from the 
perspective of a territorial tax system. Finally, the United Kingdom has modified its 
traditionally worldwide tax system towards the implementation of a more territorial 
model in light of the admittedly practical purpose of attracting business and high-worth 
individuals to establish their residence within its territory. 
All of these evaluations ultimately lead to the confirmation of the conclusions 
stated at the end of the first chapter of the research, i.e. of the fact that the principle of 
territoriality (if we were to hypothetically acknowledge it ever existing as an actual 
principle, with the meaning given to the word “principle” in the international law 
context) has suffered a progressive demotion from being a guideline for the allocation of 
taxing of taxing powers amongst countries with regards to transnational items of 
income, so as to ensure cross-border neutrality of investment, to a mere criterion of 
economic policy. In light of this progressive “technicalisation” of territoriality, we cannot 
but agree, therefore, with those authors who have found that what hat has been 
progressively lost in the evolution of the tax systems at the international level is the 
“institutional” element of territoriality807. 
The only effective limit to Member States’ freedom in choosing on how to shape 
their fiscal system comes from European Union law, as the analysis of the evolution of 
the two “case studies” of exit taxation and Controlled Foreign Companies regime has 
shown. 
 Another (probably obvious) result that can be drawn from the comparison is that 
countries charging taxes on income wherever produced or accrued on whoever has a 
connection of a personal and subjective nature with their territory (often, residents) 
generally extend their taxing powers on those subjects (non-residents) not having any 
connection with their territory beside the fact that they produce (part of) their income 
within said territory, which has led to the coexistence of worldwide taxation for 
residents and territorial taxation for non-residents, as is the case for Italy, the United 
Kingdom and, in part, France. 
 It can also be concluded that, in general terms, worldwide systems entail certain 
“fiscally territorial” elements with regard to the treatment of residents as well, with the 																																																								
807 Sacchetto, C., Territorialità, cited above, passim. 
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establishment of “tempered worldwide” tax measures for some specific items of income. 
This is the case, for example, of income accrued on foreign permanent establishments, 
which is generally taxed by the state where the permanent establishment is located and 
is exempted from tax charges on the head office or parent company in its state of 
residence/establishment. Cross-border dividends are also often exempted from taxation 
in the state of residence of the subject receiving them, so as to avoid international 
economic double taxation, thus de facto derogating from the worldwide tax structure of 
the system in favour of a more territorial provision. 
 The difference between residence and non-residence, and the different nature of 
the consequences attached to the two statuses, is essential to territorial, or semi-
territorial, tax models as well, even though one is often led to the opposite conclusion: 
the circumstance that the state only taxes those income located within the territory of the 
state, regardless of them being produced or owned by residents or non-residents, would 
theoretically imply that the key-concept for the functioning of the system is not the 
concept of “residence”, but rather the definition of what constitutes the actual “source” 
of the income. 
 However, almost paradoxically, the concept of residence plays a fundamental role 
also in identifying the source of the income. The localisation of certain items of income, 
in fact, may be based on the residence of the subject paying them: this is true, for 
example, as far as dividends, interest and royalties are concerned, which are generally 
deemed as being “produced” in the territory of the state if and insofar as they are paid 
by subjects who reside within its territory. This is also true for employment income, 
which is considered as originated in the territory where the subject paying the salary is 
located, resident or established. 
A paramount relevance is, therefore, constantly given to the concept of 
“residence”, the true “arbiter” of the match between “source country” and “residence 
country” in the dialectical relationship for the allocation of taxing powers. The criteria 
that states resort to in order to define who resides within their territory for tax purposes 
and who does not currently need to take into account the many ways in which the 
“resident status” can be manipulated and distorted for avoidance purposes, taking 
advantage of the fast-paced evolution of transports and communications and, more than 
anything else, of the mismatches between the definition of “residence” provided by 
domestic legal orders. The tiebreaker rule enshrined in double taxation conventions is, in 
fact, hardly all-encompassing and does not provide a uniform way to determine fiscal 
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residence, with a method that ultimately relies, once again, essentially on domestic 
provisions. 
 We have seen how the criteria that states use to determine who is and who is not 
considered as their resident for tax purposes may be used for actual anti-avoidance aims: 
this is the case of the Italian measures countering “esterovestizione” or of the Italian 
method of establishing residence on the ground of a formalistic criterion such as being 
listed in the civil registry of the population. 
 The relevance attributed to the concept of residence is also demonstrated by the 
fact that the Court of Justice, in examining the compatibility of Member States’ tax 
provisions with European Union law, has often focused its attention on that concept and 
on its consequences for the implementation of measures such as unlimited tax liability, 
with all evident reflections on the interaction between different tax systems and between 
national taxation and the Treaty freedoms808. The actual existence and/or the level of 
physical presence of a non-resident company in a certain country have been taken into 
account by the Court of Justice, for instance, in the evaluation of the compatibility of 
anti-avoidance rules, such as CFC regimes, with the Treaty freedom of establishment, 
proving essential in order to grant a proper functioning of the Internal Market and of 
competition. 
 Starting from these assumptions, the Court of Justice has often wondered whether 
the attribution to a subject of the qualification of “resident” or “non-resident” is able to 
impact the effective implementation of the Treaty freedoms by Member States, given that 
the limited liability to tax connected to the “non-resident” status implies limitations, for 
instance, to the rights to have negative items of income taken into account for tax 
purposes in a situation where the same negative items of income would be taken into 
account for resident subjects. Which has often led the Court to generally stop accepting 
justifications based on a supposed difference between resident and non-resident entities 
and subjects. However, the problems will probably persists as long as the issues 
concerning the criteria for the identification of residents and non-residents will persist, 
which, according to some, constitutes the main obstacle to reaching a system for the 
uniform taxation of entities and corporations in the European Union809. 
 “Residence” is also the concept on which the entire exit taxation system is 
grounded: exit taxation, by its nature, is triggered when a certain subject ceases to be 																																																								
808 Amatucci, F., L’influenza della giurisprudenza della Corte di Giustizia UE sulla individuazione dei soggetti passivi IRES, 
in Diritto e Pratica Tributaria, 2013, 5, 1079. 
809 Amatucci, F., L’influenza della giurisprudenza della Corte di Giustizia UE sulla individuazione dei soggetti passivi IRES, 
cited above, 1088. 
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considered as a resident and starts being considered as a non-resident. It is, therefore, 
evident the definition of what constitutes “residence” is essential to the application of 
exit tax measures, which, as has already been shown in the previous pages and chapters 
of the research, is possibly the truest testing ground for a new and integrated vision of a 
single “Internal Market territory”. 
 Residence does, therefore, appear to be the true key-concept in the current 
scenario of international tax law and to be paramount, first of all, for the implementation 
of European Union law, as interpreted by the Court of Justice and enacted by the EU 
legislature. Nonetheless, European Union still lacks a uniform definition of “residence” 
for tax purposes: the Court of Justice has not gone further than simply tracing pieces and 
lines of what could constitute a EU-level definition of the concept and all the Directives 
concerning (corporate) income taxation simply refer to the definition of “residence” 
provided by domestic tax laws. 
 The United Kingdom has tried to provide an almost “mechanic” definition of 
“residence” with the recently adopted statutory residence test, even though the key-
concept for UK taxation has proven to be not “residence”, but “domicile”. Whether or 
not this could be a possible way to go for the future depends on the compatibility of such 
an automatic definition with European Union law and with the reality of the single 
Member States. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
THE ROAD(S) AHEAD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 There is a clearly evident conflict, and some say incompatibility, between the 
sovereignty and the fiscal jurisdiction of the Member States as traditionally developed at 
international level and according to general international law (and as described in the 
first chapter of the research) and the European Union perspective, aiming at the 
establishment of an authentic Internal Market. 
 In its (non-tax) judgement on the Polydor case810, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union ruled that “the Treaty, by establishing a common market and progressively 
approximating the economic policies of the Member States, seeks to unite national markets into a 
single market having the characteristics of a domestic market”811. Statements such as this have 
traditionally constituted the basis for the Court to acknowledge the existence of a need to 
“merge the national markets into a single market bringing about conditions as close as possible to 
those of a genuine internal market”812. It is certainly correct to state, therefore, that the 
European Union ultimately aims, or should aim, at the implementation, across all the 
																																																								
810 Court of Justice of the European Union, 9 February 1982, C-270/80, Polydor Limited and RSO Records Inc. v. 
Harlequin Record Shops Limited and Simons Record Limited. 
811 Similar arguments have been made by the Court in tax cases as well. See, for instance, Court of Justice of the 
European Union, 5 October 1994, C-381/93, Commission v. French Republic; Court of Justice of the European Union, 
3 October 2002, C-136/00, Danner. 
812 Court of Justice of the European Union, 5 May 1982, C-15/81, Gaston Schul. 
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European Union’s territory, of the same conditions as those characterising the domestic 
market of a single country. 
 The merging of the existing national markets into a one single market, the 
territorial dimension of which should coincide with the entire and borderless territory of 
the Internal Market, however, presupposes the absence of any limitation or restriction to 
the movement of persons or companies across the “unified territory” and to the 
conducting of cross-border activities on the part of EU citizens. Coming to the field of 
taxation, this would imply the coordination of each single national tax system in order to 
prevent as much as possible the obstacles that taxation could impose on such cross-
border movement and would also, therefore, imply necessary limitations to the Member 
States’ freedom in legislating in the matter of taxation, possibly even going further than 
what has been established by the Court of Justice so far. 
 However, as argued in the first chapter of the research, a general principle of 
fiscal territoriality - interpreted as a hypothetical obligation for all states to levy taxes 
only on items of income which are linked to their territory - does not seem to be 
embedded in any source of international law, which means, therefore, that states are 
generally “boundless” in the determination of the extension of their taxing powers in the 
international arena, being theoretically able to even enact extraterritorial forms of 
taxation. Which evidently conflicts with all that has been said above with regard to the 
European Union context. 
 The fourth chapter of the research has, in fact, shown that, in the European Union 
context, there still is, to a certain extent, a considerable degree of “compartmentalisation” 
of the EU territory, which is capable of hindering the unity and integration of the 
Internal Market. Member States’ fiscal sovereignty and the apparent inexistence of any 
internationally recognised limit to such sovereignty might, therefore, constitute a 
problem for the integration of the Internal Market813. 
Nonetheless, it is also true that, in practice, countries generally tend to conform to 
criteria whose application resembles the mechanisms underlying a hypothetical 
“binding principle of territoriality” as it stands in general international law, as a 
jurisdiction principle recognising a state’s right to legislate on the basis of a territorial 
connection between a state and a certain subject or object. The Court of Justice of the 
European Union has consistently held that Member States remain sovereign in 
determining the connecting factors for levying taxes. However, it is clear that certain 																																																								
813 Wattel, P.J., Fiscal cohesion, fiscal territoriality and preservation of the (balanced) allocation of taxing power: what is the 
difference?, cited above, 144; Monsenego, J., Taxation of foreign business income within the European Internal Market, 
cited above, 456. 
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consequences stemming from the exercise of their fiscal sovereignty on the part of the 
Member States are not compatible with the achievement of a truly integrated Internal 
Market. 
 As it has been shown through the analysis of the Court of Justice’s case law in the 
second chapter of the research and through the analysis of the national tax systems 
conducted in the fourth chapter, both the traditional types of territorial connections 
chosen by states in the design of the extension of their taxing powers, i.e. the “objectively 
territorial” connection based on source (and the consequent application of a strictly 
territorial tax system) and the “subjectively territorial” connection based on residence 
(and the consequent establishment of a system of worldwide taxation), pose certain 
problems of compatibility with the achievement of a truly integrated Internal Market. 
The determination of the territorial connection between Member States and taxable 
income is, therefore, essential in order to understand how to reach the “highest purpose” 
of the European Union. This is one of the reasons why, as highlighted in the fourth 
chapter of the present work, it seems safe to say that the key-concept that needs to be 
defined to the aim of shaping a truly territorially integrated tax system is the concept of 
“residence” (and, a contrario, of “non-residence”). 
 As to the necessary coordination of national tax laws in the EU context, some 
have argued, following the notion of a proper Internal Market as enshrined in the 
Treaties and developed by the Court of Justice’s jurisprudence, that, in the context of the 
European Union the laws of only one Member State should be applied to a cross-border 
economic operation814. This view comes, to a certain extent, quite close to the notion of the 
principle of territoriality as developed in the context of international tax law, i.e. the 
statement that the laws of only one country are applied within its territory815. The 
application of this reasoning would imply that cross-border items of income would have 
to be taxed, within the territory of the European Union, according to a single set of tax 
rules, i.e. pursuant to the tax law of only one Member State, that is to say either the 
Member State of source or the Member State of residence. 
 This somehow utopic solution would allow the elimination of juridical double 
taxation in the context of the Internal Market, since there would be no “parallel exercise” 
of taxing rights on the part of more than one Member State. Such a solution would, 
therefore, imply the need to choose which tax model better fits the purposes and nature 
of the European Union. 																																																								
814 Vanistendael, F., The compatibility of the basic economic freedoms with the sovereign national tax systems of the Member 
States, cited above, 142.  
815 Monsenego, J., Taxation of foreign business income within the European Internal Market, cited above, 351. 
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The question as to which system best fits in the context of the European Internal 
Market should find its answer in the objectives that the functioning of the Internal 
Market itself pursues, first of which, as recognised by the Court of Justice, is the 
achievement of the highest possible level of efficiency by allowing the Internal Market to 
operate in the same way as a national market would, with the attainment of an open 
market economy and unadulterated competition. 
European Union law is not, at least apparently, oriented towards inter-nations 
fiscal equity, since it is generally up to the Member States to determine the allocation of 
tax revenue amongst them in a way that they deem as fair and equitable816. Nevertheless, 
there has been an intense debate on whether or not the European Union legal order 
favours a model following capital export neutrality or a model built to ensure capital 
import neutrality. A question to which the “case-by-case” approach of the Court of 
Justice does not certainly provide an easy answer. 
 Part of the legal doctrine has argued that pure territorial taxation for both 
residents and non-residents would be, in the European Union context, a simple and 
neutral system, on the basis of economic allocation of the results of business activities, 
removing both international inconsistencies deriving from international tax law and 
restrictions to free movement817. “Pure territoriality”818 would arguably also be consistent 
with the principle according to which Member States cannot treat nationals of other 
Member States worse than how they treat their own nationals. 
The application of such a model on a large scale would involve a base exemption 
in the Member State of residence of all positive and negative items of income accrued 
abroad and territorial allocation of costs819. The uniform implementation of such a model 
on the part of all Member States (irrespective of them being “residence countries” or 
“source countries” in the specific cases at issue) would, according to this thesis, remove 
every problem connected to extraterritorial taxation and the need for complicated 
mechanisms in order to prevent the effects of double taxation820. 
 On the other hand, some authors have spoken against the compartmentalisation 
of tax bases that would be generated by the adoption of purely territorial tax models on 
the part of European Member States (even though the Court of Justice, as it has been 																																																								
816 Garcia Prats, F.A., EC law and direct taxation: towards a coherent system of taxation?, cited above, 6. 
817 Terra, B.J.M., Wattel P.J., European tax law, cited above, 457. 
818 Wattel, P.J., Capital export neutrality and free movement of persons, cited above, 115. 
819 Wattel, P.J., Corporate tax jurisdiction in the EU with respect to branches and subsidiaries; dislocation distinguished from 
discrimination and disparity: a plea for territoriality, cited above, 201. On a similar point, see also Amatucci, F., 
Limited tax liability of non-resident companies and freedom of establishment, in EC Tax Review, 2003, 4, 202. On the 
same issue, Vanistendael, F., The compatibility of the basic economic freedoms with the sovereign national tax systems of 
the Member States, cited above, 136. 
820 Wattel, P.J., Red herrings in direct tax cases before the ECJ, cited above, 88. 
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argued above, seems to have accepted such effect as compatible with EU law)821. More 
specifically, it has been argued that, in the context of the European Union, in absence of 
any unifying or harmonising measure on the point, worldwide taxation ensures, for both 
individuals and corporations, horizontal cross-border loss relief. In other words, 
worldwide taxation ensures that foreign losses can be deducted from positive domestic 
income, thus ensuring that such losses can be used by the taxpayer in order to reduce 
his/her/its overall tax burden even in absence of any positive item of income in the 
country where the losses have arisen, and, ultimately, complying with principles such as 
tax progressivity and ability-to-pay. This is what legal doctrine has defined as “always-
somewhere approach”, especially after the Marks & Spencer judgement. 
 These are some of the reasons why part of the European tax law scholars have 
stated that the most appropriate solution would be the implementation, by both the 
Member State of residence and the Member State of source, at least as far as individuals 
are concerned, of worldwide taxation with double taxation relief (essentially by way of 
the credit method) for both resident and non-resident taxpayers. According to its 
supporters, this option would ensure progressivity also on foreign-source income, a 
correct division of personal tax allowances (which are not related to the country where 
the source of the income is located) and cross-border loss compensation822. 
Moreover, the simple adoption of a purely territorial tax system would have 
unacceptable consequences for states, especially with regards to income characterised by 
a high level of mobility. The immediate consequence of the adoption of such a system 
would be to leave taxpayers with too much liberty in the shaping of their interests, 
leaving them with the actual possibility to choose the tax system applicable to their 
income or transactions. The system would, therefore, need so many corrective measures 
that it would end up being completely different from a “purely territorial” model. 
 With regard to the Court of Justice’s case law, it should also be noted that, as it 
has been shown above, the Luxembourg Judges have generally recognised that a 
different treatment of residents and non-residents in the field of taxation does not 
generally constitute a breach of EU law, since the two positions are not, in principle, 
comparable. However, according to the Court’s decisions, exceptions to this general 
principle could and should be made when, in practice, residents and non-residents find 																																																								
821 See, for example, Monsenego, J., Taxation of foreign business income within the European Internal Market, cited 
above, 259. 
822 Terra, B.J.M., Wattel, P.J., European tax law, cited above, 457. Nonetheless, the Authors acknowledged the 
administrative difficulties arising from the application of the proposes model of taxation, since, for example, the 
Member State of source would have to be able to ascertain the worldwide income and the personal circumstances 
of non-resident taxpayers. 
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themselves in objectively comparable situations. In this case, the Member State of source 
would be obliged to granting the non-resident taxpayer the possibility to avail itself of 
the same tax treatment reserved to residents of that Member State. 
 This position, however, has been, and still is, upheld by the Court of Justice only 
with regard to individual taxpayers, whereas a different reasoning seems to apply as far 
as corporations or juridical persons are concerned. The ratio behind this different 
treatment of physical and juridical persons is linked to the need to ensure the 
implementation of the ability-to-pay principle, which, even though not enshrined in any 
particular piece of EU law, has been recognised by the Court as paramount in order to 
ensure the effectiveness of the principle of non-discrimination. The basic reasoning is 
that, if taxes should be assessed on the basis of an individual taxpayer’s personal 
situation by virtue of the ability-to-pay principle, the same does not need to apply with 
regard to corporations, which, by their nature, do not have any “personal situation” that 
should be taken into account. 
Notwithstanding the opinion expressed by legal scholarship, what appears to be 
certain is that both “objectively territorial” taxation and worldwide taxation, however, 
raise issues of compatibility with the European Union’s objective to attain a properly 
functioning and truly integrated Internal Market. The analysis of the Court of Justice’s 
case law on direct taxation, territoriality, discriminations and restrictions has proven so. 
European Union law, therefore, does not clearly point to which of the two general 
criteria for the exercise of state taxing rights best suits the objective of a more integrated 
Internal Market. Moreover, no clear indication as to which country between the Member 
State of source and the Member States should have priority to tax a certain item of 
income comes from the analysis of secondary EU law concerning direct taxation. The 
Court even accepts the admissibility of the absence of any effective double tax relief, 
provided neither Member State discriminates between cross-border situations and 
purely domestic ones. 
Also the Court of Justice of the European Union considers both capital import 
neutrality and capital export neutrality perspectives as compatible with primary EU law 
and not hindering the aim of realising a proper functioning of the Internal Market823, 
since, according to the Judges, both perspectives do not result in a higher tax burden on 
foreign-source income than on domestic income. Especially since European Union law 
(or better European Union primary law) does not even require Member States to prevent 
international double taxation: under the Kerckhaert-Morres, Damseaux and Block doctrine, 																																																								
823 Kemmeren, E.C.C.M., The internal market approach should prevail over the single country approach, cited above, 575. 
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in fact, if, in a cross-border situation, no relief from double taxation is available and 
neither of the two Member States involved discriminates against non-residents or against 
foreign-source income (i.e. if double taxation is caused by the mere exercise in parallel of 
taxing powers by two Member States at the same time), then, under European Union 
law, there is no remedy available to the taxpayer concerned, in absence of positive 
integration. 
Part of the legal doctrine has, nonetheless, argued that, if the Court of Justice were 
competent to make a choice between the two traditional tax models (worldwide taxation 
or “territorial” taxation), the principle of source country entitlement should prevail824, 
while the Member State of residence should have to prevent double taxation (e.g. by 
exempting all foreign-source income from tax, adhering to a purely territorial model, or 
by granting a proportionate tax reduction or by crediting the foreign tax paid), as it was 
the economy of the Member State where the income had its source to offer the taxpayer 
the economic opportunity to earn the income on which tax is levied825-826. 
 If examined from a certain perspective, the Court of Justice’s case law would 
actually seem to favour a tax model based on pure territorial taxation over a fiscal model 
based on worldwide taxation. This hypothetical preference could be inferred, for 
example, from the Court’s decisions on CFC regimes, which are inherently “extra-
territorial” by nature, since the Court of Justice has essentially limited - though not 
disallowed - the implementation of such provisions to “extreme cases” (i.e. “wholly 
artificial arrangements”), with an approach that has recently been picked up and broadly 
confirmed by the EU legislature with the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive, as shown in the 
third chapter of the dissertation. However, as it was shown in the previous pages of the 
research, the Court has gradually accepted some forms of extra-territorial exercise of 
taxing powers, acknowledging, to some extent, the Member States’ rights to protect their 
tax bases from tax avoidance practices and the lawfulness of the establishment of an 
“extended worldwide liability to tax”. 																																																								
824 Kemmeren, E.C.C.M., Double tax conventions on income and capital and the EU: past, present and future, cited above, 
159. 
825 Terra, B.J.M., Wattel, P.J., European tax law, cited above, 131. 
826 However, this was not the position held by the 1962 Neumark Report, which held that it seemed neither 
necessary nor desirable to reach an uniform implementation, within the European Union, of the principle of 
income taxation at source, since this would have arguably led to the creation of situations contrary to those of a 
proper Internal Market, being it able to deviate from taxation of the overall income of the taxpayer, ability to pay 
and progressivity. The Report concluded that double taxation should be completely avoided (which was 
confirmed also by the subsequent 1992 Commission Report of the Committee of Independent Experts on 
Company Taxation, also known as “Ruding Report”), but that, however, each taxpayer should be ultimately 
taxed according to his/her/its economic capacity in accordance to the provisions of his/her/its country of 
residence. On the point, see Kemmeren, E.C.C.M., Double tax conventions on income and capital and the EU: past, 
present and future, cited above, 161. See also the Commission Communication to the Council and to the European 
Parliament “subsequent to the conclusions of the Ruding Committee indicating guidelines on company taxation 
linked to the further development of the Internal Market”, SEC(92)1118, 26 June 1992. 
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 Another proof of the Court of Justice’s preference for territorial tax regimes could 
be found in its case law on group relief of cross-border losses. The Court’s “final losses 
doctrine”, in fact, treats the obligation of the Member State of establishment of the parent 
company’s to allow the relief of foreign losses as a “last resort” that could be advocated 
only in “extreme cases”, i.e. when such losses would not be used anywhere else in the 
Internal Market. On the other hand, however, a purely territorial tax model and 
consequent allocation of taxing powers amongst Member States was found to be non-
compliant with European Union primary law when preventing the deduction of losses 
incurred by foreign subsidiaries827. 
It is also true, in fact, that this approach, which was described as “always 
somewhere approach”, is interpreted, by part of the legal doctrine, as a demonstration of 
the exact opposite theory, i.e. the Court’s preference for a tax model based on capital 
export neutrality. As shown above, in fact, the principle of tax territoriality was found to 
be in contrast with European Union law when preventing enterprises to have the losses 
incurred in foreign territories taken into account in their Member State of residence for 
tax purposes. The lack of cross-border loss relief that would follow from the 
implementation of purely territorial tax systems would indeed constitute a considerable 
obstacle to the proper functioning of the Internal Market, as acknowledged also by the 
Commission. 
 However, the fact that the Court of Justice, in cases like Gilly828, Van Hilten and 
Thin Cap GLO, seems to recognise and sometimes also to adopt the OECD practice of 
international tax law (in particular, the solutions provided by the OECD Model 
Convention and its Commentary) seems to go in the opposite direction, since the OECD 
Model has predominantly adopted a residence-based system including a tax credit 
system for the elimination of double taxation. Moreover, in its Gschwind judgement829, the 
Court recognised that current international tax law is generally based on the “residence 
principle” in the allocation of taxing powers amongst countries in circumstances with 
cross-border elements. 
On the other hand, however, conclusions such as those reached in Schumacker - 
where the Court ruled that the Member State of source must take into account the 
personal and family circumstances of a non-resident individual taxpayer, if said 
taxpayer obtains his/her income entirely or predominantly in the Member State of 																																																								
827 Monsenego, J., Taxation of foreign business income within the European Internal Market, cited above, 444. 
828 Where the Court held that it is not unreasonable for Member States to base their bilateral agreements on 
international practice and on the OECD Model Convention. 
829 Court of Justice of the European Union, 14 September 1999, C-391/97, Gschwind. 
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source and does not receive sufficient income in his/her Member State of residence to be 
subject to taxation in a way enabling him/her to have such circumstances taken into 
account therein - seem to opt for a solution in the sense of favouring capital import 
neutrality and taxation at source830. 
More recent case law of the Court of Justice has allowed a certain use of 
worldwide taxation for the purposes of prevention of tax avoidance (see, for instance, 
Van Hilten, Argenta and Cadbury Schweppes) and the same has been done by the recently 
adopted Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive. The Member States’ need to prevent tax 
avoidance has thus become paramount in the more recent analysis of the Court of 
Justice, with the Luxembourg Judges recognising the possibility for Member States to 
enact objectively discriminatory or restricting measures to that aim and the need of 
prevention of tax avoidance becoming a fundamental support of the admissibility of the 
sovereign choices made by Member States in the allocation of their taxing powers. 
In light of the above, it seems safe to say that the Court of Justice does not seem to 
explicitly lean towards a tax model pursuing neutrality in either the Member State of 
residence or the Member State of source, aiming at the elimination of discriminatory tax 
treatments from the perspectives of both Member States. Some have found this approach 
to be ultimately inconsistent831. However, it should be recalled that it is not the Court of 
Justice’s role, according to the institutional structure of the European Union, to create 
and implement tax policies, being it something that is (and better be) left to the 
legislature. The Court rules on the prohibition of discriminations on grounds of 
nationality, irrespective of whether the hypothetical discrimination is a consequence of 
the tax jurisdiction of the Member State of source or the Member State of residence. 
 On the other hand, the analysis of EU secondary law on direct taxation, as 
conducted in the third chapter of the research, would seem to show an overall tendency, 
on the part of the EU legislature, towards the implementation of fiscal structures based 
on worldwide taxation and on priority to tax cross-border items of income being granted 
to the country of residence of the taxpayer. As it has been shown in the previous pages of 
the present work, this assumption is contradicted by the analysis of European Union 
positive law on direct corporate taxation, where, exception made with reference to the 
Merger Directive, one cannot but observe a general tendency towards recognising the 
Member State of residence the primary or exclusive right to tax certain items of income. 																																																								
830 Kemmeren, E.C.C.M., Double tax conventions on income and capital and the EU: past, present and future, cited above, 
173. 
831 Graetz, M.J., Warren Jr., A.C., Income tax discrimination and the political and economic integration in Europe, in Yale 
Law Journal, 2006, 4, 1217. 
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Which, according to some, could be interpreted as a sign that the European Union 
policy-maker favours a model based on worldwide taxation over a model adhering to 
strict territoriality. 
This is what may be derived, for instance, from the analysis of the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive, as interpreted by the Court of Justice, and of the Interest and 
Royalty Directive, but this tendency would appear to have been somehow confirmed, 
even though for different purposes, by Articles 7 and 8 of the Anti-Tax Avoidance 
Directive on CFC legislation, expressly allowing forms of extraterritorial exercise of 
taxing powers on the part of the Member States, even though in “extreme cases” where 
there is a seriously pressing need to curb international tax avoidance. 
 It should be borne in mind, however, that all pieces of EU secondary law on direct 
taxation are by nature applicable only to some specific cross-border issue and do not in 
any way aim at providing a clear all-encompassing view of how income taxation should 
work in the context of the Internal Market. 
 Moreover, as far as the debate between capital import neutrality and capital 
export neutrality is concerned, it has been shown in the previous pages that secondary 
European Union law treats them both as equivalent as far as Member States’ obligations 
are concerned. The Parent-Subsidiary Directive allows Member States a choice between 
the two methods; the Arbitration Convention embraces both methods; the CCCTB 
proposals exempt profit distributions received and income from a permanent 
establishment in a third country. 
The attempt to attain the purpose of a fully integrated and functioning Internal 
Market has, so far, led the European Union institutions (especially, but not exclusively, 
the Court of Justice) to limit national fiscal sovereignty only in specific circumstances, 
without, however, ever proposing alternative tax models to be implemented in the EU 
context. It has been convincingly argued that the case law of the Court of Justice, even 
though sometimes showing a certain degree of “interventionism” in the choices and 
policies of the Member States in the field of direct taxation, disrupting the “balanced 
allocation of taxing powers” created by the Member States in the exercise of their 
sovereign prerogatives, is, however, not sufficient in order to attain the purpose of a 
fiscally integrated Internal Market832. 
It is commonly accepted that the Court of Justice of the European Union is the 
main driver of economic integration amongst Member States. The Court has, in fact, in 																																																								
832 Monsenego, J., Taxation of foreign business income within the European Internal Market, cited above, 456; Muten, L, 
Will case law do?, in Hinnekens, L. (ed.), A vision of taxes within and outside European borders, Amsterdam, 2008, 658. 
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exercising it role conferred upon it by the Treaties (i.e. to ensure that in the interpretation 
and application of European Union law the law is observed and to ensure an uniform 
interpretation of European Union law across all Member States), the power to ensure the 
enforcement and implementation of the fundamental Treaty freedoms and of the general 
principle of non-discrimination, and it has actually used this power extensively over the 
years to intervene on the tax systems of the Member States in relation to cross-border 
transactions and circumstances. 
The process of “negative integration” that is being carried out by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union has, according to part of the legal doctrine, led to a de facto 
modification of the division of competences between the European Union and the 
Member States and, according to some, to an infringement of the above-mentioned 
general principles of conferral and subsidiarity833. 
Many have criticised the influential, and some say excessive, role played by the 
Court of Justice in matters concerning direct taxation. This criticism ranges from the 
specific critique of single judgements of the Court to a general disapproval of the Court’s 
decision of applying its traditional “free movement approach” to direct tax cases834. 
Given the present acquis communautaire in the field of direct taxation, and the 
corresponding extension of the fiscal sovereignty of Member States in the allocation of 
taxing powers amongst them, there is not much that the Court of Justice has the power 
to do about the fiscal consequences of the territorial fragmentation of the tax base within 
the European Internal Market835. According to many voices that have spoken out on the 
point, the Court should not allocate or divide taxing powers amongst Member States and 																																																								
833 Sacchetto, C., Member States tax sovereignty: between the principle of subsidiarity and the necessity of supranational 
coordination, cited above, 807; Rasmussen, H., Between self-restraint and activism: a judicial policy of the European 
Court, in European Law Review, 1988, 37. 
834 De La Feria, R., Fuest, C., Closer to an Internal Market? The economic effects of EU tax jurisprudence, Oxford 
University Centre for Business Taxation, Working Paper 11/12. As highlighted by the Authors, the basis for the 
criticism to the Court’s case law in the field of direct taxation tends to be the Court’s lack of competence in the 
field, which threatens national tax sovereignty, the Court’s lack of awareness of the particularities of tax law and 
the Court’s lack of concern for the potential budgetary implications of its decisions. On the point, see also Weber, 
D., In search of a (new) equilibrium between tax sovereignty and the freedom of movement within the EC, cited above, 585; 
Bizioli, G., Balancing the fundamental freedoms and tax sovereignty: some thoughts on recent ECJ case law on direct 
taxation, cited above, 133; Avery Jones, J., Carry on discriminating, in British Tax Review, 1995, 6, 525; Kingston, S., 
The boundaries of sovereignty: the ECJ’s controversial role applying Internal market law to direct tax matters, cited above, 
287; Wattel, P.J., Red herrings in direct tax cases before the ECJ, cited above, 81; Thommes, O, Effect of ECJ decisions on 
budgets of EU Member States: EC law without mercy?, in Intertax, 2005, 12, 560; Vanistendael, F., The ECJ at the 
crossroads: balancing tax sovereignty against the imperatives of the Single Market, cited above, 413; Seer, R., Le fonti del 
diritto comunitario ed il loro effetto sul diritto tributario, cited above, 51; De Hosson, F., On the controversial role of the 
European Court in corporate tax cases, in Intertax, 2006, 34, 294. 
835 It has been observed that, since the Court is an unelected body and its Judges are appointed by common accord 
of the governments of Member States through a system by way of which, essentially, each Member State 
nominates a judge and the nomination is ratified by the other governments, it could mean that too much power is 
given to the small Member State that has the power to appoint one judge in the same way as the large Member 
States. See, amongst others, Wattel, P.J., Corporate tax jurisdiction in the EU with respect to branches and subsidiaries; 
dislocation distinguished from discrimination and disparity: a plea for territoriality, cited above, 200. 
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should not prescribe which of two concurring jurisdictions should prevail or should 
remedy double taxation. Therefore, it has been highlighted that the Court should not 
deal with problems such as mismatches in income characterisation, transfer pricing, 
conflicts of jurisdictions, income attribution to persons, prevention of double taxation 
and other issues deriving from the division of the tax base over more than one 
jurisdiction, which can and should be solved only by making jurisdictional priority 
choices of a purely political nature836. 
One of the reasons why the “creative approach” of the Court of Justice to the topic 
of direct taxation and, in particular, to the allocation of taxing powers amongst Member 
States has been also harshly criticised by legal scholarship is that the Luxembourg 
Judges cannot but resort to a “case-by-case” approach, which, on one hand, is, by its 
nature, inadequate to promote uniform and general principles and, on the other hand, 
poses some consequent problems with regards to the certainty of the law, especially as 
far as the position of the Member States is concerned, since Member States are greatly 
limited in their possibilities to plan a “fiscal strategy” given the uncertainty of the 
Court’s approach to the possibility of limits to their tax sovereignty. 
It has been argued that the Court of Justice’s case law in the field of direct 
taxation suffers from the lack of a clear identification of objectives that, in the Internal 
Market context, could enable the development of sounder national and EU tax policies, 
which would make it difficult to come up with consistent parameters and principles that 
could be used by Member States as “interpretative guidelines” in the drafting of their 
respective tax laws837. 
For all of these reasons, if a choice needs to be made on the fiscal integration of 
the Internal Market, it should be made only by the European Union legislature, which 
should be called to decide on whether priority should be granted either to a territorial 
connection lato sensu, which would imply the application of a tax model based on 
residence (or another criterion of connection with the territory of the Member State) and, 
thus, to worldwide taxation, or to a territorial connection stricto sensu, i.e. to purely 
territorial tax systems based on an objective connection with the territory of the Member 
State. 																																																								
836 Of a different opinion is, for example, Maduro, according to which “contrary to the traditional conception of judicial 
activism addressed to the protection of minorities against the democratic majority’s will, European judicial activism can 
better be described ad majoritarian activism: promoting the rights and policies of the larger European political community 
(the majority) against the ‘selfish’ or autonomous (depending on the point of view) decisions of national policies”. See 
Maduro, M.P., We the Court. The European Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution. A critical reading of 
Article 30 of the EC Treaty, London, 1998, 11. 
837 Garcia Prats, F.A., Revisiting Schumacker: source, residence and citizenship in the ECJ case law on direct taxation, in 
Richelle, I., Schön, W., Traversa, E. (eds.), Allocating taxing powers within the European Union, Brussels, 2013, 4. 
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Resorting to a normative solution through positive integration seems to be the 
preferable road ahead838. Some authors, starting from the assumption that the interactions 
between direct taxation and the European Union legal order are too relevant to be left 
merely to the principle of subsidiarity and to a hypothetical - and quite slow - 
harmonisation process, have advocated the need to abolish the unanimity requirement 
in the field of harmonisation of direct taxes, especially acknowledging that international 
double taxation constitutes, in practical terms, a considerable hindrance to the exercise of 
Treaty freedoms and that certain cases of double taxation may only be eliminated by a 
coordinated legislative action conducted at an EU level, not being it appropriate and 
correct for the Court to solve such problems by making actual political choices839. 
 An all-encompassing normative intervention of the EU lawmaker such as that 
envisaged above does appear, however, quite difficult to attain and perhaps utopic, 
especially in the absence of any direct taxing power conferred on the European Union in 
the field of income taxation. 
Of course the situation would be considerably different, at least in the field of 
corporate taxation, if corporate income tax were to become, wholly or partially, one of 
the European Union’s own financial resources. It has been argued that, in a hypothetical 
CCCTB system which would partially constitute an EU resource, transfer of losses in one 
Member State against profits of another Member State should be the rule, because in 
such a system profits and losses would only have consequences for the European Union 
treasury, which means that, since the European Union would bear all positive and 
negative consequences, the same European Union would have the right to influence the 
allocation of tax bases between countries840. 
Amongst the solutions that have, so far, been envisaged in order to reach such a 
purpose, as alternatives to the positive integration by way of directives, which seems 
somehow utopic, there is the establishment of fundamental principles of EU law in the 
field of taxation, amongst which the ability-to-pay principle would have to be listed, and 
possibly enshrined in a sort of “European constitution” which, like national 
constitutions, would have to deal with taxation as well. However, this possibility does 																																																								
838 This opinion is supported, amongst others, by Sacchetto, C., Member States tax sovereignty: between the principle of 
subsidiarity and the necessity of supranational coordination, cited above, 811; Wathelet, M., Direct taxation and EU law: 
integration or disintegration?, in EC Tax Review, 2004, 2; Vanistendael, F., The ECJ at the crossroads: balancing tax 
sovereignty against the imperatives of the Single Market, cited above, 413. Contra, see, for example, Melis, G., Persiani, 
A., Trattato di Lisbona e sistemi fiscali, in Salvini, L., Melis, G. (eds), L’evoluzione del sistema fiscale e il principio di 
capacità contributiva, Rome, 2014, 306. 
839 Vanistendael, F., The ECJ at the crossroads: balancing tax sovereignty against the imperatives of the Single Market, cited 
above, 419; Van Thiel, S., Ratträ, C., Meër, M., Corporate income taxation and the Internal Market without frontiers, in 
European Taxation, 1990, 11, 326. 
840 Vanistendael, F., Ability to pay in European Community law, cited above, 134. 
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not currently seem in any way practicable, especially after the results of the latest 
consultations on a project for a European Constitution841. 
 A more “sectorial” approach should then be evaluated. 
 For instance, the EU lawmaker should acknowledge that the concept of 
“residence”, as highlighted by the analysis of national tax laws conducted in the fourth 
chapter of the research, appears to be the true key-concept in the current scenario of 
international tax law, with a paramount relevance for the implementation of European 
Union law, as interpreted by the Court of Justice and enacted by the EU legislature. 
Nonetheless, European Union still lacks a uniform definition of “residence” for tax 
purposes: the Court of Justice has not gone further than simply tracing pieces and lines 
of what could constitute a EU-level definition of the concept and all the Directives 
concerning (corporate) income taxation simply refer to the definition of “residence” 
provided by domestic tax laws. 
 Perhaps, therefore, the European Union legislature should evaluate the possibility 
to establish a common definition of “residence”, thus going beyond the current approach 
which is based merely on a reference to the domestic notions of the concept. 
Another unsolved issue with a great impact on the fiscal integration of the 
Internal Market issue relates to double taxation. 
The Commission has frequently voiced its opinion according to which double 
taxation is incompatible with the proper functioning of the Internal Market842. Moreover, 
on this point, it has been correctly highlighted that, in the context of the European 
Union, the allocation of taxing powers amongst Member States is not so much the result 
of a choice on whether or not to tax income having its source in a foreign territory, but 
rather the result of the technique used to eliminate or reduce double taxation843. If the 
choice is for a credit system, both the residence Member State and the source Member 
State share tax jurisdiction, which means that the argument of the balanced allocation of 																																																								
841 Garcia Prats, F.A., EC law and direct taxation: towards a coherent system of taxation?, cited above, 26. 
842 See, for instance, the Discussion paper on “Taxation in the European Union”, 20 March 1996, SEC(96) 487 final, 
where the Commission clearly stated that “the Single Market is clearly not compatible with either double taxation of the 
same taxable base or no taxation at all”. On the same point, see also the Working Document on “EC law and tax 
treaties”, 9 June 2005, DOC(05) 2306, which reads: “it is clear that for nationals of Community countries exercising their 
basic rights under the Treaty, being taxed in different ways because of their nationality or place of residence and, in 
particular, the risk of being taxed twice on the same income because of the different, uncoordinated national tax arrangements 
existing within the Community, are obstacles to the smooth functioning of the Internal Market”. Furthermore, see the 
Communication on “The contribution of taxation and customs policies to the Lisbon Strategy”, 25 October 2005, 
COM(2005) 532 final: “double taxation, tax-related business restructuring costs and more general differences between 
Member States’ tax rules mean that firms may prefer to operate domestically rather than in another Member State. These are 
significant obstacles to achieving the full benefits of a competitive Internal Market. The removal of these barriers would help 
create new opportunities for market entrants, and the resulting competition would spur investment and innovation. 
Moreover, the reduction in costs associated with the removal of these tax barriers would contribute to enhancing the 
competitiveness of the EU productive sector”. See also, finally, the Commission Communication on “Coordinating 
direct tax systems”, 19 December 2006, COM(2006) 823 final. 
843 Vanistendael, F., Ability to pay in European Community law, cited above, 133. 
	 311 
taxing powers amongst Member States loses a considerable part of its relevance. 
Nonetheless, even where the choice is for an exemption system, some residence Member 
States (e.g., the Netherlands) have been allowing deduction of foreign losses, in spite of 
the exemption, thus altering the balance of the allocation of tax bases. 
It has also been argued that an override of the limits posed by the bilateral nature 
of double taxation conventions in favour of a possibly multilateral and integrated 
approach can take place only in a supranational context, with the intervention of 
European Union institutions through positive integration 844 . This process would 
necessarily call for the re-designing of the principle of subsidiarity and for the tracing of 
new lines between what cannot and what should the Member States delegate to the 
European Union. 
 Therefore, an EU-level intervention with regards to double taxation could 
probably constitute a first, and perhaps more easily attainable, step towards the 
realisation of a truly fiscally integrated Internal Market. An option would thus be the 
enactment of a “European Union Model Convention for the prevention of double 
taxation” or, even better, a multi-lateral EU tax treaty on which the Court of Justice 
would have the power and competence to rule845-846. 
The introduction of a general prohibition of double taxation in the European 
Union based on the fundamental Treaty freedoms and, more in general, by the need to 
ensure the proper functioning of the Internal Market, possibly through a multilateral 
instrument such as a EU double taxation convention, would undoubtedly constitute a 
first step towards a fiscally integrated Internal Market, adopting a definition of 																																																								
844 Sacchetto, C., Il diritto internazionale tributario tra norme del sistema costituzionale italiano, effettività ed utopia, cited 
above, 321. According to the Author, in particular, the choice faced by Member States is between “surrendering” 
part of their sovereignty and accepting that such sovereignty should be limited and conditioned by external 
forces, such as the intervention of the Court of Justice’s case law. If Member States were to opt for the first 
solution, the result, according to the Author’s opinion, would be a qualitatively different limitation of their 
sovereignty, characterised by higher possibilities to control the process in terms of democratic representation, 
rationality, neutrality and justice. On the point, see also McLure Jr., C., Globalisation, tax rules and national 
sovereignty, cited above, 328. 
845 These solutions are similar to those conceived by the European Commission in its 2005 Working Document on 
“EC law and tax treaties”, TAXUD E1/FR DOC (05) 2306, 9 June 2005. In this document, the Commission 
envisaged five possible solutions to the problem of elimination of double taxation in the Internal Market: 1) the 
replacement of all the intra-EU bilateral tax treaties with a directive; 2) the conclusion of a multilateral double 
taxation convention by all Member States, supported by binding arbitration powers given to the Court of Justice; 
3) the introduction of a European Union Model Double Taxation Convention as a Commission Recommendation, 
which seemed to be the option which the Commission preferred; 4) the issuance of Commission 
Recommendations providing guidelines on residence taxation and non-discrimination; 5) the introduction of a 
most-favoured-nation clause in tax treaties. On the point, see Kemmeren, E.C.C.M., Double tax conventions on 
income and capital and the EU: past, present and future, cited above, 166. A similar solution has been suggested, inter 
alia, by Garcia Prats, F.A., Revisiting Schumacker: source, residence and citizenship in the ECJ case law on direct taxation, 
cited above, 41. 
846 A similar solution has been suggested, inter alia, by Garcia Prats, F.A., Revisiting Schumacker: source, residence and 
citizenship in the ECJ case law on direct taxation, cited above, 41; Gutmann, D., How to avoid double taxation in the 
European Union?, in Richelle, I., Schön, W., Traversa, E. (eds.), Allocating taxing powers within the European Union, 
Brussels, 2013, 68; Pires, M., Le fonti del diritto comunitario e il diritto internazionale, cited above, 146. 
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“territory” resembling the one implicitly developed in the field of exit taxation by the 
Court of Justice and, now, by the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive847. 
The question would, however, always be how to determine which of the Member 
States involved in a cross-border situation would be obliged to remove the prejudicial 
effects of double taxation, thus establishing a sort of “priority rule” between the Member 
State of residence and the Member State of source. Once again, we come back to the 
dialectical relationship between territorial taxation and worldwide taxation. 
It is the opinion of a large part of legal scholarship that double taxation 
conventions are relevant economic policy instruments in establishing the proper 
functioning of the European Union’s Internal Market848. One of the solutions would be to 
consider both Member States involved as jointly and severally liable to avoid double 
taxation, implying that each Member State has an independent obligation to grant tax 
relief849. This is probably the opinion voiced in 2003 by the Commission, analysing a case 
concerning double inheritance taxation in France and Germany, where the Commission 
took “the view that the two States are jointly responsible for arriving at an arrangement 
regarding taxation which respects the petitioner’s rights. It is true that if tax had not been levied 
in France, this being contrary to the principles widely recognised under international tax law and 
embodied in the OECD Model Convention, the level of tax payable in Germany would not have 
been reduced to zero. The Commission recognises that this is unsatisfactory as far as the German 
exchequer is concerned. However, a solution should not be sought at the expense of the individual 
citizen by requiring cumulative payment of two sets of estate tax but must be achieved through 
agreement between the two States concerned”850. 
A similar scenario was suggested by the Commission in its 2003 Communication 
on “Dividend taxation of individuals in the Internal Market”851, where the Commission argued 
that higher taxation of cross-border dividends should be viewed as a restriction of the 
freedom of movement of capital, also concluding that, where a tax treaty grants the 
source Member State the right to levy a withholding tax and provides that the Member 
State of residence has to grant the relative credit to the taxpayer, the Member State is 
obliged to grant that credit, thus preventing double taxation, not only by virtue of the 																																																								
847 See Chapter 2, paragraph 9, and Chapter 3, paragraph 5. 
848 Kemmeren, E.C.C.M., Double tax conventions on income and capital and the EU: past, present and future, cited above, 
157, according to which “a DTC also creates an internal market, but a bilateral one between the contracting States and at a 
lower degree than the internal market of the EU” and therefore “the aim of creating an internal market, DTCs appear to 
have in common with the TEU and TFEU”. 
849 Lehner, M., A significant omission in the Constitution of Europe, cited above, 337. 
850 Commissions response to Petition 626/2000 by Mr. Schuler, 25 January 2007, cited by Kofler, G., Fundamental 
freedoms and juridical double taxation, cited above, 43.  
851 Communication from the Commission to the Council the European Parliament and the European Economic and 
Social Committee on Dividend Taxation of Individuals in the Internal Market, COM(2003)810, 19 December 2003. 
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bilateral tax treaty concerned, but also under European Union law. Therefore, 
notwithstanding the fact that such a statement was made in a time where Article 293 EC 
Treaty had not been repealed yet, the Commission’s position would seem to be that relief 
of juridical double taxation is required under the fundamental Treaty freedoms (which 
have not been repealed) and that, in case of the stipulation of a bilateral tax treaty 
between two Member State, priority for which Member State should relieve double 
taxation under EU law should be determined by making reference to that tax treaty852. 
Another solution would be to determine which of the Member States should be 
“more responsible than the other” for the unrelieved double taxation853. One option with 
regard to this possibility would be to make reference to the OECD Model Convention, 
which is frequently relied upon by the Court of Justice and, according to part of the legal 
doctrine, seems to have become a sort of “European standard”854, even though the Court 
of Justice has ruled that international standards do not form part of European Union 
law855. 
Aside from this opinion of the Court, the option, voiced by some legal scholars, of 
referring to the OECD Model in the shaping of the allocation of taxing powers (and in 
the consequent attribution of the obligations to relieve double taxation) amongst 
Member States cannot, in any case, but be met with approval, of course, with the 
unavoidable objection that, as it has been highlighted in the previous chapter of the 
present research, the OECD Model Convention is nothing but a “model”, with absolutely 
no binding value whatsoever. 
Another field that would certainly benefit from a EU-level intervention, which 
could not but be through a directly binding and possibly multilateral instrument, would 
be the rules concerning cross-border loss relief. Even though the “final losses criterion” 																																																								
852 Kemmeren, E.C.C.M., Double tax conventions on income and capital and the EU: past, present and future, cited above, 
161. 
853 Vanistendael, F., Does the ECJ have the power of interpretation to build a tax system compatible with the fundamental 
freedoms?, cited above, 63. 
854 Kofler, G., Fundamental freedoms and juridical double taxation, cited above, 43; Lehner, M., The influence of EU law 
on tax treaties from a German perspective, in Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation, 2000, 461; Vanistendael, 
F., The ECJ at the crossroads: balancing tax sovereignty against the imperative of the Single Market, cited above, 419; 
Wouters, J., Vidal, M., An international lawyer’s perspective on the ECJ’s case law concerning the OECD Model Tax 
Convention and its Commentaries, in Hinnekens, L., Hinnekens, P. (eds.), A vision of taxes within and outside European 
borders, The Hague, 2008, 989. 
855 See, for example, Court of Justice of the European Union, 16 July 2009, C-128/08, Damseaux (“Although such an 
attribution of powers would comply, in particular, with the rules of international legal practice as reflected in the model tax 
convention on income and on capital drawn up by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in 
particular Article 23B thereof, it is not in dispute that Community law, in its current state and in a situation such as that at 
issue in the main proceedings, does not lay down any general criteria for the attribution of areas of competence between the 
Member States in relation to the elimination of double taxation within the Community […] Consequently, if a Member State 
cannot rely on a bilateral convention in order to avoid the obligations imposed on it by the Treaty, the fact that both the 
Member State in which the dividends are paid and the Member State in which the shareholder resides are liable to tax those 
dividends does not mean that the Member State of residence is obliged, under Community law, to prevent the disadvantages 
which could arise from the exercise of competence thus attributed by the two Member States”). 
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can be seen as a step forward, losses are still largely isolated amongst Member States, as 
a consequence of the implementation of a tax model based on “territoriality as a 
principle”. The effectiveness of the Court of Justice’s approach cannot but suffer certain 
limits, which demonstrates the need for a legislative solution based on EU secondary 
law. 
It is undisputable that the lack of an effective cross-border loss relief constitutes 
an obstacle to the cross-border activities of European enterprises and, therefore, to the 
exercise of fundamental Treaty freedoms and to the functioning of the Internal Market. It 
is, however, equally undisputable that the criterion that the Court of Justice came up 
with to solve the problem, i.e. the “final losses argument”, cannot be accepted as a 
suitable solution to the issue, since it creates uncertainty as it is considerably vague. 
A common consolidated corporate tax base, once finally enacted, could actually 
provide for a balanced regime with regard to the deduction of final losses, since such 
losses would be allocated and deducted in accordance with the way profits are taxed856. 
If it is to be accepted that EU-level harmonisation at least of the tax bases for the 
assessment, such rules would, according to the Court of Justice’s case law as described in 
the second chapter of this study, need to take into account evaluations based on an EU-
based “ability-to-pay principle”, which would need to be implemented on a truly 
European level to the entire Internal Market, i.e. to all cross-border situations857. In order 
to do so, however, an EU cross-border ability-to-pay principle needs to be “created” first, 
with the necessary establishment of which should be the purposes of such a 
“constitutional” principle applied at the EU level. 
 It is true, however, that both the proposed interventions (a EU-level double 
taxation conventions and a EU provision on cross-border loss relief) would necessarily 
imply an underlying decision on which between the Member State of source and the 
Member State of residence would have to have priority to tax a certain item of 
transnational income. In other terms, the envisaged solutions could not per se allow the 
EU legislature to bypass the problem of which (if any) of the two traditional tax models 
can be considered as befitting the functioning of the Internal Market. Once again, then, 
we cannot but go back to the need of a legislative choice at EU level on the point 
If, from a perspective that some (perhaps not being entirely wrong) define as 
utopic, we go back to the idea of an EU-level legislative intervention aiming at an 
integrated model for taxation across the entire Internal Market territory - provided, 																																																								
856 Monsenego, J., Taxation of foreign business income within the European Internal Market, cited above, 452. 
857 Cerioni, L., The never-ending issue of cross-border loss compensation within the EU, cited above, 275. 
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however, that the current status of the division of competences established by the 
Treaties does not seem to provide the necessary basis for a hypothetical intervention - 
then it is certainly legitimate to wonder whether residence-based taxation can still be 
considered as appropriate in order to deal with the new fiscal issues related to cross-
border transactions or a major change in the structure of national tax systems should be 
considered within the European Union Internal Market. 
Originally, stronger taxing powers on the part of the source state were 
considered, in the EU context, as an obstacle to integration. However, since the Ruding 
Report, scholars have started to consider the possibility of a return to a purely territorial 
system, or at least of a strengthening of the taxing powers of the source state, as a chance 
to solve at least some of the problems of compatibility between domestic tax provisions 
and EU law, granting equal treatment to taxpayers and mirroring their effective 
situations, regardless of where they reside. 
More in detail, three main proposals have been voiced for the purpose of 
strengthening taxation in the source country in the European Union, i.e. increasing 
withholding taxes at source with residual taxation in the residence Member State, 
exemption with progression and full allocation of taxing powers to the source Member 
State858. 
The first proposal (increasing withholding taxes and maintaining residual taxing 
powers in the Member State of residence) mirrors the position traditionally supported by 
capital importing countries and by the United Nations Model Convention: source states 
would be granted the right to levy higher withholding taxes both on residents and non-
residents and, then, both residents and non-residents would be granted the right to take 
into account the taxes paid by withholding taxes in their respective country of residence. 
It should be noted, however, that, whereas, as highlighted in the first chapter of 
the present research, the existing network of double taxation conventions already 
allocates a certain degree of taxing powers to the source state with respect, for example, 
to real estate located therein or to business income accrued through a permanent 
establishment, on the other hand, current EU secondary law on business taxation (e.g., 
the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and the Interest and Royalty Directive), as it has been 
shown in the third chapter, goes in the exact opposite direction, expressly prohibiting 
taxation at source and the levying of withholding taxes. 
According to the second proposal, taxing powers should be allocated to the 
Member State of source, while the Member State of residence may take into account 																																																								
858 Pistone, P., The impact of Community law on tax treaties. Issues and solutions, cited above, 201. 
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foreign-source income in the overall income earned by the taxpayer only for the purpose 
of ensuring progressivity of taxation through the application of the proper tax rate, thus 
complying with the ability-to-pay principle. The same problems highlighted above with 
regards to the first solution apply, however, also with regards to the second proposal 
and certainly the solution could not be fully implemented until tax treaties are 
correspondingly amended, especially by countries adopting the credit method. 
The third proposal would lead to the implementation of strictly territorial tax 
regimes, with Member States limiting the exercise of their taxing powers only on income 
accrued within their respective territories, regardless of the fact that taxpayers are 
residents or non-residents. 
It could be argued that this solution would indeed provide for the highest 
possible degree of tax neutrality in the context of the European Union and within the 
Internal Market. However, this option encounters all the limits and challenges that have 
been analysed in the previous chapter, first of all the problem of defining the “source” of 
the income, since the source country may not necessarily coincide with the country 
where the income has its origin or is produced859. 
Moreover, another problem with this option would be constituted by the need for 
Member States to comply with the “Schumacker doctrine”: if we suppose that an 
individual derives income from several Member States, each of them could levy its taxes 
on the income accrued within its territory, but then the problem arises as to where 
personal allowances should be granted. The issue, however, would be confined to the 
context of personal taxation, i.e. taxation of individuals with cross-border income, since 
corporations and other juridical persons are, of course, not allowed to deduct personal 
allowances from their income, given that they do not incur any “personal” expenditure: 
with regards to corporations, therefore, the source Member State could theoretically tax 
only the income produced or originated from an activity located in its territory and allow 
the deduction of expenditure effectively connected with the production of such income 
or expenditure suffered in its territory. 
A possible way further could, therefore, be represented by the establishment of a 
system entailing the allocation of taxing powers amongst Member States on the ground 
of “objectively territorial” tax criteria across the Internal Market (source taxation), with 
regard only to corporate income taxation, with the necessary Treaty base to enact such 
legislation being the protection of the purpose of attaining an effective integration of the 																																																								
859 Kemmeren, E.C.C.M., Origin-based double tax conventions and import neutrality, in Rivista di Diritto Tributario 
Internazionale, 2001, 2, 103; Mason, R., Tax discrimination and capital neutrality, cited above, 126; Pistone, P., The 
impact of Community law on tax treaties. Issues and solutions, cited above, 203. 
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Internal Market and of the Member States’ fiscal interest, also from an anti-avoidance 
perspective. 
Such a model would allow overcoming the main problem concerning the 
establishment of a common corporate consolidated tax base and the difficulties of 
reaching an agreement on the topic, i.e. the disagreement on how to allocate the financial 
resources raised through corporate taxation. This hypothetical tax system would also 
establish the basis for a future, perhaps utopic, European Union corporate tax, the 
revenue of which would constitute one of the EU’s own resources, finally providing the 
European Union a feasible leg to stand on when dealing with direct taxation. 
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